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What do community interpreting for the Deaf in western societies, conference 
interpreting for the European Parliament, and language brokering in international 
management have in common? Academic research and professional training have 
historically emphasized the linguistic and cognitive challenges of interpreting, neglecting 
or ignoring the social aspects that structure communication. All forms of interpreting are 
inherently social; they involve relationships among at least three people and two 
languages. The contexts explored here, American Sign Language/English interpreting 
and spoken language interpreting within the European Parliament, show that 
simultaneous interpreting involves attitudes, norms and values about intercultural 
communication that overemphasize information and discount cultural identity.  
The default mode of interpreting shows a desire for speed that suppresses 
differences requiring cultural mediation. It is theorized this imbalance stems from the 
invention and implementation of simultaneous interpreting within a highly charged 
historical moment that was steeped in trauma. Interpreting as a professional practice 
developed in keeping with technological capacities and historical contingencies 
accompanying processes of industrialization and modernity. The resulting expectations 
x 
about what interpreting can and cannot achieve play out in microsocial group dynamics 
(as inequality) and macrosocial policy (legalized injustice).  
Interpreting invites an encounter with difference: foreignization is embedded 
within the experience of participating in simultaneous interpretation because interpreting 
disrupts the accustomed flow of consciousness, forcing participants to adapt (or resist 
adapting) to an alternate rhythm of turn-taking. This results in an unusual awareness of 
time. Discomforts associated with heightened time-consciousness open possibilities for 
deep learning and new kinds of relationships among people, ideas, and problem-setting.  
An analysis of the frustrations of users (interpretees) and practitioners 
(interpreters) suggests the need for other remedies than complete domestication. 
Reframing training for interpreters, and cultivating skillful and strategic participation by 
interpretees, could be leveraged systematically to improve social equality and reduce 
intercultural tensions through a balanced emphasis on sharing understanding and creating 
mutually-relevant meanings. This comparative cultural and critical discourse analysis 
enables an action research/action learning hypothesis aimed at intercultural social 
resilience: social control of diversity can be calibrated and contained through rituals of 
participation in special practices of simultaneously-interpreted communication. 
xi 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTERPRETING 
Why is participating in interpreted communication so challenging? The backdrop 
for the study is the researcher’s career development as an American Sign Language 
(ASL)/English interpreter beginning in the late 1980s. In the first formal phase of 
research, seventy interpreters for the EP were interviewed about their experiences 
interpreting for Members of the EP. In the second phase, fifty-five Members of the 
European Parliament were interviewed about their experiences with interpreting in the 
EP.1 In both these phases, participant-observation was also conducted. Reflections on the 
researcher’s professional career as an interpreter for the Deaf occurred in parallel, 
involving academic literature, participant-observation and action research. Intended as a 
social justice intervention, this dissertation poses simultaneous interpretation as a special 
practice of intercultural communication with ritual elements implicating identities and 
relationships that are as important for society as the linguistic transfer of information. 
1.1 Culture as Communication (Communication as Culture) 
James W. Carey, an American communication theorist, summarizes the two 
complementary aspects of all communication processes: the ritual aspect existing in time, 
and the transmission aspect that operates in space (1992). Further, Carey explains how 
                                                
1  Nearly seventy Members of the European Parliament participated in these 
conversational interviews. A back-up glitch resulted in the loss of half the hard data. 
Field notes from those interviews are consistent with the findings gleaned from the 
corpus of transcribed interviews. 
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culture is generated by the performance of rituals through time, and how control of 
culture is exercised through the transmission of information across space. This research 
about simultaneous interpretation illustrates how rituals of talk about interpreting (in live 
discourses as well as in academic literature) emphasize mainly the transmission aspects 
of the communication process. This one-sided emphasis generates an ideologically-
delimited culture that manifests in particular types of being (roughly, a kind of identity) 
and a privileged manner for doing interpreted communication. In particular, the routine 
behaviors normalized by discourses about interpreted interaction play out in the actual 
relationships among-and-between people of similar and different identities. 
A discursive emphasis on transmission of information reflects predominant values 
about knowledge, technology and economy, and also contributes to how people orient to 
the experience of time and thus of social interaction. At a macrosocial level, the evolution 
of the field of professional simultaneous interpretation offers an example of the social 
construction of technology with specific and particular effects on individual identities as 
well as the capacity of individuals to create and maintain relationships both within and 
across cultural difference. The European Parliament is a site of production for a language 
ideology about simultaneous interpretation: linking microsocial features of the discourse 
about SI in the EP with microsocial features of Deaf discourse about SI brings into view 
the generation of social inequality through “the same linguistic signs or discourse 
practices… indexically linked by speakers to more than one group, at varying degrees of 
abstraction and inclusion, and at multiple sites of use and levels of awareness” 
(Kroskrity, 2000, p. 28). Such micro-macro linking also brings into view the converse, 
the action research hypothesis undergirding this dissertation: social equality. 
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The perspective gleaned from how simultaneous interpretation was originally 
conceived and operationalized can be cynical or optimistic. The current values and rituals 
that associate interpreting only with information transfer reinforce a hierarchical and 
ideological status for functional linguistics by locating meaning ‘in’ language’s linguistic 
structures rather than representing meaning as the outcome of language use in social 
interaction. This entrenched linguistic paradigm in the field of interpreting contributes to 
maintaining a particular social co-construction of a timespace (technically, a chronotope) in 
which, for instance, the dominant culture of “Hearing people” maintains status, privilege, 
and access to resources that Deaf people are still usually denied. In contrast, the related 
field of literary translation studies has escaped the narrow functional linguistic paradigm 
and developed very sophisticated ideas about language as a field of equality where authors 
and characters from minority and oppressed groups can ‘talk back’ to privileged characters 
and majority language audiences (e.g., Gentzler, 2001; Tymoczko, 2007, 2010; Venuti, 
1998). In other words, translation studies has moved beyond linguistics, per se, to 
emphasize the interplay of language use among alert interpretees. This dissertation research 
investigates why interpreting studies has been so stagnant in comparison, especially since 
simultaneous interpretation as a professional practice was formalized a couple of decades 
before literary translation began to establish academic credibility. 
1.2 Consciousness 
The disparate development of interpreting studies and translation studies 
necessarily draws attention to aspects of consciousness. Situating myself as a researcher-
practitioner involves acknowledging that participant-observation dates from my 
introduction to the Deafworld in 1988, even though (at the time) I did not have the 
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academic framing to provide such labels or comprehend that I was already doing some 
version of action research. The ‘80s was a time of tremendous upheaval in the profession 
of ASL/English interpretation and in the overall empowerment of Deaf people. For 
instance, the famous “Deaf President Now” uprising occurred at Gallaudet College in 
1988, an historical peak in a cultural movement against the pathological view that 
disables and medicalizes deafness. Jankowski (2002) describes the rhetorical moment of 
Deaf President Now in Deaf Empowerment: “If the predominately hearing Congress and 
media could understand and endorse the rationale for the protest, then the conflict was 
between the protesters and the paternalistic plantation owners, rather than between Deaf 
and hearing people” (p. 125). 
The Deaf President Now historical moment in post-secondary education 
accompanied a pedagogical movement in elementary and secondary education at 
residential schools for the Deaf that was insisting on equality between the languages of 
(written) English and (visual-gestural) American Sign Language. The Bilingual-
Bicultural (Bi-Bi) pedagogy sprang from Deaf activism at The Learning Center for Deaf 
Children in Massachusetts and the Indiana School for the Deaf and, notably, incorporated 
many non-deaf “hearing” allies (e.g., Mahshie, 1995). The ally concept became 
prominent in sign language simultaneous interpretation as an outcome of heated struggle 
since the 1970s regarding the disenfranchisement of the American Deaf community from 
the (US) national professional organization they had been instrumental in creating in the 
1960s (e.g., Fant, 1990). 
In 1986, Baker-Shenk published an article on “oppressor characteristics” targeted 
at the “hearing heritage” (p. 44) of (most) sign language interpreters, introducing 
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processes of stigmatization (Goffman, 1963) based on assuming the audiological function 
of hearing as the standard way of being human and drawing other parallels with 
stereotyping based on ethnocentric assumptions of superiority. She concludes: 
We need more creative alternatives than the pendulum swing from 
interpreter paternalism to interpreter machine offers. We need a more 
humane model which is sensitive to the socio-political realities of the deaf 
community—which neither exploits those realities (paternalism model) 
nor ignores them (machine model). (Baker-Shenk, 1986, p. 53) 
This is the first mention, in print, of the machine model. It arose from her observation of 
“the theme of ‘interpreter control’ occur[ing] again and again…suggest[ing] the presence 
of paternalism and a pejorative view of deaf people shown in a lack of respect for their 
language and linguistic rights” (p. 52) 
Baker-Shenk’s article followed on the heels of the refusal in 1983 of the national 
organization, the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID), to recognize ASL as an 
official language, a vote which occurred at the tail end of a raging controversy about the 
certification of oral interpreters (who do not use ASL but are trained in making spoken 
English visible on the lips). Fant explains, “Oral interpretation was far less an issue about 
needed services than it was one of who decided what” (1990, p. 37). The power struggle 
in RID continued through the 1990s with an offshoot series of Allies conferences (mainly 
in New England, which is RID’s Region 1, e.g., Kent, 2007) and the competitive 
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development of an interpreter credential by the National Association of the Deaf.2 During 
the late 1990s and 2000s, RID embarked on a strategic course of reconciliation, 
eventually establishing a Deaf Advisory Council, a permanent Board position for a Deaf 
Member-at-Large and hiring a Deaf Executive Director for only the third time in the half-
century since its founding.3  
This brief chronology touches a few highlights of the American Deaf 
community’s journey to voice. Voice is a sociolinguistic concept regarding the 
achievement of a desired uptake of communication (Blommaert, 2005). Voice is, 
therefore, a central concern of everyone involved in simultaneously-interpreted 
communication. One reason to highlight the Deaf voice here is as an example of the 
collective development of discursive consciousness. Giddens (1979) described the 
difference between “practical consciousness, as tacit stocks of knowledge which actors 
draw upon in the constitution of social activity, and … ‘discursive consciousness’, 
involving knowledge which actors are able to express on the level of discourse” (p. 5). 
Giddens explains that the transition of practical consciousness to discursive 
consciousness occurs through reflection, and may involve a period of collective struggle. 
                                                
2  “MY understanding of RID and NAD [National Association of the Deaf] and NIC 
[National Interpreter Certification] is that Marcella M Meyer, founder of GLAD 
(Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness) back in the 80's had an issue with RID 
certifying interpreters and the membership issue, feeling like there was a monopoly 
within RID. She went toe to toe with them and signed a ‘lease’ with NAD to certify 
interpreters. When that ‘lease’ expired, NAD and RID combined and then became 
NIC. You can google Marcella Meyer or GLAD and look at her tribute page, and see 
if you can glean more info. At least that's how I remember it.” Connie Schultz, 
Facebook email, April 20, 2013 [personal correspondence]. 
3   “Shane H. Feldman, M.S., CAE was named the new Executive Director by the RID 
Board of Directors on November 29, 2012” (RID Views, p. 25 Winter 2013). 
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For the Deaf community in the United States, the Registry of Interpreters for the 
Deaf provided a focal point for concentrating the collective struggle from indigenous tacit 
knowledge of ‘how to be Deaf’ to the discursive knowledge necessary for training others 
in the Deaf Way. W.E.B. Dubois’ (1903/1979) concept of double consciousness is also 
implicated by Deaf people telling non-deaf/hearing interpreters about aspects of privilege 
and dominance that hearing interpreters may be unable (or unwilling) to perceive. During 
the 1980s and 1990s, sign language interpreters were constantly challenged to create 
conditions for the performance of Deaf identity and Deaf cultural values during 
interpreted communication. Empowerment was practically a daily topic of conversation 
within the profession (especially at residential schools for the Deaf); however at that time 
the remedies were unclear and even a bit mysterious. 
1.2.1 The Machine Model of Interpreting 
Du Bois described double consciousness as “a peculiar sensation…this sense of 
always looking at one’s self through the eyes of others” (1903/1994, p. 45). The 
experience Du Bois describes of the American Negro’s hyper-awareness of whites 
looking down from a (supposedly) superior stance parallels some descriptions of 
Deafhood. “Hell, it’s our world too!” exclaims Ben Bahan (1989, p. 47), asking 
pointedly, “What right do hearing people have to impose on us the dominance of their 
world?” Bahan’s indignation was aroused (in one instance) by a waitress at a roadside 
diner whose routine assumption that he should learn to verbalize English illustrates the 
legacy of how hearing people exert control, both historically as well as in the present. 
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For instance, hearing people control language and educational policies,4 provide 
or fail to provide communication accessibility,5 and promote medical interventions.6 
Some of these attitudes of privilege and its accompanying exercise of power have been 
conceptualized as audism (attributed to Humphries, 1975;7 Lane, 1992) and oralism 
(Ladd, 2003). It turns out that ASL/English interpreters are very often carriers of these 
oppressive attitudes (e.g., McDermid, 2009), sometimes even despite being aware of their 
adverse effects. 
                                                
4   The 1880 ban on signed languages from the Milan conference initiated a century of 
severe linguistic repression (Gannon, 1981). In the US, the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 opened a crack for the re-emergence of ASL in residential schools for the Deaf. 
Later, the 1990 Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (1990) re-emphasized the 
rights of individuals with legally-defined disabilities. 
5   The Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended 2008; The Robert T. Stafford Act; 
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973; The Fair Housing Act; Architectural 
Barriers Act; Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; Olmstead; and the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 are all supposed to guarantee communication 
accessibility for the culturally Deaf as well as for people who lose their hearing due 
to aging or accident. 
6   Cochlear implants were originally understood by the culturally Deaf as a form of 
medical genocide, in which the will of hearing people to force Deaf people to 
communicate via speech and sound overrides the equally natural capacity to 
communicate via manual gestures and sight. Now, after hundreds of thousands of 
children have already received implants and grown up with varying degrees of 
integration in the “Hearing” world, Deaf communities embrace people with implants 
while still questioning the morality of the medical practice. 
7   “According to an article in Capital D Magazine (vol. 1, issue 1) (now apparently 
defunct), Tom Humphries invented the word "audism" in 1975 to mean an attitude 
that people who hear and speak, or have good English are superior. This applies 
whether the person who hears and speaks is deaf or hearing. I remember that when I 
was in my early teens, I liked a deaf girl who was strong ASL, but someone else 
(hearing) put down the girl because she was strong ASL and weak in English.” 
(Berke, 2011). 
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It was the overwhelming evidence of oralist and audist attitudes that originally 
inspired Baker-Shenk to write about the machine model of interpreting as a problem of 
interpreter ethics (1986, 1992). The Deaf community agreed, adopting the term and 
extending the machine model criticism to the inadequate ASL fluency of many 
interpreters who were supposedly qualified (or at least allowed to work as if they were). 
“Let me clarify my use of the term ‘machine’ model,” writes Baker-Shenk seven years 
after introducing it. “I first used this term at the 1985 RID Convention...since then, it has 
been used in a different way, specifically referring to the linguistic process of word-for-
sign or sign-for-word, machine-like transliteration” (1992, p. 123). Transliteration tends 
to ignore grammatical differences between ASL and English, imposing an English 
structure by attributing a one-to-one correspondence of meaning between English words 
and ASL signs. Sign choices are biased toward a preferred or most common English 
definition regardless of the semantic range of the sign in American Sign Language 
(ASL). The mechanical quality experienced by Deaf people watching transliterations is 
based on a disconnect between the interpreter’s semantic production and the customary 
flow of communication among equally fluent users of ASL (e.g., Kannapell, 1989). 
This amalgamation in Deaf criticism of signed language interpreters as 
performance machines is curious: it reveals a tangle of linguistics and social interaction. 
Unethical interpreter behavior accompanies linguistic misproduction and vice-versa. In 
other words, the focus of critique on interpreters’ linguistic renderings (which need to be 
fluent in order to transfer information), implicates the dimension of social interaction, 
because how one handles the ambiguities of meaning influences the identities and 
relationships of interpretees with each other and with interpreters (following Turner 
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2007).8 What the Deaf naming of the machine model of simultaneous interpretation 
accomplishes is to challenge the norms of social interaction in this special kind of 
intercultural communication, while also questioning the standards for linguistic 
production. 
Baker-Shenk explains her original use of “the term ‘machine’ model ... was to 
describe the interpreter’s role...functioning...ethically...as machines. This machine model 
clearly reveals the basic tendencies of people in power (the dominant class) both to deny 
the reality of their power and to deny that power is part of what’s going on in every 
situation” (emphasis in original, 1992, p. 123-124). One purpose of this dissertation is to 
extend the Deaf voice beyond the professionally-defined interpreter’s role9 to encompass 
the ethical behavior of the other interpretees as well, namely the hearing people involved 
in the intercultural interaction. 
It may seem obvious that the signed language interpreter was never operating 
alone, that they/we are aided and abetted (one could say) by the culture shared with the 
hearing interpretees who are involved in each and every interpreted communication. The 
point is to stretch the scope of social interaction beyond the dyadic unit of an interpreter 
and a single interpretee (whether the source or the receiver) to a group-level view 
                                                
8  The term in traditional usage is interlocutor. I follow Turner’s (2007) lead in 
preferring the label of interpretee because it clarifies the relative positions of all 
participants within the scene of interpreted communication, without obscuring the 
reality that interpreters are also sometimes interlocutors, that is, “someone who takes 
part in a dialogue or conversation” (Oxford Dictionary online, retrieved 26 March 
2014). 
9   The idea of an interpreter functioning in an isolated, discrete or invisible role was 
first challenged in theoretical terms by sign language interpreting researchers 
Cynthia Roy (1989, 1993, 2000) and Melanie Metzger (1995, 1999) and then by 
spoken language interpreting researcher Claudia Angelelli (2001, 2003). 
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encompassing all of the participants in the interpreted interaction. This move is 
theoretically necessary for interpreting studies to move beyond the functional linguistic 
paradigm. Paradigm growth may also signal a further stage in Deaf empowerment by 
supporting the continued evolution of Deafhood-centered agency through the exercise of 
Deaf voice that is enhanced by interpretation rather than diminished by it. 
Developing voice and agency within a field of linguistic equality measured by the 
quality of social interaction during interpreted communication is conjecture.10 For now, 
the practical move is to cultivate discursive consciousness and elicit increased 
responsibility among interpretees for noticing and engaging proactively with the 
dynamics of simultaneous interpretation (SI). There will be mistakes that are not noticed 
(such as also always occur in same language communication). But often there are non-
verbal cues and other behavioral indicators (such as deviations from the patterns of social 
interaction or responses that are unexpected or non-sensible in the context) which could 
be acted upon by an alert and conscientious interpretee. Not following up on cues that are 
noticed replicates and reifies social inequality. 
1.2.2 Interpreting Makes Timespace Apparent 
There is a lot going on during simultaneous interpretation. Immersion into ASL 
and the Deafworld provides a macrosocial backdrop for some of the microsocial 
dynamics that repeatedly play out during interpreted interaction. I was an English 
monolingual when I had my first significant encounter with simultaneous interpretation 
                                                
10   “Fields of equality” are a theoretical construct from economist Amartya Sen (1992). 
The notion of a linguistic field of equality constructed through skillful and strategic 
use of simultaneous interpretation is one of the contributions of this dissertation. 
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in 1989.11 I had joined an activist lesbian group and became intrigued that non-deaf 
“hearing” members of our political initiative seemed incapable of following the simple 
instructions for using an interpreter. Two deaf lesbians involved with the group were 
willing to scribble English with me on notepaper or napkins; sometimes we were lucky 
and allowed to grab a few minutes of a professional interpreter’s downtime. To my 
surprise, I started to recognize vocabulary and was soon able to remember many signs 
well enough to begin to express some of my own ideas. Without hesitation I sought to 
learn American Sign Language well. 
Although I did not set out to become a professional ASL/English interpreter, 
training opportunities and encouragement from friends and colleagues at the Indiana 
School for the Deaf drew me along that career path. Twenty-three years later I find 
myself still fascinated by the challenges of simultaneous interpreting and thrilled by its 
fringe benefits; especially the regular exposure to new places, diverse peoples, novel 
ideas, and alternate ways of being. This background is important because it shapes how I 
approached research into the system of spoken language simultaneous interpretation at 
the European Parliament in 2005 and again in 2008-2009.12 
Being an interpreter provides an odd vantage point because interpreters are, 
according to convention, ‘not supposed to be there.’ In my own professional work and as 
                                                
11  Junior high school classes in Spanish did provide me some exposure but I have, to 
date, not pursued fluency and can barely handle rudimentary conversation. 
12   The 2008-2009 trip was funded by a Fulbright scholarship. The 2005 trip was 
sponsored through the Anthropology Department’s European Field Studies Program 
and jointly funded by the Anthropology Department, Communication Department, 
and the School of Behavioral and Social Science at the University of Massachusetts 
Amherst. 
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a researcher, I have continued to observe interpretees being unable to use the interpreting 
process well. Over the years, I have come to understand that a major reason is this norm 
of pretending the interpreter is invisible. This seems particularly true for hearing people 
communicating with the Deaf: it is quite common to observe hearing people 
misunderstanding and misusing the interpreting process, sometimes even despite their 
supposed or professed familiarity with simultaneous interpretation. 
Specifically, many non-deaf, non-signing people (who are grouped together as 
“Hearing People” from the Deaf point-of-view because of our attachment to sound, 
especially to auditory language) seem not to see visual-gestural language. That is, signing 
does not always appear to register it in cognitive consciousness: all the physically 
expressive motion of ASL does not appear to register in awareness as talking, that is, as 
equivalent to the sound of a voice. Eventually, I also came to realize that Deaf people 
frequently do not achieve the most that they could from this unique practice of 
intercultural communication. These puzzles led to research questions regarding the 
general conditions of interpreted communication: where did they originate? How are they 
evaluated? Who is responsible for identifying and establishing the conditions required for 
effective interpreted communication, and when, how, and by whom are these conditions 
evaluated and adjusted when necessary? 
Fieldwork with spoken language interpreting shows that many of the issues 
flagged by Deaf criticism about simultaneous interpretation also appear in the discourses 
about simultaneous interpretation (SI) at the European Parliament. There may be nuances 
in the criticisms of interpreters and interpreting at the EP that depend somewhat upon the 
language(s) in use, however the findings show that there is not much difference in the 
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criticisms of SI in the EP from larger/more common languages and those of language 
users from smaller/less common languages. It is interesting that such relative balance in 
user-generated criticism of simultaneous interpreters does not hold between spoken 
English and ASL. 
Instead, most hearing users of signed/spoken language simultaneous interpretation 
are remarkably uncritical. In contrast with the (hearing) users of spoken/spoken language 
simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament , if hearing interpretees say 
anything about the sign language interpreting process, they tend to wax poetic in their 
praise of the sign language interpreter and/or carry on about the beauty of the signed 
language.13 Deaf users of simultaneous interpretation, however, regularly critique 
ASL/English interpreters for failing to mediate the social interaction in such a way as to 
enable them to remain culturally Deaf during the communication process. The 
preservation of cultural characteristics and linguistic distinctions during interpreted 
communication is actually discouraged at the European Parliament: such displays are 
often understood as a kind of nationalism. A permanent official (in the Parliament’s civil 
service) wryly commented, “Some people love their languages more than others” (F25). 
Usually, cultural criticism by Deaf persons is aimed at linguistic dysfluency or a 
specific action or inaction by the interpreter in relation to mediating the interpersonal 
dynamics in a culturally satisfactory manner; often both. The point to be emphasized here 
is that, while Deaf people are interested in the information exchange they are also 
                                                
13   E.g., this glorifying attitude was glaringly evident in tweets about ASL/English 
interpreter Lydia Callis interpreting for Mayor Bloomberg in New York City during 
public emergency warnings in advance of Hurricane Sandy (October 2012), and 
subsequently exaggerated by spoofs on Saturday Night Live and Jon Stewart’s Daily 
Show.  
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interested (sometimes even more so) in the cultural flow of the interaction, its structure of 
feeling (Williams, 1977). A disconnect in perceptions between the Deaf viewpoint and 
the perspective of many professional signed language interpreters (who, like me, tend to 
believe that we do a very hard job as well as we can) is what initially focused my 
researcher’s gaze. In the last few years, scholarship has begun to confirm that bringing 
Deafhood (Ladd, 2003) into an interpreted interaction requires the interpreter’s 
investment in ensuring mutual understanding (Adam, Carty, & Stone, 2011; Forestal, 
2011; Kent, 2013; Stone, 2009). The intensity of Deaf concern over the loss or 
suppression of culture during interpreted interaction led me to wonder about parallels and 
contrasts in the European Parliament. 
The challenge does seem to arise for the Deaf when the participants in 
simultaneously-interpreted communication events, referred to in most literature as 
interlocutors but labelled here interpretees, are taught to proceed to communicate with 
each other as if the interpreter is not there. Not only does this fly in the face of the 
obvious, but it builds a strong constraint against acknowledging the interpreter at all. 
Deaf people can be very critical of the interpreter INTERRUPTING14 to ask for 
clarification or repetition and can be angered when they perceive an interpreter TAKING 
OVER (Kent 2004). These management behaviors of the interpreter by Deaf interpretees 
occur in relation with other targets of Deaf criticism, which are contextualized by an 
extensive history of prejudice and discrimination from Hearing People, including outright 
                                                
14   Written English glosses of semantically-rich ASL signs are usually represented by 
ALL CAPS. Capital letters signify the English word that is most accurate to the 
semantic meaning associated with an ASL sign in the given context of use. 
Synonyms are possible. 
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oppression (e.g., Gannon, 1991; Ladd, 2003; Moore & Levitan, 2003; Padden & 
Humphries, 1988; Wilcox, 1989) and (what is perceived by many as) medical genocide.15 
The fact that most interpreters, by definition, come from the majority Hearing culture 
endows the matter of ‘ensuring mutual understanding’ among interpretees with layers of 
complication. The expectation exists that interpreters should understand (automatically, 
naturally); intentionally ignoring the interpreter is a norm that seems to make sense in 
signed language interpretation just as it does in spoken language interpreting at the 
European Parliament. 
1.3 Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation 
As noted above, Deaf people have been criticizing sign language interpreters’ 
disengagement from ensuring mutual understanding soon after the field began to 
professionalize, gaining momentum in the 1970s and 1980s (e.g., Baker-Shenk, 1986, 
1992). It turns out that the model of simultaneous interpretation adopted by sign language 
interpreters is premised upon a system Peter Uiberall says was “crafted by trial and error 
in an attic room of the Nuremberg Palace of Justice” (Gaiba, 1998, p. 13). An interpreter 
who worked extensively during the Nuremberg war crimes tribunal, Uiberall was the first 
interpreter to be cited regarding the implementation of the electronic technology that 
made simultaneous interpretation possible. His comment refers explicitly to the human 
                                                
15   At its most basic, cochlear implants are justified by pathologizing deafness and 
glorifying the sense of sound. Cochlear implants have had the effect of making 
mainstreaming more possible through, in the United States, the idea of “the least 
restrictive environment” (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, amended 
2004). The result has been devastating to residential schools for the Deaf, which 
provided the institutional container for the birth and development of American Deaf 
Culture (e.g. Edwards, 2012). 
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component required to complete the newly patented Filene-Finlay parallel processing 
machinery in order to make it functional for immediate social interaction. 
The historic context of the invention and use of the system of simultaneous 
interpretation is detailed by Francesca Gaiba in The Origins of Simultaneous 
Interpretation: The Nuremberg Trial: 
There is much disagreement about the trial, concerning its raison d’être, 
its fairness, its being or not “victors’ justice.” On one thing, however, 
there is consensus: the trial would not have been possible without the 
simultaneous interpretation into four languages. (p. 27) 
Gaiba’s comprehensive overview of the invention and original use of simultaneous 
interpretation begins to fill an enormous gap in scholarship about the Nuremberg Trial. 
My task is to build from her description and present an argument about the extent, reach, 
and consequences of that historic consensus. It remains widely celebrated that 
simultaneous interpreting enabled the fair and equal participation of French, German, 
Russian and English witnesses, judges, jurors, legal counsel and observers. In addition to 
agreement about the necessity of simultaneous interpreting for the occasion of the 
international war crimes tribunal, there was also unquestioned acceptance that the 
interpreter’s function was just one among many of the invisible components of an 
electronic machine. This dissertation explores and critiques the normative outcomes from 
seventy years of implementing the system of simultaneous interpretation as it was 
invented and validated at Nuremberg. 
Today, the European Union is the world’s largest user of simultaneous 
interpretation services. The system in use at the main EU institutions (the European 
Commission, the European Court of Justice, the European Parliament) is directly 
descended from the model championed at Nuremberg. The Members of the European 
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Parliament (EP), elected from the official Member States of the European Union, are the 
main users of the system of simultaneous interpretation in the EP. I had extensive 
conversations and observations with a diverse, volunteer sample of fifty-five MEPs over 
the course of one legislative year. I also spoke with permanent administrative and 
technical support staff.16 These conversations complemented interviews with official 
European Parliament Interpreters in 2005 (Kent, 2009). 
Using techniques from the ethnography of communication and critical discourse 
analysis, I sought to learn about the use of simultaneous interpretation in the European 
Parliament (SI in the EP) as experienced and understood by its performers and 
participants. I was immediately struck by similarities in patterns of talk. For one thing, 
interpreters and users talking about SI in the EP expressed many similar sentiments about 
interpreting as had been said by interpreters and users of SI during and about Nuremberg. 
I will demonstrate that the continuity of assumptions about the values of simultaneous 
interpretation, including what it is good for, and how to do it, have not changed from the 
origins at the international war crimes tribunal in Nuremberg to its present-day 
implementation in the European Parliament. These unquestioned values and assumptions 
have extended problematically to everyday life, as evidenced by sign language 
community interpreting for the Deaf. I also draw upon Mikhael M. Bakhtin’s (1981) 
theoretical notion of chronotopes, the construction of a sense of time through the use of 
language, as a means of thinking in practical terms about what geographer David Harvey 
calls the postmodern condition, involving the collapse of time and space (1990). Modern 
                                                
16  Some ninety people participated in these conversational interviews. A back-up glitch 
resulted in the loss of half the hard data. Field notes from those interviews are 
consistent with the findings gleaned from the corpus of transcribed interviews. 
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communication technology allows people in developed parts of the world to 
communicate with others as if there is no geographical distance and without the 
intervention of long periods of time waiting for responses.  Sometimes this 
communication access extends even into undeveloped and underdeveloped regions, too. 
The historical development of the intercultural communication practice of 
simultaneous interpretation illustrates how language, language use, and social interaction 
create and co-create the human experience of time here-and-now: in post-structural post-
modernity. Simultaneous interpretation is special in part because, as a unique mode of 
intercultural communication, the active work of interpretation among people using 
different languages brings relationships and the shared creation of meaning into view. 
Identities and social status are explicitly present whenever simultaneous interpretation is 
used. Skilled practitioners and users of SI in the EP use the interpretation process to alter 
or maintain power dynamics. Commonalities of complaint about interpreting by two 
different sets of users, the culturally Deaf and Members of the EP, direct attention to 
critical problems with positioning the interpreter as a non-participant in interpreted 
communication. 
1.4 Points of Reference: Thinking in Time 
The research method and logic of analysis is influenced by Neustadt and May’s 
(1986) argument to politicians and policymakers to make effective use of history by 
thinking in terms of timestreams. 
In thinking of time as a stream, the preeminent challenge is to judge 
whether change has happened, or is happening, or will. The imperative 
need is to get that reasonably right. This mode of thought contributes to 
the chances of doing so by continuously posing comparisons of present 
with past and future. (p. 256-257) 
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Tracing timestreams for making strategic decisions guides the organization of this 
dissertation. Roughly, I take the situation as represented by discourses about interpreting 
in the European Parliament during its Sixth Term (2004-2009) and trace chains-of-
utterances (Bakhtin, 1981) through discourses about interpreting in the American Deaf 
community to the modern invention of simultaneous interpreting at Nuremberg (1945-
1946).  
The patterns of talk about spoken language simultaneous interpretation that drew 
my attention at the European Parliament were primed by exposure to patterns of talk that 
had already captured my attention in signed language interpreting. The nascent intuition I 
had was that interpreting makes time visible, and, by doing so, imbues communication 
with an unusual sense of palpability, raising questions of control and meaning that are 
usually passed over in everyday life. 
1.4.1 Engineering 
Interpreting has not previously been considered as an example of the social 
construction of technology (Bijker, Hughes & Pinch; 1987; Bjiker, 1990). Simultaneous 
interpretation emerged with the advent of electronic technology patented by Edward 
Filene and a partner, Albert Finlay, and subsequently developed by IBM.17 An action 
learning18 hypothesis of this dissertation is that discourses of translation, that is, any talk 
and all texts in which the word “translation” is used when referring to simultaneous 
                                                
17   Today, IBM promotes their involvement as “Pioneering Machine-Aided 
Translation.” IBM 100 Icons of Progress. Retrieved 5 April 2013. http://www-
03.ibm.com/ibm/history/ibm100/us/en/icons/translation/. 
18   Action learning is described in more detail in chapter two. 
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interpretation, represents the pluralingual communication processes of interpreted 
interaction as a kind of mathematics or otherwise amenable to being coded according to a 
rigid scheme. The generic idea of translation is to move something in space without 
changing its properties. 
The notion of translation depends upon the assumption that meaning is an 
attribute of language that can be moved from one place in space (the source language or 
person or both combined) to another place (the target language or person or both 
combined) without alteration. Translation, in this commonsense view, requires a binary 
source-target dichotomy that necessarily eliminates other factors that bear, significantly, 
upon the co-construction of shared meaning in real time. These basic assumptions of 
translation underlie the functional linguistic paradigm that remains predominant in 
interpreting studies. Evidence of this dominance in the professional practices of 
interpreting occurs through frequent reference and built-in bias in favour of locating 
meaning in the source producer/production, disregarding input filters of the receiving 
target (whether conceptualized as the target language or as an embodied human being) 
and considering only the immediate, local setting as the contextualizing environment. 
The presumed fixity of meaning ‘in’ spontaneous source language utterances has not 
been adequately deconstructed in regard to performances of simultaneous interpretation. 
Nor has this bias been reframed as relevant to the participation of interpretees during 
simultaneous interpretation. 
When live, spontaneous interpretation among co-present human beings 
communicating in real (synchronous) time is referred to as translation, the necessity of 
interpretation is hidden because the intercultural aspects of the communicative interaction 
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are de-selected. This is an example of what Burke (1966) calls a terministic screen,19 
because the commonsense meaning of “translation” leans in favour of engineering 
equations, rather than recognizing, say, cultural relativity. (For instance, an algebraic 
“transposition, i.e., the shifting of the terms of an equation from one side to the other, as 
for instance, the passing from 3X + 7 = 25 to 3X = 25-7” (Dantzig, 1930/2005, p. 80) is 
assumed as akin to a notion of moving “a meaning” (usually expressed as “the meaning”) 
from the “side” of one language to the “side” of another language. This analogy of a 
simple equation may be the source for Hatim’s (2001) observation of “a tendency to use 
linguistics as a scapegoat and as something to blame for the ills that have befallen us” (p. 
xiv). Hatim is referring specifically to “the discourse” of the research agenda within 
translation studies (p. xiv), a discourse that typically culminates in the conclusion that 
“linguistics has all but failed us” (p. xv). This dissertation makes a likewise gesture: that 
linguistics has ‘all but failed’ interpretation, too, while agreeing with Hatim, who 
concedes linguistics can retain usefulness as long as it is comprehended as one approach 
of many within a range of ways for interpretees and interpreters to collaborate in ensuring 
mutual understanding. 
                                                
19   In Language as Symbolic Action, Kenneth Burke describes the “terministic screen” 
in which diction (the choice of this or that word or phrasing) necessarily ‘selects’ an 
emphasis or framing while ‘de-selecting’ other emphases and framings. “We must 
use terministic screens, since we cannot say anything without the use of terms; 
whatever terms we use, they necessarily constitute a corresponding kind of screen; 
and any such screen necessarily directs the attention to one field rather than another” 
(1966, p. 50). He continues: “Within that field, there can be different screens, each 
with its ways of directing the attention and shaping the range of observations implicit 
in the given terminology. All terminologies must implicitly or explicitly embody 
choices between the principle of continuity and the principle of discontinuity” (p. 
50). At stake during SI is whose continuity will be supported or dropped, and which 
discontinuities will be tended to or ignored.  
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The reality of influences on the cultural aspects of simultaneous interpretation is 
more geometrical (one could say spherical) than linear algebra or the traditional versions 
of functional linguistics allow. The research collected in this dissertation shows how the 
accretion of discourse about interpreting has severely constrained the professional 
performances of interpreters and interpretees, effecting the cultural practices of 
participating in SI. This embedded engineering imagery may have inhibited the field of 
Interpreting Studies from evolving in the more sophisticated ways demonstrated by theory 
in literary translation, and kept interpretees, particularly those from linguistic minority 
cultures, from reliably attaining achievements of voice. Perhaps the reticence of 
interpreting scholars, trainers, and practitioners to engage the unforeseen consequences of 
relying exclusively on linguistic models has also delayed translators from making more 
progress on Bassnett and Levefre’s (1998) call for translators to study cultural interaction. 
1.4.1.1 Prediction, Risk and Engineering Safety 
Engineers require prediction in order to design appropriate controls that reduce 
risk and uncertainty in order to maintain engineering safety (Petroski, 1992). Historically 
and today, language is used as a tool for control over others. Historically, for instance, in 
instituting nationalism (Anderson, 1992) and recently in the English Only movement in 
the United States (e.g., Olson, 1991). Language is also used to enact resistance and 
demonstrate opposition to being controlled (e.g., Sibii, 2003, 2006), and to promote or 
argue against any social movement. Postcolonial scholarship in particular cases (i.e., 
bilingualism in North Africa, Mehrez, 1992) shows how to “transform plurilingualism 
and translation into radical elements that defy compartmentalization and pre-existing 
hierarchies by constantly moving and migrating” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 195). In other 
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words, translation (which, from the point-of-view of their field, includes/subsumes 
interpretation), is a means for generating conditions that enhance the possibility of 
exercising voice (Blommaert, 2005), and may be a medium for creating linguistic fields 
of equality in the capabilities approach called for by Amartya Sen (1992). 
This dissertation’s findings illustrate how opportunities for voice-enhancing 
creativity by interpreters during simultaneous interpretation are resisted by discourses 
that equate interpreter agency with the loss of control by interpretees. These engineering-
like discourses are notable for their insistence on privileging the source language, yet also 
for their adverse effects on the interpretees, whose assumptions about risk and 
uncertainty are measured by how effectively the interpreter remains invisible. In other 
words, making it seem as if no differences are present or operative during intercultural 
interaction has been made more important than acknowledging differences and, therefore, 
addressing them when needed. 
1.4.2 Control 
Control is fundamental to communication processes and social organizing: 
culturally as well as institutionally. Simultaneous interpreting raises concerns about 
control depending on the position, perspective, and disposition of social actors. 
Understanding what can and cannot be controlled, and how to institute appropriate 
controls in order to provide boundaries and limits for interpreting as an institutional 
practice, are topics largely avoided by professional practitioners and researchers, with the 
notable exception of Dean and Pollard’s (2001) Demand-Control Schema. Demand-
Control Schema (DC-S) is a ‘work analysis’ framework for signed language interpreters 
that details a set of ‘controls’ that interpreters can use within the range of ‘demands’ 
25 
presented by interpretees. In this prescriptive model, the controls are ‘professional 
practice skills’ to be exercised by the individual interpreter. DC-S has the capacity to deal 
with larger system issues if interpretees and interpreters use it together to evaluate work 
effectiveness and ethics. In this regard, DC-S provides a way to contextualize 
institutional elements and intercultural factors organizing interpreted interactions. 
Unlike most models of interpreting which focus exclusively on linguistic tasks (as 
critiqued by Hatim, 2001; Gentzler, 2001; for an early example of a model for sign 
language interpreters, see Ingram, 1974),20 the Demand-Control Schema acknowledges 
the managerial functions of the interpreter’s task, outlining four demand categories 
(environmental, interpersonal, paralinguistic, and intrapersonal) and three sets of control 
opportunities (pre-, during, and post-assignment) (Dean & Pollard, 2013, pp. 5, 19). The 
premises of DC-S originate in research and guidelines for occupational safety (Karasek, 
1979). Concern with interpreter safety is a recent development;21 it is the opposite of the 
focus of concern at Nuremberg, which was interpreter failure. Within the field of 
engineering, risks of engineering failure are assessed by measures of engineering safety 
(Petroski, 1992). The principle of engineering safety does not appear to have been 
extended to the human beings who completed the circuitry of the IBM system which 
produced the collapsed-time possibility of (so-called) “simultaneous” interpreting. 
                                                
20  A collection of interpreting models for sign language interpreters is being collected 
in a forthcoming volume, The Sign Language Interpreting Studies Reader, Roy & 
Napier (Eds.). 
21   Interpreter safety may have been a fleeting concern but Dean & Pollard’s DC-S 
model quickly moved its focus onto the aspect of Karasak’s model involving work 
effectiveness and work ethics (Robyn Dean, Facebook chat, 14 December 2012 
[personal correspondence]). However the frequency of repetitive motion and overuse 
injuries in the field is significant (e.g., Peper & Gibney, 1999).  
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Balancing safety and the risks of failure is a management challenge. The 
Directorate of Interpretation at the European Parliament is responsible for this function in 
their administration of the language regime in the EP, which is commonly labelled  
controlled multilingualism (Podesta, 2001a; 2001b; 2001c). The Registry of Interpreters 
for the Deaf (RID) is responsible for this function in their administration of the 
credentialing system for American Sign Language/English interpreters in the United 
States; a responsibility now officially shared with the National Association of the Deaf 
(NAD).22 There are substantive differences between these two types of organizations: the 
EP is a direct employer of interpreters, while the RID is a professional association of 
interpreters who are employed by unaffiliated private and governmental entities. RID is 
challenged to work in partnership with Deaf advocacy organizations,23 the EP is 
                                                
22  The National Interpreter Certification (NIC) was launched December 1, 2011. The 
first performance report, jointly released by NAD and RID on February 20, 2014, is 
available at http://www.nad.org/news/2014/2/nad-and-rid-release-performance-
report (retrieved 27 March 2014). The report includes both a summary and the full 
technical report of the certification test’s validity and reliability as well as candidate 
performance results during the first testing cycle. The results of a 2002 Role 
Delineation Study and a 2011 Job/Task Analysis Survey are included as supporting 
documentation. 
23   Along with the NAD, RID is a member of the Deaf and Hard of Hearing Consumer 
Advocacy Network (DHHCAN), which includes the American Association of the 
Deaf-Blind (AADB), American Deafness and Rehabilitation Association (ADARA), 
American Society for Deaf Children (ASDC), Association of Late-Deafened Adults 
(ALDA), Cerebral Palsy and Deaf Organization, Communication Service for the 
Deaf (CSD), Conference of Educational Administrators of Schools and Programs for 
the Deaf (CEASD), Deaf Seniors of America (DSA), Deaf and Hard of Hearing in 
Government, Gallaudet University (GU), Gallaudet University Alumni Association 
(GUAA), Hearing Loss Association of America, National Black Deaf Advocates 
(NBDA), National Catholic Office of the Deaf (NCOD),Telecommunications for the 
Deaf and Hard of Hearing (TDI), and the USA Deaf Sports Federation (USADSF). 
RID’s Government Affairs Program (GAP) also works with the Deaf and Hard of 
Hearing Alliance and the National Interpreter Association Coalition. (Source:  
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structured to operate in tandem with other formal governing institutions of the European 
Union. Hence, control is exercised by each organization with different sets of formal and 
informal means. What the organizational structures have in common, however, is the 
need to establish and maintain control of a communication process involving people from 
different cultural backgrounds using different languages. 
One of the moves in this dissertation is to treat the discourse of the research 
agenda in interpreting studies as parallel with the commonsense discourse of users of SI 
(the interpretees) and also with the common sense discourse of most trained practitioners 
(the interpreters). Few members of these groups, it should be noted (including 
interpreting researchers), are educated (as yet) about social theory in general, let alone 
communication theory, cultural studies or postcolonial theory. The concept of “parallel 
process” comes from a psychoanalytic tradition of group relations theory.24 Parallel 
processes25 occur in “microcosm groups” composed by members of salient identity 
groups and organization groups (Alderfer & Smith, 1982, p. 40). The notion as applied 
here is that the salient members of discourses about interpreting, namely interpreters and 
interpretees, include persons with a range of ascribed and achieved identity 
characteristics. Achieved is used in the sociological sense of having acquired through life 
                                                
24  Wilfred Bion worked on group relations in the United Kingdom after World War II, 
at the same time as Kurt Lewin was developing his approach to group dynamics in 
the United States. Bion’s contributions to psychoanalytic theory are summarized by 
Bleandonu (1994). 
25  In terms of the parallel process concept mentioned previously, what Deaf people are 
telling community-style interpreters may be a similar message (with similar 
problematic dynamics) that community interpreters are trying to tell conference 
interpreters. Likewise, the Deaf discursive consciousness may have significance for 
users of interpreting services who are experiencing conditions of linguistic inequality 
despite the accommodation of SI. 
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circumstances (things that befall a person by accident or chance, such as surviving an 
accident or winning a lottery) or effort (undergoing training or being a parent). Achieved 
identities (sometimes called status) are complemented with ascribed identity 
characteristics, which in this case would include one’s native language as well as features 
of gender, ethnicity, nationality and so forth). This essential heterogeneity is intrinsic to 
these discourses; members are essentially diverse from each other. They can be 
constituted as a group only by virtue of a shared cultural activity and practice; their 
participation, interest and concerns with simultaneous interpretation. 
In addition to the achieved characteristics salient to simultaneous interpretation 
(e.g., researcher, interpreter, interpretee, trainer/teacher) there are also administrators, 
professional association officers, referral agency personnel, even authors of fiction and 
directors of film who represent interpreters and interpreting in particular ways.26 There 
are also discourses that can be described on the basis of ascribed characteristics, such as 
the Deaf who use signed languages, the influx of Eastern Europeans into the European 
Parliament in 2005, majority language users such as English monolinguals, as well as 
discourses based on nationality, gender and others. In general, these more particular 
discourse strands are not teased out in detail, although features that suggest them are 
present. This action research did not note particular relevance of traditional demographic 
(ascribed) characteristics, and does not draw particular conclusions on the basis of 
                                                
26  Diriker (2004) names five meta-discourses about simultaneous interpretation: 
general reference books, codes of ethics, professional organizations, academia, and 
the media. The discourse analysed here does not fall neatly into one of these 
categories: it is a discourse of practitioners and users/participants including elements 
which could originate in one or more of Diriker’s meta-discourse categories. 
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national boundaries per se. One rough division is noted between the so-called “old” and 
“new” languages, as defined by the boundary of “the big bang enlargement” in 2004.27 
1.4.2.1 Establishing a Reference Group 
The popularity of Dean & Pollard’s (2001, 2013) Demand-Control Schema 
suggests that control is very much on interpreters’ minds. However there is no research 
on how interpreters themselves conceive of control, per se; the closest is a literature on 
interpreter norms (eg., Chesterman, 2006; Diriker, 2004; Duflou, 2012; Gile, 1999; 
Harris, 1990; Harris & Sherwood, 1978; Shlesinger, 1989b; Toury, 1995, 1999).28 
Community and conference interpreters are the closest reference groups for each other, 
despite all efforts to compartmentalize them.29 (Merton, 1957; Merton & Kitt, 1957) 
Likewise, there is no research on the European Parliament’s administrators’ conceptions 
                                                
27  As described by European Parliament Official Martin Wooding for a story in the 
Shanghai Star, 30 October 2003. 
28  An example of a norm that could be understood as a control is provided by Diriker 
(2004, p. 164). Diriker’s example from an academic conference is compared with 
similar examples in the European Parliament by Duflou (2012): “… the interpreter 
learnt to solve the problem of not being able to refer to herself as “I” when 'on mic' 
(i.e. when the microphone is switched on and the interpreter is heard by the users) by 
speaking about herself as 'the interpreter' in order to be able to correct a mistake 
made earlier” (p. 152). 
29  Reference group theory offers ways to understand processes of norming: “Informal 
preparation for the roles to be performed in connection with future statuses tends to 
have a distinct character…the individual responds to the cues in behavioral 
situations, more or less unwittingly draws implications from these for future role 
behavior, and thus becomes oriented toward a status he [or she, or ze] does not yet 
occupy. Typically, he does not expressly codify the values and role-requirements he 
is learning” (Merton, 1957, p. 385). 
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of controlling interpretation processes,30 let alone the relationship between administrative 
(i.e., managerial) control of interpreters and the control(s) available to interpreters during 
work performances. As a thought experiment, extracting the practice and discourse of 
control regarding simultaneous interpreting from these disparate institutional settings 
allows comparison by analogy with control in another kind of institution. 
Organization scholars (especially within schools for business management) have 
generated a literature on control in organizations, especially in regard to for-profit 
businesses where the effectiveness of control is measured by time and cost. Drawing on 
Follett’s (1948) definition of control, Rayat (2011) explains how international business 
managers construe control as “an exercise of power toward specific ends” (p. 4). First, 
Rayat notes: “In organization studies, researchers have found that organizational 
members in different countries tend to attribute different meanings to the same 
organizational phenomena” (p. 9). Second, researchers “have found differences in both 
practices of control and preferences for controls in different countries” at the 
organizational, individual, inter-organization and intra-organizational levels (p. 8). 
Therefore, “Control cannot be explained just in terms of systems, structures, or policies. 
In order to understand how control works in organizations, we must attend to what 
managers, as agents of control in organization, think of their task of control, and their 
beliefs and values relating to control” (p. 14). 
                                                
30  There is a series of articles justifying the design and implementation of “controlled 
multilingualism” as the language regime for interpretation in the Parliament (Podesta 
2001a, 2001b, 2001c). These are descriptive and rhetorical pieces offering 
justifications for, not an analysis of, the conceptions of control upon which the 
system is based. The argumentation is predominantly financial. 
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According to Rayat (2011), organizational researchers “agree that control is an 
important function of management, yet they do not expound how the notion of control 
fits into managers’ wider expectations, experiences and understanding of management” 
(p. 2). This knowledge gap seems quite analogous to the absence of understanding of 
control by interpreters and interpretees during interpreted interaction. When control in 
organizations has been studied, the academic gaze has tended to emphasize the 
perspective of those being controlled (i.e., employees), disregarding, for instance, “the 
value attributions made by managers” (p. 2). Roughly, one can perceive a sense of ‘being 
controlled’ in the discourse of Deaf consumers as they critique signed language 
interpreters as well as by the Members of the EP who are consumers of its controlled 
multilingualism interpreting regime. These broad strokes of commonality justify 
considering managers of international business as a reference group for simultaneous 
interpreters (and vice-versa, but that argument is not made here). 
1.4.2.2 Disclaimer: Comparison Groups 
Conference and community interpreters are presented as reference groups for each 
other explicitly for the purposes of comparison and contrast with people talking about 
(and performing) interpreting from other (non-professional) positions. Literature on 
simultaneous interpretation typically segregates two types of SI, conference interpreting 
and community interpreting, as if they have little in common. Signed Language 
interpreting with the Deaf community is presented here as an exemplar of so-called 
community interpreting, and interpreting with Members of the European Parliament is 
presented here as the exemplar of so-called conference interpreting. Both are exemplars 
of simultaneous interpreting (not consecutive interpreting, in which interpreters take 
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notes and render interpretations in an explicit, non-overlapping, turn-taking sequence 
with original speakers and intended receivers). The division between conference and 
community interpreting has heretofore served as a convenient way to build discrete 
bodies of knowledge within a high degree of shared boundary conditions (the institutional 
setting, social class statuses of participants, legal requirements, etc.). However the 
activities of interpreting, its performances, practices, and modes of cultural production, 
are represented within this dissertation as more alike than dissimilar, despite the 
traditionally-understood distinction. In this view, the boundary conditions used to 
distinguish between community and conference styles of interpreting are superficial 
characteristics that are exceeded by more fundamental shared characteristics and 
outcomes of interpreted social interaction.31  
1.4.3 Conference Interpreting : Community Interpreting 
The institutional setting of interpreted events has been used to carve up the field 
of SI practitioners in terms of resources and prestige. “Conference” interpreting is usually 
posed in contrast with “community” interpreting, and conference interpreters have 
generally received more training and more prestige than their counterparts working in the 
everyday world of social services, public education, medical appointments, court cases, 
                                                
31  This assertion of essential similarity is the opposite of the conclusion drawn by 
Angelelli (2000) when she applied Hymes’ taxonomy of speaking to compare a 
community interpreting event with a conference interpreting event. “The analysis 
suggests that there are more differences than similarities between the two settings” 
(p. 580). She and I do agree that it is important to intervene in the “blind transfer” (p. 
580) of conference interpreting standards to community interpreting, which is what 
makes her emphasis on differences sensible. 
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employment situations and emergency response.32 The terms of distinction are instructive 
and a target for critique. 
The conference interpreting style in the European Parliament is descended 
directly from the Nuremberg precedent. It generally adheres to a translation ideal that 
“historically…has valorized translations that measure up to some ideal by smoothing 
over contradictions, and has ignored or dismissed those which do not seem to cohere. 
Such a practice, in turn, affects that which gets produced” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 200). 
Community-style interpreting has been indirectly influenced by the Nuremberg precedent 
through the process of professionalization. To some extent, community SI has escaped 
the full force of conference-style systemic constraints. Although struggle has been 
necessary to mold this relative looseness33 in community SI to support a broader range of 
voices during SI, this struggle (epitomized here by the American Deaf community’s 
struggle from practical to discursive consciousness and then to voice) brings the double 
constitution of language use and the social co-construction of reality into view. 
Gentzler (2001) explains it like this: 
In the act of reproducing the textual relations (of the original text), a 
double constitution becomes quite lucid: the language restraints imposed 
by the receiving culture are enormous, yet the possibility of creating new 
relations in the present are also vivid - not just the old relations 
transported to a new time and place, but also a myriad of signifying 
                                                
32   The role of research in establishing the profession of community interpreting as a 
distinct domain within Interpreting Studies is the subject of the 4th volume from the 
triennial Critical Link international community interpreting conferences (Wadensjö, 
Dimitrova & Nilsson, 2007), in particular the chapter, “Critical linking up: kinships 
and convergence in interpreting studies” (Pöchhacker, 2007). 
33  Technically, “interpretive flexibility” (Kline & Pinch, 1996). This concept, 
associated with the social construction of technology, will be described in chapter 
six. 
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practices that both reinforce and alter present signifying practices. In fact, 
the process of translation and the process of construction of our own 
identities may be analogous: as translations are subject to at least the two 
semiotic systems (source and target languages) but are nevertheless 
capable of changing those very structures, so we, as humans, are the 
subjects of a variety of discourses but are also free to change those 
relations that condition our existence. (p. 200) 
Gentzler’s formulation encapsulates the cultural turn in translation studies, which is just 
beginning to reach among scholars and practitioners in Interpreting Studies. This 
dissertation speculates this delay may be due to the way interpreting was socially-
constructed under the sway of an engineering discourse emphasizing control. 
1.4.4 Interpreting is Not Translation: i.e., Temporal Matters (synchronicity vs 
asynchronicity) 
One way to understand the essential difference between interpretation and 
translation as cultural productions is to apply Marshall McLuhan’s (1964) insight about 
communication technologies: the medium is the message.34 The standard distinction, that 
translation is written and interpretation live is both too simplistic and exactly the point. 
The frozen quality of words written in a permanent form35 puts readers in a specific zone 
of asynchronous relationship with the other participants in the communication process. 
The author(s), translator(s) and readers are usually not together in either time or space: 
they are typically scattered about in more-or-less random places which may or may not 
                                                
34  The English word “message” is problematized in the last chapter and Appendix F. 
35  “Seleskovitch considers the form of the source text as constituting the key 
difference; written translation is static, allowing analysis and reflection before the 
text is reformulated in another language, whereas the text to be interpreted will only 
be heard once, and what one will remember of the text is its content and meaning, 
not its form (1978: 2)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 55). 
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even be in the same geographic location where the author wrote or the translator 
translated. Readers and translators are engaged with the text after the time the author has 
written, and at different times than when other members of the audience are reading it.36 
Characteristically and classically, translation involves relatively few overlaps in 
timespace. 
In contrast with the essentially solitary activity of writing or reading a written 
text, the experience of participating as an interpretee in simultaneous interpretation puts 
one in the midst of a spontaneous and dynamic communication process.37 Typically, 
interpretees are in the same physical space, or conditions are created so as to seem 
‘together’ through the use of sophisticated technology (such as video relay services which 
enable signed and spoken language interpretation between Deaf people and non-signing 
hearing persons). Simultaneous interpretation has time boundaries in the present: there is 
a starting and endpoint, you are ‘here’ and ‘now’ (present in body, with others) and may 
(or may not) achieve voice depending on the attention and focus of your mind, rhetorical 
skills, and familiarity with the norms of social interaction in the specific setting. 
                                                
36   This insight about the mediation of time goes back (in Western thought) to Aristotle, 
via Plato. “Otto Kade (1968: 35) and Reiss & Vermeer (1984) regard the opportunity 
to make corrections as the key feature distinguishing written translation from 
interpreting” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 56).  
37  See Streeck and Jordan (2009), “Communication as a dynamical self-sustaining 
system” addresses “the importance of time scales and nested contexts.” Also, “Gile 
[1993: 74-75] suggests…there are qualitative features that differentiate written 
translation from interpreting. Since interpreting is intended for the immediate use of 
the recipients, Gile assumes that they do not expect the same kind of terminological 
accuracy as they would in a written translation, nor can they expect the same kind of 
polished style as in a written translation (cf Toury [who argues there are different 
systems and strategies in addition to different modes of written and oral translation] 
(1995:235)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 56, 55) 
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(Recordings that one can watch or listen to afterwards shift the audience member along 
the relational timespace continuum in the direction of frozen text because the immediate 
interactive capacity is eliminated.)38 Crucially, and in sharp distinction from translation, 
interpretation occurs within a relationally-shared timespace. 
We will not forget that at the linguistic level translators of written texts do 
sometimes interpret, and simultaneous interpreters sometimes achieve felicitous 
translations.39 This may be why Vermeer can “[state] that everything he says about 
translation refers to interpreting, and vice versa (1989: 83-83)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 55). 
Here is a brief illustration from a prose-poem by Ama Ata Aidoo: 
‘Zo vas is zis name, “Sissie”‘? 
‘Oh, it is just a beautiful way they call “Sister” by people who like you 
very much. Especially if there are not many girl babies in the family . . . 
one of the very few ways where an original concept from our old ways has 
been given expression successfully in English.’ 
‘Yes?’ 
‘Yes . . . Though even here, they had to beat in the English word, 
somehow.’ (Aidoo, 1977, p. 28) 
                                                
38  The fact of recordability could, perhaps, serve as motivation for interpretees (and 
interpreters) to more frequently problematize interpretations in the moment. 
Although such interventions could be framed as disruptions and even edited out of 
final productions, non-action in moments of confusion or concern about clarity, 
meaning, or understanding generates the appearance of consent: a false confirmation 
of shared comprehension. 
39  Felicity is a condition of speech acts conceptualized by J.L. Austin in How to Do 
Things With Words (1962). Felicity conditions are those that establish the foundation 
for achieving voice with any particular speech act.  
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The closeness of match between languages regarding a particular expression is what 
distinguishes, linguistically, a “literal” translation from a “free” interpretation. The closer 
a lexical match, the more translational; the further the reach to establish a connection of 
some sort, the more interpretive. Nuances of distinction and similarity at these semantic, 
syntactic, or grammatical levels will generally not be included in this study, which is 
focused on the interactional level, e.g., the collective and group-level dynamics of 
engaging the interpreter as a remedy for many kinds of repairs.40 
Using the terms ‘interpret’ and ‘translate’ as if they are synonyms has effects that 
will be demonstrated. Analogies from math and engineering serve as metaphors to 
illustrate the significance of distinctions between translation and interpretation, all in 
service of demonstrating that the differences are worth serious consideration. In contrast 
with the linguistic emphasis on control via immediate matching of meaning in the space 
of interaction, we will focus on the unfolding of meaning in time at the level of 
relationships as they are co-constructed among interpretees and interpreters through 
mutual engagement in intercultural communication using simultaneous interpretation. 
The theoretical goal is to establish, on the basis of discursive and behavioral 
evidence, the necessity of valuing and making creative social uses of the timespace 
components of simultaneous interpretation. Two aspects of temporality have been 
identified as figural in distinguishing between interpretation and translation. One aspect is 
the synchrony of participants in interpretation versus the asynchrony of participants in 
translation. The other aspect is the fixing of meaning in a linguistic now instead of in a 
                                                
40  Technically, transactional level not interaction level. This term is not defined and 
contrasted with interaction until chapter four. See footnote 201.  
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continuously-unfolding timestream. The boundary of temporal co-presence and the 
consciousness of participants in regards to where they locate control (exclusively in the 
language or equally or moreso in the interaction) outlines the zone of this research. The 
practical goal of comprehending these temporal features is to produce an argument 
illustrating that the intercultural communication practice of simultaneous interpretation 
can be revitalized to serve, institutionally, as a societal-level design intervention for 
promoting cultural and linguistic diversity in order to counteract time-space compression 
(Harvey 1990), particularly as it has been generated, via language and language use, by 
the age of mechanical reproduction (Benjamin 1916/1969 English translation). 
1.5 Why the European Parliament? 
The European Parliament is the largest and most representative governing 
institution of the European Union and, in combination with the European Commission, 
crafts law for the entire EU. The European Parliament (EP) is one of three major 
institutions of the European Union,41 and is loosely akin to the United States’ Congress, 
especially in its role of being the political body that is supposed to be representative of 
                                                
41  “The EU is the result of decades of integration, from the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC) to the establishment of the EEC in 1957 (the Treaty of Rome), 
to the Single European Act in 1987, to the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union 
of 1993, and to the latest revised Treaty. The fact that the EU was developed from 
three communities (the ECSC, the European Atomic Energy Community – Euratom 
– and the European Economic Community – EEC) is still reflected in the internal 
functioning of the EU. The three communities have been governed by five 
institutions: the European Parliament (since 1958), the Council and the Commission 
(single bodies since 1967), the Court of Justice and the Court of Auditors. They are 
supported by five bodies: the Economic and Social Committee, the Committee of the 
Regions, the European Ombudsman, the European Investment bank, and, as the most 
recent addition, the European Central Bank” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p.  75). 
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and for the citizens of Europe. While the United Nations also employ a significant 
number of interpreters, the regular structure for simultaneous interpretation (called a 
language regime)42 in the UN encompasses only six official languages.43 In other words, 
despite the visual appearance of all those delegates from all the countries of the world 
wearing headphones with which one might assume they are listening to their country’s 
language, UN Delegates are limited to choosing among Arabic, Chinese, English, French, 
Russian, or Spanish. In the EP, the number of language choices available at the turn of a 
dial often exceeds twenty,44 and can include languages natively spoken by relatively 
small national populations (e.g., Catalan and other regional languages granted status 
                                                
42   Kroskrity (2000) describes “regimes of language”: “ ‘Regimes’ invokes the display 
of political domination in all its many forms, including what Gramsci (1971) 
distinguished as the coercive force of the state and the hegemonic influence of the 
state-endorsed culture of civil society” (p. 3). Juxtaposing this with the “many senses 
of ‘language’ that, by contrast, emphasize its form (not its meaning), decontextualize 
its use, limit its role to providing labels for pre-existing things, and otherwise present 
language as [an] apolitical, even sometimes asocial, phenomenon….[led to] 
‘Regimes of Language,’ as…promis[ing] to integrate two often segregated domains: 
politics (without language) and language (without politics)” (p. 3). Kroskrity and his 
colleagues’ move builds upon Bernstein (1975), Gumperz (1962), Hymes (1980), 
Labov (1972), Bourdieu (1977, 1991) and Foucault (1972, 1980). See also “Spaces 
of Multilingualism” (Blommaert, Collins & Slembrouck, 2005).  
43   The only counterparts at such a multilingual scale as the European Parliament are the 
Indian and South African Parliaments (Corbett et al, 2008, p. 2). 
44   The physical technology is capable of handling some sixty languages “no problem” 
(F12) but “thirty is a reasonable limit” on the human side (OM57). There were sixty-
two languages recognized as “official” in the European Union (OM57) in 2009.  
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under particular conditions of cost-bearing, and languages of guests, e.g., Arabic, 
Kurdish).45 
As the host of the largest interpreting community in the world, the EP is an ideal 
site for studying simultaneous interpretation.46 The relevance is both contemporary and 
historical: namely, the European Parliament is attempting to govern with linguistic 
diversity instead of by language homogenization, and the EP is the direct heir of the first 
system of simultaneous interpretation created and performed during the World War II 
War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg. Interpreting for the European Parliament is 
prestigious: a pinnacle of professional achievement.47 
The linguistic rights of Members of the EP (formerly called Delegates) extend 
from the European Union’s earliest inception as the Coal and Steel Consortium in 1958. 
Regulation No. 1 “determining the languages to be used by the European Economic 
Community” was understood as a practical matter of equality and instituted as the first 
                                                
45   At the time of fieldwork (2008-2009), the EU was negotiating with Turkey, and 
Kurdish was not supposed to be spoken in the EP. However interpreters were 
observed to do so and some admitted (off the record) that they felt it was a matter of 
‘the right thing to do’ in the presence of Kurds who were speaking Kurdish, and who 
preferred (and in a few cases required) interpretations into Kurdish in order to fully 
comprehend and participate in the proceedings. 
46  The EP is an “ideological site….a notion developed by Silverstein (1998:136) ‘as 
institutional sites of social practice as both object and modality of ideological 
expression.’ Sites may be institutionalized, interactional rituals that are culturally 
familiar loci for the expression and/or explication of ideologies that indexically 
ground them in identities and relationships” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 19). 
47   Simultaneous interpreters for the other European Institutions jostle for prominence 
too; the relevant distinction singling out the EP is the size of its official language 
footprint and it’s institutional ambition to be the representative voice for all of 
Europe’s citizens (and, it could be argued, non-residents too). The other major 
institutions of the EU have reduced language regimes similar in size and scope to the 
United Nations. 
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rule in the original governing document (EUR-Lex). As EU expansion has continued 
over the years, the original linguistic right of choice has been extended to new Members 
despite concerns about the size, cost, and complication of the system required to enable 
functional interpretation across all language combinations. The official language regime 
at the EP during the course of the research reported here (2005 and 2008-2009) included 
twenty-three spoken languages (Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, Dutch, English, Estonian, 
Finnish, French, German, Greek, Hungarian, Irish, Italian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, 
Polish, Portuguese, Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Spanish, and Swedish), although 
Maltese was only provided during one observation. When fully functioning, simultaneous 
interpretation could occur in 506 binary combinations (e.g., English-Lithuanian, Czech-
Spanish, French-Swedish, Polish-Finnish, etcetera). In the subsequent term (2009-2014), 
a Deaf Member of Parliament was elected from Hungary, which required incorporating 
Hungarian sign language interpreters as a regular part of the language regime.48 
The European Parliament is a dynamic microcosm of the European Union and 
thus serves both symbolic and practical purposes in regard to communicating the rituals 
of identification beyond the nation to Europe-as-a-whole. According to Raunio (1996)  
“the most under-studied features…are its internal organization and the behavior of 
individual MEPs…” (p. 40). His study on political party behavior during “Question 
                                                
48   Ádám Kósa works with seven sign language interpreters (EP Newshound, 2013). 
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Time” does not address the dynamics of simultaneous interpretation.49 Is it just a 
curiosity that “the right of an elected Member to speak, read and write in his or her 
language” (a 2001 Bureau report quoted in Corbett et al, 2007, p. 38) omits “listening”? 
How beats this “heart of Parliament’s democratic legitimacy” (Patrick Twidle, in 
Lauridsen, 2002)?50 Questions such as these highlight the community building function 
of SI in the EP by suggesting that skillful and strategic participation in simultaneous 
interpretation is at least as crucial as the transfer of information among speakers of 
various languages. If the goal of the EU is truly not to impose a common language on all 
of its citizens, but rather to maintain a pluralingual social structure in which knowing 
multiple languages is a core element of the European identity, then the skills of 
communicating across language difference through participating in the intercultural 
communication practice of simultaneous interpretation are as integral as the skills of 
communicating within language similarity through language learning. 
                                                
49  Raunio (1996) found, for instance, that “Party groups’ questioning activity is not 
related to their size and influence” (p. 224); and MEPs “make active use of questions 
in order to raise matters important to their constituents” (p. 225). He concludes: 
“Parliamentary questions have a well-established and important part to play in inter-
institutional relations, especially between the Commission and the Parliament” (p. 
226). Raunio’s study was specific to the Strasbourg Parliament; it is probably fair to 
generalize his results as representative of behavior in the Brussels Parliament too. 
50   “Multilingualism” is touted as the heart of the European Parliament’s democratic 
legitimacy in innumerable EU and EP public relations documents and occurs 
frequently in the talk of elected Members and permanent staff of the EP. 
Multilingualism is the official language ideology of the EU; its primary strategy is 
language learning. Bauman & Briggs (2000) present a critique of Locke and Herder 
that illuminates a trajectory of philosophical thought about language that is 
recognizable in EU language policy overall, as well as its instantiation in practice at 
the EP.  More on language ideology in chapter seven. 
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1.6 Research Question 
This study aims to reduce ambiguities about control and meaning during 
interpreted communication generally, that is, in as broad a manner as possible. This 
motivation complicates the matter of delineating a singular research question. Instead, the 
study revolves dynamically around four points of reference: consciousness, control, 
culture (through reference group comparisons) and voice. These reference points were 
selected in order to illustrate an outline for articulating theory about the social 
construction of timespace. The practical aim is to circulate language among practitioners 
and users of interpreting that calibrates (Holquist, 2009) to an alternative chronotope than 
the dominant postmodern condition of timespace compression (as described by Harvey, 
1990). The method of action research was chosen specifically to promote interpretive 
flexibility and enable the researcher to root in reflective action learning. 
1.6.1 Commitments: Action Learning 
The reporting trajectory persists with the ethos of action learning. “If it is to be creative at 
all, research cannot be confined to the testing of predetermined hypotheses. New concepts 
and hypotheses emerge in the process of inquiry, and these become the basis for further 
inquiry. This, we take it, is exactly how continuity in science occurs” (Merton & Rossi, 
1957, p. 249). I have in mind an intuition about systems change using simultaneous 
interpretation as an institutional lever for creating a field of equality as conceptualized by 
Amartya Sen (1992). Articulating a rationale for economic and social policies that 
support and encourage the use of simultaneous interpretation requires reflective analysis 
of existing conditions. Grounding rational recommendations in widely-shared 
experiences necessitates bridging participant experience with academic theorizing. I am 
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particularly interested in how people in policy-making positions understand their own 
language-related choices and concomitant communication interactions, and the extent to 
which they consider, or fail to consider, the full range of communicative implications. 
Studying the attitudes and tensions emerging from talk about language use, 
language choice, and communicative efficiency with diverse users of two sophisticated 
systems for simultaneous interpretation addresses a gap in research regarding the 
perspectives of users of simultaneous interpretation. Considering interpreters and users51 
together as whole units of social interaction that can be considered through lenses of 
group and organizational studies is rare. Imagining the communication among all of these 
participants in simultaneously-interpreted interaction as a form of culture is also unusual. 
Conceptualizing the attitudes and behavioral practices of co-participants in simultaneous 
interpretation as sites for cultural production is presented as a hypothesis for readers to 
explore and experiment with in terms of cultivating agency and establishing better 
conditions for the exercise of voice for all participants (interpretees and interpreters) in 
the special intercultural communication practices of simultaneous interpretation. 
1.7 Organization of Chapters 
Crafting the argument that simultaneous interpretation brings the social 
construction of timespace into view led naturally to considering the temporal framing of 
                                                
51  To reiterate, users (also referred to as consumers and clients) have traditionally been 
identified interlocutors. Instead, I follow the lead of Graham H. Turner in referring 
to the users of SI as interpretees (2007). Distinguishing the basic roles in interpreted 
interaction as interpretees and interpreters emphasizes the co-participatory nature of 
communication. Also, problematizing assumptions of interpreter neutrality, the 
objectification of interpreters as machines, and the reduction of language to 
simplistic units of unambiguous meaning are served by this terministic switch. 
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this dissertation. Rather than a strictly linear process, the chapters cycle through emergent 
reference points, adding depth and detail. The next chapter describes the method of 
research, further establishing the juxtaposition and narrative strategies of action learning. 
Chapter three situates a recent timesnap of literature from Interpreting Studies (all fifteen 
contributions in one volume of conference proceedings published in 2009) in contrast 
with a longer trend of development in Translation Studies. Chapter four introduces the 
case study of the European Parliament as a democratic institution within the larger 
project of the European Union. The social reconstruction of conference interpreting by 
users of the system of SI in the EP is explored and a particular context of legislative work 
regarding asylum seekers is established. 
The fifth chapter extends the exploration of discourse about interpreting in the 
European Parliament, investigating the possibility of a paradigm shift from 
multilingualism to pluralingualism and introducing the concepts of homolingualism and 
social interpreting. Chapter six revisits the establishment of technological and social 
norms for simultaneous interpretation and explores community interpreting for the Deaf 
as the natural point of comparison and contrast with conference interpreting. The sixth 
chapter includes an argument that community interpreting is an invention of Deaf culture. 
Finally, chapter seven touches upon some philosophy of the (so-called) language problem 
and tracks a few contemporary chronotopic calibrations with the goal of considering their 
forward influence on policy, practices, and legislation regarding SI while also engaging 
questions and implications of language ideology. 
The design of these chapters is to cultivate thinking both backwards and forwards 
in time. Beginning with a current enactment of the intercultural communication practice 
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of conference-style simultaneous interpretation (SI) and comparing it with preceeding 
and concurrent developments in community-style SI, then casting further back in history, 
the narrative seeks to expand discursive consciousness. 
Keeping in mind “the multiplex indexicalities of languages” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 
27), this research is premised in the “correlational relationship between high levels of 
discursive consciousness and active contestation of ideologies (p. 19). It’s imagined 
audience includes interpretees and policymakers as well as academics and practitioners. 
Structuring society to better accommodate language difference is, by definition, a 
challenge of thinking in terms of time. Achieving a political economic infrastructure that 
celebrates and protects differences would be evolutionary. Learning how to collaborate in 
the social co-construction of meanings and relationships through proactive participation 
in the special intercultural communication practice of simultaneous interpretation is 
proposed as a design stream for establishing a field of linguistic equality where the 
achievement of voice is a realistic possibility for all participants in interpreted 
communication. 
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CHAPTER 2 
“METHOD”: NARRATIVE AND TRANSDISCIPLINARY JUXTAPOSITION 
2.1 Overview 
The ambition of this dissertation is to tell a story that inspires change. The goal is 
to “make a gathering that renders clear what is obscure” (Tedlock, 1983, p. 252) and 
which consistently “sticks to its object” (Henri Bergson, in Moore, 1996, p. xvii). 
Juxtaposing the comparison groups of community and conference interpreters and their 
respective interpretees within a unified historical narrative is the strategy.52 The audacity 
of a researcher’s “integral involvement…in an intent to change the organization[s]” is a 
characteristic of action research highlighted by organization scholars Eden & Huxham 
(1996, p. 539). “This intent may not succeed,” they clarify, “no change may take place as 
a result of the intervention – and the change may not be as intended” (p. 539). 
Within such a frame, action learning is a humbler stance that aims to contribute to 
the knowledge of actors both within and beyond the research context, ideally resulting in 
“double loop learning” (Argyris & Schön, 1974). Double loop learning involves engaging 
research participants in critical reflection regarding “how the very way they go about 
defining and solving problems can be a source of problems in its own right” (Argyris, 
                                                
52  Mona Baker argues that “narrative provides a basis for shared language and values, 
thus enabling the mobilization of numerous individuals with very different 
backgrounds and attributes around specific political, humanitarian, or social issues” 
(2010, p. 23). 
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1991, p. 2).53 Action research is a qualitative method that became popular in management 
and organization studies during the 1970s and 1980s. The sub-style of action learning 
was selected for this dissertation research because it allowed the greatest range of motion 
for exploring the relationships among ‘objects’ and ‘subjects’ in the research domain 
while foregrounding the researcher as a learner, too. 
The concept and practice of action research is tightly tied with the study of group 
dynamics and processes of organizational and social change, stemming from post-WWII 
work by Kurt Lewin (1946; 1947). Lewin shifted the object of psychology from the level 
of a self-contained individual to the social level of individuals as members of groups, 
inventing the field of social psychology. Lewin (1936) was particularly interested in 
change processes, and created an equation of social action: that a person’s behavior (B) is 
a function (f) of that person (P) in their environment (E), B = f(P, E). Mathematical 
analogies are popular in the field of communication and figure importantly in the origins 
and models of interpreting and the production of interpreters. 
Action research “directly confronts the theory/practice relationship” (Clegg et al, 
1996, p. 13). Action research is a methodology “concerned with a system of emergent 
theory” (Eden & Huxham, 1996, p. 533, also Herr & Anderson, 2005). Such theory is 
necessarily interpretivist and subjective, considering multiple simultaneously-occurring 
                                                
53  Double-loop learning is contrasted with single-loop learning. Chris Argyris explains: 
“I have coined the terms “single loop” and “double loop” learning to capture this 
crucial distinction. To give a simple analogy: a thermostat that automatically turns 
on the heat whenever the temperature in a room drops below 68 degrees is a good 
example of single-loop learning. A thermostat that could ask, “Why am I set at 68 
degrees?” and then explore whether or not some other temperature might more 
economically achieve the goal of heating the room would be engaging in double-
loop learning.” (1991, p. xx). 
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complex transactions: intrapersonal and intragroup (within persons and their own 
language use), multiple interpersonal and intergroup dynamics (between interpretees and 
interpreters, among interpretees with and without interpreters, among interpreters with 
and without interpretees), intra-institutionally (among MEPs, EP interpreters, and 
Parliament’s staff), and inter-institutionally (taking the European Parliament as an 
organizational locus of policy making for society). All of these layers confirm Eden and 
Huxham’s (1996) recommendation that action research be geared toward theory 
generation and development, rather than (for instance) trying to test the results of a 
single, particularized hypothesis. 
Eden and Huxham particularly emphasize the necessity of producing results that 
can be generalized from the specific case to wider applications in other contexts. Also, 
“history and context…must be taken as critical” (1996, p. 539). They assert that the best 
action research is importantly concerned with systematic relationships, because “the aim 
is to understand conceptual and theoretical frameworks where each theory must be 
understood in the context of other related theories” (p. 532). Most of the emphasis here is 
to document the discourse about simultaneous interpretation, with references to other 
literature provided as markers of theory informing and grounding the analysis. Contrary 
to the academic preference for paraphrasing, most citations are quoted in order to 
emphasis discursive relations in addition to intellectual and epistemological connections. 
Ethnographic documentation is obviously a necessity in order to track “theory 
[that] develops from a synthesis of that which emerges from the data and that which 
emerges from the use in practice of the body of theory” (Eden and Huxham, 2002, p. 
533). Hence lengthy quotations from research participants, representative as well as 
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demonstrative of the iterative (Herr & Anderson, 2005), looping (Greenwood, 1997), and 
cyclic (Heron, 1996; Lather, 1986) nature of dialogically developing understanding 
among researcher, participants and relevant literature (Herr & Anderson, 2005). All 
quotations taken together should illustrate the application of interpreting (as theory) as it 
develops into prescriptions for interpreting (as practice). Action research assumes there 
will be “implications beyond…the project…that could inform other contexts” (p. 539), 
which must be “capable of being explained to others” (p. 539) and “disseminated in such 
a way as to be of interest to an audience wider than those integrally involved with the 
action and/or with the research” (p. 539). 
2.2 Commitments: Interpreting as a Communication Event 
An assumption that carries throughout this dissertation and its analyses is a 
disciplinary stance that views interpreting as a communication event, not as a linguistic 
event. Although language and linguistics are obviously involved in any and every 
instance of simultaneous interpretation, one of the action research hypotheses is that the 
linguistic frame is inadequate for addressing the complexity of intercultural social 
interaction, even when reduced to the realm of interpreted communication. A reference 
point for this action learning question is Claudia Angelelli’s (2000) application of Dell 
Hymes’ “taxonomy of speaking” (p. 580). Hymes’s (1962) SPEAKING54 rubric is 
                                                
54  Dell Hymes (1962) created a rubric for remembering the components of 
communication events: S=Setting, Scene. P=Participants. E=Ends (intended, actual). 
A=Act (the speech act). K=Key (generally, tone). I=Instrument or channel of 
communication. N=Norms. G=Genre. This dissertation investigates norms and ends 
(both actual and intended). Kroskrity notes that “Hymes (1974:33) called for the 
inclusion of a community’s local theory of speech, even if only as ethnography” 
(2000, p. 6). 
51 
foundational to a robust area of research called the ethnography of communication. 
Angelelli explains: 
[Hymes] defines a speech community as ‘a social, rather than a linguistic 
entity’ (1074: 47) thus differentiating it from language. This distinction 
separates Hymes’ work from Bloomfield’s or Chomsky’s since the later 
[sic] have equated speech community to language. (Angelelli, 2000, p. 
584) 
Using Hymes’ categories in an abstract, comparative analysis, Angelelli concludes “there 
are more differences than similarities between the two settings” of conference and 
community interpreting (p. 580).55 
Angelelli (2000) couches her argument in a disagreement with Roberts (1998) 
about whether interpreting in these two settings are “equal on the types of skills they 
required from interpreters and on the ethical principles they observed” (p. 581). Angelelli 
is working within an equivalence paradigm56 in which “the goal of translation or 
interpretation (T&I) is that a message makes the same impact on the target audience that 
a speaker/signer intends for an audience of her/his same language” (p. 580). An important 
caveat (offered in parentheses) is Angelelli’s idealization of equality sans the role of 
                                                
55  Interestingly, rather than establishing a single variable, Angelelli sets up a contrast 
between “conference interpreting in a simultaneous mode  (done in a booth) with 
community interpreting in consecutive mode” (emphasis added, 2000, p. 582). She 
says this “rationale…is what emerges from the literature…and from the average 
situations observed” (p. 582). Her study is interview based, presumably only with 
spoken language interpreters. This deduction appears to be born out in her table’s 
section on Channels in which she specifies “the medium of speech transmission  
(e.g. oral, written, telegraphic, etc.)” (p. 588) without acknowledgment of signed 
languages. The gathering of simultaneous sign language interpreters with 
simultaneous spoken language interpreters together within the mode of simultaneous 
(not consecutive) interpreting is unique to this action learning research endeavour. 
56  See section 2.4, Tangling with Translation Studies, for more on the equivalence 
paradigm. 
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privilege. She seeks to argue that it is possible to “[show] that different interpretation 
situations are different in substantive ways (without falling into the prestige trap)” (p. 
582) and to “explore interpretation events where the standards of conference interpreting 
(regardless of prestige) may prove insufficient to gain an understanding of the complexity 
involved in community interpreting” (p. 582). 
The prestige Angelelli is referring to regards the basis of Roberts (1998) 
argument, which, Angelelli reports “was based on the similarities of community and 
conference interpreting in order for the former to achieve the same status and prestige 
that the later [sic] enjoys” (p. 581). My position is that community interpreters should 
have the same status as conference interpreters, although the status question is not a 
sufficient motivator in and of itself. The disagreement with Angelelli is twofold: first, 
prestige (power, privilege) can never be ruled out (Foucault, 1980);57 and second, with 
her conclusion that “a single standard of interpretation … [is] inappropriate since 
different communicative events require different performances on the part of the 
interpreter” (p. 582). Taking a stance in action research and action learning allows 
attention to shift among the elements and assumptions embedded in Angelelli’s claim: 
including, for instance, the relevance of performance differences depending upon which 
single standard is applied, and the exclusive focus on the interpreter’s performance with 
no responsibility or accountability afforded to interpretees. 
                                                
57  “Michel Foucault offered a slightly more optimistic view of the relationship between 
language and power…for Foucault, discourse is ambiguous and plurivocal. It is a 
site of conflict and contestation. Thus, women [for instance] can adopt and adapt 
language to their own ends. They may not have total control over it but then neither 
do men. Choice, chance and power govern our relationships to the discourses we 
employ” (Sawicki, 1991, p. 1).  
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Also, referring to “one of the main pillars and classics since they were the first to 
write on interpretation and interpretation pedagogy,” Angelelli borrows the definition 
provided by Seleskovitch and Lederer (1989): “Interpretation is the transfer of a message 
across languages” (Angelelli, 2000, p. 581). This transfer model (a transmission model) is 
a central theme in the discourses about interpreting presented here. The prevalence and 
function of a transmission model in determining the social organization and norms of 
interpreted events will be critiqued, particularly as a feature of linguistic inequality. 
Finally, in keeping with a kinship model (e.g., Pochhacker, 2007), Angelelli poses 
conference and community interpreting as “two points on an interpretation continuum, 
rather than a dichotomy” (2000, p. 582). She lays out her basic assumptions regarding 
each: “We may assume that a community interpreter is probably quite familiar with the 
ways of speaking that occur in her/his community. Undoubtedly, this means that she/he is 
a fluent speaker of that speech community” (emphasis in original, p. 585). “A conference 
interpreter has to be familiar with the ways of speaking that occur in a conference. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that he/she must be a fluent speaker of that 
speech community (of which the speaker and the audience are genuine members who do 
not share a common language)” (emphasis in original, p. 585). 
As the rest of the dissertation will demonstrate, some of Angelelli’s (2000) 
conclusions are problematized with a more proactive inclusion of sign language and the 
community interpreting norm of simultaneous signed-spoken language interpretation 
rather than consecutive (as is often necessitated by working in the same oral/auditory 
medium). For instance, she characterizes the Hymesian Scene of community interpreting 
involving the interpretees’ having “constant interaction with both speaker and listener 
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allow[ing] for negotiation and clarification” (p. 589) and the interpreter as a Participant 
“facing a dialogic situation (of which she is an active participant too), [in which] she has 
the opportunity to interact differently if she needed to negotiate meaning (ask for 
elaboration, clarification, etc.)” (p. 590). Angelelli’s findings from spoken language 
community interpreting are not necessarily in accord with signed-spoken language 
community interpreting. Some reasons for the differences involve power and 
institutionalized practices of professional simultaneous interpretation. 
2.3 Paradigms: Two Approaches to Language & Communication 
As hinted at above, the functional linguistic paradigm privileges the source 
language as primary in interpreted communication. This privileging is structured through 
emphasizing the text (the words) rather than the speech act (the interpretee’s voice in the 
interaction). The structuralism of focusing on linguistic functions remains the dominant 
and unchallenged way of thinking about interpreting. An interpretivist or interactional 
paradigm has made some inroads into Interpreting Studies, for instance in the guise of 
‘dialogic discourse-based interaction’ (Pöchhacker 2004, p. 79), but the lessons of the 
interpretive paradigm are continuously subsumed by the perpetuation of positivist 
structural framings. The synonym of ‘positivist’ for both ‘functionalist’ and ‘structuralist’ 
is because the functions being structured are maintained and reinforced: an additive 
‘positive’ effect. Although a literal equation is far too crass, for the purposes of 
introducing the argument I will borrow a generalization between structuralism and a 
building-block approach to language, and another generalization between interpretivism 
and a creative approach to language. 
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Barnett Pearce (1994), in the tradition of American pragmatism, poses the 
opposition between static building-blocks and a perpetual creativity in language use in 
order to establish two basic orientations to “language as such” (Benjamin, 1916/1969).58 
As with any duality, the opposition can be exaggerated too extremely, and each 
orientation can be applied to the same stimulus or object of study. The point in using this 
opposition as a heuristic is not to argue that one is more right than the other, only that 
both exist, and each entails different possibilities. The building-block and the creative 
orientations to language both focus on language, but the building-block approach looks at 
the words as if disembodied from the speaker/signer, and the interpretivist approach 
never neglects the context that the speaking/signing body is situated within. 
In How To Do Things With Words, J.L Austin showed that some speech acts 
“make things happen” (1962/1992). The classic examples involve ministers who 
pronounce marriage and judges who sentence criminals. If someone not authorized to 
utter those words says them, neither married life nor jail time are forthcoming. The action 
of these statements made by non-authorized persons is, then, that of lying or make-
believe. Any saying and every utterance always does something, it is the meaning or 
effect that differs depending upon who says it and how it is received, which can be 
separated (as in structural linguistics) as if these are independent variables, or taken 
together as intradependent variables of social interaction. 
This power of language to do things, of language as an activity, is also illustrated 
by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s (1953) theory of ‘speech playing’ or language games (Pearce, 
                                                
58  “Benjamin himself believed that “all human knowledge, if it can be justified, must 
take on no other form than that of interpretation” (Kirsch, 2006). 
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p. 110). The difference between Austin and Wittgenstein is that in Austin’s speech act 
theory the component parts of language are discrete and have fixed meanings; language is 
composed of building-blocks to be put together in certain ways to conduct specific 
behaviors and accomplish desired actions. The range of meaning for “I pronounce you 
man and wife” in the building-block conception is fairly narrow, because the phrase is 
intended only to be uttered under appropriate circumstances. Whereas for Wittgenstein, 
language is always understood first as uttered in a context, from which it follows that the 
meaning(s) of a speech act are always flexible: “the meaning of what we say is 
determined by how it fits into the game” (Pearce, p. 110). From the creative perspective, 
“I pronounce you man and wife” could be a joke, a theatrical performance, or a scathing 
social commentary; each of which would do different work, socially. 
Critical discourse analysis provides evidence that discourses about community-
style SI tend to reflect the building-block orientation to language. The building-block 
assumption concerning language carries across settings of conference and community 
interpreting, research and practice, interpretees and interpreters. The building-block view 
is a natural fit with the structuralism of functional linguistics. To give one quick example 
from the volume of community interpreting studies research that will compose the 
literature review in chapter three, Tebble (2009) provides a diagram, a “Hierarchy of 
discourse structures” (Figure 4, p. 210), which she describes as “a ranked scale from the 
smallest unit, the speech act, to the largest discourse unit, the genre itself” (p. 209). The 
metacommunication implicit in this “language about language” (p. 210) is of discrete, 
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unconnected units (uttered speech acts) serving explicit functions as if they only ‘build 
up’ in an additive way to generate a top level of a discourse hierarchy.59 
In keeping with the paradigm, Tebble (2009) uses the label, genre, for the top 
level. In contrast, interpretivist theories start with a multilayered view of language and 
social interaction and work ‘up,’ ‘down’ and ‘through’ discourse toward both genres and 
acts. Imagine the center and periphery of a sphere, with ‘action’ moving in both 
directions, originating (and re-originating) from both the center and the periphery in 
multiple flows of circulation. The difference is that an interpretivist view can allow the 
act to change the genre, a possibility not available within structuralist regimes that 
establish the genre as determinant. The analysis up to this point makes the case that 
structuralism (specifically the functional linguistic paradigm) retains too much sway in 
the practice of simultaneous interpretation. This is particularly evidenced in the 
community interpreting literature by the frustration of interpreters with interpretees and 
in tensions within the academic meta-discourse of interpreting researchers. 
                                                
59  Vuorikoski’s view is more nuanced. “Genres are the result of socio-discursive 
practices acquired by text producers” (2004, p. 66). She draws upon Jean-Michel 
Adam (1999) who has combined discourse analysis with a non-English-centered text 
linguistics. Vuorikoski uses terminology developed by Halliday (1985/1990) but 
does not rely upon him solely because “his work is based on the English language” 
(p. 66). “Adam quotes Bakhtin and his definition of the functions of genres. Bakhtin 
proposes that for the reciprocal intelligibility of language, the genres of discourse are 
just as important as the grammatical forms of language. Compared with the 
grammatical forms, the discourse genres are more changeable and more flexible 
while still possessing a normative value for the individual speaker; the speaker has 
not created them himself, they have been given to him. (Bakhtin 1984: 287, quoted 
by Adam 1999: 90)” (in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 67). Tebble refers (functionally) to the 
normative value of a genre; which I’m seeking to balance with attention to their 
changeability and flexibility. 
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The goal of this dissertation is to expose and engage these paradigmatic tensions 
with consideration of the implications for material practice. Bringing the language of the 
interpretive paradigm into critical interaction with the language of the structural paradigm 
is an experiment. This experimental essence dictated the selection of action research as 
the most appropriate methodology. Critical discourse analysis is one of the main tools 
used in service of the action research. Technically, it could be considered an experiment 
in foreignization. This term will be properly defined in the forthcoming section on 
translation studies, after the following section on methodology. 
2.3.1 Action research: Application in the Interpretivist Paradigm 
The combination of research tools includes critical discourse analysis (e.g., 
Fairclough, 1992, Blommaert, 2004) and Dell Hymes (1962, 1972, 1974) SPEAKING 
rubric from the ethnography of communication (e.g., Angelelli, 2000; Carbaugh, 1990). 
Fairclough’s (1992) three-dimensional theory of critical discourse analysis is an 
application of an interpretivist orientation to language in a style that might be 
characterized by the later Wittgenstein (1953) who, for instance, poses ‘family 
resemblances’ as a way to think about the meanings of words based on the web of their 
relationships with other similar and related words. For Fairclough (1992), every utterance 
is simultaneously an act, an instance of discursive practice, and an instance of social 
practice. The words of an utterance are given meaning by the relations among definitions 
held by interlocutors according to individual discernment as to which of the 
simultaneously-occurring levels (discourse, social interaction, speech act) is significant or 
necessary within the given context at each turn in the communication process. 
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Creativity enters based upon interpretee choice (whether this is consciously 
prioritized or habitually conditioned) regarding which level(s) of an utterance to respond 
to: the discrete act (conceived as a turn in a ritual flow of interaction), the discourse 
instantiated by the act (e.g., a particular ideology or a social construction of identity), or 
the enactment of social practice (e.g., empowerment or disenfranchisement). As useful 
and productive as structuralism is for understanding useful and important things about 
communication, linguistic functionalism cannot accommodate the variability of these 
simultaneously-occurring levels of communication because linguistic functionalism 
focuses ‘positively’ and exclusively on the speech act, rendering the other levels of 
meaning essentially invisible. 
So, while it may seem that the difference between structuralism and interpretivism 
is only the matter of direction, as in the opposition between induction and deduction, 
either building up or inferring down, the crucial distinction regards what is excluded or 
included in the analysis. For instance, drawing upon my own and other working 
interpreters’ experiences, we often recognize speech acts representing different social 
practices or distinctive discursive practices in one language that are appropriate for the 
context but unfamiliar to interpretees using another language. How can this be dealt with? 
Structuralism will reduce these social and discursive practices to a single 
dimension by insisting the speech act represents a supposedly uncontroversial (one could 
say traditional or customary) speech act indicating a particular kind of turn given the 
script prescribed by genre. Interpretivism will assume as a matter of course that speech 
acts always carry potentials for new social relationships and discursive alternatives to 
genre norms that could be made meaningful by interpretees at any moment during the 
60 
event. A creative orientation to language and language use presumes a wider degree of 
flexibility in the realm of meaning-making than the structuralist building-block approach 
usually allows. This is not because the building-block view prohibits or denies the 
emergence of spontaneity or discovery; rather the structuralist view conditions its 
adherents to ‘positively’ seek the expected and familiar instead of cultivating alertness for 
the significance of the unusual, unordinary, or atypical. 
Heuristically-coupling these two approaches to language, building-block and 
creative, with the respective paradigms of structuralism and interpretivism, enables a 
demonstration of how they work as language ideologies while demonstrating that they 
can also work well together, hand-in-hand.60 This is one of the action research goals of 
exploring the difference between Giddens’ (1979, 1984) practical consciousness and 
discursive consciousness in interpreter and interpretee accounts and representations of 
simultaneous interpretation. What do interpretees and interpreters know how to do in 
                                                
60  Kroskrity (2000) “introduce(s) the notion of language ideology…[by] offer[ing] a 
language-ideological myth of origin. In such a myth, the concept of language 
ideology is the offspring of a union of two neglected forces: the linguistic 
‘awareness’ of speakers and the (nonreferential) functions of language. Both of these 
forces were prematurely marginalized by the dominant and disciplinarily 
institutionalized approaches to language, which denied the relevance—to linguistics, 
certainly—of a speaker’s own linguistic analysis and valorized the referential 
functions of language to the exclusion of others. In effect, this surgical removal of 
language from context produced an ‘amputated’ language that was the preferred 
object of the language sciences for most of the twentieth century. 
 Two of the many proposed definitions of language ideology emphatically restore 
the relevance of these contextual factors…Michael Silverstein (1979:193) defined 
linguistic ideologies as ‘sets of beliefs about language articulated by users as a 
rationalization or justification of perceived language structure and use.’ In a similar 
way, but with a more sociocultural emphasis, Judith Irvine (1989:255) defined 
language ideology as ‘the cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic 
relationships, together with their loading of moral and political interests.’ Both 
definitions place a focal emphasis on speakers’ ideas about language and discourse 
and about how these articulate with various social phenomena” (p. 5). 
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practical terms, and what are interpretees and interpreters able to say about what it is that 
they are doing during simultaneous interpretation? Giddens’ (1984) distinction is one of 
reflexivity: 
The reflexive capacities of the human actor are characteristically involved 
in a continuous manner with the flow of day-to-day conduct in the 
contexts of social activity. But reflexivity operates only partly on a 
discursive level. What agents know about what they do, and why they do 
it—their knowledgeability as agents—is largely carried in practical 
consciousness. Practical consciousness consists of all the things which 
actors know tacitly about how to ‘go on’ in the contexts of social life 
without being able to give them direct discursive expression. (Thursby, 
n.d., Paragraph 10) 
In the next chapter, we’ll see in the literature, there is not much evidence of discursive 
consciousness of researchers about the social and epistemic practice of constructing 
paradigmatic knowledge. This is not because interpreting researchers lack discursive 
consciousness. It is a side effect of operating, practically, in only one paradigm: 
structural, positivist linguistic functionalism. 
Reading a critical discourse analysis of previously taken-for-granted knowledge 
may be confusing or even alienating. If so, these are among the possible effects of 
foreignization, an important concept from the field of translation studies from Lawrence 
Venuti (1998). Comparing the professional discourses between interpreting researchers 
and translation researchers highlights similarities and differences in the practical and 
discursive consciousness of researchers in these fields. More on Venuti’s relevance to 
this study will be presented below. 
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2.4 Contrast: Tangling with Translation Theory 
To pursue development of discursive consciousness about paradigmatic tensions in 
interpreting research, some comparison will be made between the academic fields of 
interpreting and translation studies. Basil Hatim’s (2001) Teaching and Researching 
Translation and Edwin Gentzler’s (2001) Contemporary Translation Theories establish 
bases for the advancing evolution of thought in terms of literary translation theory. More 
current thinking is quite radical. In Translation, Resistance, Activism (2010), editor Maria 
Tymoczko has composed a collection of chapters exploring “how we have arrived at a 
position where translations are read and discussed as records of cultural contestations and 
struggle rather than as simple literary transpositions or creative literary endeavours” (p. 3). 
For instance, Mona Baker (2010) presents “some of the ways in which translation 
and interpreting may…challenge the dominant narratives of time” (p. 23). An example is 
provided by Antonia Carcelen-Estrada (2010), who sets two antagonists 
in dialogue, hypothesizing that the [Huaorani, an indigenous people in the 
Ecuadorian Amazon whose language is Huao Terero] translated their 
bodies as the [Summer Institute of Linguistics] translated the Bible, with 
consequent divergence between actions and intentions in both systems. 
The temporal, semiotic, and intentional miscommunication between these 
two groups unveils different levels of ideology and significant ethical 
problems. (p. 65-66) 
Where Carcelen-Estrada finds evidence of “a native strategy for cultural survival” (p. 66) 
from inside the translation process, Pua’ala’okalani D. Aiu (2010) describes how and 
why “Hawaiians often choose not to translate because refusal to translate allows 
Hawaiian speakers to keep the context of their language intact” (p. 104). This contributes 
to the irony that “both translation and non-translation work to empower Hawaiians (p. 
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105) who promote “Ne’e papa i ke ō mau,” that is, “the inevitable return tide of the 
Hawaiian language and with it Hawaiian cultural values and practices” (p. 89). 
Tymoczko locates “the metonymic nature of both translation and activism” (2010, 
p. 250) in the “specificity…of engaged translation” (p. 251) wherein “activist strategies 
are highly variable and…sensitive to context, minutely located in time and space” (2010, 
p. 249). Importantly, in order to be successful, an “activist translation must fit the felicity 
conditions of its time” (p. 251).61 Within this dissertation, the notion of interpretation as 
activism and resistance are mainly held in the wings and backstage. Instead, the narrative 
foregrounds existing tensions and problems in keeping with Fairclough’s (1989) “faith in 
the capacity of human beings to change what human beings have created…[through] 
people developing a critical consciousnesss of domination and its modalities, rather than 
just experiencing them” (in Tymockzo, 2010, p. 227). 
2.4.1 A Dash through Key Developments in Translation Studies 
Writing in 2001, Gentzler explains: 
In the early days of translation theory, multiple theories simply did not 
exist. The goal at the time, and which, despite the prevailing evidence, 
continues to be the goal of some scholars today, was to establish one 
general theory of translation that would hold across cultures and 
languages. (p. xii) 
                                                
61  The coordination of actors in timespace, in combination with external conditions, 
generates time felicity. 
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The ‘early days’ in Gentzler’s (2001) account are the 1980s.62 Gentzler establishes the 
formal origins of translation in the 1960s with the advent of academic programs 
involving translation; these came to be known as the North American translation 
workshop. Paul Engle instituted a Creative Writing Program at the University of Iowa, 
hosting the first translation workshop in 1964; a Ford Foundation grant established the 
National Translation Center at the University of Texas Austin in 1965; and two 
publications were being produced by 1968 (Modern Poetry in Translation and Delos). 
Then there was a plateau during the 1970s about which Gentzler says, “One reason is 
surely the monolinguistic nature of the [US] culture” (p. 6).63 
                                                
62   Note: this is the time period when American Deaf resistance against institutionalized 
oralism (Ladd, 2003), audism (e.g., Padden & Humphries, 1988; Lane, 1992) and the 
colonization and co-optation of American Sign Language within the profession of 
sign language interpretation was gaining momentum. 
63  American monolingualism had particularly profound effects on deaf people. 
Historian R.A.R. Edwards (2012) traces how American nationalism was imprinted 
on the deaf body, whose cultural identity was formed in conjunction with the 
establishment of residential schools for the deaf in the mid-nineteenth century. As 
sign language began to emerge as the natural language of the deaf, and deaf people 
began to associate with each other, observers noticed the spontaneous development 
of behavioral norms and attitudes associated with a unique culture. This was 
welcomed by early manualists such as French sign language teacher Laurent Clerc 
and American businessman Thomas Gallaudet, who had “an understanding of 
disability that was located more in the society than in the body. The deaf body may 
not hear, but it need not be made over to approximate hearing norms. Rather, social 
norms may be adjusted to accommodate the deaf body” (p. 157). This was “a vision 
that the oralists, led by [Samuel Gridley] Howe and [Horace] Mann, would not 
accept….The most that could be done would be to mask this inferiority by making it 
possible for the deaf to pass as hearing and so to reify the norm of the able-bodied. 
The way for a society to deal with disability, in this oralist vision, was to make it 
invisible. This erasure of the disabled from public view, in order to preserve the 
body politic as uniformly able-bodied accounts for the impulse to train the deaf to 
pass as hearing” (p. 158). 
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Previously, linguists had begun to address some concerns of translation earlier: 
Jakobson distinguished among intralingual, interlingual, and intersemiotic translation in 
1959,64 and Quine discussed problems with determining meaning in 1960. “The 
problems,” writes Gentzler, “of referentiality and indeterminacy have historically 
troubled translation theory, making positions calling for a one-to-one transfer approach 
and methods revolving around a decoding and recoding process increasingly difficult to 
hold” (2001, p. 12-13). That ‘transfer approach’ remains dominant in discourses in 
simultaneous interpretation, which has not yet moved beyond what Hatim calls “the 
equivalence paradigm” (2001, p. 12). 
In other words, translation studies has been addressing “the epistemological 
problem” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 35) for all of the decades that sign language interpreting has 
been in existence and most of the decades since spoken language simultaneous 
                                                
64  Roman Jakobson’s (1959) work is in structural linguistics. His three types of 
translation are not addressed but remain, foundationally, in the background. 
Kroskrity (2000) establishes Jakobson as part of the lineage building up to the 
concept of language ideology: “Semiotic models of communication were formulated 
by Jakobson (1957, 1960) and then in a functional idiom by Hymes (1964). Based on 
the theories of C.S. Peirce (1931-1958), they recognized a variety of sign-focused 
‘pragmatic’ relations between language users, the sign vehicles of their languages, 
and the connections between these signs and the world. By contrast, most models—
whether the ethnoscience models of cultural anthropologists or the formal models of 
Chomskian linguistics—reducted linguistic meaning to denotation, or ‘reference,’ 
and predication. One of the key advantages of such semiotic-functional models is the 
recognition that much of the meaning and hence communicative value that linguistic 
forms have for their speakers lies in the ‘indexical’ connections between the 
linguistic signs and the contextual factors of their use—their connection to speakers, 
settings, topics, institutions, and other aspects of their sociocultural worlds” (p. 7). 
The effectiveness of making such indexical connections is a key feature of achieving 
voice. Also, Gentzler argues, “the Jakobson term ‘creative transposition,’ with the 
emphasis on creative, seems more operative [as a definition for translation] 
(Jakobson, 1959: 238)” (2001, p. 35). 
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interpretation was invented at Nuremberg.65 The epistemological problem is a label that 
refers to the conundrum of establishing a definitive foundation for a unifying theory of 
interpretation, that is, for a central organizing principle that eliminates the disagreements 
about whether the essence of communication (and thus of translation) lies in energy, 
identity, things, meanings, referents, sources, or time (Gentzler, p. 35). 
Seemingly far removed yet in parallel with developments in translation theory, 
during the 1980s American Deaf communities were trying to reclaim community-based 
cultural performances of sign language interpreting from an influx of cultural outsiders, 
re-establish the education of deaf children in the visual medium best suited to their 
cognitive development, and counter the medicalization of deafness which justifies 
surgical interventions such as cochlear implants and intensive speech therapies. While the 
American Deaf community was fighting for their bodies on the ground, translation 
theorists were fighting against what Gentzler (2001) calls a theoretical “stranglehold” (p. 
xi). “In the late 1980s…the field [of literary translation] was trying to set itself free from 
the dominance of…source-text oriented theories” (p. x-xi). 
2.4.2 The Cultural Turn 
Gentzler (2001) outlines five strands of intellectual thinking that have influenced 
the field of translation studies: 1) new criticism aimed at a “proper”66 translation of 
                                                
65   The “IBM System” of electronic technology that enabled the simultaneous 
interpretation of four languages during the Nuremberg Trials after WWII is 
discussed in chapter five. 
66  “Richards’s 1953 model was specifically tailored for the translator who aimed to 
arrive at the ‘proper’ translation” (2001, p. 14).  
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poetry in service of “perfect understanding”67 (i.e., Richards, 1929, 1953); 2) an energy-
based theory of language68 as a vortex characterized by “luminous” details69 and 
dynamism of meaning70 (i.e., Ezra Pound);71 3) translation as paradox72 and thrust73 (i.e., 
                                                
67  “’A perfect understanding would involve not only an accurate direction of thought, a 
correct evocation of feeling, an exact apprehension of tone and a precise recognition 
of intention, but further it would get these contributory meanings in their right order’ 
(Richards, 1929: 332)” in Gentzler  (2001, p. 11).  
68  “[Pound’s] method was modern [not postmodern] insofar as it emphasized 
juxtaposition and combination, hoping that the new configurations would react 
chemically, combining into a new compound, and thereby give off energy” 
(Gentzler, 2001, p. 23).  
69  “Words, according to [Ezra] Pound, were always seen in a network of relations: 
Anglo-American words were signs similar to Chinese characters—always capable of 
being compounded and capable of being metamorphosized” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 18). 
“Theoretically for Pound, Chinese characters represented not meanings, not 
structures, but things, or more importantly, things in action, in process, things with 
energy, their form” (italics in original, Gentzler, 2001, p. 18). 
70  “[Pound] thinks not in terms of separable languages, but of a mesh or interweaving 
of words that bind people together regardless of nationalities. The threads of 
language run back in time, and as one traces them back, variable connections can be 
made…Pound’s ideas were not aimed at fixed things, but at things that can change” 
(Gentzler, 2001, p. 19). 
71  “According to Pound’s translation theory, meaning is not something abstract and 
part of a universal language, but something that is always already located in 
historical flux—the ‘atmosphere’ in which that meaning occurs. To unpack that 
meaning, one has to know the history and reconstruct the atmosphere/milieu in 
which that meaning occurred” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 22).  
72  The paradox is epistemological, “how is it possible to know anything we do not 
already know” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 27), which problematizes the idea of “a universal 
objective reality. Reality can only be learned, he argues, through the names we give 
it, and so, to a certain degree language is the creator of reality” (p. 24-25). “The 
activity of translation, according to Will, somehow reveals to the translator that 
language is simultaneously unstable and stable, that texts are interwoven in reality 
and in a tradition of fiction, and that man, as a complex system, is both subjected by 
language or systems of discourse and is capable of creating language or new 
relations in the present” (p. 30).  
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Frederick Will); 4) a digression into the creative process of translation, in which ad hoc, 
so-called ‘free’ or ‘modern’ translation “by writers with limited language skills ... 
allow[ing] translators without the facility in a given language to translate, using literal 
versions as cribs, from which they intuit the ‘essence’” emerges (Gentzler, p. 32), raising 
“a whole new set of questions” (p. 34); and finally, 5) the cultural studies’ contribution of 
Lawrence Venuti in “rethinking translation” through criticism (consonant with Gentzler’s 
own) of “the humanistic underpinnings…[which] reinforces prevailing domestic beliefs 
and ideologies” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 36). 
Venuti’s main thesis is that translation tends to be an invisible practice in the 
United States. By invisible, he means that the translators tend to be self-
effacing in their work, denying their own voice in favour of that of the author 
and / or the prevailing styles in the receiving culture, and that in translation 
criticism, scholars tend to ignore the decisions and mediations of the 
translators, commenting instead as if they have direct access to the author. 
Translations are judged to be successful when they read “fluently,” giving the 
appearance that they have not been translated” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 36) 
Simultaneous interpreters may recognize this discourse of invisibility and flow.  
Gentzler’s intellectual strands in the history of translation studies overlap and 
expand upon five types of equivalence described by Hatim (2001) on the basis of their 
                                                
73  “What Will advocates…is an approach that translates not what a work means, but 
the energy or ‘thrust’ of a work, for which there is no ‘correct’ way of translating. 
He writes: ‘Translation is par excellence the process by which the thrust behind the 
verbal works of man … can be directly transferred, carried on, allowed to continue. 
…Works of literature are highly organized instances of such thrust … these blocks 
force themselves on, through time, from culture to culture (Will, 1973: 155).’ This 
‘thrust’ is a new concept … Translation is less seen as a ‘carrying over’ of content, 
but as a ‘carrying on’ of the content in language. In translation, texts are reborn, 
given new life, stimulated with new energy … Meaning is redefined by Will not as 
something behind the words or text, not as an ‘essence’ in a traditional metaphysical 
sense, but as something different, as thrust or energy…a possible/impossible paradox 
of language which not only defines the translation process, but defines how we come 
to know ourselves through language” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 28-19). 
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academic discipline: formal equivalence from the field of linguistics (i.e., Catford); 
dynamic equivalence from the field of sociolinguistics (i.e., Nida); pragmatic equivalence 
from the field of structural linguistics (e.g., Koller); text-based equivalence from the field 
of poetics (Beaugrande), and foreignization and equivalence from the field of cultural 
studies (Venuti). What distinguishes Gentzler’s organization from Hatim’s is that Hatim 
appears to accept the assumptions of equivalence, while Gentzler highlights the fact that 
there is always a non dit - that is, in any translation there is always something left unsaid. 
In other words, Gentzler’s starting point is the impossibility of equivalence. 
“Translation theory is not easy,” he explains. “Rather, it involves complex theories of 
meaning and complex social forces creating numerous barriers, in addition to the already 
prohibitive linguistic ones” (2001, p. xi-xii). Hatim is by no means arguing that 
translation is easy, however he provides a sense that it can be packaged within academic 
boundaries. Gentzler disagrees, highlighting the “interdisciplinary… incompatibilities… 
[which] show how such problems of communication and exchange are grounded in the 
differing theoretical assumptions of each approach” (p. 2). Gentzler also argues for the 
inherent value of translation studies, which has provided “a first look into the black box 
of the human mind as it works and reworks” the tasks of interpretation (p. 35). 
Rather than a (structuralist) emphasis on equivalence, Gentzler describes creative 
discovery, how translation “simultaneously reinforces and subverts” (2001, p. 9) because 
“the very limits and constraints of the activity of translating seem to help in making 
possible new verbal constructions” (p. 36). This inherently creative play results in “the 
possibility of challenging norms and creating new forms of expression” (p. vii). 
Gentzler’s analysis corresponds with and reflects the influence of Lawrence Venuti, who 
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calls the question on the equivalence paradigm (with its privileging of the source text and 
its emphasis on transfer) with his 1998 work, The Scandals of Translation: Towards an 
Ethics of Difference. 
2.4.3 Foreignization 
What does it mean to foreignize? Venuti poses foreignization as a counterpoint 
not only to the idea of equivalence, but also to the values assigned to fluency. “Venuti 
sets up two paradigms for translation: one he calls fluent and the other foreignizing; one 
opts for acceptable uses of linguistic and cultural terms and images| and the other ab-uses 
or chooses alternatives” (Gentzler, 2001, p. 41-42). Venuti questions any representation, 
explanation or definition “that mystifies…[translation] as an untroubled communicative 
act” (emphasis added, 1998, p. 11).74 
While there are significant differences in the communication event of 
writing/reading a translated literary work and the communication event of participating in 
live simultaneous interpretation, the paradigm conflict between fluency and 
foreignization holds. The intercultural setting made manifest by the need for live 
interpretation highlights how fluency domesticates and assimilates what is foreign, alien, 
or just different even when there is only one language involved. 
                                                
74  Full context: “The very function of translating is assimilation, the inscription of a 
foreign text with domestic intelligibilities and interests. I follow Berman (1992:4-5; 
cf. his revision in 1995:93-94) in suspecting any literary translation that mystifies 
this inevitable domestication as an untroubled communicative act. Good translation 
is demystifying: it manifests in its own language the foreignness of the foreign text 
(Berman 1985:89)” (Venuti, 1998, p. 11). 
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As an example, Gentzler (2008) analyses an intralingual translation that illustrates 
how 
a retelling of the same story in the same language is always going to be a 
different story…Translation enters the novel less by the juxtaposition of 
language and more by the juxtaposition of culture and sexuality. In this 
motel at the edge of the civilization, run by women and with many women 
guests, the only male figure in the book, “L’homme long” 
(“Longman/Oblong Man”), comes to represent the foreign. He is the 
outsider, his arrogance does not fit in, and his devices—the mathematical 
equations in his writings, the pornography that he reads in his room, the 
gun that he hides under a napkin—represent a threat to the community. 
One of the hardest parts in the translation is not to assimilate the foreign, 
and in this case the goal is not to assimilate the male figure, who also most 
of the time is polite and treats people with respect. While Maude Laures 
[the protagonist in the novel, a translator] is able to capture the chaos, 
ecstasy, energy, and sexuality radiated by [an antagonist] Angela Parkins, 
whether she captures the foreignness as she translates L’homme long into 
l’homme’oblong is debatable. (Gentzler, p. 63-64)75 
Gentzler is not claiming that l’homme’oblong’s difference is completely erased in the 
translation, but he seems to suspect that some of the aspects of culture, socialization, and 
personality that make L’homme long such a remarkable contrast and obvious outsider in 
the situation are muted, dulled, perhaps sacrificed in service of faithfulness, accuracy and 
similarity to the source text.76  
In other words, too much fluency can hide power. Venuti elaborates: 
A translation always communicates an interpretation, a foreign text that is 
partial and altered, supplemented with features peculiar to the translating 
                                                
75  Le désert mauve by Nicole Brossard (1987). 
76  “Brossard’s fiction,” explains Gentlzer, “for the first time to my knowledge, allows 
the reader to enter that cultural space of translators in their own unique element. 
Brossard’s fiction attests to the intensity of the behind-the-scenes work carried out 
by translators, and metaphorically reveals the displaced nature of an individual 
caught between two languages and cultures, such as the entire population of Quebec” 
(2008, p. 63). 
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language, no longer inscrutably foreign but made comprehensible in a 
distinctively domestic style. Translations, in other words, inevitably 
perform a work of domestication. Those that work best, the most powerful 
in recreating cultural values and the most responsible in accounting for 
that power, usually engage readers in domestic terms that have been 
defamiliarized to some extent, made fascinating by a revisionary 
encounter with a foreign text. (1998, p. 5) 
Domestication, in this usage, refers to shaping the communication in terms familiar to the 
receiving culture’s frameworks or worldview, rather than maintaining frames or aspects 
of worldview that are disconcerting because of cultural difference, that is, because of the 
alien or other-ness of the source. No doubt there are double standards that skew when and 
to what extent source texts are domesticated or not. 
For instance, in a critique of a specific, linguistic-oriented theory usually applied 
to live conversation (Grice’s (1968/1989) cooperative principle), Venuti notes that “the 
remainder, the possibility for variation in any linguistic conjunction, means that the 
translator works in an asymmetrical relationship, always cooperating more with the 
domestic than the foreign culture and usually with one constituency among others” 
(1998, p. 22). It is in that ‘cooperation’ with the domestic, that is, the rendering of target 
language fluency and comfortable cultural reference points and markers that the 
foreignness of an original (e.g., source language) can be left unexpressed, creating the 
remainder or non dit. “Fluent strategies…mystify their domestication of the foreign text 
while reinforcing dominant domestic values—notably the major language, the standard 
dialect, [and] possibly other cultural discourses” (Venuti, 1998, p. 22). 
The display of fluency to make translation appear easy and feel smooth is what 
Venuti means by mystification. Challenges, gaps, unbridged differences and hierarchies 
of power can be hidden by fluency. The co-construction of understanding is mystified, 
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shared meaning made mysterious, because there is little evidence and few clues to the 
presence of alternatives. It is against this homogenizing force of fluency that Venuti 
poses the strategy of foreignization.77 Specifically, to resist and remedy domestication, 
Venuti suggests that translators reproduce the features in language 
that signal linguistic and cultural difference…Such translation techniques 
expose the illusion of transparency by making the translator’s work visible, 
and thereby encouraging a rethinking of the secondary, derivative status of 
the translator. They also, ironically, preserve important elements of the 
source text that frequently are smoothed over, elided, and / or adapted to 
the point that they are no longer recognizable. (Gentzler, 2001, p. 39) 
In other words, foreignizing preserves cultural difference. While this section refers 
specifically to written translation of literature (especially fiction and poetry), the 
relationships of translators to texts, their authors, and audiences in regard to language and 
communication is not substantially different from the relationships of interpreters to live 
utterances and interpretees. Remember, for instance, Hawaiians’ choices about 
participating (and not participating) in interpreting and translation activities (Aiu, 2010) 
as a way of conducting “ethnic boundary maintenance”  (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 25). 
Venuti’s influence on translation studies and translation itself can hardly be 
overstated. In the Forward to her edited volume, Translation, Resistance, Activism, Maria 
Tymoczko (2010) states: “Venuti’s writings on translation as a mode of resistance and his 
calls for action addressed to translators were central in motivating discourses about 
translation, ethics, ideology, and agency” (p. vii). Gentzler too argues that “Venuti’s 
                                                
77  Venuti characterizes foreignization as a minoritizing strategy: “Minoritizing 
translation can…move between cultural constituencies precisely because its 
heterogeneous discourse is able to support diverse notions of coherence that circulate 
among different constituencies” (1998, p. 23). 
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approach outlines the first step in rethinking translation, exposing certain assumptions 
held by those in institutions governing translation and opening the way for alternative 
approaches, Venuti’s and others’” (2001, p. 43). 
2.5 Researcher’s Positionality 
As researcher, I occupy an interesting positionality (Herr & Anderson, 2005) with 
respect to the research site. I am an insider of the profession of simultaneous 
interpretation and an outsider to the European Parliament. During the interviews with EP 
Interpreters it was common for interpreters to note my identity as an American, e.g., “We 
don’t get too many of those around here” (EPI #48), while identifying with me on the 
basis of the daunting challenge of providing spontaneous interpretation with integrity. 
My differences were of note to some and not to others.78 I blended in as a white 
person.79 Many people speak English with a vast array of accents, making my American-
ness not particularly obvious. One female Member shared with me an in-depth feminist 
                                                
78  My being American did seem relevant during some conversations with European 
Parliament Interpreters during the preliminary research phase in 2005, however as a 
general dynamic the more salient identification was my professional training and 
experience as an American Sign Language/English interpreter. In 2008-2009, a few 
Members of the EP were intrigued by my background, but most remained focused on 
their own thoughts and experiences of being an interpretee in the Parliament. 
79  The relevance of whiteness is construed differently in Europe than in the United 
States (and differently in different parts of Europe), but there can be no denying the 
colonial past or the privileged present. The research conclusions do imply that 
whiteness is intertwined with language use in simultaneous interpretation, but a 
specific race-based analysis is not conducted. Do make note, however, of the 
contrasting examples that are provided (e.g., Apache (Basso, 1996), Hawaiians (Aiu, 
2010), Huarani (Carcelen-Estrada, 2010), Xavante (Graham, 1995).  
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critique of the gendered and engendering dynamics of political interaction in the EP.80 On 
a few occasions lesbians co-identified with me and provided helpful background support. 
I also received substantial assistance, input and guidance from numerous heterosexuals, 
both male and female. 
2.5.1 Questioning Norms 
Consistency in the frame of the researcher is a condition for the success of 
strategic intent (Eden & Huxham, 1996, p. 533). In this case, the intention is to draw the 
intelligence of Members of the European Parliament to matters of language ideology and 
the (collective, ritualized) communication practices that they inspire in order to motivate 
a broad re-evaluation of assumptions about interpreting practices.81 “The really valuable 
insights,” say Eden and Huxham, “are often those that emerge… in ways that cannot be 
foreseen” (p. 533). Real surprises did in fact emerge, slowly and over time, through a 
continuous process of conversational interviews loosely following Kolb’s (1984) 
experiential learning cycle of inquiry, comprehension, re-evaluation, and new/revised 
comprehension. In these conversations, I would ask questions, text my comprehension, 
re-consider new/different angles and perceptions, generate new understandings and 
generally do a lot of thinking out loud. 
                                                
80  In reference to gender and “multiple inequalities” in the EU, Mieke Verloo argues: “It 
has become clear that attention to structural mechanisms and to the role of the state 
and the private sphere in reproducing inequalities is much needed” (2006, p. 211). 
81  For instance: “The negative effects of these [identified] factors [of source language 
production by MEPs] on the interpreter’s performance have been discussed in the SI 
literature (e.g., Gerver 1969, Seleskovitch 1982, Lederer 1978/2002), yet the practice 
of reading out written speeches from manuscripts continues” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 
184). 
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In order to really comprehend the system, it was necessary for me to question 
norms and explore the boundaries of acceptable practice. Occasionally this brought me 
into conflict with the administration, enough so that at one point I thought about calling 
the method guerrilla research. In an effort to pursue “the opportunities for triangulation 
that do not offer themselves with other methods” (Eden & Huxhom, 1996, p. 539), on 
one occasion (during the second research period, 2008-2009), I slipped postcards under 
the doors of the interpreters’ booths during a meeting that I was observing, asking them 
to email me if they noticed any glitches with the communication. The principle of action 
research is that such efforts must be “exploited fully and reported. They should be used as 
a dialectical device” (p 539). 
Soon afterwards, I was cautioned that my badge (issued by an MEP) would be 
revoked (by the administration) if I entered the interpreters’ booth space again. On 
another occasion, after being advised (from the left hand, so to speak) that interpreters 
might be willing to help me on a volunteer basis during unscheduled time, interpreters 
were directed (from the right hand, as it were) not to cooperate with my requests for 
interpreting assistance. After these boundaries were established I was cautious not to 
violate them, although I did persist in posting in my blog and some people (from within 
and outside of Parliament) did engage me via email. 
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There were public demonstrations of support for my research by interpreters 
(some of whom held positions within the AIIC Negotiating Delegation for the EU82) who 
supported and encouraged me offline, and a few who would leave their booth and 
approach me, visible to everyone, where I sat for observations at a desk on the floor of 
meeting rooms, asking if they could be of particular assistance to me in that setting. The 
politics of my presence was made apparent. My hope, then and now, is to transcend 
controversy by focusing on the research outcomes, which are of general interest to 
anyone concerned with language difference and cultural equality, and in particular how 
these can be mobilized to stabilize economies and ease local conflict. 
2.6 The Premier Case Study 
In 2004, Anna-Riita Vuorikoski published her study of political speech in the 
European Parliament, assessing “whether interpreters’ versions of the speeches allowed 
the listeners to receive the same impression of the speakers’ messages and intentions as 
people receive when listening to the original” (p. 16). She gave special attention to the 
collaboration from Members in generating source texts (STs) that facilitate “an 
unhampered flow of communication in a meeting (cf Kalina 2002)” (p. 16). She focused 
particularly on qualities of “planned and scripted texts [that] are part of the discourse” 
during plenaries (p. 19), contrasting these with the orality (cf Shlesinger) of speeches 
                                                
82  The International Association of Conference Interpreters (AIIC) is “a worldwide 
representative organisation, AIIC…[who] negotiates the terms and conditions of the 
interpreters who work for the EU organisations. The sector includes several 
institutions, chief amongst them are: European Commission, European Parliament 
and the European Court of Justice. The AIIC-EU Agreement applies to all 
interpreters who work for the institutions, members and non-members alike.” 
Retrieved 4 March 2014, from http://aiic.net/directories/aiic/sectors/. 
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delivered without a written text. Her research is firmly planted in the equivalence 
paradigm, focused on “the faithful transmission of a source language message, rendered 
accurately in the target language” (emphasis in original, p. 19).83 [Notice: If I rewrote her 
statement to reflect the emphasis of this communication research it would be on 
transmission.]84 She clarifies, importantly, that “these criteria (accuracy, faithfulness, 
etc.) will not advance our understanding of SI quality unless they are linked with a 
theoretically grounded analysis of empirical material” (p. 88). 
Vuorikoski maintains the ideological hegemony of the original speaker’s source 
text through a concise yet comprehensive review of major models and theories of 
interpreting. She also cites studies (Kurz, 1989; Moser, 1995) confirming that the most 
                                                
83  “‘Equivalence’…is an old concept in translation studies…[it] has been chosen as the 
key concept for getting hold of the elusive idea of ‘sense consistency with the 
original message’, which, according to theories of interpreting, is not, and must 
never be, tantamount to word-for-word translation” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 22). 
Vuorikoski acknowledges that the framing of her “[research] question echoes 
Eugene Nida’s (1969) ideas of dynamic equivalence as well as the definition by 
Déjean Le Féal (1990)” (p. 25). She also cites Halverson (1998), Lederer (1977), 
Mackintosh (1995) and Snell-Hornby (1988).  
84  The argument will show that an exclusive emphasis on the transmission of 
information feeds the illusions of faithfulness and accuracy, ritually recreating the 
myth of their possibility rather than engaging what Vuorikoski also acknowledges:  
“on-the-job experiences both in the EP and elsewhere have repeatedly confirmed the 
observation that non-correspondences between the original speeches and their 
interpreted versions are the rule rather than an exception. This observation has been 
confirmed by I[nterpreting] S[tudies] scholars starting with Oléron and Nanpon 
(1965/2002), Gerver (1969/2002), and Barik (1975/2002)…[and others]” (2004, p. 
89-90). The argument of this dissertation is that the fact of non-correspondence 
neither invalidates meaning-making nor destroys meaningful connections (e.g., 
Chang, 1995). The fact of non-correspondence is not, however, construed as an 
excuse or justification for poor performances, but is predicated on faith in the 
integrity of interpreters. As Vuorikoski puts it, “We can take it for granted, however, 
that interpreters strive for maximum correspondence with the original speech, 
including maximum accuracy and faithfulness” (italics in original, p. 90). 
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important criteria for (so-called) “end users of SI” (p. 45) is the sense consistency of the 
interpreter’s version of ‘the message’ with the speaker’s version of ‘the message.’ Kurz’s 
and Moser’s surveys were influenced by a survey Bühler (1986) conducted of “linguistic 
(semantic) and extra-linguistic (pragmatic) criteria” used by established professionals 
within the profession when considering the admission of new professional colleagues to 
the elite International Association of Conference Interpreters (known by its French 
acronym, AIIC) (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 44). In other words, even though designed to 
assess the priorities of interpretees, the items available for rating by end-users were pre-
determined by interpreters. 
Recognizing some limits of this framing, such as the fact that “most members of 
the audience do not concentrate on comparing the original with the interpreter’s version 
even if it were technically possible” (p. 46), Vuorikoski (2004) designed another study85 
which investigated whether audience members believed the “interpreting had been 
‘informed’” (p. 46). Despite reducing the criteria and seeking to adapt the terminology 
for non-linguist laypersons, she still encountered difficulties: individuals did not 
necessarily attribute the same meanings to the terms, in some cases revealing that they 
did not interpret the dynamics of the interpreting process in the same ways as interpreters 
themselves. Vuorikoski concluded: “the quality criteria were not operational for research 
purposes as they meant different things to different people” (p. 47). 
Leaving aside the problem of assessing interpretees’ evaluations of interpreting 
quality, Vuorokoski refined her question to seek the features in target texts (TTs: the 
                                                
85  Prior to the 2004 study summarized in detail here. Vuorikoski conducted a survey 
with audience members in 1995, using the metric of “informed.” See Vuorikoski 
(1993, 1995, 1997).   
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interpreted versions of speeches) that “convey the ‘sense of the original message’, 
enabling those listening to the interpreters to have the same basis for creating an 
impression of the incoming speech as those listening directly to the original” (emphasis 
in original, 2004, p. 48). While acknowledging communication as transaction,86 
Vuorikoski presents her research fully within the traditional linguistics-oriented 
paradigm. She asserts that “professional interpreters have described the task of the 
interpreter…[in] the core issues of communication, that is, how ideas are expressed and 
how the ideas of others are understood” (p. 50). Vuorikoski’s focus is on the ideas (aka, 
information). 
Performing a comparative content analysis brought her right up against the 
problem of meaning. “Pragmatics together with cognitive linguistics, not to mention the 
key philosophers of language, provide a number of approaches to and definitions of what 
is meant by ‘meaning’. (See e.g., Meyer 1986; Leech 1991/1983: 30-35)” (Vuorikoski, 
2004, p. 59). Vuorikoski chooses a psycholinguistically-informed macro-structural 
method combining Pöchhacker (1994) and Shlesinger (1989a) in order to “focus…on the 
substance of the speeches and on the issue of the interpreter’s primary task of conveying 
this substance to listeners” (p. 59). She adapts Williams (2001) argumentation theory (in 
keeping with new rhetoric theory, e.g., Kenneth Burke, Chaim Perelman (1982) and 
Stephen Toulmin)87 for the content analysis rather than worrying about microtextual 
                                                
86  Quoting Hatim & Mason (1990), see more on the conceptual difference between 
interaction and transaction in chapter six. 
87  “New rhetoric covers all discourse that does not aim at general truths. In new 
rhetoric, ‘argument’ refers to the various textual means of aiming at either accepting 
or rejecting the thesis under dispute” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 60, cf Perelman & 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1958/1968).  
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errors or omissions. This move seems to open up more roles of participation in the 
interpreted event, because the role of the audience is crucial: “In Perelman’s view, there 
is no argumentation without an audience” (p. 60). 
The size of Vuorikoski’s (2004) corpus of “120 speeches and interventions” (p. 
91) made by MEPs and members of the European Commission during plenary debates in 
a hemicycle at the European Parliament, and the diligence of her analysis of the 
spontaneously-generated interpretations by European Parliament interpreters, are beyond 
impressive.88 She has carefully selected and blended insights from a variety of theorists in 
translation studies, discourse analysis (especially Adam, 1999) and cognitive linguistics 
(Setton, 1999). Controls are established to obtain a corpus across authentic, parallel 
simultaneous interpretations of original speeches to overcome the limitations of previous 
studies (cf Gile, 1990; Kalina, 1998; Setton, 1999; Pöchhacker, 1994). 
The conditions of video-recording several interpreters’ simultaneous 
interpretations for comparison with the video-recorded original speeches by Members are 
carefully laid out within the macrostructure of the European Parliament as a producer of 
its own unique genre. The specific context of each recorded plenary meeting is explained 
                                                
88  The 120 original speeches include 54 in English, 11 in Finnish, 44 in German and 11 
in Swedish, and “includes the interpretations of these speeches into these four 
languages, i.e., three [target text] versions of each speech” and “the verbatim reports 
…[which] contain slightly edited versions of all the speeches in the original 
languages” and additional supporting materials (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 92). Seventy-
seven speakers compose the entire corpus; excluded are speeches made in Danish, 
Dutch, French, Greek, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish (p. 96). For the analysis, there 
are “65 speeches by 50 speakers…the exact number of interpreters…is more difficult 
to count…the 37 interpreters (three per language booth plus the extra pivots) take 
their turns according to their language combination. A rough estimate of the number 
of interpreters included in the corpus is 30; the report discusses the TTs of around 20 
interpreters” (p. 97-98). 
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within the context of a very structured monthly flow of committee and political group 
meetings (two weeks and one week, respectively) in preparation for the full parliament 
plenaries (one week). She explains that most utterances of Members in debate are 
document-driven, that is, in reference to a report or pending piece of legislation, although 
some refer to institutional issues or politics more broadly. 
With the exception of the meetings of the political groups, the debates of 
all the regular meetings are based on documents, most typically draft 
legislation. This has an immediate influence on the nature of the discourse 
that interpreters are expected to interpret. The printed documents contain 
not only codes, terms and concepts that are part of the speakers’ discourse, 
but they also contain text passages that speakers may quote by reciting 
them from the documents. (p. 80) 
The provision of documents in a timely manner is thus one indicator of Members’ 
collaboration with interpreters. Vuorikoski does not elaborate on this except to point out 
situations when “interpreters received them shortly prior to the start of the debate, which 
meant that there was not enough time to read the documents beforehand” (p. 82).89 
Overall, Vuorikoski proceeds on the presumption that “the speaker plays a crucial role in 
the achievement of quality in interpreting…the key question…to explore is what 
facilitates this collaboration and what may obstruct it” (p. 88). 
Refining the research question, Vuorikoski moves to investigate the extent to 
which non-correspondences (that is, non-equivalencies) between the interpreted version 
and the original version “hamper the listener from creating an equivalent representation 
of the speaker’s message to that of a fellow member of the audience listening to the 
                                                
89  “The documents containing the MEPs’ draft resolutions only reach the interpreters’ 
booths shortly before they are discussed. Consequently, interpreters have only a 
limited time to have a look at them before the debate begins” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 
216). 
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original speaker” (2004, p. 90). She could be establishing a foundation for broadening the 
analysis from a strict comparison between the two texts (original, interpreted) to include a 
triangulation of meaning-making among audience members. Most significantly, by the 
careful research design guaranteeing multiple versions generated under identical 
conditions, Vuorikoski has established a way of locating common causes for omissions 
and errors (classic evidence of non-correspondence) in the source language as uttered by 
the speaker rather than in the interpreted version rendered by the interpreter. 
Building on the assumption that interpreters are aiming for maximum 
correspondence, however it is labelled (as accuracy or faithfulness), “if at least two of the 
three interpreters fail to convey information that is relevant or important considering the 
speech as an entity, this failure may be caused by some characteristic in the ST [source 
text]” (emphasis in original, Vuorkikoski, 2004, p. 98). Her goal is “to find features in the 
STs that can be used to determine the de facto constraints of the SI method” (p. 100). 
Vuorikoski distinguishes between “minor non-correspondences between the STs and TTs 
which…shift the angle or emphasis of the original to some extent, but the audience will 
still get the main gist of the speaker’s message…[and instances when] the information 
content of the ST may be translated [sic] incorrectly, or that essential elements of the 
content have been omitted” (p. 104). 
In keeping with the political context, three categories of deviations (in the TT 
from the ST) proved significant: rhetorical devices, argumentation features, and semantic 
or propositional content (Vuorkikoski, 2004, p. 107). These are explored in “different text 
profiles from the point of view of SI processing”: specifically a general topic that “does 
not set high demands;” an EU topic requiring institutional knowledge, and topics or 
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issues “which require an up-to-date knowledge of world affairs” (p. 117). These typical 
(to the EP) text profiles are broken down in terms of the main arguments and speech acts 
in the ST and the non-correspondences in the TTs (p. 118). Crucially, in the context of 
the EP, the most important goals of argumentation are “1) to make the audience adhere to 
the argumentation; 2) to make the argumentation more effective; 3) to make the argument 
more persuasive” (Vuorikoski summarizing Perelman, 2004, p. 126). 
2.6.1 Key Finding: Social Problems are More Relevant than Linguistic Problems 
Regarding the matter of speakers collaborating with interpreters, the most 
consistent and dramatic patterns involve speed. Both the pace of delivery and turn-taking 
often occur too quickly for interpreters to accomplish a quality rendition. For instance, 
In the corpus at hand, interpreters often omit material from the final points 
of the speech. This may be determined by the speech situation where 
interpreters have to finish speaking immediately after the speaker has 
stopped, as the President will give the floor to the next speaker, 
mentioning his name and political group. These are items that must be 
rendered by the interpreters, too. Here is a paradoxical situation. 
Interpreters are instructed to lag behind the speaker in order to get hold of 
the idea he [or she] is developing before producing their SI version. Yet in 
the fast moving debate interpreters must stop speaking as soon as the 
speaker finishes. Thus, even if they only lag a little bit behind the speaker 
they may have to skip several items of the speech, or condense the final 
phrases into something that sounds logical in the context. Consequently, 
the rhetorical effect of the original speech is lost in the TTs. (Vuorikoski, 
2004, p. 126) 
Vuorikoski’s finding confirms and corroborates Gerver’s previous finding (1969/2002), 
in which he “was able to conclude that simultaneous interpreting provides empirical 
proof of ‘an information-handling system which is subject to overload if required to 
carry out more complex processes at too fast a rate and copes with overload by reaching 
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a steady state of throughput at the expense of an increase in errors and omissions’” 
(emphasis in original, Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 99). 
In other words, in addition to the pace demand, the desire for flow forces 
interpreters to (try to) generate prosody (‘something that sounds logical’) according to the 
(familiar) terms of the target language (an example of what Venuti would call 
domestication) at the expense of the (supposedly more important) content of the source 
language. Also, the equivalence criterion of ‘sense consistency with the original message’ 
combined with the time demand often puts interpreters in the position of needing to 
choose between “the semantic content and the illocutionary force of an argument” 
(Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 128). As with any speech act in any communication event, “It is up 
to each interpreter to decide what that ‘sense’ is” (p. 131); each interpretee and non-
interpretee (in the case of Members listening to the original because they share that 
language) also individually decides ‘the sense’ of the message. Rarely questioned is the 
assumption that all listeners (without the mediation of SI) not only could, but actually do 
interpret the original in the same way. Assuming a uniform, automatic correspondence of 
comprehension between source text and all receivers is also troubled by the evidence of 
non-correspondences in interpreted texts. 
Specifically, “when the speaker’s rate of delivery is fast, and the ST syntax is 
complicated, consisting of agent constructions and several qualifiers, for example, 
interpreters are no longer able to convey all the lexical and illocutionary elements of the 
speech” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 142-143). The speech act category of implied criticism is 
also more difficult to interpret “in a rapid flow of speech” (p. 143). Additionally, 
“metaphorical language is often the reason for discontinuities in the TT’s” (p. 150) and 
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“in most cases, figurative speech is not conveyed successfully in the TTs” (p. 163). 
Vuorikoski does not speculate if a reason for this may be the (lack) of additional 
processing time provided to interpreters in order to comprehend the work that a metaphor 
is being used for in the given instance and also compose a suitable parallel. She does 
make a temporal link with humor, irony and sarcasm: “these rhetoric devices may not be 
easy to identify in a rapid flow of speech, nor to translate and produce at the pace set by 
the speaker” (p. 167). 
Vuorikoski also suggests that omissions or inaccuracies in interpreting “EU-
related concepts” into TTs (2004, p. 172), which are assumed to be known by interpreters 
on the basis of experience and general job preparation,90 “may be due to the fast rate at 
which the speaker reads” (p. 173). She contextualizes non-correspondences involving 
retour interpretations: “It has to be borne in mind, again, that the STs were written and 
read from scripts without pauses or marked emphasis on individual terms, concepts or 
other keywords” (p. 177). “Even the most frequent abbreviations,” she continues, 
“…[tend] to suffer in a rapid stream of ST speech, complicated by a relatively dense 
syntax…as well as colorful expressions (‘tinkering with funding’) in collocation with EU 
terminology ([in this case] CAP programs)” (p. 178-179). Generally, “an increase in 
presentation rate, and a decrease in the length and number of pauses separating meaning 
units, correlate positively with the number of omissions and errors” (p. 236). 
                                                
90  “Speakers expect the names of the various EU or other international conferences to 
be shared knowledge” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 170); and  “In terms of shared 
background knowledge it can be assumed that MEPs as well as interpreters with 
experience at the EP know what is meant by the various Objectives and how the 
Structural Funds are governed and administered” (p. 202). 
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Tools that work to clue interpreters in to features of argumentation include 
repetition (e.g., p. 148); rhetorical questions (p. 148-149); “using uncomplicated 
[syntactical] structures” (p. 197); “coherence…which focuses on one point” (p. 197); 
“focusing on key issues...[and] present[ing] ideas or questions in a straightforward 
manner” (p. 206); “clearly marked themes” (p. 226); “adjust[ing written speeches] for 
oral presentation” (p. 226); and contributing to prior knowledge of interpreters through 
advance provision of documents. When “interpreters have the opportunity to become 
familiar with the topic and the key concepts of the meeting[,] They can therefore be 
expected to have at least some degree of shared knowledge with the speakers” (emphasis 
added, p. 152). Implied is that speeches that conform to a rhetorical pattern consistent 
with the unique genre of the EP are also more likely to be interpreted effectively. These 
rhetorical features include: 
● the speeches are characterized by traditional structure of argumentation: the speakers 
introduce their topic, discuss it, and conclude by presenting their final point; 
● the main arguments are based on values shared by EU; 
o the MEPs are acting as guardians of democracy; 
o MEPs as spokesmen of the citizens; 
o they emphasize the role of the European Parliament; 
● they indicate the speakers’ stance towards the topic of the meeting. (Vuorikoski, 
2004, p. 153) 
 
This is a discourse structure that interpreters will assume as a roadmap to where one is 
going (see Tebble on discourse analysis in chapter three). 
One speech in Vuorikoski’s corpus “contained the largest number of various types 
of non-correspondences with the original. The speech is clearly a carefully prepared 
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written document. The speaker simply read it out loud from the manuscript and most of 
the argumentation was lost in all three TT versions” (2004, p. 154). Interpreters seemed 
not to have had access to the prepared text; or at least not in time to actually read and 
process it.  
[This] confirms what Setton has observed in his study: ‘Even in 
professional SI, serious breakdowns may occur when concentrated written 
text is read as it stands with no warning or documentary support, […]” 
(1999: 256). 
In contrast to that German speech, the English speeches delivered [in the 
same setting] can all be characterized as more spoken-like in their rhetoric 
formation and their argumentation. There are very few instances where all 
three interpreters omit relevant items or argumentation or distort the 
meaning altogether. (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 154) 
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All of the analysis leads to a major conclusion: “Failures in TTs are to a large extent 
linked with the characteristics of the ST” (p. 155).91 
2.6.1.1 The Unshared Knowledge Constraint 
It is well established in the SI literature that “the availability—or 
unavailability—of shared information may affect the interpreter’s reconstruction of the 
speaker’s message (Shlesinger 1995b: 195)” (in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 216). For her 
(2004) research, Vuorikoski included a session called ‘debates on topical and urgent 
subjects of major importance’ based on her own experience. “When I was working as a 
freelance interpreter for the EU…this session taxes the interpreter’s world knowledge 
                                                
91  Not allowing time exacerbates other problems in the source texts (STs), which 
include: use of “a coined compound like ‘intergovernmentalism’” (p. 165); sarcastic 
analogies (p. 166); “a witty rhetoric device of adapting a familiar figure of speech” 
(p. 166-167); “ad hoc metaphors” (p. 169); personification (p. 171-172); “if the 
speaker refers to isolated issues…as well as political items…which have no 
metatextual links to previous utterances” (p. 174) or are “lack[ing] metatextual 
elements for linking the various items, or for foregrounding them” (p. 191); 
acronyms and/or “the reasons for referring to them” can be problematic during retour 
(p. 175); complicated syntax such as deixis, reiteration, and “the use of marked 
syntactic constructions like [in this example] nicht +noun – sondern + noun) in order 
to highlight the main argument” (p. 180), and (for an example of complicated syntax 
in English) a segment containing “eight elements that need to be 
processed…[including] some of these items do not have a direct equivalent in other 
languages (‘fail to complete’, telecoms’)” (p. 182);  “ideas are expressed in long and 
complicated sentences” (p. 184) or “dense with references to various proper names 
and concepts” (p. 191); “facts and figures are easily confused” (p. 222); “lists” (p. 
228); “semantically close lexical units” (p. 221); “alternating between reading 
from…notes and speaking freely” (p. 199); in sum, certain syntactic elements such 
as “linguistic devices creating cohesion and coherence in a written text; negative 
constructions; genitive constructions with several modifiers; elliptic infinite 
constructions that contain several objects” are “unsuited for the oral translation [sic] 
of aurally received texts” (emphasis added, p. 208).  In particular, “Speeches [that] 
have been prepared and written in advance [if] they tend to follow the cohesive 
devices that are characteristic of literary style” (p. 226).  
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even more than either the debates on the reports dealing with draft legislation or the 
debates dealing with EU institutional issues” (p. 216). The sample reported in her 
analysis includes “human rights issues…that could be described as exotic or remote 
from the point of view of a rank-and-file interpreter” (p. 218). Again, she notes that 
many (if not most or even nearly all) of the identified problems with STs are 
compounded by “the fact that speakers read their texts, referring to issues and names 
that are not known to the interpreters” (p. 231). 
Sharing knowledge is possible only under conditions of “mutual intelligibility” 
(drawing upon Bakhtin (1984), in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 68). This is the lens Vuorikoski 
applies: “The discourse of the European Parliament…is an example of a genre created 
within one institution, and the features of this genre can be studied from the point of 
view of discourse analysis, pragmatics in particular, and text linguistics” (p. 67-68). 
Generating “mutual understanding” (p. 206) requires conformity to the capability 
constraints of simultaneous interpretation. These are empirically identified and 
theoretically explained by Vuorikoski in support of previous assertions and theory 
regarding the factual nature of these constraints. Her results demonstrate divergences 
in genre performances by Members of the European Parliament from the conditions 
required to generate shared understanding across language differences. 
Reading verbatim from texts written with literary conventions violates orality. 
“Shlesinger [1989] uses ‘orality’ to mean the spoken-like vs written-like character of the 
text, as distinct from its mode” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 42). Two of Shlesinger’s four 
parameters of orality are relevant to Vuorikoski’s study: the “degree of planning” (which 
implicates time) and “shared context and knowledge” (p. 42) “Shared context, which 
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includes knowledge pertaining to the speaker; the intention of the utterance; situational 
and circumstantial parameters, and other extralinguistic knowledge” (emphasis in 
original, p. 43) comes into play with the provision of speech texts and other supporting 
documentation prior to interpreting assignments. “When evaluating the performances of 
the interpreters in the present corpus, the parameter of shared context is crucial, and the 
aspect of shared knowledge in particular” (p. 43).92 
Meetings for urgent issues involving human rights and democracy are conducted 
under the same regime of simultaneous interpretation as other meetings. Interpreters may 
or may not receive documentation or texts of speeches in advance. “The speaker has been 
assigned 3 minutes’ speaking time. He has a written speech which he recites in a manner 
typical of a classroom reading exercise” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 219). The analysis in this 
context highlights the impact of the lack of shared knowledge between MEPs and 
interpreters (p. 96). “The more specific the speaker is, the less of the content of the 
speech is conveyed in the TT. This is even more so when the speech is read at a fast rate” 
(p. 219). Comparing the practically random scene of an urgent meeting with the scene of 
other meetings in which interpreters have already read the report and related documents, 
                                                
92  Vuorikoski presents Lederer’s view on shared knowledge in relation to notions of 
equivalence: “For Lederer, finding an ’equivalent’ expression in the TL is not the 
best method of interpreting. In her view, the important element of ’intelligent’ 
interpreting is to be free of the wording of the original speech. According to her 
theory, the best method is to produce an ’intelligent’ interpretation instead of merely 
establishing equivalents between two languages. According to her observations, this 
procedure is resorted to by interpreters until they have accumulated shared 
knowledge with the speaker(s). Once the interpreter begins to understand the theme 
and topic of the speech he is translating, he probes more and more deeply into the 
intended meaning of the speaker, leading to a different SI technique where the 
interpretation departs from the linguistic meaning of the source text (1978/2001: 
132)” (in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 53). 
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Vuorikoski’s empirical evidence shows beyond a doubt that “the interpreter’s knowledge 
of the topic of the meeting does, in fact, have a positive effect on the quality of 
interpreting’ (p. 152). 
Three inter-related features of the system of SI in the EP are drawn into high-
relief by Vuorikoski’s study: temporality, varying quality of source text production by 
speakers, and the degree of effort given to constructing shared knowledge among 
interpreters and interpretees within the shared institutional context. Another problem that 
confounds interpretation involves the integrity of speakers’ utterances. “Accuracy of 
interpreting would be greatly enhanced if the speech acts were conveyed faithfully. The 
party addressed, or the person used by the speaker, as well as the political group the 
speaker commits himself to, should be rendered faithfully” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 208-
209).93 
2.6.1.2 An Integrity Problem? 
“If it is in the speaker’s interest that his [or her] speech is conveyed accurately 
and faithfully by the interpreters, he [or she] could collaborate with interpreters by 
avoiding the ST features enumerated” as problematic (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 236). 
Members of the European Parliament could speak more slowly, provide more and longer 
                                                
93  Raunio (1996) explores the behavior of political groups in the EP during the fifth 
term (1989-1994), which is the term previous to the ‘big bang enlargement’ term 
covered here. Hill (2000) describes “ideological complexity” in campaign speech in 
the United States “distinguish[ing] two distinct language ideological discourses: the 
discourse of truth and the discourse of theater. The former is a more popular 
perspective grounded in expectations of ‘informed choice’ and ‘full disclosure’ and 
indexically linked to personalist readings of ‘moral character.’ The latter discourse is 
controlled by campaign specialists who worry about their candidate’s ‘performing’ 
their ‘messages’ in appropriately staged venues” (Kroskrity, 2000, p. 18). 
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pauses, minimize textual density, and adapt written scripts to an oral presentation style. 
Vuorikoski has asked, “If the argumentation, the speech act, and the relevant vocabulary 
are not rendered in the TT, what are the features in the ST that explain the shortcomings 
in equivalence?” (p. 158). My fieldwork shows that some advice about structuring their 
speeches to be more amenable to interpretation is either given to Members formally or 
they learn it on their own; the question then becomes, why are Members not 
cooperating? 
For instance, why do Members persist in reading from manuscripts as fast as 
possible without inflection when there is incontrovertible evidence this ST production 
leads to interpreting errors?94 Why is the matter of interpreter overload ignored even as 
MEPs complain about the evidence when “the interpreter’s output suffers, showing an 
increase in the number of errors and omissions?” (p. 194). If interpreters’ outputs show 
evidence of strain, this is a signal to the institution not only about information transfer, 
but, importantly, about rituals of communication that establish identity and 
relationship. 
The problem is no longer a question about language and linguistics; it is a 
question about social organization and relationships characterized by, and encompassing, 
language difference. Bear in mind that Vuorikoski set out to identify and “highlight the 
constraints involved in the simultaneous mode of translation [sic]” (2004, p. 185). Her 
assumption “that failures in the parallel TTs in the same segment of the same ST will 
provide empirical data about textual features that hamper or obstruct an accurate 
                                                
94  Vuorikoski repeats the claim several times with increasing stridency: “The 
simultaneous mode is particularly ill suited for the translation [sic] of a written 
speech which is read from notes at a fast rate” (2004, p. 204). 
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rendering of the ST [by interpreters]” (p. 184) is supported by her close analysis. To 
make the case, she selected samples from the corpus that showed these problems; not 
samples that effectively generated equivalence.95, 96 
In nearly all cases, even the most egregious speeches, “there are segments that are 
rendered quite successfully” (p. 205). Vuorikoski (2004) determined that “the more 
closely interpreters conveyed elements related to argumentation, the more accurately they 
managed to convey the sense of the message. These elements are not strictly language-
specific; instead, they are used to express a speaker’s line of reasoning in a way which is 
common to all” and (not incidentally!) helps all listeners (my emphasis, p. 234). 
Functional linguistics and textual analysis undergirds the new rhetoric/argumentation 
theory Vuorikoski has deployed to diagnose the problem.97 Another frame is needed to 
move to the next level. 
                                                
95  “The segments that were selected for close scrutiny…represent topics and linguistic 
features that at least two out of three interpreters did not render correctly” (p. 236). 
96  Vuorikoski also emphasizes the necessity of interpreter fluency, their “knowledge 
and command of the languages in question” (p. 236) and notes differences between 
novice and experienced EP interpreters based on the time required to build sufficient 
institutional and contextual shared knowledge (p. 174). 
97  “Linguistics has always been interested in problems because they bring out the contrast 
between what is ’normal’ or ’standard’ and what requires further study. In the present 
investigation, the problem segments were selected in order to highlight the factors 
which make simultaneous interpreting difficult” (p. 236). Vuorikoski names “three 
main angles” of analysis suited to the EP’s unique genre (rhetorical elements, speech 
acts, and the semantic and syntactic aspects of the speeches) “based on the premise that 
essential elements of the sense of the message are contained in argumentation” (p. 233). 
95 
2.7 Scrutinizing a Scandal 
As we have seen, theoretical diversification and ungroundedness in translation 
studies was challenged by Venuti and others (e.g., Aiu, 2010; Carcelen-Estrada, 2010; 
Gentzler, 2008; Tymoczko, 2007, 2010). In particular, Venuti’s (1998) The Scandals of 
Translation: Towards an Ethics of Difference explores, among other things, the “self-
inflicted marginality” (p. x) of translation studies. “With rare exceptions,” Venuti argues, 
“scholars have been reluctant to negotiate areas of agreement and to engage more deeply 
with the cultural, political, and institutional problems posed by translation (for an 
exception see Hatim and Mason 1997)” (p. 9).98 In contrast, interpreting studies appears 
to be trying to negotiate intradisciplinary agreement without taking critical stock of the 
cultural, political and institutional problems evident to at least some participants in the 
field.99 This dissertation addresses this gap through a combination of foreignization and 
critical discourse analysis. Juxtaposing a collectivized and empowered Deaf voice with 
some critical strands of translation research brings paradigm conflict into view, raising 
more questions than answers while charting, albeit optimistically, some potential 
strategies for social change. 
                                                
98  Basil Hatim and Ian Mason build their definition of translation on the idea that all 
texts are seen ‘as evidence of a communicative transaction taking place within a 
social framework’ (original emphasis)…according to them, translation—including 
simultaneous interpreting—is communicative discourse (1990: 2-3)” (in Vuorikoski, 
2004, p. 50). For instance, regarding argumentation, Hatim & Mason note that 
“persuasive strategies may differ in different cultures” (1997, p. 127). 
99  Critical in the context of use throughout this dissertation means taking stock of 
power and keeping power in the account. Fairclough (1989, 1995) is a key resource 
for critical discourse analysis, as is Stuart Hall, seminal to the field of cultural 
studies, which establishes a position from which “to take some bearings about the 
general question of the politics of theory” (Hall, 1992, p. 278).  
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While the selection of theorists and concepts utilized in service of this action 
research project may appear eclectic, it is not mere bricolage. I approach simultaneous 
interpretation as an institutionalized intercultural practice, that is, as a particular and 
specific kind of social organization that binds together people(s) who are inherently 
diverse and heterogeneous.100 While there is no one “organization” in the literal sense of 
a singular club, business, non-profit, governmental or other corporate entity that 
encompasses the whole social practice of simultaneous interpreting, the essential 
hypothesise of this research is that the social practice itself is unified and unifying, with 
both adverse consequences and productive implications. As an intercultural social 
practice, simultaneous interpretation communicates identities in time and regulates 
relationships in space. The entire presentation is framed as action learning into the realm 
                                                
100  Like any other social practice, interpreting and especially discourses about 
interpreting, are inherently ideological. Kroskrity (2000) proposes “it is profitable to 
think of ‘language ideologies’ as a cluster concept consisting of a number of 
converging dimensions” (p. 7). “First, language ideologies represent the perception 
of language and discourse that is constructed in the interest of a specific social or 
cultural group” (p. 8). “Second, language ideologies are profitably conceived as 
multiple because of the multiplicity of meaningful social divisions (class, gender, 
clan, elites, generations, and so on) within sociocultural groups that have the 
potential to produce divergent perspectives expressed as indices of group 
membership. Language ideologies are thus grounded in social experience which is 
never uniformly distributed throughout polities of any scale” (p. 12). “Third, 
members may display varying degrees of awareness of local language ideologies. 
While the Silverstein (1979) definition quoted above [see footnote #56] suggests that 
language ideologies may often be explicitly articulated by members, researchers also 
recognize ideologies of practice that must be read from actual usage” (p. 18-19). 
“Finally, members’ language ideologies mediate between social structures and 
forms of talk. The dynamic and synthetic role of ideologies is especially well-
captured in Silverstein’s (1985:220) appeal to the necessity of including this often 
neglected and delegitimated level of language analysis: ‘The total linguistic fact, the 
datum for a science of language, is irreducibly dialectic in nature. It is an unstable 
mutual interaction of meaningful sign forms contextualized to situations of interested 
human use and mediated by the fact of cultural ideology’” (in Kroskrity, p. 21). 
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of meta-discourse about simultaneous interpretation because it is an extension of the 
researcher’s critical reflections of personal and professional experience101 on two counts 
of being a privileged outsider: to Deaf culture102 and to conference interpreting.103 The 
on-going action research question involves whether this foray can be continued through 
engaging interpretees in addition to interpreters in more reflexivity about simultaneous 
interpretation as an activist strategy for maintaining language diversity and promoting 
cultural equality. 
Steyaert and Janssens (2013) define three strategies for introducing reflexivity 
into organizational thinking about languages: scrutinization, scandalization, and 
invention. These strategies neatly describe the “action” dimension of research conducted 
during conversational interviews with Members of the European Parliament. By engaging 
with Members as already critical and reflexive thinkers about interpreting, our 
conversations about the use and understanding of the system of interpreting in the EP 
generated insights about simultaneous interpretation as a potentially productive 
intervention in intercultural communication. For instance, by drawing Members’ 
attention to the presumed normalcy of ignoring the interpretation process, the apparently 
natural trend to using English as lingua franca (ELF) was (at least potentially) troubled. 
                                                
101  “Experience cannot be mistaken, though we may be misled by it” (Moore, 1996, p. 
73), discussing the philosophy of Henri Bergson. 
102  From the Deaf standpoint, I am Hearing person who learned American Sign 
Language as an adult, eventually becoming an interpreter through a mix of 
socializing and professional schooling. 
103  My status as an American researcher in Europe, my bilingualism involving a sign 
language rather than another spoken language, and my career in community 
interpreting all marked me as an outsider to the conference interpreting milieu in the 
European Parliament. 
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Steyaert and Janssons explain: 
The way we use and adopt languages is never natural; instead, it is the 
effect of a complex process with cultural, historical, institutional and 
political dimensions. Certain standard explanations or widespread 
discourses have been prioritized, implying that we have to be wary of any 
kind of naturalization in language practices. (p. 133) 
Establishing action research as the methodology allows investigatory latitude to deviate 
from pre-scripted interviews and pre-defined problematics to explore tangents and 
alternatives that were un-anticipated or otherwise emerge spontaneously during co-
intelligent dialogue.104 
The strategy of scrutinization (Steyaert and Jannsons, 2013) is used for 
“examining how certain linguistic resources are prioritized in the field and inquiring into 
the various consequences of that choice” (p. 136). Scrutizination was used pervasively, 
including when the other strategies of scandalization and invention were foregrounded. 
Attempting to generate “awareness of and agony about the hegemony of English” (p. 
134) through a scandalization strategy was not a preconceived goal of this action 
research. Rather, scandalization in this context was intended “to provocatively point out 
the flagrant problems with the current polices and practices” (p. 134) of the system of 
simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament. In other words, the targeted 
scandal was not the use of English, per se, but the less tangible implicit norms of 
expectation regarding the implementation and use of simultaneous interpretation. These 
norms include, for instance, prohibitions regarding interacting with simultaneous 
                                                
104  “In its broadest sense, co-intelligence involves accessing the wisdom of the whole on 
behalf of the whole” (Tom Atlee, The Co-Intelligence Institute. Retrieved 24 
February 2014, http://www.co-intelligence.org/). 
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interpreters. This interaction taboo (Kent, 2012) supports a normative ideology that 
positions interpreters as if they are not co-participants in this special practice of 
intercultural communication. 
What Steyaert and Jannsons call invention is a strategy for what Aristotle called 
productive knowledge. In contrast with theoretical knowledge, whose goal is truths, and 
practical knowledge, which aims at action, productive knowledge is “directed towards the 
creation of artifacts of all sorts…[specifically of] grasping the nature of the productive 
processes by which [for instance] tragedies and the tragic effects are produced” (in F.C.T. 
Moore, 1996, p. 70). Taken in total, cultural discourse from Deaf communities are 
ambivalent about interpreting. While the gains of communication access are notable and 
appreciated, the American Deaf community in particular can seem traumatized by 
interpreting moreso than rescued by it.105  
The ambition of this research project is to collect both theoretical and practical 
knowledge in service of productive knowledge. It is a daunting prospect made possible 
only through the stance of action learning. I have been regularly and consistently 
humbled by the wisdom of interviewees, professional interpreting colleagues, and 
academic peers and mentors. Their insights over the duration of this research project have 
contributed greatly to the resulting representation. “Precision,” according to Henri 
                                                
105  A primary resource for the assumptions and motivations of this research is the 
researcher’s lived experience (e.g., van Manen, 1990). 
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Bergson, a French philosopher who uses time as the measure of all things,106 “consists in 
the adaptation of methods,” specifically, “methods of enquiry to the subject-matter” 
(p.11). Jumping among interpersonal and institutional levels of analysis has served in the 
fashion of triangulation to sharpen and pinpoint the focus of interpretive critique on 
humans immediate awareness (or lack thereof) of durance, of what is being co-
constructed as human culture because of certain unquestioned practices of simultaneous 
interpretation and through the performances of these practices in intercultural social 
transaction. 
Bergson commentator F.C.T. Moore chooses durance in English as a translation 
for the French durée to emphasize Bergson’s wish to draw attention to “the fact or 
property of going through time” rather than “to refer to a measurable period of time 
during which something happens” as in the more literal translation, duration (emphasis in 
original, 1996, p. 58). Discourses about interpreting revolve around time in a way that 
recommend Bergson’s framing of this particular problematic: 
When we are concerned with measurement, as we frequently have good 
reason to be, we use a clock, taking it as the standard. But why should the 
motions of a clock be privileged? Why should the successive ticks or the 
successive vibrations of a quartz crystal, have a special lien on the value 
of t? (Bergson, in Moore, 1996, p. 61) 
 
                                                
106  “The flow of time of which we are aware at the level of individual consciousnesss, 
that flow which is misrepresented when we analyse it perforce into components, 
becomes the model for life itself” (Moore, 1996, p. 9). Note: Moore finds Bergson’s 
“attempt to create a sort of super-phenomenology for life itself, analogous to a 
phenomenology for an individual consciousness…dubious, though…he [Bergson] 
had some interesting arguments for it.” Moore links Bergson’s super-
phenomenology with “the fashion for ‘panpsychism’” (p. 9). 
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The research protocol asked for an initial 15 minute meeting. The idea was to establish a 
connection, observe the MEP at work and then follow-up when I had actual incidents that 
we could investigate together. Some MEPs were on the clock with the appointments but 
most were relaxed, indicating that we could continue talking past the scheduled end time. 
I interpreted this as interest in the subject. 
All conversations, interviews, readings, observations and participation in 
simultaneous interpretation by the researcher were done, as alertness and perception 
allowed, with durance and discursive consciousness in mind. 
102 
CHAPTER 3 
INTERPRETING STUDIES AND THE TRANSMISSION MODEL 
3.1 Conference and Community Simultaneous Interpretation 
Professional practitioners of simultaneous interpretation (SI) have typically been 
divided into two camps: conference interpreters and community interpreters. Simultaneous 
interpreters for the European Parliament exemplify the conference interpreter who works in 
elite international settings such as academic conferences, political negotiations, and 
multinational corporations. Simultaneous interpreters for the Deaf (i.e., sign language 
interpreters) exemplify the community interpreter who works in the every day world of 
citizens, linguistic minorities, foreigners, and non-dominant language speakers as they 
access social services, acquire education and training, participate in workplaces as 
employees or managers, receive medical care, and navigate legal proceedings. Is the 
orientation to language similar or different in these two contexts of ‘conference’ and 
‘community’? Do the differences or similarities distinguish simultaneous interpretation 
from translation? Just as Translation Studies has historically subsumed Interpreting Studies, 
conference interpreting has dominated community interpreting. The following analysis of a 
selected literature from Interpreting Studies deliberately spotlights community interpreters. 
Ozolins & Hale state the first Critical Link conference in 1995 “served as an 
introduction to the international state of affairs” (2009, p. 1), implying that the present 
volume likewise represents the academic view of current conditions, thoughts, and 
concerns germane to the development of community interpreting at the global level. 
Given that the chapters in this (2009) volume overtly focus on themes of quality and 
shared responsibility, they provide an historical, situated snapshot of contemporary 
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academic discourse about “quality” and “responsibility” in SI. Implicit in the discourse 
are also attitudes about “sharing” which will be explored later. 
3.2 State of the Research in Interpreting Studies 
Community interpreting is one of many social fields of intercultural interaction in our 
time, an era characterized by contradictions of social comfort, transnational backlash, 
economic crisis, unprecedented technological advancement, paradigm multiplication, and the 
sixth mass extinction.107 This snapshot in time is provided through a critical, 
deconstructionist-type of discourse analysis of contributions to the premier publication of 
community interpreting, the proceedings of the biennial, international Critical Link 
conferences. The volume chosen to contextualize community interpreting research and theory 
was published in 2009, containing papers presented at the 2007 conference in Sydney, 
Australia. This time period corresponds with the data collection from fieldwork undertaken at 
the European Parliament, which is elaborated in subsequent chapters. Critical Link 5: Quality 
in Interpreting - A Shared Responsibility (Hale, Ozolins & Stern, 2009) illustrates 
marginalization as an everyday characteristic of this field of labor. Despite tremendous growth 
in the scholarly study of community interpreting since the first Critical Link conference in 
                                                
107  The sixth mass extinction is sometimes being called the Holocene extinction. It is 
firmly established as anthropocentric, that is, human-caused. Conservative estimates 
anticipate the loss of half the biodiversity on earth in less than 80 years. More 
alarming estimates by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (May 13, 
2013) involve drastic changes that threaten the continued existence of homo sapiens. 
Retrieved 5 April 2014, http://www.ipcc.ch/  
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1995, fifteen years later Ozolins & Hale report108 “those who use interpreting services very 
rarely understand the complexities of the process or the role of the interpreter” (p. 3). 
The contributions to Critical Link 5: Quality in Interpreting - A Shared 
Responsibility (henceforth, CL5) demonstrate that supporting and promoting community 
interpretation remains a tremendous social and democratic challenge. Even those 
countries that provided early models of well-institutionalized service provision, such as 
Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States, are “still struggling with issues of 
status, quality of services and professionalism” (Ozolins & Hale, 2009, p. 1). This leads 
contributors González & Auzmendi to assert, “It is crucial that the authorities get 
involved in the development of this profession” (2009, p. 146). The “authorities” 
apparently means government officials and policy-makers, not necessarily interpretee 
participants whose own orientations to language greatly influence the ways simultaneous 
interpretation is performed. Whether the users of community SI understand SI as a 
particular kind of intercultural communication is not at all clear.  
This timesnap of literature shows interpreter frustration with user confusion around 
exercising voice in this less-than-common communication situation. Voice is used here in the 
                                                
108  Rather than the customary academic protocol of disassociating authors from the ideas 
they propound, this critical discourse analysis of a representative sample of literature in 
the field of community interpreting foregrounds researchers’ voice(s) in the academic 
milieu. Representing knowledge is paradigmatic (e.g., Kuhn, 1962) and ideological (e.g., 
Hall, 1962; Kroskrity, 2000). “At moments of transition from one intellectual epoch to 
another, the strains within a given system of thought become unsupportable and need to 
be removed. When this happens, the absolute presumptions of the era are themselves 
called in question, and normal rational debate ceases to be possible. There are no longer 
agreed procedures for settling differences, or a shared vocabulary in which to discuss 
them” (Toulmin, 1972, p. 100). This absence of shared vocabulary under conditions of 
paradigm shift motivates the intervention of interpreters, and calls for the rapid skills 
development of interpretees in order to generate new procedures for settling differences. 
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technical, sociolinguistic sense: as a measure of effective communication, that is, 
communication that results in something close to what is sought (e.g., Blommaert, 2005). Users 
represented in the chapters of CL5 include: the clerical assistant in Austrian asylum hearings 
who is responsible for recording the written record (Pöchhacker & Kolb, 2009); plaintiffs caught 
between Chinese legal translators and interpreters in Hong Kong’s bilingual courts (Ng, 2009); 
members of the Australian judiciary (Roberts-Smith, 2009); Aboriginal families and community 
members (Cooke, 2009); healthcare providers in Italy accommodating English-speaking patients 
(Blignault, Stephanou & Barrett, 2009; Merlini & Favaron, 2009); biomedical researchers in 
Canada (Kaufert, Kaufert & LaBine, 2009), non-deaf “hearing” jurists in the presence of 
Australian sign language (Auslan) interpretation (as explored in a simulation by Napier, Spencer 
& Sabolcec, 2009); and a witness bursting into a special kind of song known as a bertso while 
giving legal testimony in Basque Country (González & Auzmendi, 2009). Although interpreting 
in the European Parliament is generally understood as “conference interpreting,” Members of 
the European Parliament (MEPs) refer to themselves as representatives and participants in an 
over-arching “European community” (emphasis added).109 As community-oriented interpretees, 
MEPs are also represented as users and participants in SI through the expressed concerns of 
conference interpreters for the European Parliament (Kent, 2009). 
                                                
109  Vuorikoski (2000): “Democracy is one of the primary values upheld by the EP 
rhetoric; a quantitative analysis revealed that ’democracy’ appears in the EP 
speeches more frequently than in ordinary journalese (Wordsmith analysis against a 
million word corpus of UK journalistic texts). The concept of democracy also 
includes the idea of open markets… (p. 129); and “In their role of guardians of 
democracy the MEPs also act as spokespersons of the citizens” (p. 130); in sum, 
“…the EP rhetoric, which is based on the shared values of democracy, on an open 
market economy and the supremacy of the interests of the citizens/consumers” (p. 
147). Overall, “democracy and human rights are two of the core values which are 
defended by MEPs” (emphasis in original, p. 187). 
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Table 1. Languages and Settings from One Volume of Research on Community 
Interpreting in 2009 
Authors Countries Institution Institutional Language Community Languages 
Ozolins & 
Hale 
not country-
specific 
International 
conference & 
research 
literature 
English  
Roberts-
Smith Australia 
Legal – 
Criminal 
Trials 
English 
a language of Papua New Guinea,a 
a “native tongue” of Australia, 
Punjabi, Auslan, a Chinese 
language, Malayalam, Portuguese, 
Spanish, several Aboriginal 
languages. By inference an 
indigenous Canadian language, 
perhaps Greek and Japanese 
Ng China (Hong Kong) 
Legal – 
Criminal 
Trials 
English Chinese, Cantonese, “other Chinese dialects,” Mandarin 
Kent 
European 
Union 
(European 
Parliament) 
Government 
Dutchb, English, 
Finnish, French, 
German, Greek, 
Hungarian, Italian, 
Lithuanian, Polish, 
Portuguese, Spanish, 
& Swedish 
Dutch, English, Finnish, French, 
German, Greek, Hungarian, 
Italian, Lithuanian, Polish, 
Portuguese, Spanish, Swedish 
Garrett Australia Healthcare English 
Mentioned: “Chinese languages, 
Vietnamese, Arabic, Italian and 
Greek” but the specific languages 
of participants in the study are not 
named.c 
Cooke 
Australia 
(Northern 
Territory) 
Aboriginal 
customary law English 
Djambarrpuyngu, “thirty or so 
Aboriginal languages,” “an 
Aboriginal pidgin.” By inference: 
Eora / Dharawal / Darug, and some 
Yolŋu Matha languages. 
Napier, 
Spencer & 
Sabolcec 
Australia Legal – Jury Duty English 
Australian Sign Language 
(Auslan); mentions American Sign 
Language. 
Pöchhacker 
& Kolb 
Austria 
 
Legal – 
Asylum 
Hearings 
German 
English. Levels of English fluency 
of study participants are not clear. 
English is the official language of 
Gambia and Zimbabwe. 
Participants from Nigeria may be 
more fluent in a Niger-Congo or 
Afroasiatic language. 
González 
& 
Basque 
Country Legal – Court 
Batua (unified, 
standard Basque) 
Spanish and the six dialects of 
Euskera (the Basque languages): 
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Authors Countries Institution Institutional Language Community Languages 
Auzmendi Biscayan, Guipuzcoan, High 
Navaresse, Low Navaresse, 
Labourdin and Souletin. 
Ortega 
Herráez, 
Abril Martí 
& Martin 
Spain 
Hospitals, 
social 
services, 
emergency & 
civil defense 
organizations, 
security forces 
& courts. 
Spanish 
English, French, Arabic, Italian, 
Portuguese, Russian, Basque, 
Galician, Polish, Romanian, 
Berber, Catalan, Chinese, Czech, 
Greek, Dutch, Albanian, 
Bulgarian, Slovak, Japanese, 
Macedonian, Moldovian, Serbian-
Croatian, Ukrainian, German, 
Lithuanian, Wolof, Urdu, Punjabi, 
Hindi 
Lee Australia 
Professional 
Interpreter 
Rating/ 
Assessment 
English Korean 
Merlini & 
Favaron 
Italy 
(Palermo, 
Sicily) 
Healthcare Italian English 
Tebble Australia 
Academic 
tradition of 
discourse 
studies 
English 
Greek, Italian, Spanish, Serbian, 
Cantonese, Mandarin, Khmer, 
Vietnamese 
Blignault, 
Stephanou 
& Barrett 
Australia 
(New South 
Wales) 
Healthcare English 
Arabic, Cantonese, Croatian, 
Greek, Italian, Korean, 
Macedonian, Mandarin, Polish, 
Spanish, Thai and Vietnamese 
Kaufert, 
Kaufert & 
LaBine 
Canada 
(Manitoba) 
Medical 
Research – 
ethics of 
human 
subjects 
research 
English 
Cree, Afrikaans, Inuktitut, 
“eight… languages other than 
English, with a roughly even split 
between indigenous and other 
languages.” 
Mentioned: French, Spanish, 
Punjabi, Arabic 
Source: Hale, S. B., Ozolins, D. U., & Stern, D. L. (2009). The Critical Link 5: Quality in Interpreting- a 
shared responsibility. John Benjamins Publishing Company. 
a Few of the languages are named in the quotes or descriptions of this broad range of 35 court cases: an 
intriguing oversight for this chapter or a deliberate (institutionalized) legal maneuver? 
b In 2009 there were twenty-three official languages of the European Parliament. Listed here are the 
languages spoken by the sample of interpreters in this study. 
cOnly some of the studies in this volume explicitly list the languages spoken by research subjects; some 
refer to nationality as a proxy, others identify languages in particular instances, which may or may  not be 
inclusive of variation within the corpus. 
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3.2.1 Community Interpreting Studies: A Bracketed Sample 
The 2009 volume, CL5, provides a reasonable sample of state-of-the-art research 
about simultaneous interpretation. A technique borrowed from philosophers (especially 
phenomenologists and deconstructionists) is to ‘put brackets around’ the object of study, 
hence creating a container to concentrate the analytical gaze. Bracketing off the CL5 
volume from the entire literature about SI is intended to provide a clear and coherent 
reference point for analysis and critique. The fifteen contributions to CL5 compose a 
diverse range of reports on the status of SI in several countries (see Table 1), are based in 
different institutional domains, and involve various language combinations. The title of 
the volume shapes its scope, putting two dynamical configurations into tension, quality 
and shared responsibility.  
3.3 Tebble’s 4-step Discourse Analysis Frame 
Within the CL5 timesnap of academic research on community interpreting, 
Tebble (2009) draws upon an interdisciplinary approach to discourse analysis, in order to 
argue that “skills in discourse analysis of spoken language are no longer the province just 
of scholars; they need to be part of the repertoire of the professional interpreter” (2009, p. 
202). “By understanding the nature of the interpreted speech event,” she elaborates, 
“interpreters have a framework of the social context of their work” (p. 205). Tebble’s 
introduction to discourse analysis is both a contribution to, and a continuation of, 
academic meta-discourse (Diriker, 2004) about community simultaneous interpreting. 
Tebble’s overview is both broad and selective. She briefly outlines three approaches 
(conversation analysis, interactional sociolinguistics, social semiotics) with a brief sketch 
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of their varied disciplinary origins before elaborating upon the social-semiotic approach 
to discourse analysis known as systemic functional linguistics. 
Tebble (2009) presents four core prescriptions as lessons from functionalist 
discourse analysis. These lessons are borrowed in the following sections to organize and 
enable reflection upon the academic meta-discourse represented by the works in CL5: 
1 Know where you are going. 
2 Know where you are. 
3 Interpret all feedback. 
4 Ascertain the certainty of facts. 
3.3.1 Applied Discourse Analysis 1: Where is the Field of Community SI Going? 
Tebble explains: “If you understand the genre of the speech event…then you have 
a schema, a frame or structure for understanding where the […interaction…] is going” 
(2009, p. 208). (This is the roadmap mentioned for the genre example on page 87: the 
standard argumentation structure for Members of the European Parliament.) The 
analytical move in this section is to raise the level of analysis from type of interpreted 
event to the academic meta-discourse about simultaneous interpreting. The answer to the 
question of the field’s development is implied by Ozolins & Hale in their introduction to 
CL5 (2009). At the global scale, conditions for community interpreters are not improving, 
infrastructures for education, training, and certification are being created very slowly if at 
all, and attitudes toward the value of SI for society at large remain mixed and uncertain. 
One could conclude that community interpreting as a field of profession activity for 
communicative justice is going nowhere fast. 
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Yet, simultaneously, there are patterns of convergence in the research meta-
discourse (e.g., Pöchhacker, 2007) that provide a toehold for “a concerted unified 
approach” (Ozolins & Hale, 2009, p. 3). This dissertation proposes that an impressive 
range of inequities and injustice at the level of language difference could be redressed 
through the strategic use of simultaneous interpretation as a strategy for creating 
linguistic fields of equality, in service of, for instance, the justice-based economic goals 
articulated by Amartya Sen (1992). 
The organizing committee for the conference leading up to the publication of CL5 
knew that unified and concerted action does not and cannot happen by dint of the 
interpreter’s effort alone. The responsibility for generating communication that checks 
for mutual understanding is inherently a social responsibility that must be shared by all 
participants in the intercultural communication encounter. In order for practitioners and 
researchers in the field of simultaneous interpretation to elicit attention and active co-
participation in the generation of meanings during processes of simultaneous 
interpretation, we need to identify and recognize our own contribution to the status quo of 
current conditions. On this basis, interpreters and interpretees can join with researchers 
and interpreter trainers to envision a mutually-agreeable destination and chart a course to 
reach there. 
3.3.2 Applied Discourse Analysis 2: Where is Community SI Now? 
Tebble titles this section of her summary on functional discourse analysis 
“Interpreting the signposts” (2009, p. 210). She explains, “Apart from knowing where you 
are going…everybody needs to know where they are at any one time” (p. 210). Tebble 
uses the metaphor of a journey: “having a schema in mind…is like knowing the route of a 
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journey…but actually negotiating the way can require the use of signposts” (p. 210). 
Given typical patterns in the history of the development of disciplinary knowledge, the 
field of Interpreting Studies is perched on the verge of what become known as paradigm 
wars. The structuralist framework of Halliday’s systemic functional linguistics serves 
intellectual conservatism and is a natural fit for risk-averse professionals, interpreters and 
academics alike. However, moving to embrace an interactionist paradigm (also called an 
interpretivist paradigm)110 is a necessary step toward the diversification of perspectives 
that is crucial to the ongoing development of scientific knowledge (Kuhn, 1962). 
The interpretivist paradigm is grounded by theories of language as a creative 
process whose use entails tangible outcomes of social construction: such as identities, 
relationships, and the many group dynamics that compose social reality (Berger & 
Luckmann, 1966/1967). Given that community interpreters embody expertise with 
languages and intercultural communication, it is possible to imagine that, rather than 
engaging a paradigm shift as one of aggressive competition (i.e., an intellectual war), we 
might embrace a collaborative, exploratory dialogue toward more sharing of 
responsibility for defining and producing quality of participation during special 
intercultural events involving simultaneous interpretation. 
                                                
110  The interpretive paradigm is described by sociologists Gibson Burrell and Gareth 
Morgan as “informed by a concern to understand the world as it is, to understand the 
fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience….It sees 
the social world as an emergent social process which is created by the individuals 
concerned” (1979, p. 28). 
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3.3.2.1 Lessons on How to Use an Interpreter: Re-Centering the Problematic of 
Simultaneous Interpretation 
“Australians,” Roberts-Smith writes, “are generally completely unfamiliar with 
working with interpreters and have little understanding of what is involved” (2009, p. 
34). Contrast this, however, with Cooke’s observation that “English-speaking Australians 
absorb this information [about the key characteristics and process of communicating 
using interpreters] through the mass media” (2009, p. 94). Ironically, both Roberts-Smith 
and Cooke are probably accurate. Participating in interpreted interaction is still an 
uncommon intercultural experience. Most people either do not have the personal 
experience that generates familiarity and understanding, or have experienced rigid, 
mechanical interactions that reinforce differences and lack of connection, thereby 
rendering comprehension difficult. Meanwhile, representations of SI in the mass media 
consistently reflect stereotypes and generalizations, perpetuating adverse discourse 
effects that tend to play out in problematic ways during real life encounters. 
Interpreter frustration with interpretees is reflected throughout the CL5 sample of 
contemporary interpreting research discourse.111 González & Auzmendi (2009) put it 
explicitly, “The different parties involved (judges, prosecutors, lawyers and defendants) 
have no awareness of the role of interpreters” (p. 146). A more conservative statement 
might acknowledge that interpretees are aware of the interpreter, but their experiences 
and exposure to enacted interpreters’ role and responsibilities do not enable the pro-active 
                                                
111  Vuorikoski notes that European Parliament interpreters also talk about interpretees, 
but she only provides a single summary statement: “Interpreters frequently discuss 
the performances of the speakers that they have just interpreted, pointing out features 
that made interpreting difficult, or stating simply that someone had been ’a good 
speaker’” (2004, p. 21). 
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responsiveness and engagement with the intercultural communication process that 
interpreters wish interpretees would embrace. Cooke argues “that ethical issues and 
dilemmas…may often be discussed and resolved if the quality of intercultural 
communication is high” (2009, p. 93), noting, in the instance of Australian-Aboriginal 
interpreted interaction, that “this presumes a level of cultural awareness and sensitivity on 
the part of police and lawyers that is not always present” (p. 92). Roberts-Smith puts the 
matter quite succinctly: “monocultural or Anglophone lawyers and judges often lack an 
understanding of the interpreting process and the work of interpreters” (2009, p. 13). 
From an interactionist point-of-vew, the dynamic result of monocultural 
monolingualism forces the interpreter into both error and ad hoc attempts at 
accommodation, such as reported in Spain by Ortega Herráez, Abril Martí & Martin 
(2009). “Ad hoc solutions are the order of the day and (inter)cultural mediation is given 
priority over interpreting (or translating, as it is usually mistakenly called) which is seen 
as being somehow narrowly literal and inadequate for community settings” (p. 150). 
There are three tensions embedded in this single statement. One tension involves framing 
intercultural interaction as unusual or unfamiliar because it deviates from an unnamed but 
assumed norm for interacting. (Typically the unacknowledged norms are of the mono-
culture associated with the dominant language.) The second tension regards confusion 
about language use and the substantiality of differences between interpreting and 
translating. Third, the object of the communication process during interpreted interaction 
is torn between a limited, structuralist emphasis on information exchange via presumedly 
pre-established discrete linguistic meanings versus the social aspects of identity and 
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relationship formation that accrue through collective repetition of the smallest rituals of 
interaction.112 
Such tensions indicate a paradigmatic crossroads wherein scholars and 
professionals associated with the field of simultaneous interpretation can either maintain 
the structural linguistic precedent that seeks (as represented by Lee) “to apply the same 
standards across different language streams” (2009, p. 172) or creatively reconcile our 
representations of what interpreting is and what interpreting does in order to get at what 
interpreting can do. For instance, is interpreting about: 
● “equivalence across languages and cultures” (emphasis added, Lee, 2009, p. 175; 
related to Ng’s semantic mapping between Chinese and English, emphasis 
added, 2009); 
● “the sense consistency between the source text and the target text” (emphasis 
added, Lee, 2009, p. 171); 
● “the process which the language has to go through” (emphasis added, González 
and Auzmendi, 2009, p. 137); 
● “effective communication between parties who do not speak the same language” 
(emphasis added, Ng 2009, p. 50); 
● “to ensure that the witness can access the question being asked…and that all 
personnel in the courtroom can understand the account” (emphasis added, 
Napier, Spencer & Sabolcec, 2009, p. 100); 
● “the ethical issues and dilemmas facing the interpreter” (emphasis added, Cooke, 
2009, p. 93); 
● the “linguistic barriers that deaf people face” (emphasis added, Napier et al., 
2009, p. 102); 
● the achievement of “the same effect on the target language listener as on the 
source language listener” (emphasis added, Lee, 2009, p. 175). 
 
                                                
112  Structuralism is also known by the labels functionalism and positivism, cf. Burrell & 
Morgan, 1979).  
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The emphasis added to the selected statements illustrates that interpreting research 
has constructed its object more in terms of (roughly) externalized artefacts of 
communication (such as texts, languages and words with supposedly fixed meanings) 
than in terms of less tangible outcomes of communication (relationships, identities, 
inequalities and so on). The former construction constitutes the logic of difference as a 
barrier. The diversity of these representations suggest paradigm conflict between 
structuralist and interactionist modes of analysis. 
Paradigm conflict is illustrated by the array of quotes showing a) the dominance 
of the structural linguistic frame, which emphasizes language, as opposed to the social 
interaction frame, which emphasizes people, and b) the centering of the interpreter 
(usually in isolation from interpretees) as the fixed location for all troubles. Together, the 
isolation of the interpreter and the emphasis on language combine to structure interpreted 
interaction as a homogenous professional activity. As a result, attention is deflected from 
attending to the communication differences that interpreted interaction necessarily entails. 
Interpretees are disenfranchised from the complex dynamism of intercultural 
communication and interpreters are, by and large, prevented from drawing them in to do 
something it. 
3.3.2.2 Three Discursive Tensions 
The contributions to CL5 explore conditions of simultaneous interpretation across 
a range of institutional settings in a number of countries and involve an extensive array of 
language combinations. (Review Table 1.) Reading across each scene, with attention to 
how authors represent and discuss the findings of their research, some dialogic tensions 
become apparent. One tension is between so-called unusual or atypical dynamics of SI 
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and a taken-for-granted notion of what interpreted interaction ‘should’ feel like. A second 
tension involves the stress of interpretee ignorance about using interpreters, which seems 
to be a direct outcome of maintaining the twin myths of interpreter neutrality (Metzger, 
1995, 1999) and interpreter invisibility (Roy, 1989, 1993, 2000), both of which contribute 
to interpretee perceptions of interpreter opaqueness (Angelelli, 2001, p. 11; 2003). The 
operation of these myths are apparent across the diverse range of settings and regardless 
of language combinations, with some variability among institutional scenes. The tension 
of interpretees’ acceptance of these myths about the interpreter’s role enables a third 
tension to come into view. 
The third tension regards language itself. Specifically the different orientations 
and understandings that people from any of these groupings (interpretees, interpreters, 
interpreting researchers, even bystanders and non-participants) have about what language 
is and what language can do, that is, language ideologies. The following, continuing 
critical deconstruction of this timesnap of published research on community interpreting 
shows a paradigmatic contest between traditional structuralism (mainly linguistics) and 
creative interactionism. Structural linguistics in particular organizes knowledge through 
reduction (usually to ‘words” or morphological units, sometimes to ‘meanings’ which are 
presented as if fixed and unchanging), while the lens of creative interactionism is 
premised in the on-going necessity of meaningfulness as a constantly-evolving and 
persistently-dynamic feature of social interaction. 
3.3.2.2.1 Tension 1: An Unnamed, Assumed Standard 
Half of the authors (8/15) make a uniqueness claim about their study that only 
makes sense in contrast with some presumed normative type of community interpreting. 
117 
These generally appear in authors’ claims about certain characteristics or features 
respective to their research sites. For instance, Ng (2009) claims a deviation from “the 
usual case” because court interpreting services in Hong Kong “have long been provided 
for the linguistic majority [Chinese], instead of for the linguistic minority [English]” (p. 
39). Napier et al.’s (2009) experiment to test the communicative efficacy of simultaneous 
interpretation for potential Deaf jurors in Australia pits minority language users against 
the assumptions of majority language speakers. Comprehension rates were equivalent 
between mock ‘jurors’ communicating only in English and mock ‘jurors’ communicating 
via English/Auslan113 interpretation, demonstrating that interpreting between two 
languages is as effective for understanding as communicating in only one language. 
In a different kind of legal setting, Pöchhacker and Kolb (2009) make special note 
of discovering interpreters in asylum hearings working in a team-like way based on their 
awareness of the future consequences of documented statements. Likewise, Merlini & 
Favaron (2009) investigate the “highly specific context of peer-to-peer communication 
[between Italian and US nurses] in an institution where interpreters interrelate daily with 
their clients, and where they feel and are perceived by the healthcare staff as part of a 
team” (pp. 188-189). Blignault, Stephanou & Barrett (2009) highlight the importance of 
interpreters “being a valued member of the health care team” (p. 221). This special 
emphasis on considering the interpreter as a team-member or co-participant in the 
interpretation process brings into view a norm that does not typically acknowledge the 
interpreter’s presence. 
                                                
113   Australian Sign Language. 
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González & Auzmendi (2009) highlight “the nature of the Basque language” (p. 
135) and “the delicate political situation [of Basque Country and Spain]” (p. 135) as 
generating “truly arduous” (p. 135) conditions for Spanish-Basque interpreters that are 
“truly complex” (p. 135) and must be “endured” (p. 146). They emphasize the “highly 
unusual situation rarely found elsewhere” (p. 145) of interpretees who are actually fluent 
in both languages and are exercising their right of choice regarding which language to 
use. Meanwhile Cooke (2009) proposes “the bar is perhaps set higher for legal 
interpretations by Aboriginal communities than by the mainstream agencies who use 
them” (p. 89), and Kaufert, Kaufert & LaBine (2009) compare and contrast ethical 
practice at another intriguing juncture: that between medical researchers and the 
interpreters who work for medical research teams in the field. Noting a distinction 
between the goal of doctor-patient healthcare (which is, interpreted or not, the patient’s 
health), and the goal of research (which is knowledge), Kaufert et al comment upon a 
study of researcher experience in developing countries (Dawson & Kass, 2005) where the 
majority of researchers had not learned the language of their subjects and thus necessarily 
“would have used interpreters. Yet there is no mention of interpreters in the paper or their 
contributions as language mediators” (p. 245).114 
All of these claims to distinctiveness suggest that diversity and variation are 
actually the norm for community-based simultaneous interpretation rather than the 
exception. This begs the question of what hypothetical norm is being imagined by these 
researchers as the basis for comparison and contrast? The standard that comes into view 
                                                
114  Hidden or “invisible translation” is a theme of the international management 
literature (Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011; Piekkari & Tietze, 2008),) and also 
part of the structure of controlled multilingualism in the European Parliament. 
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seems to require operating as if the interpreter is not present in the communication 
process, despite the varying dynamics of interpreting (such as the directionality of 
interpreting, with reference to the majority or minority status of the language) and the 
language profile of interpretees (monolingual or fluent in two or more of the languages in 
use). Since the interpreter is not acknowledged as a crucial part of the communication 
process, their mediation of these dynamics is not represented. This absence generates a 
norm of silence, keeping interpreters as if invisible and certain kinds of talk about 
interpreting taboo. 
3.3.2.2.2 Tension 2: Adverse Effects of Interpreter Invisibility 
This brings us to the second tension evident in a critical reading of the discourse 
in CL5, that of perceptions of interpretee ignorance of how to use interpreters. There is no 
discursive evidence of recognition that user incompetence or ignorance occurs as an 
effect of (traditional) interpreter insistence on the invisibility of role. In reviewing a 
trial115 nullified on an appeal that the defendant was spoken to in “a language she did not 
understand,” Australian Justice Roberts-Smith (2009) quotes the findings of the English 
Court of Appeal in which they criticize the solicitor and counsel: “Not once does it 
appear to have occurred to either of them to question the interpreter so as to ascertain 
whether or not he was understanding what the appellant said to him and whether, he, the 
interpreter, had the impression that she was not comprehending the language he was 
talking to her” (p. 19). 
                                                
115   Begum (1991) 93 Cr App Rep 96. 
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Setting aside the ethical implications of that interpreter’s non-professional 
performance,116 ‘to question the interpreter’ is not a behavior encouraged by the 
profession. How does one pose inquiries to someone who is supposed to be invisible? 
This is an example of how the interpreter is actually “opaque” (Angelelli, 2003, p. 16 
cited by Ortega Herráez et al, 2009, p. 152). It is not much of a stretch to comprehend the 
desired effect of professional accreditation processes and codes of conduct for 
interpreters’ professionalism as having an adverse effect on interpretees. As a remedy, 
Roberts-Smith, for instance, wants “guaranteed competencies” (2009, p. 33), for 
interpreters, without mention of baseline skills needed by interpretees.  
In their exposition of the results of using the term “norm” for desired professional 
behaviors instead of “rule” in healthcare interpreter training, Merlini & Favaron (2009) 
draw upon a few sources to suggest interpreters must oppose “the linearity of habit” (p. 
199, quoting Danou, 2007, p. 50) which keeps interpreters (supposedly) invisible. Note 
Merlini & Favaron’s cautionary caveat: they acknowledge that such a contrary stance 
“may be too daring a proposition in our field, where non-professional practice is still all 
too frequent” (p. 199). Whether taken as a rule or a norm, interpreter invisibility is not 
only idealized within codes of professional conduct but is often actually celebrated. It is 
the context of accustomed invisibility, for instance, that explains how Pöchhacker & Kolb 
(2009) did not anticipate how “forcefully” (p. 123) the written record of oral asylum 
                                                
116  The “fake interpreter” fiasco at Nelson Mandela’s Memorial Service in 2014 is 
hardly an isolated issue; just higher profile. Uncredentialied and unqualified 
interpreters illustrate a general disregard for intercultural communication by Hearing 
(non-deaf/non-signing) interpretees as well as interpreters. The acceptance of 
incompetent job performances is a particular instance of audism (the systematic 
oppression of Deaf people).  
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hearings in Austria emerged as a significant indicator of the interpreter’s presence and 
performance in the interpreted communicative interaction.117 
Pöchhacker & Kolb (2009) discovered that co-production of the documentation of 
an asylum hearing elicits a “significant degree of shared responsibility on the interpreter’s 
part for the legally relevant manifestation of the interview” (p. 119). They describe in 
detail what might be considered a reversal of “established principles…whereby the 
interpreter essentially renders what was said rather than what is to be written” (p. 133), 
resulting in cooperative behaviors “by all participants, with the interpreter assuming a 
role and responsibility far beyond normative precepts” (p. 120). In this variation of role, 
the interpreter envisions the purposes the written record will be put to later, and crafts the 
target language interpretations with such future use in mind. In other words, the 
interpreter accepts some responsibility for ensuring that the voice (i.e., the 
intended/desired effects) of the asylum seeker carries forward into the next levels of 
bureaucracy and administration. 
The actions engaged by the interpreter indicate what Pöchhacker & Kolb (2009) 
call a “collaborative relationship, or mutual co-orientation” (p. 127) marked by “a verbal 
alliance” (p. 128). The alliance involves the interpreter “adopt[ing] the interviewer’s 
perspective” (p. 128) and “ask[ing]…follow up questions” (p. 128). Specific behaviors 
include pausing for the person writing or typing to catch up with the interpretation (p. 
126), “dictating punctuation marks” (p. 125), and apologizing when “repair[ing] a clause 
                                                
117   “Though not explicitly included in the original design of our research project, the 
role of the written record emerged so forcefully from our observations that it became 
a crucial point of interest, alongside and as part of such fundamental topics as role 
boundaries, neutrality and fidelity” (Pöchhacker & Kolb, 2009, p. 123). 
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that … has already been uttered” (p. 128) because it may require typing corrections (p. 
128). Reciprocally, the interpreter is open to being reminded by the recorder “of the last 
words before [an] interruption” (p. 127). One upshot of sharing responsibility for the 
accuracy of the record named by Pöchhacker & Kolb is “a more actively involved and 
less invisible interpreter” (p. 134). 
It seems, at least on the basis of this specific CL5 corpus, that future-oriented 
behavior by the interpreter is likely to lead to shared responsibility among and with 
interpretees. Such multidimensionality beyond the assumed, taken-as-normal limitations 
of the interpreter’s contribution to the quality of communication is particularly evident in 
Aboriginal and First Nations communities. According to Kaufert et al. (2009), “There is a 
tradition of interpreters playing pivotal leadership roles in small remote Northern 
communities” (p. 247). Along similar lines, an Aboriginal interpreter describes a process 
conducted by her nation’s elders that could be considered the community’s counterpart to 
mainstream professional accreditation: “The old people felt I had to be put through a 
ceremony to receive my shield, my coolamon, with my story and the poison story as well: 
the story that gives me real authority to be able to speak” (Cooke, 2009, p. 89). Respect 
for the intercultural communication process is built in this indigenous way in parallel 
with professional credentialing from mainstream society. 
Such reciprocal authorization among interpretees to empower the interpreter is 
also exhibited within the peer-to-peer healthcare team in Italy. Incidents occur which 
“foreground the interpreter as an interlocutor in his [or her] own right” (Merlini & 
Favaron, 2009, p. 194), and the nature of observed teamwork is such that, in one instance, 
“the interpreter explicitly helps the parties settle [a] disagreement” (p. 195). That 
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particular facilitation was accomplished by a shift from direct to indirect speech, which 
the interpreter explained “as a deliberate attempt to step into the interaction in order to 
solve the deadlock” (p. 196). This creative use of interaction to stimulate a shared, 
positive outcome for participants in interpreted communication may be an application of 
the kind of intuitive agency that is negatively valued by structuralist ideology (i.e., the 
unquestioned reliance on linguistics and meaning’s location in the source language) 
because it makes the creative effects of interpreter agency (such as the selection of 
diction, the management of turn-taking, or the assertion of interpreter wisdom) so 
obvious. In other words, if allowing the interpreter to shift their footing (Goffman, 1982) 
is all the maneuvering required to solve a communication problem, then it should become 
evident that resistance to the interpreter making such shifts can perpetuate problems. 
The satisfaction for shared responsibility within these situations where the 
interpreter has decision latitude (Lee & Llewellyn-Jones, 2011) is in stark contrast with 
the frustration of interpretees such as Roberts-Smith, who are constrained by the 
formalities of maintaining the myth of interpreter invisibility and its accompanying 
assumption of neutrality. 
3.3.2.2.3 Tension 3: Diverse Conceptions of Language 
This brings us to the third tension, the orientation to language itself, to language 
as such (Benjamin, 1916/1969). Ideologies of language in the context of simultaneous 
interpretation effect the social interaction of the interpreted event, the range of possible 
meaning(s) for utterances delivered during the event, and the likelihood of understanding 
or misunderstanding on the part of some or all participants. Kaufert et al.(2009) provide 
an intriguing juxtaposition of two different perspectives on language: 
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The assumption underlying that two people speaking the same language 
should roughly agree on translation is relatively fundamental to 
interpreting and also the assumption underlying the use of back-
translation. However, the people we interviewed who were working with 
Aboriginal languages had a different perspective and talked about 
language as a constantly changing entity as new words come in, such as 
the translation of HIV/AIDS into Cree, and old words were lost. (2009, p. 
242) 
There are a couple of different dynamics represented in this statement, one dealing with 
historical change through language contact and the other revealing a kind of immediacy 
need for shared comprehension so as to enable continuation of a communication process. 
The point about agreement hides, somewhat, an assumption that the recognition of 
agreement is presumed or idealized as being automatic. This is because the ‘rough 
agreements’ rely on an established stability of meaning that speakers of the same 
language are expected to share. The fact that interpretees usually do share some stability 
of definitions should not overshadow the ever-present possibility of misunderstanding 
based upon different uses of terms and/or unfamiliarity with particular terms.  
Contrast the desirable instantaneity of automatic recognition with the interpreter 
who told Kaufert et al. (2009) about “the need for patience in finding the ‘right’ word in 
the sense of being the word that was understood” (p. 243). This is a fundamentally 
different orientation to language and the attribution of meaning because it a) shifts the 
location of definition from the sender of a communicative act or utterance to the 
receiver(s), and b) privileges the human experience over the linguistic artifact. This is a 
paradigmatic re-framing which allows, for example, another way of understanding the 
tension Ng exposes between “adequacy” and “acceptability” in Hong Kong legal 
translation and interpretation (2009). 
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Ng describes the adequacy criterion in terms of a “semantic mapping between the 
English and the Chinese texts” (2009, p. 41), while the acceptability criterion refers to 
what is sensible to the average (non-legally trained) Chinese individual in court (p. 40-
41). The adequacy criterion is premised upon the structuralist assumption that interpreters 
interpret between languages (things) rather than for people (beings), and that the 
languages of English and Chinese are essentially composed of interchangeable and 
corresponding parts. This is patently not the case, and Ng documents systemic 
maneuvering within the legal infrastructure to account for instances of “semantic 
incongruence” (p. 48). This is necessary because adequacy satisfies a rule, while 
acceptability satisfies people. 
The possibility of controlling the communication process seems to be re-assuring 
to interpretees who are put off by the need to accommodating language difference. Ortega 
Herráez et al.(2009) describe the situation in Spain, which they tell us “receives more 
immigrants than any other country in the EU and is one of the world’s major tourist 
destinations” (p. 150). Their study across sectors (hospitals and social services, 
emergency, civil defence, security and the courts) finds “the majority [of community 
interpreters] apparently go beyond the functions that would usually be attributed to 
community interpreters in countries where this activity has become consolidated as a 
profession” (p. 162). Ortega Herráez et al. are supporting more professionalization, with 
its prescribed restrictions on the functionality of the interpreter’s role. For instance: 
Court and police interpreters would seem to have a narrower, more limited 
view of their role, and are subject to certain constraints…the situation is 
more controlled by the service provider and perceived as more formal. 
(Ortega Herráez et al., 2009, p. 162-163) 
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However, looking across the discourse in CL5, there appears to be evidence of 
more desirable outcomes of interpreted interaction under conditions of less or reduced 
control than in those situations where the interpreter’s range of decision latitude (Lee & 
Llewellyn-Jones, 2011) is constrained. Ortega Herráez et al (2009) are likely more 
interested in a kind of middle-ground that brings the untrained community interpreter into 
the professional community, but perhaps without having to adopt overstrict restrictions 
on role that constrain effective intercultural communication. Research in heathcare 
(mainly US-based) has found that 
Professional interpreters have been linked with increased patient 
satisfaction, greater patient involvement, improved understanding, greater 
compliance with treatment, improved access, and reduced medical errors 
(Brach and Fraser, 2000; Timmins, 2002; Jacobs et al., 2001; Flores et al., 
2003; Baker et al., 1996, Flores et al., 2005). (Garrett, 2009, p. 73) 
Evidence of positive gains from interpreted communication in the medical field is 
contrasted with Roberts-Smith’s negative assessment of court interpreting: 
“The continuing perception amongst many, if not most, Judges and 
lawyers is that interpreters are actually an obstacle to communication. 
Some of these perceptions are due to a lack of appreciation of linguistic or 
cultural differences or what the process of interpretation entails. 
Unfortunately, many are also the product of practical experience.” (2009, 
p. 29) 
In the legal field, what is emphasized are the “consequences of communication failure” 
(Roberts-Smith, 2009, p. 29) rather than, as in healthcare, the positive effects of 
intercultural, interpreted communication success. This is a classic terministic screen 
(Burke, 1966).  
The emphasis on failure overrides the recognition of success, making it seem as if 
interpreted interaction is always fraught and interpreters are always suspect. Instead, a 
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more realistic assessment would recognize that interpreting is probably no more or less 
prone to misunderstandings than communicating in one language, as Napier et al’s mock 
juror experiment demonstrated (2009). Interpretees simply need to learn the skills of 
falsification, especially when an interpretation deviates from reasonable expectation, and 
take steps to remedy or co-construct shared understanding, just as with any 
communicative repair, by asking questions and paraphrasing to ensure mutual 
comprehension. 
3.3.2.3 Failure of the Monolingual Illusion 
A fascinating result of Napier et al.’s experiment comparing interpreted 
information with non-interpreted information was “that both the deaf and hearing ‘jurors’ 
in this study equally misunderstood some terms and concepts” (emphasis added, 2000, p. 
113). With all the insistence that “the interpreter must not ‘clean up’ the evidence by 
giving it a form, a grammar or syntax that it does not have” (Roberts-Smith, quoting 
Canadian Chief Justice Lamer who was himself quoting another source,118 one must 
wonder at the implication that communicating in the same language guarantees either 
understanding or truthfulness, let alone accuracy and precision of intended meaning. In 
fact, despite insisting (for instance) upon interpreter use of the first person, it turns out 
that interpretees are not fooled by the illusion: they may actually be detrimentally 
constrained by it. Merlini & Favaron (2009) trace the rationale of interpreters using first 
person to a combination of being “frequently echoed in the literature” (p. 189) and having 
                                                
118   Steele, “Court Interpreters in Canadian Criminal Law” in RvTRan [1994] 2 SCR 
951), Roberts-Smith 2009: p. 23 
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“advantages; over and above enhancing clarity, brevity, and impartiality, [specifically] it 
is thought to create ‘the illusion of a direct exchange between the monolingual parties’ 
(Wadensjö, 1997, p. 49)” (p. 189) 
While this corpus of research on community interpreting generates evidence case 
many (if not most) interpretees do not know how to work with interpreters, it may also be 
that interpretees are working with interpreters the best they can under the conditions that 
the profession of interpreting has itself imposed. Legal discourse has explicitly adopted 
both the invisibility imperative and the structural linguistic logic about language. 
Revisiting the jurisprudential basis for the presence of a court interpreter, Roberts-Smith 
gave us the image of a “cipher” which, by definition, is a “zero, one that has no weight, 
worth or influence” (Merriam Webster Free Online Dictionary), i.e., the interpreter is to 
have no substance. However, the interpreter’s task is to transform the non-communicative 
status of those speaking a language different than officials of the court to the 
communicative position of having voice in the language of the court. Assertions that 
represent the interpreter’s contribution as non-existent do not foster proactivity regarding 
working with interpreters. 
For instance, Roberts-Smith (2009) paraphrases Her Honour presiding over the 
case of Perera v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs: “The function of the 
interpreter is to convey in English what has been said in another language, and vice-
versa, so as to place the non-English speaker as nearly as possible in the same position as 
the English speaker” (p. 25). What position is this? “The position in which he or she 
would be if those defects did not exist” (Roberts-Smith, p.17); with defects specified as 
“for want of some physical capacity or for lack of knowledge of the language of the 
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court” (p. 17). The language of the court is explicitly privileged and deviations from its 
standard deliberately demoted: there is no give-and-take recognition of the mutual value 
or inherent equality of different languages. 
Continuing interpreter practices and interpreting researcher complicity with this 
mal-alignment of non-presence with the de-valuing of difference interferes with the 
interpretees’ abilities to conduct communicative repair. To make a repair is to “say ‘no’ 
to an expression…its motive is intelligibility” (Bolinger, 1953/1965, p. 248 in Schegloff, 
Jefferson & Sacks, 1977, p. 361). Speakers routinely self-correct and occasionally make 
corrections to others’ speech (Schegloff et al.) By defining out clarifications and other 
interactions with interpreters that can be construed as interruptions to a monolingual 
flow, interpreters are not only invisible, they become unaccountable, too. Eliciting 
feedback and monitoring from interpretees, however, does suggest the possibility for co-
creating a way out of the invisibility-unaccountability cycle. Judges and lawyers have not 
lost sight of the interpreter’s presence in case law, even if they prefer not to accommodate 
interpreters in court. They are aware that permitting an interpreter “adds another 
dimension to the Court’s task” (Roberts-Smith, p. 22) by virtue of the interpreter being 
“transposed between” the tribunal and the witness (p. 15). 
However, the discursive focus on the interpreter still hides119 what it is that the 
interpreter’s presence ought to be bringing more clearly into view: shared responsibility 
is most crucial at exactly those moments of intercultural, multilingual communication 
when the language difference is most keen. Rather than expecting the interpreter alone to 
overcome intercultural differences made manifest in language difference, communicating 
                                                
119  Through the terministic screen process of de-selection (Burke, 1966). 
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effectively is a shared activity that requires careful attention from all interpretees if 
mutual understanding is to be achieved. This is not a task to be accomplished invisibly by 
an individual or even a team of professional interpreters. It is the interpretees who can 
judge what it is they want or need to understand, and the interpretees who have the ability 
to say ‘no’ and offer a repair to their own or another’s talk. “Self-correction and other-
correction are related organizationally” (Schegloff et al., 1977, p. 362). The organization 
of repair bears on interpreted communication at least as much as it does on non-
interpreted, single language communication. 
The moment for quality intervention in interpreted interaction in order to share 
responsibility is identified by Her Honour in Perera, when she “pointed out that 
interpretation is not a mere mechanical exercise, but one which involves both technical 
skill and expert judgment….perfect interpretation may be impossible – no matter how 
accurate the interpretation is, the words, style, syntax or emotion are not those of the 
witness and some words are culturally specific and incapable of being interpreted” 
(paraphrased by Roberts-Smith, pp. 25-26). This interpretee knowledge is amplified by 
“all members of the court” (p. 27) in De La Espriella-Velasco v The Queen—who 
“accepted that forensic interpretation, especially in court proceedings, is a complex and 
sophisticated process” (p. 27). Specifically: 
The interpreter must express, in the target language, as accurately as that 
language and the circumstances permit, the idea or concept as it has been 
expressed in the source language. The individual aspects of this 
expression of what is required, are important. The reference to the ‘idea or 
concept’ being expressed acknowledges that the process of interpretation 
is not merely the substitution of a word in one language for an equivalent 
word in the other and that there is often a lack of semantic equivalence. 
That, and social or cultural differences may mean that even the ‘idea or 
concept’ itself has no equivalent in both societies. (p. 27) 
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Acknowledging the possibility of no equivalent contradicts the criterion of accuracy, 
calling for another measure. 
Indeed, to avert the outcome documented by Ng, that “…the meticulous efforts on 
the part of the legal translator to attain semantic mapping do not always seem to pay off” 
(2009, p. 50), what is needed is a real time combination of interpretee awareness of the 
need to act communicatively into these moments and interpreter openness to sharing the 
mediation of intercultural, multilingual differences with these engaged interpretees 
(rather than holding our expertise inaccessibly behind the imposed veil of invisibility). 
Even though interpreters express frustration with interpretees, interpreter resistance to 
sharing is also evident, although it may not be conscious. Recommendations made by 
contributing authors to CL5 locate specific remedies for improving interpreted 
communication in increased or improved performance by the interpreter, often specifying 
within the field of interpreter training. 
Such thinking is a discourse pattern following linear structuralist rules rather than 
breaking open a co-creative, cooperative effort of truly sharing responsibility for 
meaning-making with interpretees. Paradigmatic shift requires coordination among and 
across all the institutions who need effective interpreting, not just a change in one field of 
interpreter education and training. The comprehension and meaning-making needs of 
institutions using interpreters are significant, although perhaps in different ways than the 
needs of the individuals who must persist (with varying degrees of courage and character) 
to communicate in another language. 
An interesting feature of interpretee criticism of interpreters is a kind of projection 
that they, themselves (as interpretees) speak plainly and clearly within a rational or 
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logical rhetorical framework that listeners, watchers (if using a signed language) and 
interpreters automatically understand. In fact, Napier et al. cite Judith Levi’s (1993) 
assessment of the US State of Illinois’ jury instructions (written in English for native 
English speakers), in which Levi identifies several problems, such as “incohesive 
discourse organization, that is, confusing sequences of points, discontinuity, and needless 
interruptions to the flow with unrelated information” (2009, p. 104) among other equally 
disturbing features of the monolingual legal monologue. In the mock trial with deaf and 
non-deaf ‘jurors’ using English-Auslan simultaneous interpretation, Napier, et al. report: 
The results of the comprehension test show that both hearing and deaf 
‘jurors’ misunderstood some concepts. In relation to the closed/multiple-
choice questions, approximately 10.5% of the questions were answered 
incorrectly by all participants. Of the open-ended questions, some 
responses were problematic from both deaf and hearing participants. 
(2009, p. 107) 
Not only are the error/misunderstanding percentages comparable, but in at least one 
instance, Deaf ‘jurors’ relying on interpreters did better than the control group of hearing 
counterparts (p. 111). Napier et al. conclude, “The material was…challenging as hearing 
‘jurors’ misunderstood some aspects of the summation even though they were receiving 
the information directly in English” (emphasis added, p. 114). 
The proper target of critiquing communication breakdowns in interpreted 
interaction involves the complicity of interpretees in allowing noticeable glitches to pass 
by without remark. This includes ascertaining comprehension rather than simply 
assuming that the interpreter has magically fixed all difficulties. Garrett, for instance, 
notes: “No one [in Australian hospitals] is required to ask, [or] document the important 
question: ‘How well do you speak English?’” (p. 75). This institutional-level failing to 
imagine other ways of communicating is complemented on the patient side with a “theme 
133 
of powerlessness” (p. 76) and “an emergent construct” which Garrett and her colleagues 
labeled ‘The Happy Migrant Effect,’ i.e., “patients discounted and minimized the 
significance of [very negative] events” (p. 76). Some identified motivators of ‘The Happy 
Migrant Effect’ include positive assertions of new country patriotism and appreciation for 
comparatively better services than was available in their country of origin, however these 
impulses serve to feed generalized Australian English monolingualism, excusing 
inadequate simultaneous interpreting, and even justifying its absence. 
This critical reading of the meta-discourse in CL5 is posed as representative and 
characteristic of normative biases that interpreted interaction is not natural and should be 
measured by the standards of same language communication. Evidence of this hegemonic 
relationship is provided by the three tensions. 120 First, according to accounts from 
interpreters, these researchers report that interpretees do not know how to use 
interpreters. That is, there is a perceived lack of practical knowledge about how to 
communicate when different languages are involved. Second, this perceived lack of 
knowledge is blamed on the interpretees but remedies are aimed at providers: interpreters 
and interpreter-educators. This indicates difficulties with interpreting the discourse’s 
signposts! 
Tebble (2009) introduces the difference between a framing move and a focusing 
move, arguing, “framing moves … make a major contribution to the coherence of the 
                                                
120  The attitude that speaking (together) in the same language is better, natural, and 
more normal than speaking (together) using different languages is an example of 
hegemony, as defined by Gramsci (1971).  
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discourse” (p. 211).121 In discussing the example she provides, Tebble suggests that 
interpreters might drop framing moves in favour of focusing moves because focusing 
moves have “obvious content” (p. 210) while framing moves are discourse markers that 
“signal the next stage” or “can be signposts to new topics” (p. 211). She also suggests 
reasons why interpreters justify dropping framing moves, such as an assumption that 
interpretee can figure it out on their own or a belief that “there is no equivalent 
expression” (p. 211). What is missing from the academic research about community 
interpreting is acknowledgment of the frame: a frame that established invisibility as a 
feature of professional practice. Complaining about invisibility while persisting in a 
discourse that excludes interpretees serves to reinforce invisibility. 
Which brings us to the third tension, involving language ideologies. Some of the 
confusion about what language is and what language does is represented in Tebble’s 
(2009) rehash of the common interpreter lament of ‘no equivalent expression.’ 
Sometimes it is not “the expression” per se that needs to be interpreted but the move that 
expression is meant to signal. Every culture has a way to indicate a new topic or a new 
stage in an interaction. The challenges of intercultural communication stem less from 
lack of equivalent concepts than from different senses of propriety, timing and protocols. 
All interpreting discourse that emphasizes the importance of words undermines the 
stewardship of interpretees’ identities and cultural ways of being. This is the arena where 
interpretees must engage with interpreters for interpreted communication to truly 
generate shared meanings and good relations. 
                                                
121  Tebble’s source for defining framing and focusing moves is Sinclair & Coulthard, 
1975). 
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3.3.3 Applied Discourse Analysis 3: Interpret All Feedback—Including Input from 
Interpretees 
Cooperation among interpretees and interpreters is most necessary regarding 
backchannel feedback. Tebble’s (2009) example continues with the way systemic 
functional linguistics privileges “the feedback that can and should be interpreted is that 
given during a turn at talk when only one person is speaking” (p. 211). On the one hand, 
this seems almost too obvious to even state; that is, until one considers the many 
instances when full interpretation of each interpretee’s turn at talk does not occur. So, on 
the surface there is actually already quite a large problem. Also problematic, perhaps 
even more so, is slippage allowed with backchannel feedback: 
The most difficult feedback to interpret would be the [in this case] 
physician’s auditor back channel feedback made while the interpreter is in 
process of relaying what the patient has just said; or made by the patient 
while the interpreter is in the process of relaying what the physician has 
just said. Such interpreting can be achieved with varying degrees of 
success. (p. 211) 
As a description, this is a true statement of the relative difficulty of interpreting every 
interpretee’s backchannel communications on par with each interpretee’s turns at talk. 
Understood from the perspective of meta-discursive framing, that is, as a signpost for 
people trying to understand where they are in any process of interpreted communication, 
Tebble could be read either as advocating partial success or excusing partial failure. The 
conditions of interpreting that inhibit utterances occurring in two directions at the same 
time both being interpreted are worthy of more attention and investigation. 
Writing about the experience of one set of users of interpreting services in the 
Australian healthcare system, Garrett reports that she and her colleagues created “an 
emergent construct” for interactions that were interpreted based upon a “theme of 
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powerlessness [that] appeared central to many patient experiences” (2009, p. 76). 
Concerns by users of legal interpreting services in Basque Country “doubt the efficiency 
of the interpreting services” enough that they essentially collude with authorities to cut 
the interpreter out of interactions, “relegating the role of the interpreter to insignificance” 
(González and Auzmendi, 2009, p. 139). These two situations are different in that the 
users have different language profiles: in Basque Country, most are bilingual and thus 
exercise a choice to use interpreters, whereas the patients in Australian emergency rooms 
and hospitals must rely upon family, friends, and bilingual staff to facilitate 
communication when interpreters are not provided. 
One could argue that the two cases are incommensurate: one is in healthcare the 
other in the justice system. The former refers to a situation in which professional SI is not 
provided; while the latter refers to a situation in which professional SI is provided but not 
used. At the meta-discourse level, however, it is not the difference in 
power/powerlessness that matters most between Basque Country bilinguals in court and 
immigrants seeking healthcare in Australia but rather the similarity between them: 
interpretees in both situations apparently often feel the communication situation is out of 
their control. Roberts-Smith (2009) reports that judges’ and lawyers practical experience 
of inadequate, absent, or unprofessional SI, and also “because the process of 
interpretation has not been understood” (p. 29) has led many in Australia’s court system 
to consider interpreters “an obstacle to communication” (p. 29). Official disappointment 
often finds a target in the interpreter rather than in the organization, delivery or enactment 
of interpreting services. 
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While none of the CL5 cases or studies alone characterizes the entire user 
experience of community interpreting, taken together they represent user 
disenfranchisement with community SI. Only in two instances (in the CL5 corpus) do we 
find substantial evidence of a positive effect from the intercultural communication 
practice of SI. First, in the case of the Deaf ‘mock jurists’ in Napier, et al’s simulation 
that found “levels of comprehension between deaf and hearing participants were similar” 
(2009, p. 99). Second, in Merlini & Favaron’s (2009) report on positive outcomes in 
healthcare interpreter training by a linguistic decision to refer to “norms” instead of 
“rules” to guide interpreter decision-making while interpreting (p. 198). Given the ratio 
of only two studies with positive outcomes to eleven or twelve with negative reports in 
the CL5 corpus, one might determine that simultaneous interpretation is a failed 
enterprise. Critical discourse analysis, however, suggests that an alternative framing is 
possible. 
Instead of reading the academic literature as an exclusively objective reflection of 
reality (which is the functionalist approach), we can interpret the meta-discourse as an 
extension of a certain and peculiar set of prejudices and biases. As illustrated above, 
discourses about interpreting document prejudice against interpreted communication and 
bias in support of non-interpreted communication. By embracing attitudes about language 
and communication from the field without questioning where the attitudes come from and 
whom they serve, interpreting researchers replicate and perpetuate popular 
misunderstandings about simultaneous interpretation. 
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3.3.4 Applied Discourse Analysis 4: Ascertaining the Certainty of Facts 
The example provided by Tebble (2009) to illustrate the application of functional 
discourse analysis is a medical encounter between a physician and a patient. She draws 
upon the components of Hymes (1964, 1972) model of the speech event and a 
previously-derived generic structure of interpreted medical consultation (Tebble, 1999). 
Tebble explains that this structure was empirically established by combining a top down 
approach (Halliday & Hasan; 1985; Hasan, 1977) and a micronanalytical or bottom up 
approach (Sinclair and Coulthard, 1975; Tebble, 1992), both being methods of systemic 
functional linguistics. 
The speech act [the smallest unit] occurs within a conversational move of 
which there are typically two that occur within a conversational exchange. 
One or more exchanges comprise a transaction. A transaction comprises 
one or typically a sequence of exchanges of a particular type; and the 
genre element is made up of one or more transactions on one topic. Using 
this method of analysis the structure of each discourse can be identified 
and compared, revealing patterns of generic structure. (Tebble, 2009, p. 
209) 
As long as there is no challenge to the genre structure by virtue of an intercultural 
difference (such as an alternative generic structure for the particular event), positivistic 
functional description is adequate. 
What is particularly helpful about using a medical encounter as an introduction to 
discourse analysis is the care that physicians must take to ensure that they comprehend 
what the patient is telling them. Tebble (2009) continues by describing “two significant 
strategies used in professional consultations and interviews to check information are the 
formulation and the observation” (p. 212). Adopted from conversation analysis (cf 
Tebble, 1992), “each is the first part of an adjacency pair: formulation and decision; and 
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observation and decision” (p. 213). ‘Adjacency pairs’ is the technical term identifying the 
complementary ‘exchanges’ introduced above as conversational moves. 
What critical discourse analysis of the CL5 volume offers as an addition and 
complement to functionalist description is the observation that turn-taking does not 
always follow in neat sequences of sensible adjacency pairs (cf Schegloff, Sacks & 
Jefferson, 1974). Throughout the CL5 discourse there is evidence that meanings are not 
always transparent; that shared understanding requires back-and-forth, give-and-take 
exchanges. The intercultural challenges of interpreted communication manifest at two 
levels: the turn and the word. As noted above, problems with turn-taking are frequently 
elided. Problems with the word receive the most attention. 
The positivist notions that meaning is self-evident and controlled by the speaker 
are assumptions that can only hold up if one views language and language use as 
permanently fixed. Ng provides a neat demonstration that this is inaccurate even in law: 
“there is no such thing as a forever accurate translation of ‘burglary,’ whose meaning has 
changed and can be expected to change as time goes by” (2009, p. 44). Likewise, the 
structuralist goals of semantic mapping and notions like equivalence establish fixed 
targets that may serve more as impediments to effective communication than support; 
particularly so in rapidly changing economic and environmental/institutional conditions. 
The spread of English as a lingua franca has also generated frustration among 
community interpreters who believe they would be better able to render target language 
utterances from a native language source than from English spoken non-fluently. Ozolins 
& Hale describe the increased anecdotal evidence…of this phenomenon of difficult to 
grasp English (in the case of English-speaking countries) of significant numbers of 
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professionals, themselves migrants, who increasingly provide the workforce in public 
health systems and elsewhere, leading to problems for interpreters no less than for many 
English-speaking patients. (2009, p. 5) 
Ortega Herráez et al.report a somewhat similar situation in Spain, where 
police interpreters who said they did not explain cultural differences were 
those working with English, and in most cases using it as a contact 
language, so it is quite likely that they did not have access to the cultural 
background of the speakers in question, since it was not a native English-
speaking culture. (2009, p. 157) 
Recall that the policing situation in Spain already constrains interpreters greatly, 
heightening concerns about anyone using a non-fluent language to give testimony or 
otherwise discuss legalities. It is not only English that presents such challenges of 
comprehensibility. Basque/Spanish interpreters, for instance, need to be familiar with six 
dialects (González and Auzmendi, 2009), and familiarity with many Chinese dialects is 
necessary for Cantonese/English interpreters in Hong Kong (Ng, 2009). 
Rather than interpreting between languages with well-known common grammars, 
interpreters will be increasingly called upon to ‘interpret’ source language utterances that 
are idiosyncratic and inventive, rather than conventional. This is quite evident in the 
European Parliament where the use of non-fluent, mother-tongue-inflected English as a 
Lingua Franca (ELF) challenges conference interpreters (Kent, 2009). These concerns 
with the complexity and nuance of languages are dynamic features of transnationalism 
that can only be resolved through increased cooperation in interpreted intercultural 
interaction. But is insisting on the need enough to make it happen? “It is…critical for all 
participants in interpreted encounters to have a mutual understanding of each other’s 
roles and needs” (Ozolins & Hale, 2009, p. 3). Achieving increased comprehension by 
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interpretees of the interpreter’s professional performance capacities is blocked by norms 
that insist on interpreter invisibility and non-intervention. 
3.3.5 Going Beyond (Applied Discourse Analysis 5): Where Does the Profession 
Want Community SI To Go? 
Positive structuralism stops its analysis with description, hiding its prescriptions 
which are always latent and implied, and sometimes overtly stated. For instance, Tebble 
writes: “Knowing the genre that one is interpreting means knowing the stages of the 
speech event” (p. 209). This is an example of the normalcy of hegemonic ideology. It is 
perhaps a subtle point, but the idea that one can learn one structure and apply that lesson 
to every similar encounter is an oversimplification and a disservice to cultural variability. 
Interpretivist analysis goes further. Applying a critical lens suggests that some elements 
of the discourse analysis presented so far suggest that interpreters and academics of SI 
participate and talk about the practice of SI in ways that co-construct the very dynamics 
we seek to remedy. 
Specifically, the discourse in CL5 demonstrates concern with language more than 
concern with understanding. This was illustrated earlier with the list of quotes illustrating 
three tensions in research discourse about simultaneous interpretation. González & 
Auzmendi, for instance, put the lens on “the process which the language had to go 
through” (2009, p. 137), and Ng’s (2009) study essentially boils down to a debate 
between the semantic mapping of disembodied languages (“translation”) to the socially-
experienced human-to-human co-construction of shared understandings 
(“interpretation”). Lee’s advocacy for “absolute criteria” in the assessment of interpreting 
performance (2009, p. 174) carries the structuralist paradigm’s focus on language as 
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interpreting studies’ proper object of research to its linguistic paradigm extreme as the 
sole basis for evaluation. The argument Lee provides is rational: 
Since interpreting performance assessment tends to rely on the 
demonstration of skills rather than on tasks that test comprehension of the 
source speech, understanding may have to be assessed only through the 
message rendition.” (p. 174) 
Positivist implication? The skill of finding and uttering equivalent words must be 
performed ‘right’ the ‘first’ time, all the time. Because (goes the hegemonic ideology) 
there is no time for ‘extra’ turns in pursuit of clarification or other information to support 
an interpretation most suitable to the unique configuration of participants in any actual 
setting. 
However, the contribution from Pöchhacker & Kolb (2009) demonstrates what 
could happen in real life when interpreters and interpretees share responsibility for 
documenting the results of a legal interview with deliberate regard to the future trajectory 
of the written document as a proxy for the personified body of the asylum seeker. This 
attention and cooperative interaction by the interpreter with the interpretees (and vice-
versa) resembles more closely that of the doctor who genuinely wants to understand the 
health and medical conditions of a patient. These enactments and representations of 
interpreting suggest that the problem of interpreter assessment is to construe 
‘understanding’ in interactive, not only linguistic, terms. 
While the asylum interpreter in Austria (Pöchhacker and Kolb, 2009) takes on a 
great deal of responsibility for the written record, Ortega Herráez et al. found 100% of 
police interpreters (in Spain) stated that they 
would never explain questions of procedure, and we would attribute this 
answer to the fact that in police settings there is more control over the 
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interpreters (they do not have the opportunity to chat with non-Spanish 
speakers) and the fact that there is less procedure to explain. (p. 159) 
While it is interesting that the action of “explain[ing] questions of procedure” is equated 
with “chat,”122 the point to highlight here involves the matter and perception of control. 
“Police interpreters would seem to perceive greater risk in acting on their own initiative, 
probably because they work in a setting where encounters are much more ritualized and 
restrictive” (p. 159). What Ortega Herráez et al. are expressing is similar to that 
suggested by Pöchhacker and Kolb: both sets of authors refer to the relationship between 
interpreter’s role performance and the exertion of control by the setting. Sharing 
responsibility for the written record “challenges established principles of professional 
ethics,” explain Pöchhacker and Kolb (2009, p. 133), because “the production of [the 
written record] should, in principle, be the sole task of the recording clerk working under 
the guidance of—and from dictation by—the adjudicating official conducting the 
hearing” (p. 133) and interpreters are “essentially [to render] what was said rather than 
what is to be written” (p. 133). 
The attachment to “what was said” is a language ideology that exerts control over 
the interpretee’s voice by restricting the interpreter’s role. This articulation of role with 
control (or control with role) is constructed in this academic meta-discourse through 
authorial metacommunication in a passive voice, one that elides human agency (Pinker, 
2007). On the one hand, the discourse about the need for professionalization indicates 
                                                
122  The idea that non-interpreted ‘direct talk’ by an interpreter with an interpretee is 
‘only chatter’ (rather than about something of substance for the effectiveness of the 
interpreted communication) could be argued as an example of miniaturization (Sen, 
2006), in which a whole person and all of their identities are reduced to one 
dimension, in this case, that of someone who does not speak the dominant language.  
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distress over, as represented in the Basque case, “the lack of standardization” and “lack of 
tradition” (González and Auzmendi, 2009, p. 136). Yet Roberts-Smith (2009) makes 
similar claims about “a professional structure of recognized and guaranteed 
competencies” (p. 33) for court SI in Australia where professional SI is well-established 
but still not yet understood as an interactive mode of intercultural communication. 
The “facts” in the CL5 research discourse, however, do show normative 
structures, traditions and even an ideology regarding professionalization. The intense 
focus on the interpreter, the interpreter’s role, and the interpreter’s linguistic competence 
(etcetera) effectively eliminates serious consideration of interpretees’ agency and 
responsibilities during SI. One could say there is little space for exploring interpretee’s 
responsibility for quality in SI because interpreters fill the stage. The structuralist 
paradigm, with its building-block-like emphasis on discrete words and assumed 
equivalences of meaning, invokes a totalizing differentiation and imposes a discursive 
barrier against uses of language that might invite different emphases. The asylum 
interpreter’s give-and-take interactions with interprees is a precursor to interpretees 
taking more turns paraphrasing and confirming mutual understanding as a new normal of 
proactive participation in ensuring mutual understanding. 
Again, the structuralist, building-block logic presumes meaning resides 
exclusively in diction and other linguistic categories rather than being socially 
constructed among conscious beings through mutual processes of communication. Ng 
advocates changing the weighting from overemphasizing written translation’s language 
criteria of adequacy and acceptability to privileging simultaneous interpretation’s 
emphasis on fluency and comprehensibility (2009, p. 51). Researchers in Interpreting 
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Studies could also conceivably cooperate to make a deliberate discourse move similar to 
that made by Merlini & Favaron when they opted to describe the interpreter behavior of 
speaking in the first person as a norm and not a rule (2009). 
Garrett (2009) also offers prescriptions for change. On one hand, she advocates 
the positive outcomes associated with community-oriented SI. “There are very 
compelling safety, equity and quality arguments to support” maintaining universal access 
to interpreters for patients with limited English proficiency (p. 78). Specifically, Garrett 
elaborates: 
Professional interpreters have been linked with increased patient satisfaction, 
greater patient involvement, improved understanding, greater compliance with 
treatment, improved access, and reduced medical errors (Brach and Fraser, 2000; 
Timmins, 2002; Jacobs et al., 2001; Flores et al., 2003; Baker et al., 1996; Flores 
et al., 2005)” (2009, p. 73) 
On the other hand, Garrett maps a route for aligning advocacy for SI with other 
discourses, insisting: 
“Interpreter service policy needs to become firmly situated with the 
healthcare discourse related to quality, safety and effectiveness [by 
establishing] strong linkages between language ability, patient safety and 
equity. “(2009, p. 79). 
Similar linkages need to be built with interpretees in other fields. “To study 
communication,” Carey asserts, “is to examine the actual social process wherein 
significant symbolic forms are created, apprehended and used” (1992, p. 30). In this 
section I have sought to present a view of the situation of community interpreting in a 
changing landscape of transnational backlash and paradigmatic growth. The method has 
been to apply critical discourse analysis to a representative sample of academic meta-
discourse about community SI, and present these results in a forward-looking way. We 
have created the field in which we work, teach, and study. We can change it. 
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3.4 Consciousness in CL5 
The concept of sharing responsibility acknowledges the relational and interactive 
aspects of communication in ways that emphasizing quality and (interpreter) 
responsibility alone do not. “How little attention has been paid to language interpretation 
and the role of the interpreters in maintaining ethical relationships,” conclude Kaufert et 
al.in their review of biomedical research ethics (emphasis added, 2009, p. 247). The 
contributions to CL5 show how the relationships inevitably co-constructed among 
interpretees, and between interpretees and interpreters, are routinely de-emphasized in 
favour of focusing on criteria for (presumedly?) more measurable things such as the 
‘quality’ of ‘language’ and/or ‘interpretation’, the definition of role (the interpreter’s, not 
anyone else’s), and articulations and assessments of ethics (solely of the interpreter, alone 
and in isolation). This skewed pattern of measurement tends to hold true even when the 
overt object of analysis or theoretical framing emphasizes the interactive, social 
construction of relationships and identities. 
3.4.1 Beyond the Brackets: Discovering the Interpreter’s Unconscious 
Rather than an either/or competition, can we cooperate to talk a complementary 
interplay between structuralism and interactionism into social practice? In discussing the 
efficacy of rating scales, Lee asserts there is no alternative for testing comprehension than 
“message rendition” (2009, p. 174) and “absolute criteria” (p. 174), while at the same 
time acknowledging the performance assessment by scales “is by no means an exact 
science” (p. 174), relying to an unspecified (perhaps unspecifiable) degree upon 
“intuition” (p. 171). Two of the editors of CL5 pick up on this question about intuition in 
their introduction to the volume (Ozolins & Hale, p. 7). Meanwhile, seven of Lee’s nine 
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participants “found band scales helpful for consistent rating” and argues that even the 
responses of the remaining two skeptical participants are positive: “indicat[ing] that the 
band scales appropriately described the level of qualities the raters unconsciously or 
consciously expected in interpreting performance” (2009, p. 181).123 
On the other hand, comparative literature from the field of second language 
assessment cautions, “rater training helps to improve reliability in assessment but has 
limitations in eliminating the rater bias and rater effects (Weigle, 1994)” (in Lee, 2009, p. 
183). The acknowledgement of bias and rater effects may be what inspired Lee to include 
the presence of unconscious expectations by raters of interpreting quality. What she 
describes is assessment performance behavior by raters that appears similar to acquired 
interpreting behavior by interpreters, specifically Lee lists the rater’s own reliance on 
memory, inconsistency by the rater in referring to the source text or referring to it only 
when deviations were suspected, and eventually desisting in referring to the source text at 
all (p. 183). 
Lee proposes what I would characterize as a loose equation for measuring 
accuracy based on perceived deviations from the source text, arguing that “the gravity of 
which should be considered in terms of the effect on the coherent and faithful rendering 
of the message” (2009, p. 175). Deviations and their severity include the presence and 
frequency of “omissions, additions, unjustifiable changes or misinterpretations of the 
                                                
123  Lee  (2009) explains: “The term ‘band’ usually implies a range of possible scores 
and, therefore, band scores may be converted into test scores (Alderson, 1991, 
p.73).” In this case, “The number of bands in each criterion was determined on the 
basis of the existing weighting, namely 6 points for Accuracy in content, 6 points for 
Target Language Quality, and 3 points for Delivery” (p. 176).   
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meaning and intention of the speaker” (p. 175).124 Regarding omissions in interpretation, 
Ortega Herráez, et al. report: 
In general, court interpreters stated that when they omit information it is 
for communicative purposes, whereas the health/social services interpreter 
stated (quite openly) that when they omit it is because they have forgotten 
the information, have not understood it or do not know how to express it 
in the target language. (2009, pp. 156-157) 
Mentions of the unconscious and conscious omissions in the CL5 discourse sample invite 
more exploration of Jemina Napier’s work on these topics. In Sign language interpreting: 
Linguistic coping strategies (2002), Napier explicitly emphasizes “what interpreters do 
well” (p. 119). She situates her research in the realms of frame theory and discourse 
processes. Napier’s results bring positivistic structuralism and interpretivist 
interactionism into the foreground as competing paradigms within the field. Her findings 
will be explored in chapter six. 
3.4.2 Silences... 
The theory being proposed is that there has been a “silence” in the discourses 
about simultaneous interpretation about the realities of interpretation that interferes with 
professional best practices and interpretee empowerment. Discussion of omissions brings 
this silence into view. Whether the silence is a manifestation of interpreters’ practical 
consciousness that is in process of becoming discursive consciousness is an action 
                                                
124  Note: By contrast, evidence of the communication dynamics of self- or other-repair 
to uttered language is relatively unremarkable in typical, monolingual interaction 
among engaged and attentive interlocutors (Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks, 1977). 
These could also be correctable, if normatively permitted, within interpreted 
interaction. 
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research hypothesis. This ‘silence’ protects and hides the simple truth that there can never 
be a single definitive “translation” that perfectly duplicates its original. The practical 
reason is because the reference points for meaning across two languages (let alone 
between unique individuals hailing from distinctly different cultures) never align in 
complete totality. The philosophical reason is because language is only meaningful when 
some degree or experience of mutuality is involved: one could almost say that the notion 
of ‘original’ is itself a myth. 
Whether or not a tree makes a sound when it falls in the forest is irrelevant to a 
deaf person who gleans meaning from their sense of sight and physical perceptions of 
vibration. The ‘origin’ of meaning is in the simultaneity of co-occurrence . . . imagine 
‘message delivery’ and ‘message reception’ occurring in tandem. If a tree falls and the 
hearing person is startled by the noise, is this more or less meaningful than the deaf 
person who senses the rumble in the ground? Both have ‘received’ a communication: is it 
the same one? How could they check? Would they even wonder if they had ‘understood 
the same thing’? Interpreting dishevels the flow of presumed mutual comprehension that 
is taken for granted when communicating in the same language. Rather than two people 
communing on a shared experience of crashing noise, or two people communing on a 
shared experience of trembling ground, interpreting allows people to connect their 
disparate experiences to the same event. The question of participation involves 
interpretees’ desire and abilities to forge commonality by engaging the differences. The 
question of professional practice involves the extent to which interpreters mask or present 
these differences. 
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Challenges by Deaf interpretees to sign language interpreters are signals that they 
are aware and sensitive to instances of masking, which is contrary to readers’ experiences 
of written translation in which they are too removed to notice evidence of deviation or 
omission. Edwin Gentzler refers to translation silences: 
“Those ‘silences’ in the text, often known only to the translator, were 
often not only the most interesting in terms of creativity, but also the most 
revealing with regard to cultural differences” (Edwin Gentzler, 1993, p. 
xii in Hatim, 2001, p. 44) 
The silences Gentzler refers to are in written literary translations that have been 
specifically adapted to conform or appeal to the Western reader. Gentzler comments that 
these ‘silences’ are accompanied by “certain costs” (which are left unnamed). Are similar 
costs of ‘silence’ involved in simultaneous interpretation? We might consider such 
‘silences’ as clues to the presence of alternatively constructed timespaces, each premised 
(constructed, maintained and re-created) on the basis of difference.125 This clue to an 
alternative chronotope, toward another way of orienting social interaction with the 
unfolding of identity, relationships, culture and social reality, raises questions concerning 
what would be required from interpretees to enable their creativity to recognize and 
engage with the alternative flow of a interpreted communication. 
                                                
125   Derrida’s différance (1963/1973) involves a philosophical and literary critique of 
language and language use that highlights the impermanent and unfixable nature of 
words. From this poststructural vantage point, the temporal aspect of meaning-
making regards the non-arrival of any single absolute definition; from such a view, 
either chaos or creativity can commence. There is much to his philosophy that could 
be brought to bear on the challenges of simultaneous interpretation.  
151 
3.5 Addressing the Tensions in Simultaneous Interpreting Research and Practice 
The tensions this critical discourse analysis brings into view hold across 
interpreters’ and interpreter researchers’ perceptions of interpretees in all the CL5 
community interpreting contexts named above, including the outlier chapter on 
interpretees in conference interpreting. Conference interpreters at the European 
Parliament in 2005 were even more explicit than the community interpreters in their 
concern that Members of the EP (MEPs) do not understand or use the system of SI in the 
EP properly, referring to MEPs’ choices to communicate in a second or third language 
instead of their most fluent language with urgent terms such as “danger” and “loss” 
(Kent, 2007). 
The similarities among conference SI and community SI settings are concentrated 
in terms of what interpretees know and do not know about how to participate in SI, and 
appear centralized around matters of exercising voice through the agency of the 
interpreter rather than in spite of the interpreter. (The assumption is that attitudes and 
attempts at ‘control of meaning’ is an expression of the desire for voice.) These findings 
are a reason why consciousness is situated as a reference point for action research. The 
speculation is that increases in shared discursive consciousness about how to achieve 
voice during SI will generate the circulation of more linguistic and cultural differences, 
thus contributing productively to the maintenance of human diversity. 
To repeat, the three tensions that become apparent from a critical discourse 
analysis of a situated timesnap of interpreting research are: 
1 heterogenous realities in the field being opposed to a mythical ideal of 
communicative flow; 
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2 interpretees perceived as unskilled in the use of SI while interpreters are 
constrained from providing appropriate instruction; and 
3 ideas about language and meaning that are inconsistent and contradictory; a 
confusion that encompasses interpretees and interpreters. 
 
These tensions become apparent by reading the academic meta-discourse 
critically, through the lenses of two different paradigms: structural, i.e., functional 
linguistics; and interpretivist, i.e., socially co-constructed through the interplay of 
language(s) and social interaction. Applying one paradigmatic view to the knowledge 
being represented in the other paradigmatic view does justice to the complexity of 
interpreted intercultural communication. 
3.6 Convergence or Divergence in Interpreting Studies? 
The field of translation studies came into being during the 1960s mainly through 
the engagement of literary translators with intellectual developments in philosophies of 
language and linguistics. The challenges and problems of translating cultural differences 
and meanings of artistic works (especially poetry and fiction) into other languages are 
taken very seriously. Over several decades, a range of approaches, strategies and debates 
for dealing with linguistic differences and the power of the translator have been explored 
both generally and specifically, both as abstract principle and within contexts 
particularized by cultural boundaries between the language(s) of original literary work 
and the target language(s) of translation. 
In contrast, interpreting researchers (and professional interpreters) have 
historically engaged the intercultural social interaction aspects of simultaneous 
interpreting without calling into question the simple functional linguistic paradigm that 
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constrains interpretee—interpretee engagement through a rigid delineation of interpreter 
role and an evaluative emphasis on fluency and the smoothness of communicative flow). 
Perhaps it is the objectification of language captured in print126 that has enabled 
translation theory to keep pace with developments and divergences in social theory over 
the past decades. 
Meanwhile, in the last decade within the field of interpreting studies, Franz 
Pöchhacker (2007) celebrates identifying that researchers of simultaneous interpretation 
were just beginning to converge into (what he considers) a coherent disciplinary space. 
He describes this space as characterized by an emphasis on “the social sphere of 
interaction in which interpreting takes place” (p. 12) through “the dialogic interactionist 
approach developed mainly for research on community interpreting” (p. 11). 
Pöchhacker (2007) traces how interpreting studies has finally moved beyond 
gross features of modality (e.g., spoken or signed languages) and (what he describes as) 
categorizations based on model or paradigm to 
a conceptual continuum, with two broad distinctions: first, between inter-
national and intra-social, or ‘community-based’ settings; and, second, 
with regard to the format of interaction—prototypically, multilateral 
conferencing vs. face-to-face dialogue. Drawing on these two conceptual 
dimensions allows for much middle ground, including conference-like 
events in the community (especially involving Deaf people) or dialogue 
interpreting in diplomacy. (2007, p. 12) 
                                                
126  As mentioned earlier, translation deals primarily with written texts. The spatial and 
temporal fixing of written text in a static, stable configuration as a tangible, material 
artefact constitutes an object of study that is qualitatively different than the 
effervescent spoken word or gestural sign that vanishes along sound and light waves 
(except when live interaction is recorded for replay). 
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Within this disciplinary convergence, however, remains a strong and as yet un-
problematized emphasis on the source text and accuracy of interpretation measured 
linguistically. The root definitions of interpreting from within the field refer to Gerver’s 
(1971) complex information processing, bolstered by fascination within cognitive science 
to map the linguistic functions in the brain (cf Beaugrande, 1980). While there are 
traditions that focus more on target-text construction (e.g., Toury, 1995), “neither version 
of the target-text-oriented translation-theoretical [skopos theory127 or Toury’s] approach 
has gained a high profile in interpreting research” (Pöchhacker, 2007, p. 17). 
In other words, the basic functional linguistic paradigm has not been overthrown; 
its challengers have not yet prevailed. Perhaps this is because of the heightened 
sensitivity of interpreters and interpretees who are engaged in actual social interaction 
with each other, in contrast to authors and animators of written texts for readers with 
whom they most likely never meet in person?128 It could be that the spatial and temporal 
distances implied by translation has allowed translation theorists to examine more 
                                                
127  “Spearheaded by Hans Vermeer at the University of Heidelberg, the German 
functionalist theory of translation, or skopos theory, proved largely compatible with 
the decidedly descriptive approach to the target-oriented study of translation as 
promoted in particular by Gideon Toury (1995)” (Pöchhacker, 2007, p. 17). 
128   “The methods [of fieldwork] used will depend on research goals as well as practical 
and political realities of the fieldwork situation10” (Farnell and Graham 1998:438). 
Footnote 10: “The political entailments of field research are widely acknowledged in 
anthropology (see Rabinow 1977; Fox 1991; Clifford and Marcus 1986). They have 
received less attention in linguistics (see Aissen 1992). Briggs (1986) discusses 
assymetries of power in linguistic anthropology with a focus on the interview” 
(Farnell and Graham 1998, p. 443). 
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features of interlingual communication with a certain degree of protection from 
consequences.129 
One of the effects of this removal from the immediacy of spontaneous social 
interaction may be part of what has enabled translation theorists and researchers to keep 
apace of social theory in general. Meanwhile, the kinship Pöchhacker writes about is not 
a convergence of different paradigms, it is a hegemonic consolidation of the dominant 
linguistic paradigm of equivalence and fluency. The constraining elements of this 
established academic meta-discourse can be conceived as a structural control to limit or 
contain the increased variability of meaning-making that necessarily emerges when the 
heterogeneous and foreignizing aspects of intercultural interaction are included in the 
products and processes of simultaneous interpretation. 
Later, the case will be presented that much of the progress which has occurred in 
moving the field of interpreting studies toward recognition of the complexities of 
meaning-making are largely due to criticism and resistance from culturally Deaf 
communities. Pöchhacker nods in this direction, commenting on “the important 
contribution of sign language interpreting researchers such as Cynthia Roy (2000)” 
                                                
129  Specifically, during translation the spatial disconnect among reader(s), author(s) and 
translator(s) and the temporal asynchronicity as writing, translating, and reading 
occur at non-simultaneous times for each participant, creating a bufferzone for 
reactions that might be embarrassing or awkward (or perceived as such) in 
immediate face-to-face interaction. 
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(2007, p. 17) shaping the convergence he perceives on the triadic nexus130 of “dialogic 
discourse and interaction” (p. 17). In a general sense I do not disagree with him; this 
convergence is occurring. What I am contesting is the extent to which these theories from 
other disciplines and sub-fields are changing actual training, practice, performance and 
participation in intercultural interpreted communication, rather than co-opted to support 
the established functional linguistic paradigm. 
Resistance to the hegemony of the functional linguistic paradigm does not often 
come from minority language speakers during live interpreting, and there is (as yet, to my 
knowledge) no other language group with a voice as consistently challenging as that of 
Deaf culture. Instead, resistance comes from the discontented field of translation studies: 
its diverse theories and densely developed history. The gulf between translation studies 
and interpreting studies establishes a bridge between the empowered Deaf voice in 
community interpreting, and the debates and practices of multilingualism in the European 
Union, specifically as they play out in the institutional context of simultaneous 
interpretation in the European Parliament. 
3.7 Into the Field: Simultaneous Interpretation in Action 
The preceding critical discourse analysis of a situated timesnap of academic 
research about community interpreting, in comparison with a range of theoretical 
                                                
130  “Most consequentially, Cecilia Wadensjö (1998) view of interpreting as managing 
discourse in a triadic relationship, with a focus on interactivity rather than monologic 
text production, shaped a new paradigm. Centered on dialogic discourse and 
interaction (DI), this ‘DI paradigm’ drew mainly on concepts and methods from such 
fields as sociolinguistics, conversation analysis and social psychology” (Pöchhacker, 
2007, p. 17). 
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developments in the field of translation studies, establishes the need for paradigmatic 
thinking that includes interpretees as well as interpreter-practitioners, trainers, and 
researchers. An inclusive and foreignizing engagement of participants within the field of 
simultaneous interpretation is hypothesized to promote meta-communicative 
collaboration that can be consciously used for the social good. Meta-communication is 
talk that explores both discursive consciousness and practical consciousness. Instead of 
the typical literature review, a critical discourse analysis of carefully selected, 
representative instances in the research literature shows the effects of selective attention, 
particularly in Kenneth Burke’s (1966) sense of a “terministic screen” in which every 
utterance entails a selection of speech acts that simultaneously de-selects alternative acts 
with their associated indexicalities131 (or thrust, to suggest a synonym in Will’s term) and 
entailments. Both entailment and indexicality refer to effects of language use and social 
interaction over time. Whether deliberately or unconsciously chosen, language use 
inevitably directs the attention toward certain meanings and social realities (selecting 
them) and away from other meanings and social realities (deselecting them). This fact 
opens the possibility for conceptualizing consciousness, and unconsciousness, as dialogic 
                                                
131   Urcuoli 1995:109 in (Farnell and Graham 1998, p. 416): “The property that language 
shares with all sign-systems is its indexical nature: its maintenance and creation of 
social connections, anchored in experience and the sense of the real. Linguistic 
indexes may be grammaticalized or lexicalized as ‘shifters’—devices that locate 
actions in time and space: personal pronouns, verb tenses, demonstratives, and time 
and space adverbs. These are deictic in that they point outward from the actor’s 
location. The structure of action fans out from the center, the locus of I and You, to 
delineate where and when everything happens relative to the central actors: he and 
she versus I and You; there versus here; then versus now; present versus non-present 
(past or future). . . . The indexes that embody discourse extend beyond pronouns, 
adverbs and verbal categories both to the sounds and shapes of speech that identify 
the actor with a particular group and to the speech acts marking the actor’s intent as 
others recognize it. In short indexes make the social person [identity, role].” 
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accomplishments,132 that is, as outcomes and effects of people engaging with each other 
through social interaction and language in use, i.e., through talk. 
Vuorikoski claims, “It is a crucial issue in interpreting to find out whether the SI 
version allows the listener to formulate an interpretation of the TT message which 
corresponds to the one he would have formulated if he had been able to understand the 
original speech” (2004, p. 64). Important as this standard has been, rather than continuing 
in this equivalence paradigm, this research is motivated to try and understand what 
happens if equivalence is assumed as only ever an approximate achievement. In other 
words, if receivers’ interpretations of meaning (s) differ, how do people in interpreted 
communication make sense and go on? (cf Cronen, 2001). What are the outcomes of 
‘going on’ in a democratic institution endowed with the power of making public policy? 
                                                
132   Michael Billig explores the dialogic co-construction of unconsciousness in Freudian 
Repression (1999). 
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CHAPTER 4 
SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION IN THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
4.1 Political Context: Justice and Home Affairs 
The system of simultaneous interpretation (SI) in the European Parliament (EP) 
relies upon technology and the human talent for communication. The purpose of SI in the 
EP is to facilitate the European Union’s legislative process in coordination with the 
European Commission and the Council of Presidents (“the Council”). The Council puts 
forth five-year-long “programmes” that are established by the first Presidency in each 
five year electoral term. The main part of this research was conducted in the last year of 
the Hague Programme, which (among many, many other things) kicked off the second 
phase of policy-making on a common European asylum policy. The asylum dossier 
became central to this research project when the researcher was allowed to observe the 
different types of meetings involved in establishing asylum law for the European Union. 
This access began with an observation of the EP’s Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice 
and Home Affairs (LIBE), included meetings of the Asylum dossier Working Group 
(composed of a representative MEP from each political group in the LIBE Committee), 
and extended to the Trialogue meetings where the lead MEP on the Asylum dossier 
(called the Rapporteur) negotiated with representatives from the Council and 
representatives from the European Commission (“the Commission”). 
Some Trialogues during the Hague Programme were different than previous 
Trialogues because the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) had created the mechanism of co-
decision, in which the Council and Commission could no longer disregard the EP’s 
political voice as elected representatives of the European public sphere. The new 
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Trialogue rules require the Council and Commission to engage and compromise, rather 
than just consider the EP’s consultation advice. The Asylum dossier was among the early, 
precedent-setting co-decision legislation, not the old (one might say disempowered or 
disempowering mode of) consultation, so the political stakes for participating Members 
and the overall Parliament were high. In addition to establishing a new European Asylum 
Support Office (EASO) and improving the existing directives, the Rapporteur was 
carrying expectations from all the MEPs to uphold and even increase the influence of the 
EP in the overall governance structure of the European Union. The Rapporteur “is 
responsible from the beginning to the end of a specific topic” (F53),133 specifically for 
coordinating the movement of legislation through all its requisite stages, establishing the 
Working Group’s position by negotiating with the representatives from all the political 
groups (who are called Shadow Rapporteurs, usually shortened to “Shadows”), gaining 
support from the whole Committee in order to negotiate with the Commission and 
Council in the Trialogues, and writing the final report. 
We have so-called shadow rapporteurs…because if your [political] Group 
doesn’t get the Report, you need certainly someone who…makes the same 
work as a rapporteur in your group. So, who is from the first to the end as 
it was published in the official schedule, knows what is going with this 
legislation, makes all the professional negotiation, plus, of course, the 
political negotiation in the Group and among all Members. (F53) 
                                                
133   The coding system for participants in the research is divided into three categories: F 
refers to any permanent or temporary staff of the Parliament, who are described as 
“officials” or “functionnaires.” The Members, “M,” are divided into two categories, 
those representing “Old” Member countries (from before the big bang enlargement 
which vastly increased the language regime for simultaneous interpretation) and 
those representing “New” Member countries: OM and NM. The numbers are 
randomly assigned. 
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In the case of the Asylum dossier, the only settings utilizing simultaneous interpretation 
were during progress reports and voting in the full LIBE Committee, and voting in 
Plenary Sessions. 
The English fluency of the participants in non-interpreted Asylum dossier 
meetings varied, allowing observation and inquiry about communication dynamics in the 
absence of interpretation. In Hymesian terms, these variations in setting occur within one 
overall scene of social interaction. The overall scene is European multilingual 
democracy.134 Within this scene, across the settings, participants engage in specific 
events, generating innumerable acts of communication according to various keys (tones 
or moods) and according to particular genres, all within the scope of a single instrument: 
the system of simultaneous interpretation. (See Table 2.) 
                                                
134  The labels “multilingual,” “democratic,” and even “European” can be (and are) 
contested. Only the notion and practices of multilingualism are enjoined here. 
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Table 2. Hymesian SPEAKING Rubric Applied to the European Parliament 
Theoretical element of 
communication events Applied element of communication 
Scene multilingual European democracy 
Settings 
● fully-interpreted Plenaries 
● partially-interpreted Groups, Committees, Working Groups 
● non-interpreted Working Groups 
Participants 
Primary: 
● interpretees (Members of the European Parliament) interpreters European 
Parliament Interpreters (EPIs) 
Secondary:* 
● Members’ Assistants 
● Permanent Staff 
● Guests 
● Visitors 
Enabling:** 
● Technicians 
Ends Not yet determined 
Acts Every quote is an act  
Key Variable per event setting and participant 
Instrument The system of simultaneous interpretation 
Genre Political 
*Secondary Participants sometimes engage as Primary Participants 
**Other enabling participants are in the scheduling office of the Interpreting Directorate; no one from that 
office was interviewed during this project. 
4.1.1 Getting Past the Glitz: Setting(s), Scene and Instrument 
During the very last interview I wrote in my field notebook, “The interpreters 
[still] assume plenary is the object of interest. Members too.” How people felt about the 
plenary meetings in the hemicycle, with its full complement of official languages and 
hundreds of interpreters, was routinely assumed to be the only relevant subject for 
research about interpreting. After eight months of observation and conversations, it 
seemed I had been unable to pierce the established discourse about SI in the EP. Rhetoric 
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has effectively established the image of the European Parliament in plenary session as the 
icon of multilingual European democracy, crucially not just in the public imagination but 
also in the minds of its primary participants: interpreters and interpretees. This high 
profile motivated Vuorikoski’s decision to select the plenary for her study.  
In the words of Carlo Marzocchi and Giancarlo Zucchetto, who discuss 
interpreting in the EP institutional context, the monthly plenary assembly is ”the 
climax of an interpreter’s work at the EP, both in terms of peer recognition and in 
terms of effort” (1997: 81)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 16).  
That intensity also established Vuorikoski’s baseline for identifying constraints, because 
“the interpreter may experience a feeling of having reached the limit of what be 
interpreted” (p. 16-17). My motivation was to understand the interpreting occurring 
during the other part of the Parliament’s work.  
Parliament’s work is divided into two main stages: (1) Preparing for the plenary 
session. This is done by the MEPs in the various parliamentary committees that 
specialize in particular areas of EU activity. The issues for debate are also 
discussed by the political groups. (2) The plenary session itself. [...] (in 
Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 78, quoting a Europa website no longer available) 
The preparatory work of MEPs (and their Assistants, Secretariat, Commission and 
Council staff), constitutes, arguably, the EP’s community work in order to be able to 
convene in conference. Interpreters are working in all of these settings. 
Behind the primary participants are the invisible technicians who run the enabling 
electronic infrastructure. Just as there is “a big pyramid of layers” (F13) in the decision-
making process, there are also layers of human-designed and operated digital technology 
supporting the system of simultaneous interpretation. While the hardware is consistent, 
software is fitted both to the physical space of a given meeting as well as the social 
purpose of that meeting. 
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The equipment was described by a technician as “a global system” (F12) because 
it includes a “microphone conference system” for the Members and an “interpretation 
system” for the interpreters (F12). The microphone system for Members operates 
differently in the large hemicycles where the plenary sessions are held than in the other 
rooms where political groups and working committees meet. The interpretation system 
operates the same in either setting. The feature that distinguishes the different use of the 
Members’ microphone system is the degree of control by the technician. The interpreters’ 
interpretation system is “always on automatic” (F12), although each interpreter has some 
programming capability at their individual desk. 
The difference between these two systems, microphone and interpretation, is 
significant but undifferentiated in the primary participants’ discourse about SI in the EP. 
In seventy-three recorded conversations, Members, their Assistants, and various EU 
officials (temporary and permanent functionnaires, that is, Parliament staff and career EU 
bureaucrats) would talk about the differences in some features of communication 
depending on the physical location, but not in terms of the technological conditions.135 
Primary and secondary interpretees (Members and Assistants or Parliament staff, 
respectively) would describe Plenaries as full assemblies in which Members give 
speeches mainly for consumption by audiences in their home countries. The intended 
audience distinguishes the kind of talk that occurs in Plenary from communicating in 
Committees and Groups where MEPs argue and negotiate with each other over 
                                                
135  The difference in the degree of the technician’s control of Members’ microphones 
did not rise as a salient issue with the 55 interpreters interviewed in 2005. This does 
not mean that interpreters are unaware or unaffected by the degree of technician 
control, only that other concerns were more pressing during that time period. 
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legislation (Committees) and decide upon strategy according to their political party 
platform (Groups). Likewise, the distinction between Plenary and Committees or Groups 
is described by one of the régie (control room) technicians in social terms: 
In the hemicycle, the Members know when they have to speak and how 
long they can speak. They have one minute or one half minute speaking 
time. The president has to have the complete control of what’s going on. 
Nobody is able to turn on his microphone and say, “No, I don’t like what 
he’s talking about,” or things like that…. It’s contained because they are 
talking about rules, about debates they do in the rooms. If you go to the 
hemicycle and listen to what’s going on, then you are not aware of what 
they did work. You don’t understand what they’re talking about, because 
they are talking about rule number 22. They give a number. You don’t 
understand because you had to be in the room or you had to read the 
subject to know what’s going on. In the rooms it’s different because every 
group has his rooms or his room, and in the room they debate. So number 
116 talks to this one and asks a question. He answers. It’s a relay debate. 
In the hemicycle they don’t debate. (F12) 
In addition to naming the social features of interaction, the technician’s practical 
consciousness distinguishes between communication that occurs “in the room” or “in the 
hemicycle.”  
This is a subtle point, but the users of SI in the EP, the MEPs who are involved in 
these social interactions, refer to these differences based on the meeting’s social purpose. 
None indicated awareness that the technical conditions for the interpreters’ interpreting 
are different in different settings. The phrases “in the room” and “in the hemicycle” do 
not appear as significantly in the discourses of MEPs and interpreters. (See Table 3.) 
When these phrases are used they refer to the physical, geographic location of meetings 
not to label the overt types of social interaction that occur in each setting: “debate” occurs 
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in Groups and Committees (not in ‘rooms’) and “one minute speeches” occur in Plenary 
(not in ‘hemicycles’).136 
Table 3. Geographical and Social Constructs in Two Discourses about 
Simultaneous Interpreting in the European Parliament 
Discourse Setting Construct 
Technicians in the room in the hemicycle Geographical 
MEPs in the Group / in the Committee in the Plenary Social 
 
Between the conference microphone and interpretation systems, there is “a 
working reason” (F12) that motivates the degree of automation used to regulate the 
control permitted to Members as participants in the meeting. The overt reason is time 
management of turn-taking. (Of course the Members know these rules; they abide by 
them according to practical consciousness. The point is that they don’t talk about their 
effect on the quality or outcomes of intercultural communication, suggesting an absence 
or gap in discursive consciousness.) This technological differentiation to regulate control 
co-occurs with distinctive patterns of social interaction.137 Mentioning this juxtaposition 
now is to establish the overarching logic for comparing “X” communication-without-SI 
(as in the case of the Asylum Working Group and other smaller meetings relevant to the 
Asylum dossier) with “Y” communication-using-SI (the larger Group and Committee 
                                                
136  There are time limits for turns in Committees and Groups too, but the one-minute 
speeches given during Plenaries are (typically) aimed at home constituencies with 
only incidental or tangential meaning for their work with other Members. 
137  There is no chicken or egg dilemma here; the human social system and the 
engineered technology co-evolved. 
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meetings “in the room” when the interpretation system is used, and the Plenaries “in the 
hemicycles” where the conference microphone system is used). 
There is a continuum of simultaneously-interpreted communication in the EP 
anchored at one end by the fully interpreted, high-publicity plenaries and at the other end 
by small, un-interpreted face-to-face meetings in which the nitty-gritty details of 
comprehensive EU law are contested and confirmed. In the background, technicians 
believe they are even more invisible to the system of SI in the EP than the interpreters, 
yet they are absolutely crucial to the process and from their vantage point are able to 
articulate discursive consciousness about the system: 
For the members, the machine doesn’t exist….the machine doesn’t exist. 
They know that there are interpreters, but they don’t know there’s a 
machine, so they don’t realize that there’s a machine between the 
interpreters and the person. So when something works well, they thank 
interpreters, but they never talk about the technician or technical stuff. But 
if something goes wrong technical, they know how to find them. (F12) 
Despite (or perhaps because of) the invisibility, Parliament technicians have knowledge 
about the system of SI in the EP that is not present in other discourses, such as those of 
European Parliament interpreters and the users of SI in the EP. 
Subtle differences in the discourses of participants in communication events at the 
European Parliament may represent a limit or boundary between practical consciousness 
and discursive consciousness. Specifically, the generic (popular, common) discourse 
about SI in the EP assumes that the conditions of participating in interpreted 
communication are the same in these two scenarios. In other words, the assumption 
appears to be that whether you are “in the room” or “in the hemicycle” the interpreting 
should be done in the same way. Intriguingly for me as an action learner, it was only 
when the research widened beyond the dualism of “interpretees—interpreters” to include 
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the role of the technician that a meta-communicative vantage point on the established 
practical consciousness could be ascertained. Which is to say that I had been lost in the 
established discourse even though my outsider status provided an external context 
serving as a point of reference for comparison and contrast. 
What I knew about community interpreting for the Deaf was not sensible in the 
pervasive framework of a technician-controlled “microphone conference system.” Even 
though I could recognize (at least some of) the conditions and potentials for community-
style interpreting “in the room” (where “the interpretation system” is used) I was not able 
to discern the deeply coded nature of the phrase, “in the room,” nor its contrast with “in 
the hemicycle,” until someone with a different practical consciousness put the two terms 
in relation. Instead, in keeping with nearly everyone else, what drew most of my attention 
were the criticisms of interpreting (which do not distinguish between being “in the room” 
or “in the hemicycle”).138 In part, the focus on users’ criticisms came about because of a 
previous discourse analysis of what European Parliament Interpreters (EPIs) had to say 
about working as a professional interpreter in/for the EP. Themes of “danger” and “loss” 
were prominent in the EPIs discourse, which was “as full of complaints (and occasional 
compliments) about [MEPs] as their discourse is about [interpreters]” (Kent, 2007, p. 62). 
That preliminary fieldwork with EPIs will be elaborated below. Of note now is that its 
                                                
138  Criticisms of interpreters do name the settings of “in the Group” and “in the Plenary” 
as if they are being distinguished but, as will be discussed later, the substance of the 
criticisms are the same. 
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findings primed me as an action researcher to notice parallels, divergences, and 
complementarities in the users’ discourse about SI in the EP.139 
Also important is that the preliminary phase of research happened to occur during 
the spring of 2004, which was at the end of the first year of the Hague Programme,140 
coinciding with the beginning of the Sixth Term of the European Parliament. The EP as 
an institution of the European Union emerged from the founding in 1952 of an 
international, market-motivated European Coal and Steel Community to regulate the 
“free movement of coal and steel and free access to sources of production” (Europa 
2010), which next became the European Economic Community (EEC). The first 
regulation of the EEC (Regulation No 1, 1958) confirms the legal basis established in the 
1957 Treaty of Rome and governs the provision of simultaneous interpretation in the EP 
today (as well as in the other European Union institutions). 
REGULATION No 1 determining the languages to be used by the 
European Economic Community 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, 
Having regard to Article 217 of the Treaty which provides that the rules 
governing the languages of the institutions of the Community shall, 
without prejudice to the provisions contained in the rules of procedure of 
the Court of Justice, be determined by the Council, acting unanimously; 
                                                
139  The rigor of action research involves collecting as many perspectives as possible on 
the whole situation. All selected quotes are either representative instances of 
common themes or stark outliers whose very difference opens up another angle on 
the social dynamics. 
140  The Hague Program set out ten priorities for the five years of the 6th Parliamentary 
term, including an emphasis on strengthening fundamental rights for EU citizens and 
establishing an asylum support office. http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/
human_rights/fundamental_rights_within_european_union/l16002_en.htm Retrieved 
4 March 2014. 
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Whereas each of the four languages in which the Treaty is drafted is 
recognised as an official language in one or more of the Member States of 
the Community; 
HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
The official languages and the working languages of the institutions of the 
Community shall be Dutch, French, German and Italian. (European 
Economic Community, 1958) 
Notice that English is not one of the original languages. Each evolution in institutional 
arrangements and enlargement of members includes a provision amending the original 
treaty to include official languages of new Member States.  
In the European Parliament, Procedural Rule 138 guarantees Members “the right 
to speak in Parliament in the official language of their choice” and “Interpretation shall 
be provided in committee and delegation meetings from and into the official languages 
used and requested by the members and substitutes of that committee or delegation.”141 
(See Appendix C for the full text of Rule 138 and its exceptions.) As EU expansion 
continues, the original linguistic right of choice continues to be extended to new Member 
States despite concerns about the size, cost, and complication of the system required to 
enable functional simultaneous interpreting across all language combinations.142 
Partly in counter to public and political concerns regarding the cost and 
complexity of the system of SI in the EP, official rhetoric promotes the provision of SI 
for Members as a distinctively European combination of multilingualism with good 
                                                
141   16th edition (2004) Rules of Procedure of the European Parliament, 
http://www.agora- http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=OJ:L:2005:044:0001:0140:EN:PDF retrieved 5 March 2014. 
142   Croatia became an official member in 2013. 
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governance. “Our policy of official multilingualism as a deliberate tool of government is 
unique in the world. The EU sees the use of its citizens’ languages as one of the factors 
which make it more transparent, more legitimate and more efficient” (Europa).143 
Explicitly linking many languages-in-use with quality decision-making is a fascinating 
claim. “Multilingual communication when people speak…is at the core of [European] 
Community decision-making” (Europa).144 These quotations from the official EU 
website, Europa, establish and promote the rhetorical logic that was active and evident in 
the discourse of MEPs in 2008-2009, which had also appeared in the earlier (2004) 
interviews with EP Interpreters. Coincidentally, a major feature of the Sixth Term 
involved the massive expansion of the system of SI, due to the accession of twelve new 
Member nations: Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
4.1.2 Context and Instrument: Enlargement and Controlled Multilingualism 
The language regime145 for the system of SI in the EP changed considerably due 
to the enlargement of 2004, because the number of working languages jumped from 
eleven to twenty-two (see Tables 4 and 5). Technically, 23 languages were official 
(generating 506 possible language combinations) although Maltese was not being offered 
                                                
143   Europa is the official website of the European Union, constructed and maintained by 
the European Commission. Retrieved 30 April 2008. 
144   From the Joint Interpreting and Conference Service of the Directorate General on 
Interpretation (European Commission). Originally retrieved 28 November 2005; has 
since been relocated (possibly revised). 
145  The term “language regime” is being understood in the context of Hymes’ rubric as 
the “instrument” of communication in the European Parliament. 
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as interpreters were still being trained. This expansion more than quadrupled the previous 
number of SI language combinations needing to be spontaneously accommodated by 
interpreters from 110 to 462. Extensive planning (Athanassiou 2006, Gazzola 2006) was 
required at the administrative level just to imagine how to manage the complicated 
language/interpretation regime (cf Podesta 2001a, 2001b, 2001c). Podesta documents and 
defends the new language regime called “controlled full multilingualism.” Controlled 
multilingualism was invented to accommodate the realization that “symmetrical” SI was 
not going to be achieved for every new language.146 The notion of symmetry 
encompasses an equitable mirroring of all languages with each other language. 
The precedent of full symmetry was established over the course of growth from 
four languages (1957 Treaty of Rome),147 to six (1973), seven (1981), nine (1986), eleven 
(1995), twenty (2004), and finally to twenty-three (2007) at the time of this research. In 
the EP prior to the 2004 enlargement, the system of SI in the EP established norms that, 
                                                
146  Asymmetry in translation was previously introduced with a quote from Lawrence 
Venuti (see p. 122, this dissertation).  
147  “ARTICLE 248 This Treaty, drawn up in a single original in the Dutch, French, 
German and Italian languages, all four texts being equally authentic…” 
[http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.p
df retrieved 4 March 2014] 
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since 1995, accommodated a language regime of eleven official languages.148 In standard 
historical practice, teams of three interpreters would collaborate to cover all the source 
language combinations into one of these eleven official languages, e.g., Polish, or 
German, or Portuguese. In interpreter jargon, the language being interpreted into is 
known as the target language, distinguishing it from the language being interpreted from, 
which is called the source language. Full symmetry meant that every source language is 
interpreted into all ten target languages.149 
Full symmetry is an ideal that within any given target language booth, every 
possible source language that might arise from the interpretees is known to at least one of 
the team interpreters. This allows any source language to be interpreted into any target 
language, simultaneously, for all languages spoken or listened to by Members in the 
meeting. This is why most EP Interpreters (EPIs) must be fluent in at least three or four 
                                                
148  In a section called “The legal and ideological basis of multilingualism,” Vuorikoski 
explains: “It has been said that Europe is on everyone’s lips, but in different 
languages. Preserving the cultural identity of the Member States has been considered 
essential in the European context, and one way of maintaining cultural identity has 
been the language policy which guarantees the official languages of the Member 
States the status of an official language in the European Union as well. A plurality of 
cultures has been experienced as a value that the community does not want to 
surrender; instead, the many ways of thinking have been seen as a challenge rather 
than a handicap. (Zeyringer 1991: 7) In fact, the European communities are the only 
international community where the languages of all the Member States enjoy the 
status of an official language. This policy has been seen to act as a safeguard for 
political and legal equality, as citizens are able to follow the functioning of the 
institutions in their own language . (Ramos-Ruano 1991: 61–65)” (2004, p. 73). 
149  As a geometric metaphor, symmetry invokes the shape and space filled by language. 
This is a richer and more satisfying metaphor than the strict mathematical equality 
metaphor used in linguistics. 
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languages and may be fluent in as many as seven or eight.150 EPIs are combined in teams 
so that any source language will be known to at least one member of the team who can 
interpret into the booth’s designated target language. Full symmetry in the pre-
enlargement EP was possible for nearly all of the 110 possible combinations of source-to-
target languages. So, the Dutch booth, for instance, would have been composed of three 
interpreters who, among them, were fluent in the other ten official languages: Danish, 
English, Finnish, French, German, Greek, Italian, Portuguese, Spanish, and Swedish. The 
only exception to the full symmetry of direct interpretation between each of those official 
eleven languages occurred when Finland joined the European Union in 1995. 
The Finnish exception151 involves an accommodation that is strikingly strange to 
community-style interpreters. Labelled retour, this process refers to Finnish-fluent 
simultaneous interpreters’ interpreting both out of Finnish as well as into Finnish. In other 
words, to interpret from Finnish as the source language to another target language, as 
well as into Finnish as the target language from another source language. In the 
traditional EP language regime, the former is avoided whenever possible, and the latter is 
taken as the norm. All interpreters are essentially working ‘one-way’ into their designated 
target language. What is unusual about this from the community interpreting point of 
                                                
150   Language profiles being sought (as of 2012) include: Bulgarian, Czech, Danish, 
German, Greek, English, Gaelic, Spanish, Estonian, Finnish, French, Croatian, 
Hungarian, Italian, Lithuanian, Latvian, Maltese, Dutch, Polish, Portuguese, 
Romanian, Slovak, Slovene, Swedish, Arabic, and Russian. (EUROPA) 
http://europa.eu/interpretation/doc/lang_profiles_in_demand.pdf retrieved 5 March 
2014. 
151   “For the first time, interpreters had to work in both directions - Finnish staff had to 
translate [sic] out of and not just into their language, a system called ‘retour’ in the 
jargon.” Shanghai Star, 2003-10-30 Retrieved 9 February 2013. 
http://app1.chinadaily.com.cn/star/2003/1030/fe10-1.html 
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view is that community-style interpreters have always interpreted both ways: the target 
and source languages switch with the turn-taking among the interpretees. This emphasis 
and protocol regarding the direction of simultaneous interpretation has been separated for 
conference-style interpreters in the EP since inception, drawing upon norms established 
in the WWII War Crimes Tribunal at Nuremberg (which will be described in the next 
chapter). 
This division of simultaneous interpreting by ‘direction’ drives a categorization 
process based upon fluency and involves notions of passive and active use of languages. 
The argument emphasizes the potential differences of fluency between understanding 
‘what is being said’ (i.e., comprehending the source language) and ‘expressing that 
comprehension’ in the target language. A lettering system152 is used to grade linguistic 
competence: “A” languages are those in which an interpreter is fluent enough to work 
into from any of the other languages that she or he knows, that is, to generate sensible 
target language utterances that are sensible to native speakers of that language. The label 
of a booth (described further below) indicates that all the interpreters on that team are 
working into an “A” language. “B” languages are those an interpreter knows well enough 
                                                
152   “Languages are classified as “A” “B” or “C” languages. The A language is one 
(native tongue or equivalent) which the interpreter masters perfectly and into which 
he/she is capable of interpreting consecutively and simultaneously from all his/her 
working languages. In exceptional cases an interpreter may have two A languages. 
The B language is one which, without being the main language, is mastered to a 
level high enough to permit fluent interpretation in consecutive and simultaneous 
from the A language. The C language is one which is fully understood and from 
which the interpreter works into his/her A language” (EUROPA) 
http://europa.eu/interpretation/accreditation_en.htm Interpreting for Europe: 
Becoming a freelance interpreter with the European institutions: Language profiles 
in demand with the EU interpreting services, published 29/10/2010, retrieved 17 
June 2012 
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to work into from their “A” (main) language or languages, meaning the interpreter can 
perform retour. 
The Finnish exception occurred because of the linguistic uniqueness of Finnish 
combined with its relatively small user base: it is referred to as an exotic language, 
meaning, not one of the most popularly known languages in Europe. Hence, it would 
happen that an MEP speaking in Finnish would need to be interpreted into all of the other 
languages, and (for instance) none of the three EPIs in, say, the Italian or Dutch booths 
during that shift knew Finnish well enough to render a competent interpretation. In this 
case, a designated EPI in the Finnish booth would perform retour, rendering an 
interpretation of the Finnish source language (their “A” language) into one of the larger 
languages, one of their “B” languages (typically French or German in that era). Suppose 
the retour language is French. An interpreter in the Italian and Dutch booths (in this 
example) with French as an “A” or “B” language would treat the retour from the Finnish 
interpreter as the source language and proceed to interpret the French interpretation (of 
the original Finnish source) into their respective target language, Italian or Dutch. That 
additional maneuver is called a relay. Members would then receive the interpretation in 
Italian or Dutch a few seconds later than their colleagues who had received the 
interpretation without the additional mediation of the relay.153 
                                                
153  Dutch and Italian Members who understand French, however, may choose to listen 
directly to the retour from the Finnish booth, either to avoid the additional delay or 
to hear the communication with one less mediation. The Members’ right to choose is 
another variable that complicates implementation of the system of the SI in the EP. 
Particularly with multilingual Members, or Members learning another language, 
wearing their headphones in and of itself does not identify which language they are 
listening to. One has to see the channel selection to determine if an MEP is listening 
to their state’s official language or another language in their repertoire. 
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Interpreter teams are referred to by their target language and the geographical 
booth in which they are located: the French booth, the Slovenian booth, etc. The actual 
booths are constructed in the exterior walls of each meeting room and are numbered, 
geographically, in sequence from left to right looking up at them from the front of the 
meeting space (where moderators are stationed facing the rest of the participants). Thus 
the interpreters are behind most of the users, separated by soundproof glass. Eye contact 
is possible if Members make the effort, but they usually do not. Each geographical booth 
number also corresponds to a language channel, e.g. the interpreter team working into the 
target language of English occupies the second geographical booth and channel 2. In this 
way, Members become accustomed to channel numbers corresponding with the 
languages that they listen to; this design is the same in every room and hemicycle. 
Everyone quickly learns that, for instance, French can be heard on channel 3 and Spanish 
on channel 8. (See Table 4.) 
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Table 4. Standardized Language Codes for Channels and Booths in the European 
Parliament  
Language English name Language Code & Booth Name 
Auditory 
Channel 
български Bulgarian BG 20 
español Spanish ES 8 
čeština Czech CS 12 
dansk Danish DA 6 
Deutsch German DE 1 
eesti keel Estonian ET 13 
ελληνικά Greek EL 7 
English English EN 2 
français French FR 3 
Gaeilge Irish GA 23 
italiano Italian IT 4 
latviešu valoda Latvian LV 14 
lietuvių kalba Lithuanian LI 15 
magyar Hungarian MG 16 
Malti Maltese MT 22 
Nederlands Dutch NL 5 
polski Polish PL 17 
português Portuguese PT 9 
română Romanian RO 21 
slovenčina (slovenský jazyk) Slovak SK 19 
slovenščina (slovenski jezik) Slovenian SL 18 
suomi Finnish SU 10 
svenska Swedish SV 11 
These codes are from the International Organization for Standardization (ISO). They are used for 
simultaneous interpretation of official languages of EU Member States in all the European institutions. 
Source: Interinstitutional style guide, European Union. 
http://publications.europa.eu/code/pdf/370000en.htm Retrieved 22 March 2013. 
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4.1.2.1 Scene: Controlled Multilingualism 
In the EP’s sixth term, beginning in 2003-2004, controlled multilingualism 
essentially extended the Finnish exception to the exotic languages from Eastern Europe 
that were relatively unknown by the established cadre of EPIs. The new EPIs coming in 
with the new MEPs were, in many cases, already trained to operate within a different 
regime than the experienced EPIs from pre-enlargement. The new EPIs understood, for 
example, that they may often be expected to perform retour, that is, to work in both 
‘directions’ into and out of their “A” language. Meanwhile, both old and new EPIs had to 
provide and work with intermediary relay interpretations to an unprecedented degree.154 
Gazzola describes controlled multilingualism as “based on the systematic adoption of 
management correctives” (2006, p. 402). These correctives include the asymmetric 
solutions of retour and relay described above. These assymmetries introduce two 
                                                
154   In fact, the definition of an “A” language may be in the process of change. 
Historically, the divide was between “active” (A) and “passive” (B, C) languages, 
and interpreters only worked into their active languages. The Finnish exception 
demonstrated that interpreters could also work out of one “active” language into 
another (previously-labeled) “passive” language. The definitions for “A” “B” and 
“C” languages posted in footnote 113 (immediately preceding) represents the 
historic hard line between “A” and “B” languages, while the definitions from the 
official professional organization for interpreters, the AIIC: “Active languages: A : 
The interpreter's native language (or another language strictly equivalent to a native 
language), into which the interpreter works from all her or his other languages in 
both modes of interpretation, simultaneous and consecutive. All members must have 
at least one 'A' language but may have more than one. B : A language other than the 
interpreter's native language, of which she or he has a perfect command and into 
which she or he works from one or more of her or his other languages. Some 
interpreters work into a 'B' language in only one of the two modes of interpretation. 
Passive languages: C : Languages, of which the interpreter has a complete 
understanding and from which she or he works.” http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/scic/what-
is-conference-interpreting/language-combination/index_en.htm European 
Commission: The conference interpreter's language combination, retrieved 17 June 
2012, Last update: 14/03/2012. 
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additional communication variables to the system of SI in the EP: 1) the number of 
language renditions generated by interpreters 2) alters the listening/receiving stream of 
interpretee experience in the dimension of time. In the current EP, while some 
interpretees are communicating at the pace of direct interpretation (e.g., Finnish-French 
and Portuguese-German), others are (sometimes) communicating at the pace of Finnish-
English-Slovakian or Lithuanian-German-Polish interpretation. 
4.1.2.2 Interpreter Criticism: Danger & Loss 
Following Hymes (1962, 1974) interpreters are primary participants in the 
intercultural communication scene of intercultural, interpreted communication. Noticing and 
exploring these variables of rate/pacing and degree-of-interpreter-mediation as 
communication variables is a disciplinary move: “We understand communication insofar 
as we are able to build models or representations of this process” (Carey 1999, p. 31). What 
captured my attention in the criticism of EP Interpreters during the spring of 2004 was how 
unhappy they were with the MEPs choosing not to speak in their official (national) language 
(presumed, in most cases, to be the MEPs’ mother tongue). Instead, MEPs were trying to 
communicate more directly with other MEPs by making their points in a language they were 
still learning, usually English, sometimes French, and occasionally German or another 
identified shared language. (For instance, Russian was known to most MEPs from eastern 
Europe but would only be used in private if no other options could be found. This seemed to 
have more to do with Russian as a language of colonization than the fact that it is not a 
language of the EU.) 
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The prevalence of what interpreters (and, later, MEPs and other interview 
subjects) called “badly spoken languages (EPI #4)” (Kent, 2007, p. 63)155 elicited very 
strong reactions from interpreters: “The English that we have to translate from is second 
or third language English - from people who do not think in that language (EPI #8)” (p. 
66). EPIs identified three dangers and several losses associated with speaking 
inadequate/non-fluent English (Kent, 2007). 
The dangers of using a less fluent language instead of a more fluent language 
(from the EPIs’ perspective) are that interpretees (the MEPs) 
1 may not know what they are saying and/or 
2 are unaware of the full implications of what they’re saying, which could 
3 result in interpreters interpreting something other than what the MEP intends. 
 
I was eager to return in 2009 and discover if the MEPs experienced a sense of danger, 
and, if so, how and for what reasons? 
The losses vexing interpreters at the Parliamant are both cultural and political. 
Culturally, there are losses of nuance, cultural specificity, and a diversity of worldviews. 
Politically, MEPs might “lose very important points, or a debate (EPI #7)” (Kent, 2007, 
p. 64), be unaware of communication breaking down (p. 65), or face “misunderstandings, 
embarrassment, or no reaction at all, when the speaker obviously would like some 
reaction from the audience (EPI #13)” (p. 65). These reactions from EPIs came at the end 
                                                
155   The code EPI (European Parliament Interpreter) and numbering system are 
associated with preliminary fieldwork at the Parliament in 2005, published in 2007 
as “A Discourse of Danger and Loss: Interpreters on Interpreting in the European 
Parliament” (Kent, 2007). Most of that chapter is reprinted here with permission of 
the publisher. 
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of a tumultuous year, the first year of formal implementation of controlled 
multilingualism with its greatly increased language regime. The key (following Hymes, 
1962, 1974) of conversational interviews waxed and waned between frustration and 
exhilaration. These interpreters had performed durably under great stress. Their discourse 
is an important summary of the growing pains of the EP’s language regime as an 
instrument of intercultural communication for European governance. 
4.1.3 Instrument and Key: Evolution of the SI Regime 
Although both training and practice had been underway in the preceding term, in 
the span of a summer break the interpreting regime went from 110 language 
combinations to 462 (twenty-two of the twenty-three official languages simultaneously-
interpreted in meetings everyday; minus Maltese because a minimum corps of trained 
interpreters was not yet established). The average size of interpreting teams was 
increased from three to four interpreters per booth. All of the interpreters in a booth are 
“poised for which language combination is called for” by the language choice of 
Members speaking from the floor (EPI53). Retour and relay became common rather than 
exceptional. The logistics of scheduling when and where interpreters were needed (given 
the range and scope of different meetings at various levels in the legislating process) were 
stretched to extremes. Old school interpreters bemoaned the loss of institutional 
camaraderie with the massive influx of unfamiliar faces, wondering at the audacity of 
their new eastern European colleagues, many (if not most) of whom were school-trained 
rather than having grown up multilingual. The few permanent EP staff that I was able to 
talk with at that time were cynical about the interpreters’ criticism, dismissing it as a 
basic concern with future employment. I had to wait until 2008 to discover MEPs views. 
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The pitch (Hymes “key,” 1962) of the European Parliament Interpreters (EPIs) 
2005 discourse clearly indicated that the dynamics of the system of SI in the EP were in 
tremendous flux. The sense of urgency directed my attention to the social interactions of 
Members, and to questions about the shared culture and identities being created through 
the ritual uses of SI in the EP. When I returned in 2008-2009 at the end of this term, four 
years after the initial (2005) conversations with EPIs, it had become clear that the 
administrative regime of controlled multilingualism was being challenged by an emergent 
pluralingualism in which Members use multiple and mixed languages in addition to the 
services of simultaneous interpreters.156 The term, pluralingualism, comes from the 
European Commission, which directs language policy for the European Union overall. 
The Commission distinguishes pluralingualism from multilingualism but allows the term 
multilingualism to encompass both meanings. In the general discourse (EPIs, MEPs, 
career/permanent staff of the EP), no one uses the term pluralingualism. Multilingualism 
is posed against monolingualism. These concepts will be further defined and evaluated 
after the research findings are presented. 
4.2 Primary Participants: MEPs on SI in the EP 
Europe has given minority nations such as Catalonia the multitiered identity 
that is the best hope for solving language conflict: Miguel was Catalan, 
Spanish, European, and internationalist, all at the same time, and so calmly 
that he hadn’t even really thought about it. He seemed to find my eager 
questions kind of odd. Europe has made such diversity work and flexibility 
banal. It may be expensive, but it works. (Robert Lane Greene, 2011, p. 275) 
                                                
156   Cecilia Wadensjö (1998, p. 12) has already argued “that interpreter-mediated 
encounters are not comparable with monolingual ones but rather form a different 
genre subject to different considerations” (Ortega Herráez et al., 2009, p. 152). 
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4.2.1 Mission Impossible 
Criticisms of interpreting and interpreters by MEPs (and, in some cases, their 
assistants) are uniform regardless of the setting: as described above, the differentiation 
between the conference microphone system and the interpretation system are not evident 
in MEP discourse about SI in the EP. This lack of differentiation also applies to praising 
the interpreters and the system of SI, which occurs in both in genuine and obligatory 
terms. Rhetoric justifying the use and presence of interpreters appears throughout the 
interviews (which I prefer to call conversations as I did not hold to a pre-established 
framework or insist on consistency in questioning).157 
The frequent repetition of certain phrases suggested the routine incorporation of 
rhetoric generated for European publics (touched upon above). Sometimes these were 
delivered in what I took to be sincere belief and sometimes the stock phrases were 
double-voiced (Bakhtin, 1986), that is, they were delivered with an implied or explicit 
commentary acknowledging the statement as public relations. In other words, some 
MEPs (and a few of the interpreters in the earlier phase of research) talked with me as if I 
was a conduit for public relations directed toward an intended audience of European 
citizens in the general public who must be convinced of the value of this elaborate 
version of multilingualism. The routine consistency of this rhetoric enabled the 
identification of discourse themes and served as a reference point to distinguish more 
                                                
157  Maintaining such an open, exploratory stance is characteristic of action research, and 
particularly action learning. See previous footnote (##). My presence as a researcher 
was not specifically sanctioned by the Interpreting Directorate of the EP, so the 
emphasis is on action learning rather than on collaborative action research. In the 
traditional sense of action research, those responsible for the interpreting regime 
would have directly engaged and supported the research project. 
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thoughtful considerations of the diverse and potentially productive outcomes of 
intercultural communication using simultaneous interpretation. 
“Interpreters,” explained one MEP, “are professional people. They do sort of a 
mission impossible job, and there’s a limit of to how much of the message they can bring 
out” (NM74). Despite this limit, many, if not most of the MEPs who talked with me 
agreed that there are times that they would be better and more effective if they had 
interpreting. The challenges of effectively expressing oneself lead to different dilemmas 
than the challenges of understanding others. Both dilemmas hold for monolingual as well 
as multilingual Members (see Tables 5 and 6 for participant demographics). 
Table 5. Languages Known by Participating MEPs 
Languages known by participating MEPs 
1. Bulgarian 17. Kiswahili 
2. Cypriot dialect 18. Latin 
3. Chinese 19. Latvian 
4. Czech 20. Lithuanian 
5. Danish 21. Luxembourghese 
6. Dutch (Nederlands) 22. Maltese 
7. Estonian 23. Norwegian 
8. English 24. Polish 
9. Finnish 25. Portuguese 
10. Flemish (Belgium) 26. Romanian 
11. French 27. Russian 
12. Gaelic (Irish) 28. Slovakian 
13. German 29. Slovenian 
14. Greek 30. Spanish 
15. Hungarian 31. Swedish 
16. Italian 32. Turkish 
186 
4.2.2 Findings: Varied Competence of MEPs as Users of SI 
By the time I returned in 2008, the new regime of controlled multilingualism had 
reached “full cruising speed” (Gazzola, 2006, p. 400). There was only one bad English 
speaker158 that I heard in 2008-2009; his colleagues understood that “he is making a 
gesture, and so we understand that” (OM44).159 Several Members said that problems with 
inexperienced interpreters that had vexed them in the beginning of the term (e.g., 2004-
2005) had improved. 
Interpretation, it will change. So the [eastern European language] was 
really, really weak at the beginning, which was normal, because the 
human source was not enough, so they would change Committees. And, 
of course, they could not be involved into the terms, you know, of the 
daily use. They could not daily use the same terms, you know? And plus 
the interpreter, for example, the legal first, they are not lawyers, so, 
sometimes, of course, you get very fast and they don’t know what they are 
speaking about, so basically they used the wrong terms…[now] it’s much 
better. So, now, more and more often I use it. (F53) 160 
The learning curve for new interpreters to the Parliament is steep. According to Duflou 
(in progress), new interpreters to the European Parliament must acquire situated 
                                                
158  The label, “bad English speaker,” was in common parlance at the EP during both 
research periods (May-June 2005 and September 2008-July 2009). 
159   I approached this so-called ‘bad English speaking’ Member twice. I asked a second 
time because at least three people insisted that I really should talk with him. During 
the earlier research period, many Members spoke English nearly as 
incomprehensibly as this Member, but they had either been discouraged from using 
English as a Lingua Franca, or had improved their skill. 
160  Remember the key points of criticism from the interpreters at that time (about the 
MEPs’ delivery and production of the source language): speed and badly-spoken 
languages (see page XXX, this dissertation). Without too much of a stretch, the use 
of ‘wrong words’ by the interpreters is a mirror of the use of wrong words by 
Members speaking non-fluent languages. The admission of “get[ting] very fast” 
corroborates Parliament interpreter’s concern with speed.   
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competence. “The intensive learning process beginning EU interpreters go through 
cannot be considered as a mere continuation of their formal training as interpreting 
students” (Duflou, dissertation in progress). Specifically 
[European Parliament interpreting] beginners…need to acquire a broad range 
of new, practice-related, i.e. to a large extent context specific, knowledge and 
skills in order to become competent practitioners…[and this] professional 
competence is not exclusively cognitive in nature, but includes a strong 
sensory, embodied as well as a social component. (Duflou, Chapter 5) 
Further, she describes the “shared framework conditions” due to “the specificities of the 
historical, organizational and material context in which EU interpreters work” (ibid). 
Some of those conditions will be explored in the next chapter. 
It is clear that that the pressure of the new regime was most felt by the new MEPs 
from new Member States, who were working with interpreters new to the Parliament. 
Although also pressured, the situation was quite different for existing and experienced 
MEPs from old Member States, some of whom have had, e.g., “the same interpreters for 
nine years, yes…we know each other” (OM36). 
Both old Members from established Member States and new Members from new 
Member States complained. Some Assistants who booked appointments with me to meet 
with their MEP (or, in a few cases, with themselves in lieu of their MEP) told me they 
arranged the interview precisely so I “could improve the quality of the interpretation” 
(F15/OM18).161 All of the MEPs who spoke with me volunteered, hence compose a self-
selected sample and are thus not necessarily representative of the entire body. 
                                                
161  Double coding, such as F15/OM18, indicate an Assistant interviewed on behalf of 
their MEP (in this case from an “old” Member State) and therefore representing their 
MEPs’ views rather than their own. 
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Statistically, participating MEPs represented ten percent (55/785) of the elected 
Members. Several Members allowed me second and third conversations and invited me 
into observations of Committees, Political Groups and working groups at various levels. 
The corpus includes 35 additional interviews with career staff of the Parliament, and a 
few interpreters (some of whom had given interviews in 2004 and some whom had not). 
At least one Member from every member State was interviewed (in two cases, an 
Assistant represented their MEP). 
One MEP, who was recommended to me frequently as a person I should speak 
with (and whom I observed using occasionally undecipherable English), turned me down 
twice, insisting: “There are more important problems than language” (NM75). An MEP 
who did meet with me also expressed the perspective that the fact of so many different 
languages “is not a very … important problem…[only] marginal” (OM29). This could be 
taken as evidence that the system of SI in the EP is functioning quite well. A limitation of 
the research is that I was generally prohibited from talking with Members who were not 
able to converse with me in English. “There are two types of Members,” one MEP told 
me: “Those that know languages, and those that don’t.” (NM28). In practical terms, 
although bilingual, my second language is not a European language so I conducted the 
research as if monolingual. 
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Table 6. Interviewee Demographics 
Interview Demographics of participating Members of the European Parliament* 
#of MEPs interviewed 51 
#of Assistants interviewed on behalf of their MEP 4 
% of total MEPs (575 in the 6th Term, 2004-2009)  10% 
#of MEPs interviewed with lay interpretation by an Assistant 11 
#of MEPs interviewed with professional interpretation 2 
#of MEPs interviewed two times 22 
#of MEPs interviewed three times 8 
#of languages known or partially known by MEPs (range) 1 – 8 
Average number of languages known or partially known by participating MEPs 4 ½ 
#of participating MEPs from “old” EU member nations* [coded OM] 34 
#of participating MEPs from “new” EU member nations** [coded NM] 21 
#of participating MEPs who are women 10 (18%) 
#of participating MEPs who are men 45 (82%) 
Age range of participating MEPs 33-76 
Aged 30-39=2; 40-49=7; 50-59=14; 60-69=14; 70-79=2 
Median age of participating MEPs 57 
Range of terms served as a MEP 1-4 
1st term=32 MEPs; 2nd term = 11 MEPs; 3rd term = 8 MEPs; 4th term = 3 MEPs 
Median #of terms served as a MEP 1.7 
*Includes a Vice-President, a Quaestor, Chairs and Vice-Chairs of Committees & Political Groups, 
Rapporteurs and Shadow Rapporteurs of Working Groups as well as Members not in these leadership 
positions. 
 
Interviews with others (no demographic data collected) 
#of non-MEPs interviewed or overheard*** in 2008-2009 (including 
interpreters)**** 
35 
#of European Parliament Interpreters (EPIs) interviewed in 2005 65 
*Member before “the big bang enlargement” of 2004, typically of western Europe. 
**Became a Member during “the big bang enlargement” of 2004, typically of eastern Europe. 
***Occasionally during observations an insightful or revealing comment would be said by a stranger 
sitting near me. 
****Includes two administrators from the Directorate General on Conferences and Interpreting, two 
Heads of Booth (i.e., managers for each language’s team of simultaneous interpreters), an interpreter 
trainer, several administrative assistants representing themselves, a few visitors and interns, some 
technicians and a handful or more of permanent officials associated with various Secretariats. 
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My knowledge of American Sign Language and work as a professional sign 
language interpreter was intriguing to some Members but not most. As it was, I did not 
have the personal resources to hire interpreters, and the EP’s rules are designed to prevent 
interpreting outside of the formalized structure of controlled multilingualism and its 
designated contexts of use. This structural feature of the system of SI in the EP is being 
extended through a new program called Ad Personam interpreting, which was in its first 
experimental year of operation in 2008-2009. However, despite using only a fraction of 
its allotted budget in the first year of operation (NM70), those funds were not authorized 
to support this research. Requests for an exception were disregarded. In a handful of 
cases, an MEP not fluent in English was motivated enough to talk with me that they did 
arrange interpretation either through one of their Assistants or an EP Interpreter who 
volunteered to work off-the-record. 
I was interested in MEPs’ ideas about the system of SI in the EP: their criticisms, 
what they thought SI was good for and when, and how deliberately they considered 
themselves users or participants in a special kind of intercultural communication. I also 
wondered if MEPs are able to secure SI when they need it, what are the conditions when 
they believed they need SI instead of using a shared language, and the extent to which 
they consider SI an important mode of cultural production. Contrary to the field of 
community interpreting, where a discourse about users’ lack of knowledge is pervasive 
MEPs demonstrate a sophisticated range of considerations and consciousness regarding 
strategies and purposes of using simultaneous interpretation. See Table 7. 
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4.2.2.1 MEPs Strategies: Language Choice and Simultaneous Interpreting 
Table 7. MEPs Language Choices and Strategies When Addressing Other MEPs 
Scenario Same or different official 
language? 
Language choice Communicative Strategy 
A We speak the same official 
language. 
Our official language. In order to articulate ideas 
precisely; neither has 
communicative advantage. 
B We speak different official 
languages: I know more of 
their language than they 
know of mine, or we both 
know some of each other’s 
language. 
I speak some words in 
his/her language (as a 
greeting or warm-up) then 
switch to my official 
language (for the substance). 
To flatter them; to establish 
rapport; to make them more 
amenable to compromise. 
C We speak different official 
languages; I am fluent in 
theirs, they are not fluent in 
mine. 
I negotiate in their language. They may be overconfident 
because I am negotiating in 
my second language; I 
sometimes win important 
points. 
D We speak different official 
languages and are mutually 
fluent in each other’s 
language. 
We negotiate in either 
language. 
There is no communicative 
advantage in the language 
choice. 
E We speak different official 
languages and are equitably 
fluent in a shared non-native 
language. 
We use the shared language. There is no communicative 
advantage in the language 
choice. 
F We speak different official 
languages: I am not fluent in 
theirs but no interpretation is 
provided for the language 
combination. 
I negotiate in their/another 
language, to the best of my 
ability. Sometimes I win, but 
often I am frustrated that I 
have not been able to fully 
articulate my ideas or 
positions. 
I am disadvantaged but I 
have no choice except to 
make the best of it. 
G We speak different official 
languages and are not fluent 
in a shared language, but 
interpretation is provided. 
We both use the same 
medium of simultaneous 
interpretation. 
In order to articulate ideas 
precisely; neither has 
communicative advantage. 
An intermediate version of this table appears in Kent (2012, reprinted with permission).  The original was 
shared in a memo to the President of the European Parliament in 2009. See Appendix A. 
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4.2.2.2 Strategic Use and Non-Use of Simultaneous Interpretation 
Clever people, thinking hard, can often circumvent the constraints of 
value-laden language, but such ingenuity requires recognition first, that 
the constraints exist, followed by hard thought on how to get around them. 
To accept them is to chain the imagination. To ignore them or to run at 
them headlong is to invite frustration. (Neustadt and May, 1986, p. 206) 
4.2.2.2.1 Avoidance of Being Interpreted: Rhetorical Uses of a Shared Language 
Table 7 charts an emergent categorization of MEPs’ consciousness about 
language difference and the choice to use SI or a shared language. Some Members are 
highly attuned to each other’s language profiles and alert to the advantages of being able 
to utter even a few words in their interpretee’s language. Members with more experience 
in the EP, that is, Members from old Member States who had served in one or more 
previous terms, were able to use both a ‘dominant’ and ‘non-dominant’ language position 
to their advantage. For instance, in scenario B and C, a low level of fluency in the other 
MEP’s language is used to soften them up, and a high level of fluency in the other MEP’s 
language is used to play up their confidence. 
Whether (or how soon) this same-language tactic is recognized by new/more 
recently elected MEPs is an open question. Some Members ignore it: “I don’t have a 
problem, why should I care,” challenged one English-fluent MEP (NM25), asserting that 
his specialization was separate from social culture. Some simply move to the most fluent 
shared language without questioning it. “For me,” explained one Assistant to a Hungarian 
MEP, “I work in German as well with all my German colleague, which is funny, because 
they have a good English, but they know I have a good German” (F53). Others, “try for 
the better meaning . . . . bringing in words [so that] we can create a common 
expression…a common cultural expression” (OM23). 
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4.2.2.2.2 Avoidance of Interpreting: Communicative Equality with a lingua franca 
When MEPs are equally fluent in each other’s language or another shared 
language, scenarios D and E, there is no language-based communicative advantage. This 
is not to say that individual MEPs may be more or less skilled at negotiating, but they are 
not able to increase that leverage through language knowledge. The other scenarios in 
which no communicative advantage is achieved through language knowledge is when 
both/all Members speak the same official language with native fluency (scenario A), or 
when both are using the system of simultaneous interpretation (scenario G). Because it is 
naturalized, Scenario A is the baseline for assessing all of the other language choice 
strategies. Arguably, another scenario (not represented in the chart) of communicative 
equity involves Members speaking their mother tongues (an ‘active’ use in the jargon) 
and listening to another language that they understand (a ‘passive’ use).162 
There is so-called inter-institution negotiation [e.g., a Trialogue] when 
you get a big package…and…you start negotiate with the Council. And 
under the French presidency, of course, they were pushed. Then all person 
who was involved in French presidency, they had to speak in French, 
which was funny. Because when we sat down to negotiate, he spoke in 
French and then we answered in English. And then, after a while, we 
change into English. I mean he change into English, because we said, 
okay, go ahead in French. We get it. But we answer in English, because 
we are sure in English. (F53) 
That particular scenario took place without interpreting: French was ‘passively’ 
understood by the Members who spoke English as a foreign language (EFL); and English 
                                                
162  Although this argument is not crafted, there are compelling reasons and evidence 
provided to support this Member-defined use of the system of SI in the EP.  
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was ‘passively’ understood by the representatives of the French Presidency.163 (It is 
asserted by MEPs that Members “must understand [French] but to speak [it] is not so 
[necessary]” (OM23). In the case being described with the French Presidency, two 
different languages were spoken and both languages were listened to by participants in 
those meetings without interpretation. 
Such language jockeying is taken as part of the institutional culture. 
There was a fight between me and [the Chairperson of our political 
Group]. He always “why don’t—you know, your flat French and your 
English is very positive is very good”…he’s always laughing at me. “Why 
do you use your mother tongue, your barbaric language?” (OM09) 
Both French and English were foreign, learned languages for this particular MEP, who 
routinely spoke his mother tongue/official language in all meetings that included 
simultaneous interpretation. Openly admitting and sharing the pleasure of teasing each 
other about language fluencies was reported much more rarely than accusations of 
posturing.164 
They cannot press you that you speak French, you know? You find a 
common language. And there was no interpretation. But if not Mr [MEP], 
who has such a good English, and understand French, then we ask for 
interpretation….But could be a situation, so, for example, if the Czech 
presidency and they decide to speak Czech, then we need it. So it could 
happen. But it’s a funny things. No one would come to an idea. Then on 
such level, the Czech presidency, one of the, of the person of a low level 
                                                
163  In the jargon of interpreters, this ‘passive’ understanding corresponds with a “C” 
language, one that is understood enough to make a rendition into a more fluent “B” 
or “A” language. 
164  Someone, however, should be able to make a tremendously fun study of the humor 
of multilingualism and use of interpreters throughout the history of the Parliament. 
Space and scope prevent due consideration here, but stories and jokes abound. One 
historical anecdote involved some MEPs inventing a species of fish as a spoof on the 
interpreters working the Committee on Fisheries (PECH).  
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say, okay, I don’t speak French. We have to speak Czech, so go ahead, 
solve the problem. But the French, they did like this. (F53) 
In other words, the French (in the instance described above) insisted on performing their 
French identity through speaking French, regardless of the access issues it caused for 
other Members. There are always “two factors,” explained an administrator for the 
Interpreting Directorate: “catering for convenience…and a political factor. Using a 
language is a political statement” (F14). 
4.2.2.2.3 Proactive Use of Simultaneous Interpretation: Communicative Equality 
The other relevant condition in which communicative equality is achieved is 
when both/all MEPs use the system of SI in the EP (scenario G). This equalizing 
characteristic of the system, however, is less well represented in the discourse. Separating 
genuine appreciation from the official rhetoric is a matter for a more subtle analysis than 
is conducted here. The system of SI in the EP seems reluctantly tolerated and frequently 
criticized. Rather than articulating a field of equality (Sen, 1992) that can be generated by 
the skillful and strategic use of SI, public rhetoric about multilingualism promotes 
statements about transparency and democracy that the social practice of participating in 
simultaneous interpretation does not consistently deliver. For instance, when asked 
whether one knows if another Member is using the SI system to make a political 
statement about identity (perhaps the most common accusation) or to make themselves 
better understood, most MEPs admit, “I don’t know” (e.g., NM26). One Assistant 
described the situation for himself and his MEP: 
He and me, we use [the SI] when, pfff, I don’t know, when you get the 
risk to use it or you are so extremely tired. But to tell the truth, sometimes, 
easier to use English or German - my German is the first language - 
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because you work in English. And then, sometimes, I know better the 
expression of this topic in English, because I work in - we write the 
amendments, we negotiate with the others, the colleagues, the 
administrators, so the common language is English. It could be the French 
as well, but not my boss neither me, it’s not able. We read French, but we 
are not able to negotiate in French or make text in French. (F53) 
4.2.2.2.4 Avoidance of Simultaneous Interpretation: Communicative Disadvantage 
The dominant theme in the discourse privileges being able to communicate in the 
same language. This emphasis on language choice tends to mask another theme, 
represented in scenario F. “Some matters be held, for example, for committee meetings 
we have only one language is very bad” (NM70). When language difference is the 
baseline condition and SI is not provided, MEPs rely on their Assistants to mediate the 
communication on their behalf. Sometimes this takes the form of a kind of interpretation 
or translating which is regarded functional while acknowledged as non-professional. 
Sometimes MEPs simply are not able to participate, and are acutely aware that their 
participation is compromised. 
On the last sitting of our committee…there are many, many 
amendments…and we had not interpreter. So I must to discuss about the 
amendment in English. For me it was very difficult because for this case, I 
think it is necessary to have interpreter because one level is to understand 
in the non-formal discussion. You must understand what every, every 
word, what is mean this amendment, what change in original text this 
amendment? (NM69) 
Two things are interesting about this feedback: one is that interpreting is supposed to be 
guaranteed during Committee work. The second is the conundrum of forcing decisions 
when Members are unable to understand because of the failure to arrange a mechanism 
for securing interpretation when needed in any context of EP decision-making. 
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Structurally, “interpretation is given to bodies, not to MEPs” (F14). “Bodies” in 
this use are not human individuals, but the various groups composing the institutional 
infrastructure: Committees, Groups, Plenary are interpreted, while working groups of 
most types are not (unless the Rapporteur has enough status or need to make the request). 
The point is, individuals do not have a blanket right to interpretation in the European 
Parliament, rather the setting has precedence, and the status associated with one’s role in 
that meeting may, secondarily, afford more or less claim on interpretation services. 
There are additional restrictions on the provision of interpreting enumerated in the 
Parliament’s Rules of Procedure: Rule 81.4a (implementing measures during a “time of 
scrutiny” which refers to voluntary agreements between Member States), Rule 90.3 
(recommendations related to foreign and security policy), Rule 139 (regarding provision 
of interpreters during the transition to the larger interpreting regime) and Rule 179.7 
(involving Committees of Inquiry).165 An italicized section of the security rule exception 
reiterates the primary of Rule 138 (guaranteeing the provision of interpretation) while 
clarifying that decisions will be made whether or not all Members understand: 
The non-application of Rule 138 is possible only in committee and only in 
urgent cases. Neither at committee meetings not declared to be urgent nor 
in plenary sitting may there be any departure from the provisions of Rule 
138. 
The provision stating that oral amendments shall be admissible means 
that members may not object to oral amendments being put to the vote in 
committee. 
It is possible that the Member’s expressed frustration may have occurred under one of the 
special conditions of Rules 81, 90 or 179 but the scope of the conversation at the time 
                                                
165  The relevant portions of these Rules are provided in Appendix C. 
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involved the division of formal and informal settings. More likely, this type of situation 
results from the continuation of Rule 139, which provided that “in applying Rule 138, 
account shall be taken, with regard to…the availability in real terms and sufficient 
numbers of the requisite interpreters and translators” (ibid).166 However, the context in 
which the MEP shared the anecdote was to illustrate the frequently made point that “The 
places where you need interpreting most are the places where you are least likely to 
receive it” (e.g., NM27). 
Another Member gives an example of a similar problem that can occur in 
Committees even when interpretation is provided. 
I started speaking English instead of Dutch…I didn’t have any Dutch text 
in front of me, so I had to rely on the the English…I had tabled that 
amendment in English…I added this as an extra argument…but not as an 
excluding argument…I read over that when I read the English—when I 
drafted the English text, because my English is okay, but I’m not a native 
English speaker…So, in fact, this was a language problem…because the 
spirit of my amendment was certainly not to put it as an extra 
condition…if I would have tabled that in Dutch, the services would have 
translated that into correct English or in the right spirit of English. 
(OM09) 
This Member discovered a downside to working in a lingua franca, despite its 
apparent convenience. Adding “an extra argument” or “an excluding argument” entail 
different political manuevers, they call for quite different responses from colleagues and 
opponents. As much time as is (supposedly) wasted in correcting interpreters’ errors, an 
                                                
166  There is, in fact, a constant call for interpreters to build the corps sufficiently to meet 
demand. Anti-interpreter rhetoric, stressful working conditions and relatively low or 
unreliable pay (speaking generically for all kinds of interpreting in all settings) 
currently exacerbate pressures regarding this career choice. Arguably, the EU’s 
emphasis on language learning competes with promoting the skill of communicating 
effectively by knowing how to work interpreters well. 
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equal or greater share of that (supposedly) lost time must be spent trying to un-do simple 
syntactical errors of non-fluent language users. “Simultaneous translation [sic] creates 
problems, but it is astonishing that the number of real blunders is that low” (OM03). 
4.2.3 Primary Participants: Two ‘Sides’ of a Unified Discourse 
As mentioned previously, findings from a preliminary round of research with 
European Parliament Interpreters (EPIs) about the system of simultaneous interpretation 
in the European Parliament were previously published (Kent, in Hale, Ozolins and Stern 
2009). During the submission and revision process an anonymous reviewer succinctly 
summarized the function of that chapter in a volume on community (not conference) 
interpreting: 
It gives voice to the interpreters’ attitudes and frustrations. They express 
fears concerning democracy and efficiency in policymaking, identified as 
grounded in a linguistic problem, more precisely in the choice of the 
members of the European Parliament (MEPs) to restrain from utilising the 
interpreters’ services and rather speak in a foreign lingua franca. (email 
correspondence, Sandra Hale, Mar 5, 2009) 
The matter of voice for the interpreters is an extension of the desire for voice that appears 
to underlie the reasons that MEPs choose a shared language or lingua franca when 
possible. Table 7 shows that MEPs are motivated more by a desire for rhetorical 
influence than by communicative equality, but EPIs observations (at the beginning of the 
term, when there were almost as many new MEPs as there were new EPIs) centered 
around their observations of MEP failure to achieve voice. 
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4.2.3.1 Interpreters on Interpreting for the European Parliament 
“I’m talking about the magic of language that’s being killed.” (EP 
Interpreter #3) 
Much of the EP interpreters’ discourse mirrors the European Union’s public 
rhetoric about democracy and equality. Many interpreters are aware of criticisms that 
interpretation is merely symbolic and/or too expensive. It is of pragmatic professional as 
well as theoretical interest that conference interpreters, like community interpreters, have 
not yet generated proactive arguments as to the immediate and long-term value of 
simultaneous interpretation. The following re-constructed discourse summarizes a 
specific EP interpreter concern about language use that appeared in nearly every 
interview: whether MEPs choose to use their best expressive language or to speak less 
fluently via a lingua franca. Every quotation in this section is from a professional 
interpreter for the European Parliament during the spring of 2005, which was several 
months into the first year of the ‘big bang’ enlargement. Their descriptions and 
explanations are eloquent, requiring minimal exposition and spare commentary. Each of 
the selected quotations is a complement to similar sentiments; together they compose a 
compelling discourse about the choice of monolingualism (the use of a presumably 
shared language) over multilingualism (the collaborative use of many languages). 
Interpreters for the European Parliament consistently and regularly complain 
about speakers’ reading of prepared texts. “The difficulty here is...speed and badly 
spoken languages” (EPI #4). Comments range from critique of the delivery (fast reading 
of prepared text) to doubt regarding intention (such as MEPs seeking to say something 
without actually communicating anything meaningful). Mentioned by the majority of EP 
interpreters, the problems with MEPs’ speed-reading-as-talk was not accompanied by as 
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much frustration as MEPs’ lack of fluency in a lingua franca. “It’s Globe-ish again. It’s 
bad English. It’s sometimes bad French” (EPI #2). The general view is represented by 
this interpreter’s comment: “People are getting used to a lower level of quality and a kind 
of communication that relies on broken English” (EPI #8). 
“The English-speaking look-alikes” (EPI #9) are described by interpreters in 
detail: 
It’s not as if it’s English spoken by Englishmen. That’s one kind of 
English, but...it’s mainly another kind of...Pidgin English that’s spoken 
by...non-natives. Many of the new Member States have sometimes a very 
proximate knowledge of English and that makes for a completely different 
kind of English, a kind of jargon. Sometimes they don’t know the value of 
certain words or expressions, and that’s a danger. (EPI #6) 
The sentiment of danger was common among EP interpreters, because “you’re not really 
sure they know what they’re saying” (EPI #6). Consequently, the output from interpreters 
into the target language “might be slightly different. It might not be exactly what the 
speaker is trying to say. Obviously you aren’t doing this on purpose, but are desperately 
trying to understand something and then say something in the target language” (EPI #13). 
These three dangers arise repeatedly in the discourse of interpreters for the European 
Parliament: 
● interpretees possibly not knowing what they are saying, 
● interpretees being unaware of the full range of implications of what they are 
saying, and of 
● interpreters inadvertently saying something other than what the speaker intended. 
 
Accompanying the risks of reduced understanding and actual misunderstanding, 
many interpreters also talk about a related loss. “You lose the implications of what they 
say, the turns of phrase that indicate that something special is going on” (EPI #8). What 
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that “something special” might be was described primarily along the dimension of 
national culture. “The fact that a Greek tells you something, or a Swede tells you 
something, gets lost” (EPI #15). Interpreters do not mean the symbolic label or name of 
the nation; rather, they are referring to something ineffable, a subtle yet distinct quality of 
mind: 
When you speak a language, you implicitly accept the categories of that 
language. What you can express is limited by the categories that exist in 
that language. That means you might find yourself in a position where 
your political discourse is dictated by what is accepted, what is 
fashionable or not fashionable in a given language. For example, the 
Anglo-Saxon way of expressing yourself carries with it a certain 
perception of the world. When a Lithuanian or a Greek or a Portuguese 
uses English, in some way I think they are giving up part of their world 
and replacing it with a sort of internationalized sort of worldview. (EPI 
#8) 
Comments about the relationship between language and meaning appear 
frequently throughout the interview transcripts. Usually the naming of variation in 
worldview is accompanied by a tone of grief (sometimes articulated, sometimes implied), 
a Hymesian key ranging from sorrow to desolation that the scope of meaningfulness 
possible from the interactions of these cultural differences is being reduced to a single, 
flat mode of interacting. At the same time, some interpreters try to argue in support of 
MEPs’ use of a lingua franca instead of simultaneous interpretation: 
If everybody has a lingua franca where there are no advantages or privileged 
positions among the speakers, then why should they use interpreters? But 
that is also never the case. You always have someone who speaks native, 
mother tongue whereas others are required to have this foreign language, 
and you don’t have this equality any more...If someone is struggling with the 
language you can lose very important points, or a debate. (EPI #7) 
Likewise, native language speakers are not bothered by people speaking 
their language wrong because they know it’s not their mother tongue and 
they will try and understand and grasp the meaning of what the person who 
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is speaking is saying. I think that all the other people who share that 
language as a tool will not be bothered too much by the fact that that person 
speaks badly. I think the only people who are bothered by it are the 
interpreters because they actually hear where the communication breaks 
down once in a while. (EPI #3) 
What do European Parliament interpreters mean by communication breakdowns?  
The same issues are repeated with more specificity: “We see that [MEPs] lexicon is 
reduced by seventy or eighty percent when you venture into another language” (EPI #2), 
and “[MEPs] can’t tackle important things with their bad language” (EPI #14). These factors 
can lead to palpable problems, such as “misunderstandings, embarrassment, or no reaction at 
all, when the speaker obviously would like some reaction from the audience” (EPI #13). The 
frequency of such breakdowns is unclear from the current corpus of data, because while 
some interpreters observe such instances of breakdown only “once in a while” (EPI #3), 
others say, “We witness the contradictions every day – the mistakes – every day” (EPI #2). 
At the time of these conversations (2005), I was nonplussed. Why does a norm of 
using a weak lingua franca instead of the fully-expressive rhetorical range of one’s best 
official language exist in a political context of international decision-making? 
Parliament’s interpreters would speculate: 
People tend to think better of themselves than they are. Then what 
happens is they decide to abandon their mother tongue and speak in one of 
the foreign languages because they think they know it, when they don’t 
know it, or [don’t] know it adequately. (EPI #10) 
Some interpreters are also unwilling to pass ultimate judgment: “They have the 
impression to communicate better, but do they communicate better? I don’t know. It’s 
getting across general ideas, but the finesse, the nuances get completely lost” (EPI #4). 
204 
The key/tone of concern, with its implicit question of consequences, kept me asking 
more questions: what is being lost when a less-fluent language is used? What is being gained by 
this language choice? How much will the loss cost? What benefits accrue from what is gained? 
If it’s a Polish speaking bad English, I have no clue [what they mean]. 
And this is becoming part of our work more and more. The English that 
we have to translate from is second or third language English – from 
people who do not think in that language. (EPI #8) 
If speakers are not fluent enough to think in the language they are using, “It’s like Finnish 
and English: you need to be a Finn to understand that kind of English” (EPI #1), or, “...a kind 
of Swenglish that will not be easily understood by the interpreters unless they have Swedish 
or Danish...because they won’t understand the structure behind or why they use certain 
words” (EPI #6). The combinations are myriad: “Unless you know Spanish grammar, [their 
English is] very difficult to follow” (EPI #5). The examples resonate with the Member who 
explained how he had erred in generating an “extra” or “excluding” argument.167 
In retrospect, it seems that interpreters were observing (and objecting to) language 
users in the European Parliament converging to a monotone form of English. Interpreters 
described this movement toward lingua francas (especially English) and away from their 
best language in a key of regret. “The nuances are lost and everybody gets to something 
grey. The passion is lost. It becomes more generalized because that’s all you can say in 
                                                
167  Sometimes this happens in community interpreting contexts, where the minority 
language speaker adopts false cognates from the mainstream language, causing 
confusion for the interpreter. For example, when a Spanish speaker uses the term 
‘asalto’, it can be unclear to the interpreter working into English whether they intend 
‘assault’ as a general category or the specifically Spanish meaning of ‘armed 
robbery’ (Hale, 2004). Another example from a workshop presentation by Cecilia 
Wadensjö (Critical Link 5, 2007, Sydney Australia) involved Russian and the 
perfective/imperfective verb form. Second language users can generate a 
grammatical conflict with unidiomatic uses that “obscures the meaning.” 
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that kind of language” (EPI #3). Not only is the content and complexity of conversation 
reduced, but “people pretend that they understand and they don’t. Because they’re too 
embarrassed to admit they don’t know English” (EPI #2). Interpreters find “it’s difficult 
to say [to an MEP], ‘Look, don’t speak English anymore” (EPI #1). “Trying to do so? It’s 
very, very delicate...” (EPI #6). 
Interpreters agree with the democratic principle that language choice is an actual 
and legitimate right: “You can’t stop people from speaking other languages. They’re 
quite proud about it” (EPI #4). “Senior officials from Member States want to show off 
their language skills” (EPI #12). Such desires and pressures add up: “It’s very hard to tell 
them, ‘Look, with your English, you’re better to not speak it if you can’t say it” (EPI #1). 
When I finally began talking with MEPs about their point-of-view four years later, they 
claimed they were choosing English because of perceived weaknesses and problems with 
the interpretation. 
MEPs’ concerns regarding the achievement of voice during interpreted 
communication is expressed in terms of “loss” and “risk.” These terms mirror and echo 
the concerns expressed by EP Interpreters. Table 8 compares the emergent themes of 
MEPs’ sense of loss and risk in using the system of simultaneous interpretation with the 
European Parliament interpreters’ corresponding perceptions of “danger” and “loss.” 
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Table 8. Comparison of Dangers, Risks, and Losses between Members of the 
European Parliament (MEPs) and EP Interpreters (EPIs) 
Dangers 
according to EPIs 
Risks 
according to MEPs 
Losses** 
according to EPIs 
Losses 
according to 
MEPs 
MEPs possibly not 
knowing what they are 
actually saying in non-
fluent language. 
Of not controlling the word 
choices made by interpreters 
when I speak in my official 
language rather than a 
language I share (to some 
extent) with colleagues. 
Of a worldview and the 
categories implicit in 
that worldview. 
Of control of 
meaning. 
MEPs being unaware 
of the full range of 
implications of what 
they are saying in a 
non-fluent language. 
Of not controlling the 
meanings made by 
interpreters when I speak in 
my official language rather 
than a language I share(to 
some extent) with colleagues. 
Of implicit qualities of 
logic & understanding 
from each 
national/cultural, 
perspective. 
Of control of 
meaning. 
EPIs inadvertently 
saying something other 
than what the MEP 
intended when the 
MEP speaks in a non-
fluent language. 
Of the interpreter 
misunderstanding or 
misrepresenting my meaning 
when I speak in my official 
language rather than a 
language I share (to some 
extent) with colleagues. 
Of continuity in the 
communication process. 
Of speed and the 
sense of immediacy 
generated when 
using the same 
language as other 
MEPs. 
Main Danger 
perceived by EPIs 
Main Risk 
perceived by MEPs 
Main Loss 
perceived by EPIs 
Main Loss 
perceived by 
MEPs 
The use of non-native 
languages by MEPs 
lacking native or near-
native fluency. 
Having to trust the 
interpreters. 
National, linguistic, 
cultural diversity of 
thought and 
thoughtfulness. 
Control. 
**EP Interpreters refer to losses and dangers when MEPs choose against maximal utilization of the 
simultaneous interpreting system by speaking any language in which they are not fully fluent. The original 
version of this table was shared in a report submitted to the Bureau of the European Parliament (2009). 
See Appendix A. 
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4.2.3.2 Loss, or Danger and Risk? 
Reducing the discourse by primary participants about SI in the EP to the one term 
they share in common, it is “loss.” In this sense the Members and Interpreters mirror each 
other. The terms “risk” and “danger” are complementary. Here, these two sets of 
participants and their ‘sides’ of the discourse echo each other. The risk of losing control 
of meaning (as perceived by the MEPs in using the SI) complements the dangers of 
inadequate control of meaning (as perceived by the EPIs when MEPs do not use the SI). 
These perceived dangers and risks associated with (perceived) loss of control combine 
into an overall discourse of complaint. The repetition of the complaints generates general 
suspicion and distrust of simultaneous interpretation. This discursive atmosphere, along 
with direct experience, contributes to MEPs’ choices toward lingua francas and away 
from interpretation, reinforcing the concerns of EPIs who must still grapple with the 
source language, regardless of its dysfluency. 
Although this was not explicitly stated by any of the interpreters who spoke with 
me, EP Interpreters also ‘lose control’ when interpretees speak in pidgin, English as a 
foreign language, or contact languages rather than in the idiomataic grammar of the 
official languages. As many interpreters explained, “your [bad language] still has to be 
interpreted!” (e.g., EPI #53). One could argue that EPIs’ frustration is as much with not 
understanding as MEPs’ frustration is with not being understood. In other words, 
discourse about the system of SI in the EP exposes the essence of all communication: the 
dual questions of a) what knowledge is being mutually comprehended, and b) what kinds 
of identities and relationships are being enacted. 
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The pervasive presence of these strongly-felt sentiments indicates the extent and 
depth to which culture is being produced and shared among these individuals who a) 
have different roles and responsibilities within the European Parliament, and b) come 
from diverse cultural backgrounds and linguistic profiles. Because the overall system of 
controlled multilingualism inhibits and discourages immediate feedback and corrective 
action (due to time pressure and the presumed invisibility of the machine), MEPs 
perceive a loss of control of their words and meanings. 
This apparent powerlessness is both comparable and distinct from, say, the users 
of community-style interpreting such as patients in Australian hospitals who receive no 
professional interpretation services except from family or friends. As seen in Table 7, 
Scenario F, Members of the Parliament are often thrust into circumstances where they 
must simply make do. At other times, conditions and pressures of the settings (in the 
hemicycles, in the rooms) force a fast temporal rate. Members’ attempts to pack meaning 
in dense source language deliveries guarantees the absence of some of the intended 
information in the target language (in particular, one minute speeches but also during 
debate). Because the overall system of controlled multilingualism is not differentiated in 
the discourse as anything other than one system, for one purpose, using SI is considered 
risky in many situations. MEPs find it preferable to utilize a language in which they are 
less fluent but which gives them the feeling of individual control rather than the less 
controllable, shared system of simultaneous interpretation. 
4.2.4 Finding: Simultaneous Interpretation as Social Interaction 
Virtually all of the Members I spoke with were multilingual (review Table 5). 
However, Members of the EP who are not fluent in other languages (especially English) 
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often find themselves in situations where communication is curtailed because interpreting 
is not provided for most of the smaller, face-to-face working meetings. “I usually speak 
in my language, but … my second Committee168 is Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
we have only three times, I don’t know, interpretation the last five years in this 
committees, not good” (NM70). The reasons why the lack of SI is “not good” affirm the 
criticisms provided by EP Interpreters when Members insist on a shared language even 
when SI is provided: 
English is not my mother tongue so I would not pretend even that I could 
do the job in English all the time. Definitely, for example, on transport 
legislation which is very detailed, you really need your mother tongue to 
be clear on what you’re saying. (OM71) 
This is not just an individualized problem of expression: 
We have some problems with the English language because we are not 
native speakers, and when both are not native speakers it’s very difficult 
to have a good communication about a commission document, about 
amendments, and if you read some amendments it’s sometimes only one 
word to change. And that’s very difficult to have all the nuance in your 
own translation from Dutch to English and then from English to Spanish, 
Portuguese. (F10) 
Specifically, “You must understand what every, every word, what is mean this 
amendment, what change in original text this amendment? This very difficult and for this 
case I think must be interpreter” (NM69). If the crux of the interpretation regime of 
                                                
168   In this case, the MEP was not able to ask for SI in both Committees because “the 
sessions are paralleled” and “you have to pick” which Committee to schedule the SI, 
even if you will be going back and forth between the two meetings (NM70). Also, 
one must be a full Member (not a Substitute, in most cases) in order to qualify for 
making a SI request. 
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controlled multilingualism is to respond to real demand, who defines what MEPs express 
as real need? And what are the implications if real need is not accommodated?169 
I was invited during the last few months of the legislative year to observe two 
different contexts in which SI was not provided, the Baltic Intergroup and the Asylum 
Dossier Horizontal Working Group. The Baltic Intergroup included many ELF speakers; 
the group would definitely have benefitted from the provision of interpreting. Although 
there was a great deal of pressure on the communication in the Baltic Intergroup 
meetings,170 for reasons that will become clear, the analysis centers on the Asylum 
Dossier: a “package” of previously-passed legislation up for recast and a new initiative 
for establishing a European Asylum Support Office (EASO). 
4.3 Working on the Asylum dossier 
After the announcement of the Asylum dossier Working Group in the LIBE 
Committee, I observed two Horizontal Working Group meetings with the Shadows, six 
Trialogue meetings with representatives from the Council and/or Commission (one of 
which was “unofficial”), five Political Group meetings, three additional LIBE Committee 
                                                
169 “As described in the Code of Conduct, language facilities in Parliament shall be 
managed on the basis of the principles governing ‘controlled full multilingualism’. 
The resources to be devoted to multilingualism shall be controlled by means of 
management on the basis of users’ real needs, measures to make users more aware of 
their responsibilities and more effective planning of requests for language facilities” 
(Committee on Budgetary Control, 2013). 
170  Some Members of the Baltic Intergroup believed the permanent administration was 
trying to force them to discontinue meeting altogether. The status of Intergroups is 
liminal, as they are not part of the formal decision-making structure of the EP’s 
legislative work. However Members consider the work done in Intergroups to be an 
essential and necessary informal mechanism complementing the formal process.  
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meetings and three Plenaries when the Asylum dossier was on the agenda. I was also in 
the Plenary when the proposal was voted on by the entire Membership in the very last 
session of the Sixth Term. I interviewed each Rapporteur, Shadow Rapporteur and/or 
their Assistant(s), and some Secretariat staff (the bureaucratic administrations composed 
of permanent EP staff which maintains records and manages logistics during and between 
EP terms for the Committees and Groups). Throughout all the observations I was rarely 
introduced; only one MEP introduced me/my role to a Political Group—perhaps because 
the Independents were such a small group my presence would surely be noticed. In the 
other Groups and Committees, it was taken for granted that if I made it through the door I 
was allowed to be in the room. 
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Table 9. Asylum Dossier Meetings 
The Asylum Dossier: Observed Meetings 
Setting and Date 
in 2009 
“in the room” 
= 
interpretation 
system171 
“in the 
hemicycle” 
= 
operator system 
172 
No SI provided 
Civil Liberties Committee (LIBE) 17 Feb X   
Trialogue (with Council) 3 March   X 
Trialogue (with the Commission) 3 March    X 
Trialogue (with the Commission & Council) 1 
April 
  X 
Plenary 2 April  X  
Horizontal Working Group 15 April   X 
Unofficial Trialogue (with Council) 16 April   X 
LIBE Coordinator’s Meeting 16 April X   
LIBE 16 April X   
EPP-ED Political Group debate 21 April X   
Horizontal Working Group 22 April   X 
LIBE 22 April X   
IND-DEM Political Group debate 22 April X   
Trialogue (Council & Commission) 23 April   X 
Trialogue (Council & Commission) 28 April   X 
Greens Political Group debate 28 April X   
PSE Political Group debate 28 April X   
EPP-ED Political Group debate 28 April X   
Plenary 6 May  X  
Plenary 7 May  X  
                                                
171   “In the room,” all floor and interpreter microphones function on automatic: whoever 
is first to speak gets the floor (the Chairperson can turn off individual microphones). 
Turn-taking is supposed to be managed by the Chair (or a Vice-Chair) but Members 
can, and do sometimes, speak spontaneously. 
172   All microphones are controlled by a technician who is following the oral directions 
of the Chairperson who is running the meeting. No Member can initiate a turn 
speaking until the Chair has signalled to the technician to turn their microphone on. 
The technician can also turn any Member’s microphone off it they go over the time 
limit (following the lenience of the Chair, which varies). 
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Access to closed meetings (namely, of Political Groups) was not overtly policed 
except during very high profile discussions or special visits, however if there was ever 
doubt about my invitation someone would check and I could refer them to the MEP who 
had invited me. The hemicycles have a public gallery so no permission was required to 
attend for Plenaries. I was introduced during one informal Intergroup meeting (not the 
Baltic Intergroup) that involved less than a dozen people, but not in a Member’s special 
meeting on the Kurdish question (about three dozen people). The Trialogues generally 
involved about a dozen people but I was never introduced. After I had become known, 
one participant volunteered her initial reaction to my presence: 
Interviewee: You sitting there is just – you are just – you are very 
different to the rest [laughter] of the people sitting there. But I mean, you 
are ____ another one ____, so I mean – but I mean there’s a lot of people 
that sit there takes notes for MEPs or whatever they do, minutes and stuff. 
But that’s somehow attentive in a different way or whatever. . . In the 
beginning I remember the first meeting where I didn’t know who you 
were – and I felt that you were… I dunno, I was really confused. And you 
didn’t look or behave or anything that remotely could sort of place you in 
like the Secretariat or the Presidency or anything; so I was a bit – And 
then I didn’t ask, because I thought okay you were with somebody, and 
that was none of my business or whatever, [laughter] but that was quite 
funny. No but it was just – I just noticed this because the meeting rooms 
are quite sort of – they – there’s a hierarchy; you sit in little groups. So in 
then in the back there’s this mix of NGOs, and you can have a Head of 
Unit sitting there, you could have – it’s a strange mix. But still you can 
normally identify people somehow by the way they sit there. 
Interviewer: So I was unidentifiable. 
Interviewee: Yeah. I mean, I would not be able to [laughter] say what you 
were doing there. (F13) 
Mainly, what I was doing there was taking a lot of notes. (Audio recording was only done 
for interviews with prior informed consent.) 
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4.3.1 A Co-Decision Trialogue 
The need for a common EU policy on asylum was established at the 1999 
Tampere Summit, which established a deadline of five years for the first phase of 
legislation and implementation. The original directives were completed in 2004: referred 
to casually as Qualifications, Procedures, Reception Conditions, Dublin, Eurodac, and the 
Long Term Residents Directive. These directives established the minimum foundation for 
a Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Three of the original six directives were 
up for recast in 2009: the Reception Conditions Directive, “the Dublin 2 Regulation, 
which determines the member State responsible for the asylum case” (M78), and the 
Eurodac Regulation, “which is the fingerprinting system that goes along with asylum 
payments” (OM78). Recasts are a procedure instituted with the Lisbon Treaty (2009). 
Recasts allow revisions and improvements to the execution of law previously 
institutionalized by the Commission and Council without input from the Parliament. 
Recasts are one of the ways that the EP has gained influence in the overarching process 
of Europeanization, particularly in terms of democratic representation of the citizenry. 
With the new Lisbon Treaty and legislation, the execution is part of the 
competence of the European Parliament …now the European Parliament 
is involved…and, therefore, what we have to change a lot of things in 
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each law, European law, we have to change it at the end the execution that 
the European Parliament is involved and which way. (F53)173 
The chance to re-cast was eagerly received by MEPs, who were following up on the 
Hague Programme’s prioritization of the CEAS asylum process begun at the 1999 
Tampere Summit. Tampere established the goal that “by 2010 we should have the second 
phase starting where we would not only have minimum standards, but we would actually 
set up common standards” (F84). In providing guidance for the 6th Term of the European 
Parliament, the Hague Programme was following in step with this previously established 
timeline. 
Following the usual process, the EU Council of Presidents (‘the Council”) and EP 
Committee Chairmen determined that asylum policy comes within the competence of the 
Committee on Justice and Home Affairs,174 known by its French acronym LIBE. That 
first “sorting” is followed by a second “sorting” within the LIBE Committee itself, by a 
                                                
173  The Parliament has now become a co-legislator, which is a significant change since 
Vuorikoski’s work in 2004. The principle of co-decision established in the 
Maastricht Treaty is now in effect and was at play in the Asylum package 
negotiations: “The European Parliament is not a legislative body in the sense that the 
national parliaments are as it does not have the right to initiate legislation (Antola 
1996: 63)” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 77). “The most important legislative body is the 
Council (Antola 1996: 64), which has to receive the proposals from the Commission; 
Parliament’s involvement comes in the final stages of the legislative procedure 
(Noël, 1993, p. 26, in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 77). Since the Maastricht Treaty, the EP 
”has increased its powers enormously, but could be described as still only on the 
edge of constituting a legislature” (Philip Norton, 1995, p. 192, quoted in Raunio, 
1996, p. 18). While the powers of the EP have been on the agenda over the years, 
there have not been any deep-going changes since the time of this quotation even 
though the principle of co-decision, approved of in the Maastricht Treaty, did 
increase the influence of the EP in the legislative process” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 77). 
174   There are twenty Standing Committees in the EP, also two permanent 
subcommittees and a varying number of temporary committees. All of the legislative 
work is categorized according to the competence of each Committee. 
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group of “one Coordinator from each [political] Group…[who] organize the Committee 
meetings and…distribute Reports” (F84). The three asylum directive recasts were 
accompanied by a new initiative to establish a European Asylum Support Office (EASO). 
All four together composed the Asylum Dossier. 
Within the LIBE Committee in the spring of 2009 were representative MEPs from 
six European political Groups: ALDE, EPP, Greens, GUE, Socialists, and UEN.175 
“Being the lead committee is the important thing” (F84). In this case the lead was the 
EASO dossier and there “was no fight over this one” (F84). A complicated point system 
is deployed when necessary following the D’Hondt system of derogation from the 
number of seats held by each political party. “The small groups, if they want to get 
interesting Reports, they better save the points. So they don’t take many Reports” (F84). 
In this case, a Green party MEP was named Rapporteur for the EASO dossier as well as 
Shadow Rapporteur on the other three asylum dossiers. Each of the other dossiers was 
assigned its own responsible Rapporteur from the EPP, the Socialists, and ALDE. “The 
UEN didn’t demand anything” (F84). 
There may have been a slight hope that the whole dossier might be approved on 
the First Reading because the Commission was “really pushing…really keen to get this 
done and out” which is “not always the case” (F84). Technically, the First Reading refers 
to the initial, formal establishment of the Parliament’s stance on a given piece of 
legislation through a voting process in Plenary. The details of the First Reading are 
                                                
175   Political Groups represented in the LIBE Committee at the time of research: ALDE - 
Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe; EPP - European People’s Party-
European Democrats; the Greens-European Free Alliance (technically Greens-EFA); 
GUE - European United Left-Nordic Green Left (technically GUE-NGL); Party of 
European Socialists (PES); and UEN - Union for Europe of the Nations. 
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arrived at through a process of intra-Parliamentary Working Group meetings and 
Committee meetings, and inter-institutional Trialogue meetings with representations from 
the Council and the Commission. The Council’s and Commission’s representatives meet 
with the Rapporteur, Shadow Rapporteurs (or their Assistants) and other representatives 
from the EP’s permanent Secretariats in order to discover their “mutual recognition” 
regarding “what has been adopted” (F84). 
In this instance of the Ayslum Dossier, the Commission was under the Presidency 
of Jose Manuel Barroso. The Council was currently under the leadership of the Czech 
Presidency. The Council operates in six-month shifts, whereas the Commission’s 
appointed President (like the elected MEPs) stays in office for five-year terms. The 
Czechs were the last presidency of this Parliamentary term and were motivated to achieve 
a co-decision success. As it became clear that agreement would not be reached on all 
points and the Trialogue negotiations would continue into the next legislative term 
(Parliament’s 7th, 2009-2014), necessitating a Second Reading, a representative from the 
incoming Swedish Presidency also attended meetings. 
During the first set of Trialogue meetings, the “First Reading position [which] we 
have to defend in the Second Reading” (F84) becomes clear, as do any potential “red 
line” issues.176 During the First Reading on the Asylum dossier, the Council brought five 
amendments, three of which were acceptable and two of which were not. There was a 
sticking point in the Dublin Regulation regarding the concept of detention, because “in 
Spain you’re not allowed to detain asylum seekers for more than forty days” (F84) and 
                                                
176  The metaphor of the “red line” is drawn from Europe’s wars and the military custom 
of drawing a red line on maps to show the fronts of battle. (OM63) 
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none of the other EU countries had a similar restriction. There was also a significant 
debate with several amendments from Rapporteurs and Shadows trying to establish a 
solidarity mechanism. The Dublin Regulation 
determines what country…will have to treat an application…”You” 
[asylum seeker] arrive on the coast of Italy, and somehow you manage to 
move on to Spain…The Spanish government will say, “Where did you 
arrive?” “Ah, I arrived in Italy, but I come in -” “Well then you have to go 
back to Italy.” You have to apply for asylum in the first country of arrival. 
Dublin is the regulation that allows a Member State to send people back to 
where they originally entered the European Union. (F84) 
The issue of solidarity is crucial to a common policy. “The Parliament Reports are 
always about minimum harmonization - our party . . . we raise a maximum 
harmonization” (F10). The minimum standards included this “very unfriendly - 
instrument to shuffle people around…and some Member States are using it a lot, or the 
ones doesn’t have a southern maritime border” (F84). In the Dublin recast, the red line 
was being drawn around the use of the words “voluntary” or “binding” (F84). Whether 
and how Member States are required to support those countries bearing the burden of 
“massive influx” (F84) demonstrates “that a solidarity mechanism is somehow important. 
Because of course it undermines a little bit the asylum system if you have countries that 
say, ‘Sorry, we up North, we don’t care about you down there’” (F84). 
Another issue regarding the Procedures Directive also generated amendments and 
debate in the LIBE Committee but did not rise to the level of a red line in the Trialogue. 
The Procedures Directive “simply sets up a frame for the procedures to - for applying for 
asylum…to set up the minimum standards for Member States to apply to when people 
apply for asylum” (F84). The Procedures Directive governs the rules regarding the 
provision of simultaneous interpretation to asylum seekers. 
219 
4.3.2 “It Pops Up Every Time” 
The draft document included providing SI in a language the asylum seeker is 
“supposed to understand.” One MEP insisted that this was just a bad translation of the 
French word, a bit of sloppy work by someone from the Commission working in a hurry. 
It certainly caught my attention! I began to inquire of the MEPs, Assistants, and other 
staff present or involved with the Asylum dossier: “There was something about…there’s 
this clause about language, about interpreting…?” 
Ah yeah. That’s about – but this is one that has been – it pops up every 
time we deal with any asylum law. You – when you are asylum seeker 
and you get your answers, do – can you claim or can you insist on having 
it in a language that you are presumed to understand? Or what does it – 
suspected to, or what is the word you use? That you are assumed to 
understand? Or should it simply say “a language that you understand”? 
‘Cause of course there’s a big difference if you are from Nigeria and are 
likely to speak English, or if you are from say Malawi or something where 
you don’t necessarily – not necessarily have a mother tongue of any 
European language, and that means that you get in writing an explanation 
why are sent back to Spain? (F84) 
There are two issues, one involving whether or not simultaneous interpreting is provided 
(and in what language/s), and the other regarding the extent to which written 
communication is expected to suffice (and in what language/s). 
As explained in the introduction, the focus of this study is on interpretation 
because of its immediacy and the co-presence of interpretees in social interaction with 
each other. In this context, how translation becomes an issue (for asylum seekers as well 
as MEPs) is when decision-making about diction and the processes of ensuring 
comprehension of written documents are (or should be) resolved in face-to-face 
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interpersonal interaction.177 Because of the need to provide written translations into all 
official languages of the European Union, clarity of any law in the language which it is 
drawn up in is vital to ensuring translations will be understood and interpreted by 
Member States in accord with each other, all across the EU. 
Debate in the EP about communication access during asylum proceedings using 
simultaneous interpretation for asylum seekers is apparently well-worn: “We had on-
going discussions on the definition of language for I don’t know how long” (OM71). An 
Assistant explained, 
This whole language issue within the Asylum dossiers… it’s an issue 
which has been fought over many times in the past…the discussion has 
been had a million times before; in which case, for [Ms MEP], I guess she 
didn’t want to bring it up once again. We know that we’re never going to 
win that one. Is it highly unlikely that the Parliament is ever going to win 
that argument? It didn’t even win it within itself, because those 
amendments weren’t adopted. (F09) 
Despite the earlier loss on an unequivocal statement of the quality of interpreting 
provided to asylum seekers, amendments were raised to revise the Commission’s first 
wording, “supposed to understand.” One direction was to strengthen the asylum seekers’ 
rights, by “saying ‘understands’ full stop” (OM71). This effort had been made before. 
It was introduced but it was not adopted – because it is the Socialists – the 
Greens and GUE – the left – we all supported that but we didn’t have a 
majority, because the Liberals and the EPP went against it, because they 
don’t want that fight with Council, and maybe they don’t really care. Do 
the EPP really care if an asylum seeker understands them or not? (F09) 
                                                
177  Asylum seekers may often be provided with written information only. 
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Members of the more conservative EPP group would counter, “Do the Greens really 
understand the reality on the ground?” (F09). So the left and the right within Parliament 
have a ‘red line’ regarding language accessibility. 
Many explained “we have been pointing that out several times” (M71). One 
Assistant explained her MEP’s position: “The discussion has been had a million times . . . 
since we’ve been discussing this topic in Parliament the argument has been had and 
we’ve lost it – this specifically in the face of Council” (F09). “I’ve been doing this job for 
five years now and I know on another instrument we have been discussing hours with 
Council on how to define language, you know?” (OM71). The other amendment referred 
to precedent. One of the Shadow Rapporteurs on the EASO directive 
went back to the Return Procedure and…saw the definition used, 
‘understands or’ et cetera. And then I phoned with the legal services of the 
Commission and they confirmed if I would propose that specific 
definition, that that would improve the Commission text as much as 
oversight of the Commission … to follow the definition as already 
adopted in another instrument” (OM71). 
That pre-existing definition is in the Returns Directive,178 Chapter III, Procedural 
Safeguards, Article 12 on “Form,” Paragraph 2: 
Member States shall provide, upon request,179 a written or oral translation 
of the main elements of decisions related to return, as referred to in 
                                                
178  Directive 2008/115/EC of the European Parliament and of The Council of 16 
December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States for 
returning illegally staying third-country nationals. Official Journal of the European 
Union. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do
?uri=OJ:L:2008:348:0098:0107:EN:PDF retrieved 8 March 2014. 
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paragraph 1, including information on the available legal remedies in a 
language the third-country national understands or may reasonably be 
presumed to understand. (ibid) 
“The return procedure clearly is something else,” explained one of the 
MEPs distinguishing it from the directives up for recast, “but in my field, 
you cannot treat on the language an illegal migrant who is to be returned 
to his home country different in that respect than somebody who is 
coming in, you understand?” (M71) 
4.3.3 Negotiating Language Policy under Co-Decision 
While acknowledging that “the language issue is important” (OM71), it was 
understood that “the argument has been had and we’ve lost it – this specifically in the 
face of Council” (F09). Strategically, in the co-decision procedure, 
if we [MEPs] have a feeling that we could get a deal in the First Reading, 
it means that we will try to find views that we can agree on; we’ll 
compromise on what we’ve find are not essential but also stick to our 
guns when it comes to more essential parts. For asylum immigration 
packet [the three recasts], we don’t expect First Reading certainly. On the 
European Asylum Support Office, I think [the Rapporteur] has a bit of a 
chance … but I still think it’s unlikely. (NM80) 
Practically, “on the language; they can’t even negotiate that” (F09) because Parliament 
“didn’t even win it within itself, because those amendments [about understanding the 
language] weren’t adopted” (F09). Also, according to one Assistant, “there are no 
organizations sending letters or special cases to [Mr MEP],” even though “there are some 
                                                
179   The section continues in Paragraph “3. Member States may decide not to apply 
paragraph 2 to third country nationals who have illegally entered the territory of a 
Member State and who have not subsequently obtained an authorisation or a right to 
stay in that Member State. In such cases decisions related to return, as referred to in 
paragraph 1, shall be given by means of a standard form as set out under national 
legislation. Member States shall make available generalised information sheets 
explaining the main elements of the standard form in at least five of those languages 
which are most frequently used or understood by illegal migrants entering the 
Member State concerned.” (ibid) 
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problems with interpreters and problems around passports, and sometimes – that kind of 
problems we heard about during visits at centers” (F08). Instead, “general reception 
conditions and a humane treatment that kind of is the first priority. You cannot believe 
your eyes if you visit Greece or Malta or Cyprus” (OM71). Also, “access to legal advice, 
what happens to unaccompanied minors” (F09) and (as already described) the solidarity 
mechanism by which non-border countries support the border countries in matters of 
asylum and illegal immigration were taken as more foundational to the CEAS than 
language/communication access. 
Establishing another European agency was expected to garner some ideological 
opposition but not enough to thwart the EASO. For instance, one of the left groups might 
oppose on grounds of political principle rather than practical justice: 
…should there be one or two MEPs…which is against, which would be 
for a matter of principle, some Nordic members are usually against all 
new agencies for a matter of principle. So I don’t know what they would 
do on this one concerning asylum, because everybody in the group is 
absolutely in favour of whatever can protect asylum seekers’ rights. But 
there might be a problem, because when the Parliament decides to find us 
a new agency, then there are always some national delegation which are 
against, especially northern countries. But in this case, I still had no 
chance to check with my Nordic members, so I don’t know what would be 
their position. (F11) 
Likewise, “a [conservative] German EPP is totally against having any more European 
agencies because they’re fed up with European money being decentralized after agencies 
doing something that they consider isn’t that important” (F09). 
Nonetheless, most Political Groups were able to deal with 
the [EASO] report in Working Group was [because of] the fact we had a 
very clear line, and this is communicable to Mrs. [MEP], that we will 
support all of her amendments. And as far as these were seen as making 
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her chance of getting a First Reading agreement better but not necessarily 
leading to it. (NM80) 
An Assistant to the Shadow Rapporteur from another Political Group, however, 
prioritized other end-of-term responsibilities and campaigning for re-election: 
It’s better to wait for the vote because of – [Mr MEP] thinks it’s not 
possible to reach agreement with Council and Commission before the 
elections. So he said these last three months it’s not good to table a lot of 
amendments on such reports now; it’s better to wait for some outcomes 
after the elections. (F10) 
Such a decision not to table amendments in the First Reading does have 
consequences, as “new ideas can’t be introduced. So if we thought, ‘Oh, it would be a 
good idea for the Asylum Support Office to blah,’ we can’t introduce it if we didn’t think 
of it before” (F09). This sequential element of First Reading and Second Reading 
combined with the co-decision procedure motivated most Shadows “given the fact that 
this is just before European election, we to draw a line now” because “there’s a logic to 
the First and Second Reading. In Second Reading you can only table amendments that 
have been tabled in the First Reading” (NM80). 
There was a chance to-redraw the line of language access for asylum seekers with 
the EASO Directive, but the battle needed to be won in the recast directives first. An 
example is shown for the Procedures Directive, see Table 10. 
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Table 10. Amendment Reporting Process 
Amendment 14 - Recast – Rule 80a of the Rules of Procedure 
Proposal for a directive 
Article 9 – paragraph 4 
Text proposed by the Commission Amendment 
4. Detained asylum seekers shall immediately be 
informed of the reasons for detention, the 
maximum duration of the detention and the 
procedures laid down in national law for 
challenging the detention order, in a language they 
are reasonably supposed to understand. 
4. Detained asylum seekers shall immediately be 
informed of the reasons for detention, the 
maximum duration of the detention and the 
procedures laid down in national law for 
challenging the detention order, in a language they 
understand. 
Source: 1st DRAFT REPORT on the proposal for a directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council laying down minimum standards for the reception of asylum seekers (recast) (COM(2008)0815 
– C6-0477/2008 – 2008/0244(COD)){LIBE}Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs. 
Retrieved 8 March 2014. 
4.3.4 Simultaneous Interpretation as Social Interaction (SI squared) 
When the Rapporteurs and Shadow Rapporteurs from a Horizontal Working 
Group, such as the Asylum Package, report back to the full LIBE Committee (or any 
Committee) on the status of Trialogue negotiations with the Commission and Council, 
they use the system of SI in the EP to communicate with each other. By the time such 
reporting occurs there have been several small meetings and numerous conversations 
among the Rapporteurs and Shadows (and/or their Assistants) with each other and within 
each of their respective Political Groups. In the instance of the EASO and Asylum 
dossier, the first LIBE Committee’s discussion and debate regarding the red line issues 
and ideas (via amendments) regarding strategies for compromise lasted approximately 34 
minutes. 
Politically, numerous amendments were brought and voting occurred along 
customary Group lines. “In a lot of amendments, GUE, Greens and Socialists voted 
together” (F11). In this instance, 
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Either an alliance planned in advance or just… how would I say… 
convergence of intentions, the liberal [ALDE] group and the popular 
group [EPP] voted together. And when these two groups join, they have a 
majority in the LIBE committee. So whatever the liberals don’t like from 
the GUE amendments, we never have a chance to pass because we need 
them to make a majority. (F11) 
Prior to the voting, debate on the Amendments in the LIBE Committee was focused on 
the red line issues. At one point, a heated exchange occurred between the Maltese 
Member speaking English, and a Dutch Member speaking Netherlands. The issue 
involved the red line matter of the solidarity mechanism for burden sharing. The 
interview transcript180 that follows [below] involves misunderstanding, switching 
languages (technically called codeswitching), and the notion of voice. 
4.3.5 Codeswitching and Voice 
As mentioned above, all of the meetings of LIBE’s Horizontal Working Group on 
the EASO and Asylum dossier were conducted in English. The level of these meetings 
does not usually warrant the provision of simultaneous interpretation, so, in this case, 
Rapporteurs and Shadows not fluent in English made do by sending Assistants or staff 
from their Group’s Secretariat who were fluent in English on their behalf. This strategy 
was utilized for the Trialogue meetings too. Interpretation was only provided during the 
LIBE Committee Meeting (and the brief Coordinator’s meeting preceding it). Review 
Table 9. The one LIBE Committee Coordinator’s meeting (held prior to the full 
Committee meeting) that I observed involved only French and English. That 
Coordinator’s meeting dealt with a surprise move from the EPP regarding postponing the 
                                                
180  Written by the researcher in a field notebook as it occurred. 
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timetable for voting on EASO and the Asylum dossier; the last minute tactic was soundly 
rejected with a decision to move ahead with the already agreed timetable and address the 
amendments on the agenda. 
Thirty-four minutes of this LIBE Committee meeting were devoted to EASO and 
Asylum dossier amendments; fifteen booths were staffed at the beginning of the session 
(and a sixteenth, the Danish booth, became staffed at some point).181 There were 
approximately seventeen MEPs and 90 other participants present, including observers 
from the Council of Presidents. During the debate on the asylum amendments, only four 
languages were uttered from the floor: Dutch, English, French and Spanish. At one count 
(perhaps corresponding to the use of Spanish) twelve of the seventeen Members were 
wearing headsets (hence presumably listening to a simultaneous interpretation); at 
another count (perhaps corresponding with the use of French and/or Dutch) ten of the 
seventeen Members were wearing headphones. 
The Maltese MEP presented some recommendations (speaking English)182 on 
behalf of another MEP, who was Rapporteur/Shadow on one of the directives up for 
recast but was not in attendance. Then the Dutch Member who was Rapporteur on an 
asylum package directive and Shadow on all the other asylum package directives 
presented recommendations, speaking in Netherlands. Suddenly the Dutch Member 
switched to English, with “a question for [Mr MEP]” because of a recommended point 
                                                
181  These may have been interpreters in training (for any language combination, not 
necessarily Danish). Taking the opportunity to practice definitely seemed to be the 
case in the Swedish booth, which was occupied by one person not a team. 
182   Maltese was not yet being provided within the interpretation regime due to training 
and qualification issues. English is recognized along with Maltese as an official 
language of Malta: this MEP was raised bilingually. 
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that “limits the scope of my amendment. We already agreed that Dublin doesn’t increase 
cost. Could you clarify your intention with your amendment?” (Field Notebook II, p. 18) 
When the Maltese Member’s turn to respond arrived (six minutes later, after two other 
MEPs had turns), he said (in English) it was “a tough time getting a compromise. I’m 
willing to listen, maybe there is a misunderstanding” (ibid). A week and a half later, I 
was able to interview the Dutch MEP about that interaction. 
Researcher: Things got a little intense between you and Mr. MEP. 
Something was going on there. 
Interviewee: Yeah. 
Researcher: Yeah, and – 
Interviewee: We misunderstood each other. 
Researcher: Okay. Yeah, I mean it’s – I mean I don’t know either of you 
well, I mean at all, but I was like, okay. 
Interviewee: This is politics. 
Researcher: So one, you gave your presentation in Dutch, but then you 
shifted to English when you were confronting [MEP] and then when you 
were debating this particular point – 
Interviewee: Yeah, point because I was annoyed, yeah. 
Researcher: So spell that out for me. You shifted to English because you 
were annoyed, because why? 
Interviewee: I don’t know. 
Researcher: I mean how did the annoyance figure in? 
Interviewee: I think that normally one would speak, in my case Dutch or 
whatever language is your mother tongue, just because it’s also important 
that you express yourself clearly in the right wordings, but you also 
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sometimes feel that because of translation you cannot give the right 
emotion to – you understand – the right emotion to what you’re trying to 
say. So when I get a little bit excited, I might shift to English or even 
French even though it’s not my mother tongue and I make many mistakes, 
but just to have a direct conversation instead of having it translated first 
without the dynamics of my voice, you understand. 
Researcher: Okay. You’re like: I want you to hear that I’m really upset 
right now. 
Researcher: Well, I want them to understand – I don’t really realize when 
I do it to be honest. So I mean this is a Euro bubble and many languages 
are available and it’s easy happens that within one meeting we speak 
French, Dutch, English, German all together, you know. So you just shift. 
Even though you make many mistakes, I couldn’t care less if I’m able to 
express myself in a specific language then we just move forward. 
There is an intriguing mix of practical and discursive consciousness in this MEP’s 
responses.  
The “dynamics of voice,” for instance, are clearly linked with the expression of 
emotion, a non-verbal characteristic that interpreters may or may not mimic.183 This is a 
layperson’s use of the word, voice, referring to the non-verbal quality of sound. Included 
in this instance of use (that is, of saying the word “voice” to label what motivated the 
codeswitch) is a practical use of the metaphor used in the sociolinguistic definition of 
voice, which involves uptake: e.g., “I want them to understand.” The presumption is that 
achieving “understanding” will motivate an uptake of meaning, resulting some kind of 
                                                
183   Community-style sign language interpreters who are professionally certified by the 
Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (US), for instance, are expressly enjoined to 
convey “the tone and intent” of utterances (Hymes’ key), however individual 
practitioners’ skill and ability varies. Conference-style interpreters in the EP are 
often criticized by Members as being ‘flat,’ a criticism that Deaf individuals also 
levy against signed language interpreters who fail to capture the key: those non-
verbal tonal qualities of emotion and attitude. 
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compromise, ideally a compromise that is in line with, or at least closer to, the position 
this MEP proposes should be staked out. 
This particular codeswitch into English appears to be a variation of Scenario B 
(from Table 7 on MEP’s language choice strategies) in which mutual fluency in a shared 
language is not equal however there is a desire to connect not only on the informational 
level but also on the phatic level, i.e., an emotional plane.184 Indeed, as this MEP 
explains, the goal is not avoiding language mistakes, it is to “shift . . . . [so] we just move 
forward.” MEPs frequently do “just shift” (i.e., codeswitch) from one language to another 
in the middle of talking without necessarily realizing that they’re doing so; as admitted by 
that Member, “to be honest.” 
Codeswitching is a pervasive feature of social interaction among Members in the 
EP. Its relative frequency is testimony to both operational elements of the system of SI in 
the EP: the EP Interpreters and the technical infrastructure, that is, the equipment 
programmed and operated by technicians.185 First, the fact that such code switches 
between languages can be done essentially without the Members’ deliberate, conscious 
awareness is an example of practical consciousness (knowing what to do, when to do it, 
and how to do it) that provides evidence of the alertness of the EP Interpreters, who catch 
and respond to these shifts so quickly that Members can perform them practically when 
                                                
184  Phatic communication is the use of language to make contact, not to convey 
information. 
185  Occasionally, Members will shout on the floor without the microphone, particularly 
during hot debate. This can occur in both settings, that is, in the hemicycle under the 
technicians’ control or in the rooms under automatic controls. It is more likely to 
occur in the rooms during Political Group and Committee debates than in the 
hemicycles during plenaries, partly as an effect of jockeying to be the next ‘first 
person’ to talk and trigger the microphone to automatically turn on.  
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they need to, without adding the formal protocol (desired, when possible) of announcing 
a language switch so that everyone can prepare. 
4.4 Simultaneous Interpretation and Social Interaction in the EP (SI2) 
What Members want to hold in awareness is the content of the legislation they are 
negotiating, not the interpretation process. In fact it is extremely challenging to do both, 
simultaneously. When the evidence of intercultural communication arises because of the 
language choices of their colleagues or the inevitable (although minimal, percentage-
wise) errors of interpreters, the established discourse tends toward complaint: 
highlighting perceived dangers, risks, and losses of interpreted communication. Not 
evident in discursive consideration is acknowledgment of the basis of comparison. 
“Danger,” “risk,” and “loss” are measured against a non-existent ideal: the 
presumed absence of comparable risks, losses or dangers in shared language 
communication. While I was engaged in fieldwork, I referred to this as ‘monolingual’ 
interaction using a lingua franca or shared language. This confused people who 
understood themselves as multilingual even if they were using a common language in a 
given communication event. Eventually, I came to think of the basis of comparison as a 
bias for homolingual communication: the preference to communicate in the same 
language rather than in a different language. See Table 11. 
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Table 11. Distinguishing “lingual” terms  
Monolingual Intralingual Homolingual 
A person who knows one 
language 
Communication among people in 
one language (the same language) 
A preference for communicating 
in the same language 
A constant in terms of time & 
space (unless/until learn another 
language). 
Also a form of identity. 
Activity of communication in a 
specific instance. Time-bound. 
Refers to the language not the 
person. Objectifies language as 
external from use, as if language 
“exists” on its own without people. 
Description of language use in a 
given space and time. 
METAPHOR for “the same 
language” — a jargon, set of 
values, common mission, etc. 
Multilingual Interlingual Pluralingual 
A person who knows two or 
more languages with some 
reasonable degree of fluency. 
Also a form of identity. 
Activity, in a specific instance, of 
communication involving two 
languages that are understood to 
be different. Time-bound. Refers 
to the language not the person. 
Objectifies language as external to 
use, as if language “exists” on its 
own without people. 
Use of more than one language 
in a given space and time. 
Descriptive. 
 
While maintaining and promoting multilingualism in Europe is the stated goal of 
EU language policy, the system of SI in the EP seems designed to erase linguistic 
differences by creating the illusion of interacting in the same language. The evidence of a 
culturally-constructed homolingual illusion is evident from the discourse, embodied in 
the practices of social interaction already identified (with more to come), and arises from 
the capabilities of electronic and digital technology. 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONFERENCE INTERPRETATION AS A TRANSLATION MACHINE 
5.1 Distinctions of SI in the EP 
Different types of simultaneous interpretation are encountered by Members in 
various settings in the Parliament, from the high-profile SI during Plenaries to 
individualized whispering (generally referred to by the French label, chucotage) that may 
occur if, for instance, Members travel on Delegations to other countries. Most MEPs 
seem to learn ‘what to do’ and ‘how to do it’ by observation and experimentation. 
“Theoretically everything is okay but practically,” explains an MEP from ‘old’ Europe, 
I have to find a way to speak differently in my own language. When we 
start working here, translation [sic] requires a different way of talking, 
you have to account for [it]—speaking short and friendly for the 
translation [sic]. If it is too complex the message will not pass through. 
(OM20) 
Members were very reflective when asked direct questions about the interpreting, but in 
general the discourse works to discourage giving much attention to the system of SI in 
the EP. The system of use is “not so clear at first,” says an MEP from ‘new’ Europe. “It 
becomes clearer over time” (NM02). 
Overall, the system of SI in the EP can be understood as “a colossal machine” 
(OM66). At the hub of this machine are 
the technicians, the fellows dressed in blue, they make the whole system 
run. They are the twenty-fourth box: the engineers. Suddenly it happens, 
the voice stops and you don’t get the interpretation. Suddenly there is 
silence. Psst! (OM57) 
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While speaking, the Member gestures as if he’s using a screwdriver. From the 
technician’s perspective, however, “For the Members, the machine doesn’t exist…They 
know that there are interpreters, but they don’t know there’s a machine, so they don’t 
realize that there’s a machine between the interpreters and the person” (F12). The 
invisibility of the technology contributes to “a tendency to treat the interpreter 
instrumentally” (F04), such as in this Member’s description: “It is automatic 
interpretation.” He points as if to each interpreter booth. “I speak in Greek, it goes to the 
English pivot, to the French interpreter, to the French colleague” (OM24). 
From the Members’ point-of-view, 
There are two kinds of meetings: the whole series of official meetings, of 
which the translators [sic] are base, and, parallel, hundreds of small 
meetings, not for everybody—[mainly] Members with the larger 
languages. These are not translated [sic]. For the big, official meetings, in 
the first minutes of the planning meeting we decide which languages—
roughly 50% with translation [sic] and 50% directly—so we’re not losing 
the time for interpreting. In the small meetings, Frangleis works very well. 
On the second part, informal networks are created. We know who we can 
communicate with…of course, some of the Members are completely 
excluded, in a way marginalized. Both realities are true, both are real. In 
the second [smaller] one, the people discuss several languages, this 
expression you know in one language, this expression in another. It is 
typical of the nobles, not the spectacle to show how he is prepared, but 
that this is the better expression. (OM20) 
Questions of marginalization, the use of lingua francas, “the better expression” (diction), 
and “losing the time” are themes that recur frequently in the discourse and will be 
examined more closely later. Of note now is the salient division between formal meetings 
in which interpreting is provided as a matter of course, and informal meetings in which 
interpreting is rarely if ever provide (historically and certainly during the time period of 
this research). Politically, “an effective Member is one who can play at all levels” 
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(OM66), encompassing the most and least formal, including meetings with no 
interpretation as well as those guaranteed to provide it. The different demands of social 
interaction in these two opposite communication infrastructures drive the tensions in the 
overall discourse about SI in the EP. 
For the technician, the interpreting machine is more finely distinguished by the 
setting and roles of participants. The setting is either in the hemicycle Plenaries, that is, 
“in the ‘cycle;” or “in the room” for the Political Groups and Standing Committees. 
Participants’ roles are essentially binary: there are the interpreters “in the booth” and the 
Members “on the floor.” The first two sections of this chapter will describe the two main 
settings for formal interpreting (hemicycles, meeting rooms) and the subsequent two 
sections will describe the two main roles from the technological and geographic vantage 
points (interpreters in the booth; Members on the floor). The rest of this chapter will 
elaborate “the human problem” (F12) by mapping the discursive tensions about 
intercultural, simultaneously-interpreted communication in the EP. 
The representative diversity of MEPs who participated in this research is 
quantified in Tables 12 and 13. Table 12 shows the range of political party membership 
and Table 13 shows the spread of national identities. The highest participation is from the 
center-right party, which was the largest political group in the EP during the 6th term 
(2004-2009). The random sample of self-selected volunteers in this research is 
proportional to the size of each political group in the Parliament (indicated by rank). 
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Table 12. Political Party Memberships of Participating MEPs 
Ranking by 
number of seats 
won (of 785) in 
elections 
Political Party Membership of Participating MEPs / # of 
participating Members 
Position 
in 
Political 
Spectrum 
1st  (288) European People’s Party – European Democrats (EPP-ED) 18 center-
right 
2nd (217) Party of European Socialists (PSE)  14 left 
3rd (104) Alliance of Democrats and Liberals for Europe (ALDE) 11 right 
4th (43) Greens – European Free Alliance (Greens-EFA) 5 center-left 
to left 
5th (41) European United Left – Nordic Green Left (GUE-NGL) 4 far left 
6th  (40) United for Europe of the Nations (UEN) 1 far right 
7th  (30) Independence/Democracy (IND/DEM) 1 far right 
8th  (22) Non-Attached Members 0* (mostly) 
far right 
*One appointment was scheduled but the Member did not appear. 
 
Table 13. Member States of Participating MEPs 
Member States of the European Union represented by participating MEPs 
1. Belgium 14. Latvia 
2. Bulgaria 15. Lithuania 
3. Cyprus 16. Luxembourg 
4. Czech Republic 17. Malta 
5. Denmark 18. The Netherlands 
6. Estonia 19. Poland 
7. Finland 20. Portugal 
8. France 21. Romania 
9. Germany 22. Slovakia 
10. Greece 23. Spain 
11. Hungary 24. Sweden 
12. Ireland 25. United Kingdom 
13. Italy   
*Appointments were scheduled with one MEP each from Austria and Slovenia. The former was a no show 
and the latter appointment was missed by the researcher. 
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5.1.1 SI “In The Hemicycle” 
The microphone conference capacity of the electronic technology is used in all the 
meetings, but differently during the plenary sessions. The plenaries are important to 
Members because “that’s when one has the most audience” (F05). Members give one-
minute speeches that are broadcast to national audiences back home. These overtly 
political speeches are nearly always delivered in the MEP’s national language. 
Technicians are monitoring “24 booths with four interpreters and 22 languages spoken . . 
. . [and] all the languages are in real-time translated [sic] in all the languages” (F12). 
Intriguingly, the technicians are in control of the communication during the hemicycles. 
This is accomplished by putting the conference microphones into what is called operator 
mode. 
In the hemicycle, the Members know when they have to speak and how 
long they can speak. They have one minute or one half minute speaking 
time. The President has to have the complete control of what’s going on. 
Nobody is able to turn on his microphone and say, “No, I don’t like what 
he’s talking about,” or things like that. (F12) 
From the technical point of view, Plenaries are “contained” and the participation 
of Members is “programmed” (F12). When the system is “in operator mode nobody … 
can do anything, just do a request…only [the technician] can give him the microphone” 
(F12). The only exception is the President running the meeting, who “has full control of 
his button…He can always open or close his microphone and can always close another 
microphone” (F12). The reasons for this level of operator control is to prevent the 
automatic functions of the system from allowing someone to break the rules. Specifically, 
“in the hemicycle they don’t debate,” instead “everything is arranged before the meeting” 
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(F12). This programming includes knowing which languages will be spoken, when and 
by whom: 
Interviewee: Interpreters know before the meetings that’s what they will 
have to translate [sic] in those languages for that speaker, because every 
speaker is programmed… in any ‘cycle, every speaker we know at what 
time what speaker will talk about what. 
Researcher: Right. So then the interpreters aren’t surprised. They know 
the Hungarian guy is coming up. 
Interviewee: Yes. 
Researcher: And then they’ve already decided; they already know who’s 
working… 
Interviewee: Yes, everything is arranged before the meeting. (F12) 
These Plenary sessions are ‘the glitz’ of the European Parliament’s system of 
simultaneous interpretation. 
The main hemicycle at Strasbourg is an impressive circular room filled with 
semicircular rows of 750 blue desks, a grey carpet, grey-black chairs and white lighted 
walls with a softly-glowing sheen. The interpreters’ booths, along with technicians’ and 
media booths, are placed in two horizontal rows evenly-spaced between floor and the 
ceiling, appearing like long slits in a spaceship along the curved, shiny walls. Interpreters 
are visible in internally-lighted booths. Depending upon the angle of viewing, the glass of 
unlit booths is opaque or reflective. Galleries for the press, visitors and other observers 
ring the top. The new hemicycle in Brussels is equally elegant. It is “much nicer” (F13) 
than the previous facility. 
The one-minute speeches are “a talk for the record, not to be understood [by other 
Members]. I am speaking to constituents, not to Members” (OM08). After the speeches 
there is discussion (that is called ‘debate’) but “it is not debate, its just monologues. You 
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may include questions but they don’t have to respond, only if they feel like it” (OM42). 
The ‘debate’ after the speeches is also programmed. Plenaries are organized as a public 
presentation to an international audience. They are for Members “to be heard by 
constituents” (OM33). “Debate in Plenary is not really a creative process, [although] 
Members might make important statements that give you insight to dig deeper with those 
in charge” (OM61). The highly-regulated conditions of social interaction are what make 
Plenary so convenient for functional linguistic research.186 
The reference to ‘those in charge’ refers to the clearly-defined decision-making 
hierarchy of designing legislation that is conducted by the European Parliament: the 
Parliament’s institutional competence, in the parlance of the European Union. “The 
[Political Group] Coordinators are the main players—they decide what proposals to take, 
who will be the Rapporteur, and how to organize the debate” (OM20). Likewise, “in 
Committees, the political procedure is in the hands of very few people—the Rapporteurs 
and Shadows. All the conclusions are made elsewhere [than in the Plenary]” (OM61). 
                                                
186  Vuorikoski (2004) cites Marzocchi and Zuchetto (1997) in support of her selection 
of plenary for her study. “The plenary seems…to provide suitable conditions for 
research,” (Marzocchi and Zuchetto, 1997, p. 82) for the reasons they outline 
(professional recognition and intensity of effort by European Parliament interpreters) 
and also because the plenary session of the European Parliament is an ideal speech 
situation for functional linguistic research based on comparing target text 
interpretations with original source material. Drawing on Kalina, 1998, p. 130), 
Vuorikoski reports, “obtaining relevant and authentic material has been a major 
problem for SI studies.” She continues:  “One solution to these problems has been to 
select a speech situation which is characterized by features that remain constant. This 
is the plenary session of the European Parliament, where the speech situation is 
governed by strict rules of procedure. Furthermore, each speech is interpreted in ten 
languages. The setting is thus a source for material that provides an ideal opportunity 
for comparing interpreters’ versions with the originals” (2004, p. 22). Note: her 
research was conducted previous to the “big bang” enlargement. 
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The label of conference interpreting suits the Plenary setting very well. In Plenary 
sessions, the Members talk about issues and politics, making a show of debating with 
each other. While there may be ideological or practical messages delivered to colleagues 
(the other Members) during Plenaries, the speech performances are explicitly in each 
MEPs official language for national consumption at home more than for actual 
interaction with their peers in the hemicycle. The lines of debate and compromise 
regarding legislation are hashed out “elsewhere” in (less formal) Working Groups and 
Trialogues. The lines of real engagement for debate and negotiation are confirmed in the 
formal Political Group and Standing Committee meetings that occur “in the room,” not 
“in the ‘cycle.” 
5.1.2 SI “In The Room” 
In contrast with the glamorous hemicycles designed as the public showcase of the 
European Parliament, the Political Groups and Standing Committees do their work in 
large meeting rooms. “In the rooms it’s different because every group has his room or 
rooms, and in the room they debate” (F12).187 The conference microphone system is used 
in the rooms similarly to how they are used in plenary but the interaction of Members is 
much more fluid. “In the other [non-plenary] rooms, there’s no programmation of the 
speaker, so they debate…so number 116 talks to this one and asks a question. [Number 
116] answers. It’s a relay debate” (F12). The two significant differences between SI in 
the hemicycle and SI in the room involve control and interaction. Technically speaking, 
                                                
187  Notice that this section is composed of quotes from technicians, not Members. 
Remember that Members do not tend refer to “rooms” or “hemicycles” but rather to 
the types of meetings: “Committee,” “Group,” or “Plenary.” 
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whereas the technician functionally controls turn-taking via operator mode in the ‘cycle; 
in the room, the microphones run on a First On First Off (FIFO) system, with which “up 
‘til four Member’s microphones can be on simultaneously in the meeting room” (F37). It 
is practically an inverse relationship of interpersonal interaction with technological 
control: in the Plenary, a rigid schedule of turn-taking and time limits is enforced by a 
technical engineer according to a pre-designed script; in the Group and Committee 
meetings, the social interaction is managed by technology running on a kind of auto-pilot 
with minimal override. 
I observed Political Group Meetings nine times (the EPP four times; ALDE three 
times; the Greens and GUE twice each, and the PSE and IND-DEM once apiece, see 
Table 14) and Committee meetings fourteen times; as well as several formal Working 
Groups, seminars, book launches and pre-Committee meeting Coordinators’ Meetings 
(see Table 14). I tracked which booths were staffed with interpreters and what languages 
were spoken by Members on the floor. To determine the language, I would channel surf 
with my headset to find which booth was not working during a given Member’s turn. I 
took as evidence when the speaker’s voice from the floor was piped through that 
language channel. A technician explained, “by default every time the floor—for the 
moment no interpreters are speaking, on every channel you get the floor” (F12). 
Depending upon what channel a Member (or guest or assistant or any person with 
business in the room) is listening to, if that booth is working you hear the interpreter. If 
the booth is not working, “the system will switch on the floor” (F12). For the first several 
months, I relied on this method without question because the languages associated with 
each channel are fixed and the geographical booth numbering matches the channels. 
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(Review Table 4.) Then I learned that the technicians can “re-affect the programming of 
each geographic booth. So for the speaker it’s completely invisible and the interpreters 
are in another booth” (F12). I observed this when it became ‘visible’ during a meeting of 
Working Group C of the EPP-ED188 when the Chair responded with good humor to a 
complaint from Members on the floor: 
There is no Greek translation coming from the Danish booth, this is 
wonderful. The Danish interpreters? The Greek members are happy? You 
can speak Danish? The Danish interpreters have moved to the Greek box! 
This is becoming wonderful! 
Such a switch might happen because the interpreters “would prefer being in front, have a 
better view or things like that” (F12). 
The descriptions to follow represent relatively mundane examples of these 
meetings in order to establish the baseline, a fairly-normal pattern of intercultural 
communication using the formal provision of simultaneous interpretation in the regime of 
controlled multilingualism. In the Political Group observation, there was one particularly 
sharp exchange which, in retrospect, illustrated an unusual and striking shift in the 
dynamics of language use that opens insight into some of the factors motivating 
Member’s language use choices. 
                                                
188  Working Group C was the Legal and Home Affairs Sub-Committee of the European 
Peoples Party - European Democrats. See Table 12 for a list of political party 
acronyms. 
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Table 14. Types of Observations—General 
Type of Observation 
(excludes Asylum dossier meetings) 
“in the room” 
= 
FIFO System* 
“in the 
hemicycle” 
= 
Operator 
System 
No SI provided 
Dalai Lama’s speech***  X  
Plenary (Strasbourg)****  X  
EuroParl TV Studio   X 
Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET)  X   
AFET  X   
AFET X   
LUFPIG (intergroup)   X 
COCOBU (Coordinators)   X 
EPP-ED Group Seminar: “What Values to 
Promote in Europe?” 
X   
Euro Crisis Workshop   X 
Greens Political Group X   
Book Presentation X   
Environment Committee (ENVI) X   
Employment Committee (EMPL) X   
EPP-ED Working Group C X   
Baltic Intergroup   X 
EPP-ED Political Group X   
Plenary (Strasbourg)  X  
Industry, Research and Energy Committee 
(ITRE) 
X   
ITRE  X   
PSE Political Group  X   
Plenary  X  
EPP-ED Coordinators Meeting X   
EPP-ED Political Group X   
ALDE Political Group X   
ALDE Working Group B X   
GUE Political Group X   
IND-DEM Political Group X   
Baltic Intergroup   X 
Book Launch  X   
Baltic Intergroup   X 
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Type of Observation 
(excludes Asylum dossier meetings) 
“in the room” 
= 
FIFO System* 
“in the 
hemicycle” 
= 
Operator 
System 
No SI provided 
Greens Political Group X   
ALDE Political Group X   
Plenary  X  
Press Conference: E-Learning for 
Interpreters 
X   
GUE Political Group X   
The Kurdish Question (special meeting) Informal interpretation provided by a non-professional. 
*In FIFO, all floor and interpreter microphones function according to the First On First Off principle, with 
up to four microphones active at a time. Whoever is first to speak gets the floor. The Chairperson can turn 
off all microphones with a single switch. Language channels for listening are permanently established. 
Programming determines whether the language heard through the headset comes from the floor or the 
channel’s designated interpretation booth. Members can switch channels in order to listen to the language 
they prefer. 
** In Operator Mode, all microphones are controlled by a technician who is following the directions of the 
Chairperson who is running the meeting. 
*** Watched via EuroParl TV from an MEP’s office. 
**** Observed from inside an interpretation booth. 
5.1.2.1 Example: A Political Group 
During this Political Group meeting, twenty booths were staffed: German, 
English, French, Italian, Dutch, Greek, Spanish, Portuguese, Finnish, Swedish, Czech, 
Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Hungarian, Polish, Slovakian, Slovenian, Bulgarian, and 
Romanian. Danish and Maltese interpretation was not provided. All booths were active in 
the beginning of the meeting, but a check partway through discovered that the Lithuanian 
booth had stopped interpretation. This was confirmed again at a later time. At one point, 
it also seemed the Romanian booth may have stopped as well, but this was short-term if 
at all. (It is always possible that a few booths are staffed with interpreter-trainees (if no 
one present requires that language); and (as noted above) sometimes a geographic booth 
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may be staffed by interpreters working a different language than the one normally 
associated with that channel (but the language channel they are working on would remain 
the same to avoid confusion for Members on the floor. These factors introduce the 
potential of researcher fallibility regarding language identifications and counts.) 
With only one exception, each Member spoke their national language. There were 
two Chairs (or a Chair and Vice-Chair) whose voices are interspersed between turns of 
Members from the floor. One consistently spoke German and the other French. Most of 
their contributions were logistical, simply rote thank you’s at the conclusion of a 
speaker’s turn and introduction of the next speaker. Nearly every single speaker’s turn 
was done in a different language and no one seemed to miss a beat in terms of the 
ongoing continuity of communication. Dutch (NL, using the International Standards 
Office (ISO) Language Codes, see Table 4) was the first language I recorded for tracking 
purposes during this meeting. The subsequent 69 turns (70 in total) went like this: 
NL, DE (German, for Deutsch), NL, DE, FR (French), EN (English), FR, 
DE, EN, DE, EN, DE, EN, DE, ES (Spanish, for Espanol), DE, FR, EN, 
IT (Italian), DE, IT, FR, DE, ES, FR, DE, RO (Romanian), ES, DE, ES, 
FR, EN, ES, EN, DE, ES, NL, EN, FR, DE, FR, EN, FR, EN, FR, EN, 
FR, ES, FR, ES, FR, EN, FR, DE, FR, DE, FR, EL (Greek, a translation 
of their script), EN, FR, DE, ES, DE, ES, FR, EN, FR, NL, EN, FR. 
Eight of the twenty languages that SI was provided for were spoken from the floor. 
These eight source languages were simultaneously-interpreted into all twenty 
target languages provided for by the SI system of controlled multilingualism, which 
means customized to the language profile of known participants who would listen to the 
interpretation into their national language during the meeting. (“Provided that people 
listen…that’s another matter” (OM42). Listening behavior and headphone use are a 
recurring theme in the overall discourse that will be described later.) The source 
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languages spoken by Members during this political group meeting are ranked by amount 
of use from the floor, given as an approximate percentage of the total observation time of 
105 minutes, from opening gavel until the conclusion of the meeting. I estimated the 
length of speakers’ turns in minutes. (See Table 15.) The goal was not to nail down an 
exact measurement with the precision of seconds but to be able to provide a general 
characterization of a typical meeting in a room. 
Table 15. Languages Spoken from “The Floor” during a Political Group Meeting 
“In a Room” 
Language Spoken by an MEP 
“in the room” 
Total Minutes this language 
was spoken in this meeting 
(in minutes) 
Percentage of Meeting Time 
(105 minutes, total) 
Spanish 36 34% 
German 31 29% 
English 19 18% 
Dutch 7 4% 
French 3 3% 
Italian 3 3% 
Greek 3 3% 
Romanian 2 2% 
 
The frequency of use of languages is a function of the language profiles of 
Members in the Group, the relevancy of the topics to national constituencies, and the 
distribution of positions of status among Members (namely the Rapporteur and Shadow 
Rapporteur positions although of course any other Members with political interests in the 
subject can, and do, contribute). Such variables preclude any possibility of this particular 
breakdown (or any other breakdown from one meeting or plenary session) being 
representative of language use in the Parliament overall. Also, to re-emphasize: the 
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percentages of source languages spoken from the floor demonstrate only one side of the 
SI system. 
The other side of the system involves the interpretations rendered by the 
interpreters into all the languages required for listening comprehension. In this case, 
100% of the time of the meeting for the twelve languages that were not spoken from the 
floor (except, as noted above, Lithuanian. The Member may have been going back-and-
forth between two concurrently-scheduled meetings); and, for the eight languages that 
were spoken as source languages, 100% minus the time that their language was in use by 
a Member on the floor. For example, the Spanish booth worked 66% of the meeting 
(interpreting from any of the other seven source languages into their target language), 
while the Greek and Italian booths each worked 97% of the time (also interpreting from 
any of the other seven source languages into their respective target language). In this 
particular meeting, I did not detect either a retour or a relay.189 
My first visual scan about five minutes after I settled in discerned roughly one 
third of the MEPs present wearing their headphones. Some time later, as more Members 
arrived and the debate heated up, approximately half of the sixty-two MEPs present were 
using headphones. Unless I had interviewed them, I did not know the MEPs’ language 
profiles. The guest and assistant section seats are not positioned in a way to see “the 
nameplate…[which] says which language—and the officials have a list” (F30).190 It was 
                                                
189   Recall: Retour is to interpret from the booth’s language into another language 
(untraditional). Relay is when an intermediary interpretation is needed to 
accommodate a language combination that none of the interpreters assigned for a 
particular meeting possesses. 
190  It may have helped to acquire this list but it was a resource I did not imagine existed 
and learned about long after I had established an observation protocol. 
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not possible to assume whether the two-thirds to half of Members without headphones 
were fluent in all the languages used, disinterested in the topic being debated, or satisfied 
to understand some colleagues and not others. (As mentioned above, more on Member 
use and non-use of headphones to come.) 
Throughout this meeting, the system of simultaneous interpretation worked without 
any discernable problems. Of special significance is that serious battle was engaged 
vigorously and aggressively by several Members in two opposed camps on a particular 
referendum. A long-time Member (on one side of the argument) told me a month later, “it 
was the worst I’ve ever seen” (OM44). Another MEP (from the other side of this argument) 
grinned expansively when I asked him nearly three weeks later if he remembered the 
details of the exchange: “I remember it well!” (NM27). The fact of simultaneous 
interpretation did not diminish Members’ pleasure in political banter and repartee. 
5.1.2.1.1 English: A Language for Control? 
I first noticed the use of English as a language of control in a Political Group 
meeting. English, French and Italian were the main languages used on the floor (as source 
languages for the interpretation into other languages). This Group meeting (in the room) 
was called to order in English, and once most Members were paying attention the 
Chairperson switched to speaking in French. Later, when there was a spurt of quick 
interjections and repartee, the Chair shifted back to English and continued in English, as 
did Members speaking from the floor. This persisted until the burst of heightened 
interaction was contained. English was used a third time in the group to overcome a 
rising tide of murmurs that swelled into the background during a Member’s somewhat 
lengthy turn (compared with the average time spent speaking by Members prior). 
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This last occurrence was the one that caught and focused my attention on the 
codeswitching to English, because it was the first time I heard this Vice-Chairperson use 
English instead of Italian. This Vice-Chairperson had already spoken several times, 
consistently in Italian. It was a surprise and clearly a departure from the norm when this 
Member used English with an accompanying increase in volume to quiet the growing 
background murmur. It seemed to be the English as much or moreso than the volume that 
drew everyone back to the central, shared task. Once noticed, I observed this 
phenomenon repeatedly in all kinds of meetings (both in the rooms and in the 
hemicycles). English is used regularly in an authoritative bid to command attention. 
In a different meeting (a Working Group of one of the Standing Committees), a 
Spanish MEP “lost her temper” (as explained to me later by an MEP who witnessed the 
event) “and shouts at” (OM66) a Member who had interrupted somebody else with a 
Point of Order. The Member (who typically speaks Spanish) burst out in English, 
referring to herself in third person: “She agrees with that!” This dramatic codeswitch 
drew attention to a compromise that some Members [according to my source] were not 
letting on was possible. Repeatedly I observed English used to interrupt flows of 
communication occurring in other languages or to draw everyone’s focus to an particular 
assertion of voice. This tactic was used Members accorded authority to facilitate the 
meeting by virtue of their position/status (being a Chair or Vice-Chair) and by Members 
from the floor trying to establish a rhetorical position. 
5.1.2.2 The Committees 
As mentioned earlier, the bulk of the work of the European Parliament is 
organized through the institutionalized organization of formal Committees. The Standing 
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Committees, their permanent administrative staff (called Secretariats), and their 
competencies (areas of expertise and responsibility) persist as the EP’s bureaucratic 
infrastructure, while the Political Groups change in composition, alliances, and strategies 
from election to election. I was invited to observe the work of five different Committees, 
including sub-committee Working Groups and Coordinators’ meetings. The Foreign 
Affairs Committee detailed below seemed routine. Observations of the Committee on 
Employment and Social Affairs (EMPL), the Environment, Public Health and Food 
Safety (ENVI), Industry, Research and Energy Committee (ITRE) and the Civil Liberties, 
Justice and Home Affairs Committee (LIBE) all yielded a similar pattern. 
5.1.2.2.1 Foreign Affairs Committee Meetings 
The Foreign Affairs Committee (AFET) is one of the larger Standing Committees 
in the European Parliament. I observed a series of meetings during one week at the 
Brussels Parliament complex. AFET Committee Meetings are streamed through the 
Parliament’s internal television system for Members and their Assistants to track from 
their offices and for journalists to watch from the Press Bar. Soundbites may later be 
broadcast over the internet. From my observer position seated in the room (specifically in 
the visitor’s section on the floor), the technical orchestration of the system of 
simultaneous interpretation (i.e., the regime of controlled multilingualism) was seamless. 
Twenty-three languages were actively interpreted: 21 of the 23 official EU languages 
(except Irish and Maltese) and two non-EU languages as well: Tajik and Russian. The 
President of the Republic of Tajikistan, Emomalii Rahmon, brought his own (solo) 
interpreter, and Mr. Konstantin Kosachev from the Russian Duma brought a team of 
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interpreters. The use of relay and retour during this AFET meeting did not seem to 
generate any disturbances within the communication dynamics of the group as a whole. 
Per my fieldwork protocol, I noted what languages were used, and (roughly) for how 
long. See Table 16. As with the other similar tables, all measurements and calculations 
are approximate. Of the total time, 7% was given to non-EU languages (Russian & 
Tajik), while 23% was given to official EU languages other than English. If the two non-
EU languages are removed, then the ratio of English to all other official EU languages in 
this meeting was 3:1 (75% to 25%). 
Only Members have microphones but everyone on the floor has access to their 
own set of headphones: Members, Assistants and Visitors. Some regular participants do 
bring their own earphones. (I was in some observations where there were more people 
than seats; I always tried to arrive early in order to secure a seat with headphones.) There 
were 27 booths available for use in the largest rooms: when a Member begins to speak in 
a language you do not know, you simply tune your headphones to the channel number of 
the language booth to which you prefer to listen (review Table 4). Members have 
preferences and reasons for selecting an interpreted language for listening, depending on 
their own language repertoire, levels of fluency, motivation for language learning and 
overall experience with the system. For instance, Members learn which interpreters, 
whom they recognize by voice, and/or booths (according to reputation) tend to produce 
performances that meet their listening criteria). “At a certain moment, you know Mr A is 
better than Mrs X or Mrs B is best with that combination” (OM09).191 
                                                
191 This Member’s observation contradicts Vuorikoski’s statement that “it is practically 
impossible to tell the various interpreters apart” (2004, p. 22). 
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Table 16. Languages Spoken from “The Floor” during a series of AFET 
Committee meetings “In a Room” 
Language Spoken by an MEP 
“in the room” 
Total Minutes this language 
was spoken in this meeting 
(in minutes) 
Percentage of Meeting Time 
(510 minutes, total) 
English 346 70% 
Nederlands 30 5.8% 
Tajik 20 3.9% 
French 19 3.7% 
German 17 3.3% 
Polish 17 3.3% 
Russian 16 3.1% 
Greek 10 2% 
Spanish 10 2% 
Hungarian 3.5 .7% 
Lithuanian 3.5 .7% 
Slovenian 3.5 .7% 
Danish 2 .4% 
Estonian 2 .4% 
Romanian 2 .4% 
Swedish 2 .4% 
Bulgarian 0 0% 
Czech 0 0% 
Finnish 0 0% 
Italian 0 0% 
Latvian 0 0% 
Portuguese 0 0% 
Slovak 0 0% 
 
All of the interpreters, as observed on a consistent basis without exception, are in 
their booths ready to go at the scheduled start times, and none of them bolt out at the 
end—even when meetings go over the announced end time (which happens 
occasionally). When there were unplanned recesses or the meeting ended early, there was 
likewise no rush to get out of the booth. This professionalism generates a sense of the 
interpreters enjoying their work, their colleagues, and the atmosphere. 
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5.2 The Technological Hub: Two Synchronized but Separate Systems 
Completely separate from the Member’s use of the conference microphone 
system for speaking is the “interpretation system” used by the Parliament’s interpreters in 
their respective language booths. In combination, the two systems compose the global 
system of technology for SI in the EP. 
Table 17. Discursive Relations among Geographic References 
 Geographic Reference 
Phrase used in discourse “on the floor” or “from the floor”* “in the booth” 
“in the room” “in the ‘cycle” or “in the 
hemicycle” 
*Includes utterances from the Chair, Vice-Chair and other participants at the head table (Secretariat staff, 
guests, etc). 
5.2.1 SI “In The Booth” 
The interpretation systems runs on the automatic setting that is never used with 
the conference microphone system. It involves two channels, A and B. Channel A is 
fixed as the outgoing language for that booth. Channel B is programmable by each 
interpreter, individually, if they will be responsible for giving retour interpretations. 
Depending on the size of the meeting room or hemicycle there may be one to three dozen 
booths. Each booth is equipped with three or four consoles (also called a “desk”) with 
inputs for the interpreter’s headset),192 a channel knob, and an array of pre-sets for 
interpreters to select incoming languages from other booths that he or she predicts may be 
useful or even necessary. Channel A is the outgoing language: the interpreters are always 
                                                
192   “If I would be an interpreter,” a technician said, “I would have my own 
headphone…because I don’t know how many ears have been on this headphone” 
(F12). Most interpreters do bring their own headsets (F36). 
254 
working into Channel A to be heard by the Members according to the ISO-numbered 
channels on their dial (Table 4). 
In any and every booth, 
the desk is programmed. These are the seven output channels available 
from the desk. So—German, that we can’t change. This is called Channel 
A. So [in this case, German] is the default channel from the booth, the 
same channel as the name, the physical name from the booth. (F12) 
The pre-set buttons allow the interpreter to tune to languages from other booths when 
they do not know the language being spoken by the Member on the floor: 
You [the interpreter] know you will have to work in half an hour to reduce 
[for example] the Hungarian person to German, but you don’t understand 
Hungarian and you know you will have to listen to the English booth 
instead of the floor. So you can arrange your pre-set here to English, and 
when your turn comes you listen to the English instead of the floor. (F12) 
In this example, both retour and relay are occurring. An interpreter in the Hungarian 
booth will be prepared to interpret from Hungarian into English: this is the retour. She or 
he will have pre-programmed Channel B on her or his desk to go out on the English 
Channel (#2) as if coming from the English booth.193 When the Hungarian Member 
begins to speak from the floor, the retour interpreter in the Hungarian booth will press 
Channel B and override the English booth’s Channel A output.194 
                                                
193  “On most consoles, interpreters themselves can define with what channel their B 
coincides…In some of the older meeting rooms, though, it is the technician who 
assigns the channels and who needs to make the switch allowing the Czechs [for 
example] to use the German channel” (F12).  
194  Using a Hungarian Member in this example was spontaneous and arbitrary. This 
particular scenario became more complicated in the 7th term (2009-2014) because of 
the need to incorporate Hungarian Sign Language in the retour and relay.  
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Every booth without an interpreter with competence in Hungarian will also have 
already established an incoming pre-set from the English booth in their respective 
consoles. When the Hungarian Member begins to speak, the working interpreter in these 
booths will select their pre-set to the English booth. Thus, 
the retour interpreter in the Hungarian booth rendering the Hungarian 
speaker into English will be heard by any interpreters in other booths who 
switch from floor to the English channel—by pushing the pre-set button—
and by any listener in the meeting room who is listening to interpretation 
into English. (F36) 
All of the rest of the Members (as well as everyone else in the meeting, Members’ 
Assistants, Secretariat officials, guests and visitors) who do not understand either 
Hungarian or English will wait for the relay. The relay is the second interpretation from 
those booths whose interpreters are depending on the Hungarian booth’s retour into 
English so that they can render an interpretation into their respective languages, be it 
German, Czech, Portuguese, etc. This is just an example, as “the Hungarian booth might 
work into English on Channel B, or they might work into French” (F12). 
Channel B is invisible to the Members. From their perspective, there is only the 
matched pairing of channel numbers and languages managed by one dial. But for the 
interpreters, every booth has the capacity to send out on two channels, default Channel A, 
their assigned language, and Channel B, a retour language. Theoretically, any booth 
could provide a retour. In practice, only interpreters of the so-called exotic languages195 
perform interpretations both into and out of their language. Retour interpreters work for 
                                                
195  The phrase “exotic languages” is used by interpreters to refer to languages that fewer 
interpreters have competence in, compared with more frequent language 
combinations in the professional corps.  
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two audiences: directly for listeners on the floor and for their colleagues to render an 
additional relay interpretation into a third language for listeners on the floor. 
If the retour [of a given language] is into German, the pre-selection for the 
B channel will be the German channel. When retour from Czech into 
German is needed, the retour interpreter [in the Czech booth] will push 
the B button and thereby ‘usurp’ the German channel; i.e. the German 
booth will not be able to ‘send’ from that moment, as their channel is 
occupied by the Czech retour interpreter. (F36) 
That is another example using the same mechanism described above with Hungarian and 
English. Although there is no explicit requirement, “the rules are to translate in English. 
Channel B is normally English, French or German, because these are the three languages 
that are the most understood from every interpreter” (F12). 
In addition to being able to establish up to five or six pre-set incoming languages 
(which are labelled in a small digital screen), the desk/console also indicates the 
interpretation source of the auditory signal that the interpreter is listening to at every 
moment. This is important information for the interpreter to know: “A plus [symbol: + 
]means direct interpretation from the floor” (F12), i.e., that the booth an interpreter has 
chosen to listen to is actually “listening to the floor” (F36). “A minus sign [ - ] means the 
booth is working on relay” (F36). 
A technician said the meaning of the minus sign is: ““Be careful. This 
interpretation is not the first interpretation. It’s a relay’” (F12). This is the example we 
had above, in which a Hungarian Member’s speech is being interpreted via retour from 
the Hungarian booth on the English channel: “if I’m listening to the English booth and 
trying to translate [sic] what comes out from the English booth instead of translating [sic] 
the speaker” (F12) from the floor. In other words, although the signal is being transmitted 
through the English Booth’s Channel A, the interpretation did not originate in the English 
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booth but in the booth of an exotic language (e.g., in our examples the Czech or 
Hungarian booth). 
Finally, a “zero [ 0 ] means the booth is inactive, possibly because its output 
language is being spoken on the floor” (F36). This is the common situation when, for 
instance, a Portuguese Member is speaking from the floor, the Portuguese interpreters are 
just listening. In a rare instance, this technician explained that an interpreter might see a 
double minus [ -- ], to indicate a double relay, say from Romanian to French to English to 
Latvian (F16). “An X means ‘they are listening to themselves.’ We can listen to ourselves 
to check the headphones or to check the microphone. The system permits that” (F12). 
The controls available to interpreters are the same in the rooms and in the 
hemicycles. In the hemicycle/Plenary meetings, interpreters are provided with the 
program and know exactly the sequence in which everyone will speak and in which 
language. In the rooms, the interpreters receive no information about which Members 
will be present, nor when they might speak. In the rooms “there is no programmation of 
the speaker, so they debate” (F12). In other words, the interaction is spontaneous, not 
planned as it is in the Plenaries. One interpreter expressed the wish for more detailed 
information about Members’ presence and participation in the meetings. “We can only 
bring our own list of Members belonging to the Committee, Delegation, or Political 
Group…or look it up on the intranet or internet…normally we do not receive a list of 
MEPs who will attend the meeting” (F36). 
The difference, therefore, between the environmental conditions and settings for 
interpreting ‘in the ‘cycle’ and ‘in the room’ is quite significant. Even during debate ‘in 
the hemicycles’ for Plenary sessions, the Members’ communication is directed ‘outward’ 
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to national audiences as political representation and public relations. Because of the 
nature of mass communication, plenary programs are carefully coordinated. ‘In the 
rooms,’ however, Members’ communication is directed ‘inward’ towards each other and 
the products of the Parliament, which is legislation. The ramifications for the interpreters 
‘in the booth’ are profound: 
So the Czech member speaks Czech, usually, 99 percent of the time. 
There are some Members – I speak about Daniel Cohn-Bendit.196 I don’t 
know if you know him. He’s German and French and he speaks both 
languages as well. So sometimes he speaks German; sometimes he speaks 
French. It depends on who he’s talking to. So if he’s talking to another 
Member that understands French, he speaks French. So the interpreters, 
one time it’s the French booth that works and one time the German booth. 
(F12) 
Although it can be rough at the start of a term, the interpreters do learn Members’ 
language profiles and speaking preferences, as well as their rhetoric al tendencies. 
5.2.2 SI “On The Floor” 
From the technician’s perspective, a Member 
can’t do errors. I don’t know how. The only error they can do is take the 
headphone and trying to change his channel and it doesn’t work, of 
course, because he doesn’t have the headphone connected to the correct 
selector. That’s the only error, but he can’t make errors and he isn’t aware 
of what’s going on in technical. He just has to know he has to speak in 
this microphone, not too far from the microphone and not too close to the 
microphone. (F12) 
It may have been a technician’s programming error in the confusion (described above) of 
the Danish booth working physically out of the Greek booth. Sometimes I observed 
Members begin to speak and their microphones did not activate. Occasionally Members 
                                                
196  Not interviewed as a participant in this research. 
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would continue to speak even though the microphone was not working. Interpreters 
cannot hear from within the booth and are thus unable to interpret for Members who are 
not familiar with the language that Member is speaking. 
Human error can also enter the system with the interpreters’ programming of the 
desks. For instance, “they have the possibility to connect their headphone” (F12) in “two 
official jacks [pointing at them on the desk]…that they’re supposed to use…but 
sometimes, I don’t know why, they prefer to connect [pointing to another spot]… So they 
disconnect this wire that sends the signal” (F12). This physical manipulation can create a 
cascade effect: 
So [interpreters in the booth] turn the desk and that pulls on the wires and 
sometimes creates bad contacts. You see, if I disconnect this desk I will 
also – so this system is connected on one bus. That’s a digital bus. On one 
bus we can connect ten desks. So instead of connecting these four and 
these four that make eight and two in another booth, we connected two, 
two, two, two….So if there’s a crash on one booth there are still two other 
desks remaining in the booth. So that’s just a reason to secure a bit more 
the system, because every desk is connected in a daisy chain. Every ten 
desks are connected in a daisy chain. For example, if the first desk in the 
chain crashes, even if they work, they won’t have the signal anymore…if 
it’s the last desk chain there’s no problem…if it’s the first . . . (F12) 
Speculating on why the interpreters might use the incorrect jack, the technician replied: 
For me, it’s because they don’t know that they can plug the headphone in 
here. On the other system, there was the connector here, so—on the side 
of the booth. So maybe they – I don’t know…usually they did that, so it is 
like . . . . habituated? I don’t know. They do the same thing they did 
before, even if they don’t have to or they don’t need to. (F12) 
From the researcher’s vantage point, I was only aware of a very few glitches that could 
have been attributed to either the technicians or the interpreters. 
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5.2.2.1 Making Human Errors Impossible? 
“If it goes badly,” a technician told me, “it is twenty or ten percent interpreters’ 
errors and the rest is how the meeting is arranged […by…] the technician who is in 
charge of the meeting, he has to react to the situation or adapt the situation in real time” 
(F12). The technicians aspire to be invisible: “When they don’t know I exist, it is that I 
did a good job because there was no problem” (F12). Promoting this degree of 
unawareness for Members is an overt goal of the system of SI in the EP, a kind of 
intentionally-designed unconsciousness. “What the Parliament dreams about is something 
that would work alone…to make human errors impossible” (F12). 
One of the questions that I wondered about, often, is how much the ambition for 
the technology to cocoon the Members so they can work without comprehending the 
significance of the Parliament’s fascinating intercultural communication milieu spills 
over into expectations for the interpreting. Like the technician who said, “there are a lot 
of errors made that could be solved just by knowing how the system works” (F12), I 
wonder if some of the frustrations with interpreting expressed by Members could be 
alleviated if Members understood how the system of SI in the EP works, what it has 
already accomplished, and how it could further achieve the goal of a common European 
identity. 
Although surely an overstatement, one Member explained that “where politics 
happens is everywhere else” (OM40) than within the official, formalized system of SI in 
the EP. 
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5.2.3 Meetings with No Provision of Interpretation 
A significant amount of the legislative work of Members of the European 
Parliament occurs in contexts without professional simultaneous interpretation. 
5.2.3.1 A Coordinator’s Meeting 
I was introduced by the Member who invited me to the Budgetary Control 
Committee (COCUBU) Coordinators Meeting197 as a researcher looking at “how we can 
cope with our language system.” Coordinators’ meetings occur just prior to Committee 
Meetings with the goal of delineating in advance the lines of engagement from each 
political group in the imminent debate. Every political group selects an individual to 
become the group coordinator regarding work being done in each of the Parliament’s 
permanent or temporary working committees. 
In this particular Coordinators’ meeting there were six men and eleven women 
from various countries and the Commission, all speaking English with no simultaneous 
interpretation. The Chair (a position that rotates among the Coordinators – at least in this 
case) provided an overview of the agenda and invited questions and input. Not everyone 
spoke, but of those who did their English was readily understandable despite accents, 
except for one person whose accent became more prominent for a few phrases. In my 
notes, I recorded this incident as “lapsed into thicker accent, hard to follow.” No one 
asked for clarification. This left me wondering if I was the only one who struggled in that 
                                                
197   Quotes are coded differently in this section by randomly-assigned Participant 
Number (P1, P2, etc). No demographic or other identifying information was 
collected. Most of this dialogue is summarized without attribution. 
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moment, or whether there is a culture and criteria as to when one asks and when one does 
not ask to clarify someone’s enunciation. 
One Coordinator provided some background on dynamics between his group’s 
Shadow Rapporteur and the Rapporteur of a Report on security, explaining that there 
appeared to be a deviation from this working group’s customary practice in terms of 
procedures. The current Rapporteur (from a specific political group) was not engaging 
with the Shadows as much as last year’s Rapporteur had, which this Coordinator 
characterized as “strange” (P1). Another topic, regarding a category of lump sum 
payments made to Members as part of their compensation package, was named as “the 
most politically sensitive” (P2). The group jumped among topics occasionally, leaving 
me unclear at times what plan of action was being decided for which problem: the 
security matter itself or the unusual dynamics with the non-conforming Rapporteur? 
A comment about “the hardest topic” (P3) seemed to refer to the dilemma around 
transparency regarding how Members are paid but may have referred to sensitivity of 
confronting a Member whose political competence was under question. Praise was given 
for previous accomplishments, probably as rhetorical prelude to, “I know we won’t agree 
on this, but I put it out” (P4). Background information was added regarding “an on-going 
[dynamic with another EU institution]… not here in the report. I tell you in case it comes 
up in discussion . . . we fear the usual suspects will bring it in” (P2). An assertion of “no 
foul play” (P1) was expressed from those most closely involved with the actual matter. 
Finally, a new/breaking concern was shared, including references to previous similar 
situations and the warning, “this will be the hottest topic for the next months” (P5). 
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The previous paragraph illustrates that the challenges of understanding apply as 
well to Members using English as a lingua franca (ELF) as they do to interpreted 
communication. In this Coordinators’ conversation, the subjects and dynamics are so well 
known to the interpretees that much communication occurs by hint, innuendo, and 
indirect reference. I was confused at key junctures such as topic shifts and points of 
decision-making. This was obviously largely due to my outsider status, however I suspect 
that even general familiarity with the context would not have been enough for full 
comprehension of everything. 
While the general conversation was conducted all in English, there were periodic 
side conversations in other languages that occurred around the table. The extent to which 
these involved clarifications of the immediate dialogue or were sidebar commentaries and 
tangents is unknown. Although the absence of simultaneous interpretation did not seem 
to adversely affect the communication of the group in the immediate interaction, the 
scope for understanding and misunderstanding in the upcoming budgetary control 
Committee meeting was framed by what was understood/misunderstood by Coordinators. 
Specifically, the indexical (forward-acting) elements and features of discourse included 
● identifying deviations from past practice 
● predicting political sensitivity and logistical difficulty 
● brainstorming issues not in the report but expected to be raised 
● sharing perceptions and beliefs regarding identified issues 
● outlining the intended goal(s) of amendments, such as either the continuation of 
an historical stance or to soften criticism or to provide balance, and 
● anticipating the tone (key) of amendments and debate as competitive or 
cooperative. 
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The Coordinators’ previous experience within the Budgetary Control Committee 
and a history of working together as Coordinators from/for their respective Political 
Groups generated a congenial atmosphere. The key (tone) of this COCUBU meeting was 
focused, respectful, efficient and relaxed: collegial. Using English as the lingua franca 
did not appear to create problems for anyone other than the outside researcher. The 
function of this group in streamlining and sorting sticking points in the decision-making 
process was fulfilled. 
5.2.3.2 Intergroup Meetings 
I was also privileged to observe two intergroup meetings, the Land Use and Food 
Policy Intergroup (LUFPIG) and the Baltic Intergroup. Intergroups are unofficial, 
informal groups that gather Members of different Political Groups and Committees to 
discuss issues of common interest. Assistants also attend, either with or in place of their 
Member. LUFPIG ran under Chatham House rules of non-attribution; the Baltic 
Intergroup never mentioned these (at least not in any of the meetings or parts of meetings 
that I was able to attend). 
Because Intergroups are unofficial, interpretation is not provided. Members must 
choose a common language and work with it. In both groups there were Members with 
non-fluent English who managed to participate and (apparently) make themselves 
understood. On this superficial evidence, one could argue there was no need for SI, 
however the tenor of discussion (Hymes’ key) was often critical, challenging, and 
unapologetic. “The turns,” I wrote in my fieldbook, “sound like speeches, not like 
conversation (impression).” 
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My field notes describe “direct confrontation; sophisticated matter-of-fact 
deconstruction of logic behind the Commission’s stance” as LUFPIG Members discussed 
a draft framework with a representative from the Court of Auditors.198 “The will to hide a 
fundamental fact leads to obscure arguments,” said one Member (PA),199 leading another 
to assert that the Commission’s stance was “fundamentally untrue” (PB), which led to 
making a distinction between “the political level” and “the technical level” (PA). There 
was “no disagreement with the facts” (Pc) but “simplification” (PD) was needed 
regarding the definition of some terms, in order “to explain down” (PD) to effected 
individuals in remote locations. The Members discussed “what’s missing” (PA) from the 
draft as well as what it currently covered, and there was a discussion about “something 
wrong in the philosophy of the penalty” (PF) to wit: “We agree in principle but [the 
enforcement] is too weak to influence [the targeted group of people]” (PF). 
Describing what was missing and critiquing what was present in the written draft 
framework involved a high register of political discourse. The term “simplification” itself 
was identified as needing definition: “No one ever stood up and said I want things to be 
complicated, [this does] not equal watering down. We have to solve the underlying 
problems” (PD). An overt linguistic question came up only once, as a matter of curiosity: 
“how do you say ‘width’ in plural?” (PG). This is quite different than the example shared 
                                                
198  The Court of Auditors is an institution external to the European Parliament with the 
responsibility “to improve EU financial management and report on the use of public 
funds” (Europa. http://europa.eu/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-
auditors/index_en.htm retrieved 19 March 2014). 
199  As with the Coordinators meeting, participant (P) coding is random and anonymous 
(PA, PB, etc). While some of these Baltic Intergroup Members did participate in the 
research; these quotes were collected during observation and in casual conversation 
either before or after meetings, not during interviews.  
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with me after the meeting by one of the (non-interviewed) participants, which concerned 
a resolution “some years ago concerning Israel and Palestine” (PH). The English version 
included the phrase, “withdraw from the occupied territories” (PH). The Member 
explained to me how that general statement allows ambiguity not possible in French, 
wherein it must be specified if one is referring to “all” or “some” territories (PH). 
Linguistic differences like these are a “source of conflict” (PH). 
5.3 In This House: Discourse about Simultaneous Interpretation 
Now that the contrast is established between the settings characterized by the 
formal provision of SI and the Parliamentary settings deemed informal and thus usually 
not interpreted, we can finally look closely at the discursive tensions revolving around the 
use of the system of SI in the EP. In terms of social interaction, the two primary activities 
of Members involve speaking and listening. Because social interaction in the EP is 
conditioned by intercultural communication, both behaviors require choices: Members 
choose whether or not to speak their own language or a lingua franca, and Members 
choose whether or not to use the headphones to listen to colleagues whose languages they 
do not know. Generally, Members called the official language of their country “my 
language” or “my mother tongue.” Two of the fifty-five Members interviewed happened 
to have a native language different than the language of the country they represented as 
an MEP, but they did not claim their mother tongue (or “father tongue” as one labelled 
his first, native language) as their principle language in the Parliament. 
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5.3.1 Speaking in the Mother Tongue 
Committee Meetings are usually open to the press and therefore the public, so if 
interpreting is provided for your language: “In principle, use only your national 
language” (OM33). Most Members emphasized only the speaking aspect of using the 
system of SI, but others included listening: “By principle, use the interpreters and listen 
to [my language’s] interpreters” (OM09). Some Members defined the conditions for 
using the mother tongue: “If it is for a Hungarian topic, then it is pragmatic for the 
Hungarian press” (OM28). “Some moments,” explained another Member, “are external. 
It is absolutely easier to use English or French, but symbolically it is important to speak 
Polish. This is a political decision” (OM20). Whether persistently or selectively, speaking 
one’s national language is understood as “a way of saying, ‘I defend my community’” 
(OM35) and “to show there are other languages” (OM60). Sometimes this seems to be 
taken as a challenge: “If others are trying to underline their nationality, we will do the 
same” (NM64), and “At the end of the day, Romanian will be there” (F01). 
Members assert “there are many reasons to use your own language” (OM40) and 
“lots of arguments for it” (OM44). No one disagreed that “the best idea, the best way to 
express yourself, is in your mother tongue: the nuances, the big subjects, the political 
ones” (NM02). Reasons are because “the words come easier, the expressions” (OM21), 
you can be “more literate—using quotations and pictures” (OM07), and “the most 
obvious, the most important is that everyone can argue better in their mother tongue” 
(OM22). In practice, however, “You can clearly see the difference between Members 
from small countries and large countries” (OM25). Specifically, “Old Member States 
have more confidence to speak their own language than new Member States. They are so 
used to this tower of Babel” (NM64). 
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For instance, “if you’re from Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Lithuania…you have 
the fear that people won’t understand you” (F01). At a further extreme, “if we speak 
Meridian,200 we thought people would think, ‘Oh, he’s stupid!’ (NM64). However, 
“psychologically, we saw others—Chairs—speaking their language, which is not even 
popular in Europe, like Dutch” (NM64). Nonetheless, because of the prevalence of 
mother tongue speakers in the Parliament, “I got the impression that everyone speaks 
their mother tongue. It gives me prestige [to do so] and the impression that Meridian is 
equal to others” (OM66). 
Despite the benefits of expression and argumentation afforded by speaking in the 
mother tongue, some Members say “No, no. People don’t listen” (OM31). “If you speak a 
minority language, people don’t even put their headphones on” (OM66). Because of this 
widely-observed phenomenon (and others), “Mr [MEP] never talks in his mother tongue, 
only in English, sometimes in French, to leave aside all potential risks” (F01). The 
substance of these “risks” is a question at the heart of the European project. By the end of 
this chapter, the contours of tension should become plain. 
Political Groups are not open to the public so there is more latitude for language 
choice without inviting the external criticism that might come from not using the national 
language in a Committee Meeting. “If you use English [in Committee] you can be damn 
sure someone is emailing or calling: ‘Why aren’t you using your own language?’” 
(OM54). Committee Meetings are sometimes broadcast to the public. They occur in the 
                                                
200   “Meridian” is a convention invented by Veerle Duflou (in preparation). She uses it to 
protect interpreters’ confidentiality in her research on norms for interpreters in the 
European Parliament. Meridian stands in for languages that, if named in context, 
could give away the identity of the research participant. 
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room under the FIFO microphone system, which allows for relatively spontaneous 
interaction among Members. From the interpreters’ perspective (in the booth), the FIFO 
regime in the room is very different than the Plenary sessions in the hemicycle, where it 
is universal to speak the national language of your own country. “I am most aware of the 
translation [sic] in Plenary, because this is where there is the most foreign speakers” 
(OM03). Not to speak your national language during Plenary would be “a PR disaster” 
(F05). While there may be some constituent fallout from not speaking your own language 
in a Committee Meeting, Members do sometimes choose a lingua franca that is not their 
mother tongue. Language choices in the Plenary, however, are almost completely 
restricted by social and political pressure to speak one’s national language. 
5.3.1.1 Monolinguals in the European Parliament 
As one Member noted rather laconically, “Not everyone is like people from 
Luxembourg who know three languages” (NM56). Successful monolinguals were 
presented in what seemed to be a token-like fashion: “I have a Romanian colleague who 
has no other language really, but communicates very effectively” (NM02). “Some 
colleagues who are monolingual,” explained another MEP, “did very well. They have 
excellent political advisors and assistants” (OM54). One English-speaking Member 
admitted, “I never made much of an effort [to learn languages]” (OM44). That Member 
was a clear exception among the participants in this research, some of whom knew as 
many as eight languages, with the gross average of 4 1/2 languages known or partially 
known by MEPs (review Table 5). This “multilingual reality” (as it might be described in 
EU official jargon) prompted one Member to assert: “There are two kinds of Members: 
those who speak languages and those who don’t. They are excluded. They exclude 
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themselves and shouldn’t come here. The political party should not propose them. It is a 
waste, even if they are intelligent” (OM20). 
The general attitude was expressed less dramatically by other Members: “If you 
are fluent in another language you can enter the building, otherwise you are outside” 
(OM60). Likewise, “If you want to be useful here you must be fluent in two 
languages…to lobby or speak with your colleagues” (NM26). Furthermore, “if you want 
a career in the upper levels, you must have two plus your own language” (OM54). The 
contradiction between this expressed norm of multilingualism and the value of 
communication in one’s mother tongue articulates the border between the formal system 
of SI in the EP provided in the rooms and publicized through the hemicycles, and the 
informal system where the red lines of decision-making are negotiated and legislation 
crafted in legal language. 
5.3.1.2 A Flaw in the Research? Or a Reflection of the System? 
My second language and professional career as an American Sign 
Language/English interpreter may have facilitated my entry, but it did not help me 
diversify the pool of action research participants beyond the sphere of English speakers. I 
had hoped, too optimistically, that this research would warrant active support through the 
provision of EP interpreters for interviews with non-English speaking Members. That 
would have allowed the possibility of opening up another kind of practical knowledge 
from the point-of-view of monolingual Members regarding how they do, in fact, 
successfully navigate the intercultural communication differences. Such communication 
access for so-called informal purposes, however, was judged according to the 
institution’s rule-based “balance between the mother tongue and practicality. The 
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division of formal and informal is very clear” (OM22). This boundary between the formal 
and informal is upheld by the rules, and above all else, as one administrator emphasized, 
“this is a house of rules!” (F25). 
In other words, the system of SI in the EP has been designed in such a way, 
through this ‘very clear division’ between the formal and informal levels of social 
interaction, that it winds up discriminating against monolinguals. “It depends on the 
rules. It depends on the meetings” (OM59). The Ad Personam interpreting services being 
piloted at the time of this research (2008-2009) is a mechanism that could alleviate some 
effects of linguistic inequality but only if the EP acts culturally to recognize the value of a 
monolingual perspective. The bias against monolingualism is an aspect of the 
intercultural challenge faced by the European project: borrowing a label from the 
technicians, it is “a human problem.” 
The system does only what you tell it to do and it doesn’t make mistakes 
or quite never makes mistakes, only if there’s a bug or if this bug is 
arranged. The system, it’s like a calculator. You can key it one million 
times, two plus two; it always tells you four. It never does something else. 
(F12) 
Of course, “interpreting is not only for monolinguals but people who know other 
languages, too” (F25). There is something more going on than just a twist of the 
promotional rhetoric about Member States being able to send their best people regardless 
of their language profile. While there is definitely an institutional bias against 
monolinguals built into the infrastructure of EP decision-making practices, there is also 
social resistance to using interpreters even when it is expedient. 
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5.3.2 Speaking with a Lingua Franca 
The option of using a language other than one’s national language/mother tongue 
is the practical outcome of multilingualism. Lingua francas are spoken by Members in 
formal meetings where interpreters are provided as well as during informal meetings 
where professional EP interpreters are not provided. One Member put the dilemma of 
voice this way: “Whom do you address? Who do you touch with your own words and 
who through the translator [sic]?” (OM59). Tensions in the discourse about whether or 
not and when to use one’s mother tongue or a lingua franca reveal values and attitudes 
about interpersonal communication in the intercultural context of the European 
Parliament. How these influence political negotiations is represented in Table 7 on 
MEPs’ Language Choice Strategies. After I had shared some of my preliminary findings 
during our second conversation, a Member commented: “Now I start to see why your 
study is interesting” (OM44). When I followed up in our third conversation, the same 
Member clarified what was so interesting: “ the fact that they [other language speakers] 
have motives for [their language choices]: there’s an agenda behind it, or could be” 
(OM44). 
Being able to distinguish the relative weight of “an agenda” behind a colleague’s 
use of lingua francas is a way to understand the difference between practical and 
discursive consciousness about the system of SI in the EP. “It is purely political,” 
according to a Member expressing his discursive consciousness, “to speak second and 
third languages” (OM20). The knowledge that using a lingua franca is just as political as 
using one’s mother tongue appeared, for most Members (based on the way our 
conversations tended to go), to exist at the level of practical consciousness only. Few 
Members could explain how, for instance, “it gives an enormous tactical advantage to 
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negotiate in your second language, if capable. Because [other Members] are so 
comfortable and confident in their mother tongue” (OM61). At the level of practical 
consciousness, Members might say, for instance, “if you want to have contacts, then you 
have to try [to use another tongue]” (OM12). 
This interpersonal dimension of communication is reinforced by experience: “It is 
an asset to know English, French, German. You can make yourself understood, persuade 
your colleagues, establish personal relations and even friendships” (OM03). Such 
assertions of valuing the interpersonal dimension of communication are unremarkable in 
and of themselves. However, in the context of the complaint-ridden anti-discourse about 
SI in the EP, these sentiments contrast sharply with negative reactions to the suggestion 
that interpreters could be utilized in the informal situations just as well as the formal 
ones. “We are not just making statements. We are making laws” (OM57). It is as if the 
Members’ mission (“They come here to make policy” (F25)) is unrelated to the culture 
being generated by their interactions. As an outsider, this disconnect seemed obvious but 
it took a long time to wade through all the themes and realize that this artificial separation 
of process (social interaction/culture) from outcome (the rule of law/society) comes down 
to a matter of diction. 
5.3.2.1 Pluralingualism, not Multilingualism 
Discourse about language policy in the European Union overall clearly influences 
the discourse about interpreting and languages in the European Parliament. Slippage in 
the precise use of crucial terminology appears common and acceptable (at least in the 
language I could access: English). A study on potential linkages of multilingualism with 
creativity contracted by the European Commission argues, for instance, that the 
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distinction between plurilingualism and multilingualism “is significant” (Europublic 
SCA/CVA 2009: 9) but, despite the recognized significance, these differences “are 
subsumed under the term ‘multilingualism’ for the purposes of this report” (2009: 4). 
Vuorikoski follows suit:  
Simultaneous interpreting can be labeled as a sub-category of interlingual 
translation, its basic function being that of conveying the meaning of the source 
text, delivered orally in one language, into a target text, delivered orally in another 
language. With a view to the research material of the present study, focus will be 
on the aspect of multilingualism as the key motivation for interpretation activity. 
(2004, p. 51) 
Likewise, writing about multilingual management in the European Parliament, Gazzola 
(2006) reiterates a (by then) decade-old definition: “both [multilingualism and 
plurilingualism] being defined as referring to the presence or use of more than one 
language (Clyne, 1997: 301)” (2006: 394). Minimizing the difference between 
“presence” and “use” is stunning: the conflation is remarkable and significant because the 
confusion harries the discourse about SI in the EP. 
Presence refers to space. Specifically (in the context of languages), presence 
refers to the condition of proximity of human bodies within the boundaries and borders of 
a geographic location. Relevant examples from the Parliament include “the room” or “the 
‘cycle;” other examples might be a neighbourhood or school. Use refers to practice, the 
human doing of behaviors as applied activity over time. There is a problematic outcome 
of talking as if presence (in space) and usage (in time) are essentially one-and-the-same-
thing. One of these always co-occurring dimensions of communication, space or time, 
drops out of awareness completely or is reduced to an unquestioned narrow conception. 
In the discourses about simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament, the 
temporal dimension is routinely de-selected (cf Burke’s terministic screen). The 
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discourse dynamic of preferring the word “multilingualism” over “pluralingualism” is a 
social transaction (Emirbayer, 1997).201 The social agreement to say and write 
multilingualism instead of pluralingualism normalizes, through the ritual of repetition, an 
exclusive emphasis on only the spatial dimension of communication. Simultaneously, the 
repetition of the word multilingualism ritualizes ignoring the temporal dimension of 
communication (explicitly through terminological de-selection of pluralingualism). At 
the discursive extreme, such normative dynamics of language use train people to forget 
that another option exists, and can lead to repression of the knowledge that one 
previously knew and have experienced an option (Billig, 1999). 
The fact that the term, multilingualism, is preferred over pluralingualism, even 
made to substitute and replace pluralingualism, entails comprehensive consequences. The 
                                                
201  Emirbayer (1997) summarizes and elaborates a distinction by Dewey and Bentley 
(1949, pp. 105, 108, and 111), critiquing the idea of inter-action as a form of 
substantialist thinking, not as relational as it seems to imply. “Entities remain fixed 
and unchanging throughout such interaction, each independent of the existence of 
others, much like billiard balls or the particles in Newtonian mechanics” (p. 285). 
From a non-substantialist relational perspective, “the very terms or units involved in 
a transaction derive their meaning, significance, and identity from the (changing) 
functional roles they play within that transaction” (p. 287). Emirbayer continues: 
“Relational theorists reject the notion that one can posit discrete, pre-given units 
such as the individual or society as ultimate starting points of sociological analysis” 
(p. 287). The premises of this dissertation are relational. Specifically, “the relational 
point of view sees agency as inseparable form the unfolding dynamics of situations, 
especially from the problematic features of those situations” (p. 294). It includes 
“basic assumptions, beginning with the notion that cultural formations entail, not 
individual ‘attitudes’ or ‘values,’ much less disembodied ‘systems,’ but rather 
bundles of communications, relations, or transactions” (p. 300). An application of 
relational theory is Baktin’s point of departure: the utterance. “Words, concepts, and 
symbols derive their meaning only from their location within concrete utterances, 
but these in turn only make sense in relation to other utterances within ongoing flows 
of transactions: ‘The utterance is filled with dialogic overtones. . . . Each individual 
utterance is a link in the chain of speech communication…’ (Bakhtin, 1986, pp. 92-
93)” (in Emirbayer, 1997, p. 301). 
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Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR) states: “Plurilingual 
and pluricultural competence refers to the ability to use languages for the purposes of 
communication and to take part in intercultural interaction . . .” (emphasis added, 2001: 
168). The emphasis is added because the original (cited here) is misquoted at least twice: 
in the EC creativity study cited above (2009), and in a (2007) Council of Europe 
publication that the 2009 EC study attributes as the source for their (mis)quotation of the 
(2001) CEFR. In both of those (mis)quotations “interaction” is replaced by “action.” 
The notion of “intercultural action” versus “intercultural interaction” may be 
figural to the current rituals of language choice in the European Parliament. A different 
choice of diction might further aid clarification. Emirbayer (1997) describes the 
significant epistemological difference between an interaction and a transaction. Both 
terms refer to some kind of relationship, but the English word ‘interaction’ implies 
activity between separate entities as if they are permanently fixed and unchangeable: as if 
there is a substance to a person or a word that exists regardless of society or language. In 
a ‘transaction’ all entities are affected and changed (to lesser or greater degrees, but 
always in some way) because they (e.g., persons and words) are understood as 
meaningful only and always in relation to others (other people, other words). The 
conceptual and practical difference of action between rather than transaction among 
human agents reinforces the one-dimensional discursive emphasis that Members display 
regarding communicating across the dimension of space rather than communicating 
within the dimension of time. 
Of course time is a significant theme in the discourse about SI in the EP, but (as 
will be seen below) in an extremely narrow way. The spatial emphasis in the discourse 
277 
about SI in the EP invokes and reinforces a transmission view of communication (Carey, 
1995). That is, it reduces communication to the movement of information from one 
person (embodied in a physical location) to another person (embodied in another physical 
location) whether or not these bodies are co-located in the same room or hemicycle or 
dispersed in different geographic settings. 
The ramifications of Members’ one-sided practical consciousness about language 
choice and the use or avoidance of interpretation plays out in historical terms. The 
American communication scholar James Carey explains: “If the archetypal case of 
communication under a transmission view is the extension of messages across geography 
for the purpose of control, the archetypal case under a ritual view is the sacred ceremony 
that draws persons together in fellowship and commonality” (1999: 15). The themes of 
discourse regarding SI in the EP reveal a contest regarding which rituals of social 
interaction should be most honored. 
5.3.2.2 Speaking with a Lingua Franca, continued 
The caveat of the Member who referred to the tactical advantage of using a lingua 
franca “if capable” underscores the question of language choice. “Some insist on English 
and I wish to god they’d use their native language” (OM44). However, many Members 
believe “it gives a better impression if you speak their language” (OM09) and, “In 
ordinary situations, it is useful to have one language” (OM29). What constitutes an 
“ordinary” setting in the pluralingual space of the European Parliament? “Some say using 
a lingua franca “takes energy and concentration, it is easier to have interpretation 
everywhere, but this is impossible” (OM12). Others say, “with a default language, you 
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don’t have to listen so hard. You [do] miss some nuances” (NM28). There appears to be 
general agreement that by “using a lingua franca, you put part of yourself aside” (OM16). 
The limitations of a lingua franca include being “stuck saying words that I know, 
not the words that I want” (NM56) but, despite this, others believe that “the important 
thing is to get the message, not if the language is perfect” (F11). The double standard of 
how Members’ speaking is evaluated compared with how the Interpreters’ renditions are 
evaluated appears to be unconscious. One Member had the discursive consciousness to 
recognize the ripple effect: “Anyone speaking a second language is diminished. The 
range of articulation and meaning is significantly smaller than I would like. The 
interpreted language is thinner” (NM28). Other Members draw different distinctions: “If 
you are using language already adjusted to the debate, then it’s simple. But if you want to 
make a complicated speech? Forget it” (OM33). 
Of course some Members are equally fluent in more than one language and 
codeswitching between languages is no issue for them. “Some people freely use their 
languages” (NM64). Choosing a less fluent language is often considered a matter of 
politeness. “Some people do lose nuance if they are not speaking their mother tongue, but 
they do it out of politeness for the Chair” (F30). The politeness ethic is so strong that this 
leaves many Members “perpetually on the back foot” (NM28). “You can see the 
hesitation when they speak English or French, but from their own language? It [the 
mother tongue is] so necessary!” (F02). 
5.3.2.3 Informal Meetings and Making Do 
As has already been described, “in non-formal situations, [we have] no right to 
ask for [interpreting]” (NM69). Using a lingua franca in those meetings is considered 
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more intimate, there is a lower circle of people, he can tell more quicker, 
is sure of the quality of the verbal communication, he knows what he’s 
saying, knows the interpreter can’t make a mistake. It leaves this 
opportunity out. If there is a misunderstanding he knows it’s him, he can’t 
blame the interpreter and tries again.” (F17/M41) 
The references to speed (“more quicker”), quality, mistakes, misunderstanding, and risk 
(‘to leave this opportunity out’) are significant markers in the discourse about SI in the 
EP. In a way, they anchor the tensions regarding Members’ language choices, opening 
insight into language ideology and the politics of the regime of controlled 
multilingualism. It turns out that interpreting is not provided to all Members in some 
formal meetings in addition to the customary denial of SI in the (so-called) informal 
working groups. For instance, “in the Budget Committee, many can’t use their language” 
(OM33). Sometimes, because a Member is not in an assigned leadership position or 
otherwise because of how the resources are distributed, there is no interpreting provided 
“in Group or Committee, where it is most important” (NM64). “It is a problem for 
smaller countries,” elaborated another Member. “We have to ask. The larger ones are 
always covered” (NM56). 
Even those in leadership positions usually have to make do. “Rapporteur and 
Shadow Rapporteurs are without interpretation. They are negotiating on compromise 
amendments, this takes place outside of interpretation” (OM03). A Member described a 
recent experience: 
As Rapporteur…[it was] the last meeting. There were many amendments 
that were not on the list. There was no interpreting. I must discuss in 
English. It was very difficult. One level is to understand the discussion, 
but the other is every word, to know what has changed. For this I need 
interpretation. (NM69) 
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The importance of words and meanings are recurring themes in the discourse about SI in 
the EP. Sufficiently fluent multilingual Members, however, do not tend to perceive a 
problem with the linguistic inequality. 
We have excellent interpretation [in general] but…when I’m Rapporteur, 
in negotiations with the Council and Commission, we use English without 
interpretation. That was a new experience. I enjoyed it—learning the 
technical language. (OM07) 
Since it is “very rare that you can’t come up with a language no one knows anything 
about” (OM44), these meetings are “part of our daily work” (OM36), and the rules 
preclude interpretation on the basis of the formal/informal division, Members may 
become hesitant to assert their real need for interpretation, instead relying on their 
assistants and other colleagues.202 “It is hard to ask for an interpreter just for me” 
(OM62).  
“There was a Shadows meeting,” recalled a Member, “a German colleague spoke 
[and another MEP] translated [sic] for him. The rest spoke English. He told me he would 
have spoken more with interpreters and explain better” (OM65). Another described a 
situation where “the French Member would have been more comfortable with an 
interpreter” (OM09). Speaking about her MEP, an assistant explained: “either he has 
interpretation or he doesn’t participate. Or, he participates but isn’t motivated. He could 
say, ‘I’m against that or support that position,’ but not explain why” (F11). 
                                                
202  The term “real need” occurs in the 2006 European Court of Auditors' Special Report 
No 5/2005: Interpretation expenditure incurred by the Parliament, the Commission 
and the Council. The phrase, “real need” thus has a politically-defined meaning 
within the perceived resource environment of the European institutions. This 
meaning may not converge with the actual needs of real Members. 
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What happens in these situations is that a non-professional fulfills the function of 
interpretation. “In an informal meeting, if there is a Frenchman or a German, someone 
translates [sic]” (OM55). Members “use an assistant or another way to communicate” 
(NM02). You have to “make sure you have your staff with you to cover all the bases” 
(OM44). “A French colleague,” for instance, “uses an assistant to make a sequential 
interpretation” (OM33). If a Member has a real need for interpretation and the system 
cannot (or will not) provide it, this is 
my personal problem. I must arrange [an accommodation] with my 
personal funds or maybe I can negotiate with the political groups. We 
already have the funds for office staff. These are complicated 
arrangements so the need is not so often. (NM27) 
And, it does happen that “some Members use personal interpretation: they pay. I could 
pay” (NM27). 
5.3.2.4 English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) 
As is probably already obvious, “for informal, a lingua franca, now in most cases 
English” (OM09). These are “small meetings [such as] Members against the Council, 
[and] multiparty meetings with experts from outside who are specialists in particular 
fields. They are usually in English, sometimes French or German” (NM64). Members 
explain: “If I have to find a lingua franca most often it is English” (OM16), and “if there 
is no interpretation, [the language is] invariably English” (OM45). The justifications for 
using English as a Lingua Franca (ELF) are as consistent as the criticism against it. “The 
lone language we are able to use is bad English” (OM35). “Everyone knows we are 
making mistakes in English” (NM20). It is “awful English. Most of the time you 
understand that” (OM22). “When we speak together in English it is so bad English” 
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(OM35). English as a lingua franca (ELF) is a point of humor: “[My Chairperson] has 
one weakness: he is very bad in English, extremely bad!” (OM31); and a source of pride: 
“ELF,” claims a Member, “is a European language” (NM28). While some “hope it’s not 
Brussels English” (NM20), this “seeming English” (OM16) is described as “a special 
language of communication, Brussels English. It is simplified, international: not a 
sophisticated grammar” (NM20). 
A common assumption is “everybody knows English. The minimum is [my 
MEP’s] level. And he does fine” (F15/M18). “Most colleagues,” explained another MEP, 
“are very good with English—Brussels English. The exceptions are Greeks, Portuguese, 
some Italians. Some French colleagues understand English but won’t use English” 
(OM36). Indeed not everyone is thrilled with ELF: “What is upsetting me, is English is 
always in” (OM59). “I don’t like English as a lingua franca, I prefer to speak other 
languages whenever possible, that are closer to colleagues’ mother tongues” (OM61). 
“InterParliamentary Delegations are a problem, [because] not all want to use English” 
(F01). “I prefer more use of the smaller languages, that they would be equally 
represented. I don’t feel very pro-English language everywhere” (OM06). Based on these 
sentiments, an ELF-speaking MEP asks, “Is Anglo dominant? Yes, but not so much” 
(OM08). 
Despite some resistance to English (or other languages) as a lingua franca, many 
Members “force themselves to use a language they know only half-well” (OM40). A 
Member explains, “English today is the modern Latin, the modern Greek—it is a 
language of traffic…English is a commodity! Even in China! Even in France!” (OM08). 
Another Member says, “Of course, if you cannot speak English you are handicapped” 
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(OM09). “The common language in this place,” explains a permanent EP official, “is 
English. It rocketed in significance since 2004. The younger generation has very strong 
English and are weak French” (F04). “Speak English if you want to be heard!” insists 
another Member. “Who understands Meridian? Nobody! Forget it! A Polish man? [sic] A 
French?” (OM31). One perception is, “When you speak English you’re okay, you get by 
in all the meetings” (NM24), however others say, “If you’re not perfect English, then 
they are not interested in your ideas” (NM27). There are Members for which “you have 
to concentrate on his English, it’s probably his fourth language—he’s slow and rusty. But 
he can make himself understood” (OM28). 
The values associated with speaking ELF, the reasons Members’ give for using 
English as a lingua franca, often highlight a presumption of understanding. “My Member 
prefers English because he knows if he tells it there will be no misunderstanding” (F02). 
Other Members agree: “If you use English, it’s easier” (OM33). “It’s absolutely easier to 
use English or French, English is understood better, quicker. I use it with staff—it is 
pragmatic—they all use English” (OM20). Another assistant expands, “It is easier to 
communicate in English, the message gets through better, all the details. And for 
efficiency. Even rhetorically we can make a show about something” (F05). Members’ 
experiences in non-interpreted meetings where they have to use ELF (or another lingua 
franca) reinforce the choice to keep using ELF even when interpretation is provided. 
“Interpretation from Meridian is, um, not so good sometimes. [My MEP] prefers English 
because he knows if he tells it there will be no misunderstanding” (F02). 
Nonetheless, some Members remain dissatisfied with ELF. “The assumption is 
English would be the easiest. It facilitates the dialogue…to express in a common 
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language” (F01). But “maybe,” says another permanent staff official, “everybody speaks 
English but not in the same way” (F06). For one thing, “ELF speakers have “a great 
problem with native speakers of English and German—their accent, vocabulary, 
speed…” (NM27). Speaking of speed, “We don’t have that much time,” adds another, 
“we can speak quicker in English” (OM42). Clarifying the choice even further, “I speak 
English not to rely on the native language,” explains an official with one of the 
Secretariats, “because I can’t control the interpretation” (F34). 
5.3.3 Control (Loss Of) 
The specific word, ‘control,’ was not always used by Members; when it was said 
the context was usually accusatory, e.g., “the interpreter can take control of the flow” 
(OM42). Instead, the main word that riddles the discourse is ‘loss.’ “I don’t want to be 
misunderstood. I don’t want the interpreters, because of German,203 to lose information” 
(OM08). Assumptions about the value of understanding and the significance of 
information are deep and seemingly unquestioned. “Even ideally we are losing 10-15% 
of understanding the content with interpreting” (OM20). The emphasis on information 
reinforces the spatial analysis presented above, specifically, how the discourse about SI in 
                                                
203  This sentiment is common to Members no matter what language, but German syntax 
presents a special challenge because the verb specifying the relations among subjects 
and objects comes at the end of the sentence. Also, e.g., “The verbal humor exploited 
by the speaker in isolating the concept ’Außen’ (’foreign’) without the second 
element ’Politik’ (’policy’) is rather literary, or at least understandable to the 
listeners of German only. In such instances, interpreters would have to fill in some 
additional words in order to make the syntax acceptable. Yet there is usually no time 
for such editing, as this would prevent the interpreters from attending to the next 
incoming unit. None of the three interpreters conveyed this unit of the argument” 
(Vuorikoski, 20204, p. 168). 
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the EP prioritizes the transmission of information across space rather than considering the 
implications of repetitive behavior (ritual) on identities and relationships (culture) over 
time. The value placed on (automatic) understanding rides on another deep assumption. 
Specifically, Briankle Chang (1996) argues that it is just as legitimate to comprehend and 
build relationships from the starting point of misunderstanding as it is to base interaction 
upon initial assumptions of common understanding. 
Some Members display empathy: “It is not easy for the interpreters to deliver the 
message, complete and accurate” (OM06), and “Interpreters must be in a horrible 
dilemma: they have to choose a meaning then next sentence, oops!” (OM42). In terms of 
evaluating interpreting performance, experiences range from critical through 
inconsequential to genuine appreciation. Critically, Members say: “I don’t know, it is 
very difficult to decide [about the quality of interpretation]. It is case-by-case” (OM29) 
and “What we are doing here demands a lot of nuance. Sometimes the interpreting is 
mediocre and sometimes much worse than that” (OM57). More neutrally, other Members 
say: “We simply take it for granted that the service is there” (OM16], and “simultaneous 
translation [sic] creates problems, but it is astonishing that the number of real blunders is 
that low (OM03). Many Members and permanent staff say: “The whole system works 
really well. You would assume there would be more problems but it’s really rare” (F07); 
“The quality of the translation [sic] is quite good here, and also the quality of the 
interpreters—they are fantastic people” (OM59); “We do have extremely good teams of 
interpreters. We can’t fault the interpreters or the services they provide” (F30); and 
“There is much better quality here than anywhere else” (OM20). 
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Member concern with misunderstanding and loss of content (information) are 
among the main motivating factors for choosing English as lingua franca. The general 
sense is that with ELF, “I can be completely certain that what I say reaches the ones who 
are listening…to the English—and sometimes in the translation [sic] too” (OM42). 
Again, the question of listening is intimately intertwined with language choice as a 
demonstration of respect (or lack of respect) and appreciation for linguistic diversity. 
5.3.3.1 The Headphone Challenge 
“You cannot,” a Secretariat official insisted, “use headphone use as a measure of 
listening—Members are multiply fluent” (F30). As described previously, I made an effort 
to track headphone use in the meetings I observed. It is certainly true that there can be no 
direct equation made between wearing a headphone (or not wearing one) and listening or 
not listening. “If Members are not interested in the report,” the same official continued, 
“they will chat with their friends but still want their friends to pay attention to their 
report!” (F30). “They only put on the headphones,” she concluded, “for those they don’t 
understand” (F30). “We are very, very clear on what we want to do,” this Member 
expands the observation: “Those who have interest follow. They will reply and you can 
tell if they understand” (OM31).204 
Nonetheless, Members do evaluate the use of headphones by colleagues as a 
measure of attention. I repeatedly observed what this Member said: “Most Members sit 
without headphones” (OM43). For instance, in the AFET meetings I observed, I noted 
                                                
204  This is a rare expression of discursive consciousness about the process of 
pluralingual communication (i.e., involving interpreters). 
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1 “a small rustle of movement” (quoting my fieldnotes) as MEPs reached for 
headsets as a German colleague began to speak; 
2 only the Chairperson reaching for a headset (within my range of vision) when 
a Hungarian colleague announced, “I will speak in my mother tongue;” and 
3 about 50% of Members within my field of vision continuing to wearing 
headsets during the Chairperson’s response, in English, to a speech made in 
Tajikistan by the Tajikistani President. 
 
Computer technology could be designed and programmed to monitor Member’s use of 
headphones and microphones, including what channel they’re speaking or listening to, 
how much of time, etc., but sources were very clear that this would be an unacceptable 
violation of privacy with too much potential for political misuse. 
During the AFET observations, as with many others, I jotted down that “the 
headphones are giving me a headache. Squeezing too hard! Hurts ear and presses on my 
brain. Swapping ears helps (one on/one off method).” Agreeing with my observation that 
the earphones hurt, a technician told me, “They are quite unbreakable…the only thing I 
am happy these headphones are here is because nobody wants to steal them” (F12). One 
Member’s conjecture about why colleagues avoid earphone use was gender-based: “I 
think he [referring to male MEPs in general] is ashamed to use a headset, to show that 
you don’t understand” (OM40). Other Members refer to EFL: if you have “a short reply, 
try to do it in English. The Chair is English—it’s easier. Otherwise they have to take the 
earphones, listen and understand, and sometimes they misunderstand” (NM64). 
The discourse makes it seem as if misunderstanding only happens when 
interpretation is involved. A Member (not interviewed) spoke during a Committee 
meeting: “If it will be easier in English, I can read the question in English? I speak in 
Polish if there is an interpretation.” There is a time element embedded in the courtesy of 
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notifying colleagues about the language choice so they can don the headphones if they 
are interested in the topic. 
The time component is emphasized if there is a need for relay. During a 
Committee meeting, a Slovenian Member was given the floor and began speaking then 
stopped, waiting…the Chair said, “It must be the relay.” With or without relay however, 
some Members are absolutely explicit about the discrimination: “Colleagues don’t put 
their headphones on when an arcane language is being spoken. It is postcolonial disdain” 
(OM28). “Can I use Danish here?” another Member inquired in English. I note that 
apparently the answer was ‘yes’ as he proceeded to speak in Danish. At least half-a-
dozen of his colleagues in AFET did not put on their earphones. Then I realized he was 
one of the Members I had interviewed, and surmised that he was providing this 
demonstration for my benefit, which he later confirmed so I could witness the non-
cooperation and disinterest in using the headphones/listening to colleagues speaking so-
called ‘arcane’ or ‘exotic’ languages. “I did it for you,” he explained, grinning. 
Not long afterwards a Member who I never spoke with was called upon to give 
her report as Rapporteur. She opened with a sentence in Dutch followed by English, “I 
will speak in Dutch.” I record in my notes “a murmur through the room that sounded like 
disappointment: a collective groan.” The Rapporteur did proceed in Dutch and it 
appeared nearly all of the Members were wearing headphones. Perhaps there was a 
difference in substance or relevance between her topic and the Danish Member’s topic in 
the preceding example. Later, the Dutch Member responded to her colleagues’ questions 
in English. 
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Clearly there is social pressure to avoid the headphones and, by extension (or 
perhaps it is the other way around) to minimize reliance on interpretation. As articulated 
by this Member: “I don’t like to be a prisoner of language” (NM25). Such dramatic 
framings and a consistent emphasis on the loss of control characterize much of the 
discourse about SI in the EP. Given the emphasis on not using earphones, and the list of 
reasons justifying this non-use, I began to wonder what message is sent by actually using 
the headphones? “I sometimes use two headphones,” bragged one Member. “ Often I am 
able to guess what they say. Maybe I am automatically filling in? I am not worried about 
it” (OM31). “You have to take your earphones and listen. This is not a demonstration of 
incompetence,” insists another (NM64). “Make sure and listen to everyone around the 
room” instructs a third: “There is nothing worse than to not listen” (OM44). 
In principle, headphone use shows the readiness to listen to a colleague you do 
not understand. Listening, in the European Parliament, to the simultaneous interpretation 
of a language you do not know is the ultimate measure of pluralingualism. In contrast 
with ELF, which creates an illusion of shared language but still involves insiders (who 
know the lingua franca) and outsiders (who do not), wearing earphones and learning to 
communicate through the system of SI in the EP is the ultimate expression of support for 
cultural difference. Although the use of a lingua franca, such as ELF, is presented as a 
relational move, pluralingualism through interpretation is a step beyond serial 
monolingualism (aka, multilingualism) because it preserves difference and enables 
relationship simultaneously. Rather than reinforcing the use of a common language as the 
only way to demonstrate and experience the phatic qualities of communication, skillful 
and strategic use of SI in the EP could establish the ritual basis for a common European 
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identity by invoking community in a new way. This new and alternative kind of being-
present-with-each-other-while-using-different-languages invites a systemic re-balancing 
of the spatial and temporal elements of communication. Many languages, used at the 
same time, in the same place, among people communicating with each other enables 
meanings, understandings and relationships to be created and regenerated across 
nationalized boundaries of difference. A new equilbirium can be achieved by shifting the 
basis of identification from language and information to social transaction and 
interpreted, pluralingual communication. 
5.3.3.2 Re-Learning How to Speak 
“I admire [the interpreters] for what they are doing. I know how difficult it is. I 
listen to colleagues: some of them are brilliant. Some are not clear in any language. You 
can’t get a better interpretation than the source” (OM61). Along the same lines, “In 
Committee, on the whole, it is possible to follow the argument. Sometimes, I don’t know 
if it is the interpreting that is inadequate or the Member who is inadequate” (OM44). 
Generating the source language for simultaneous interpretation has become a matter of 
discursive consciousness. “At the beginning of term,” explains a Member, “people think 
about it, about being clear and not too complicated. After several months they get used to 
it. We learn how to speak to be understood: as brief as possible, as clear as possible” 
(OM20). Another confirms: “I started with complicated language. Over the years, I came 
down, to spell down things so that twelve-year-old can understand. Far from where I 
started” (OM61). “My wording,” says another, “is simple, not complicated” (OM62). 
“We’re not using a sophisticated language,” continues another. “You want to get 
your point. Use short sentences, simple words. You’re used to tv and radio—you have 
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fifty seconds, be short and clear. Don’t use strange words” (OM31). The soundbyte 
mentality applies to mother tongue as well as ELF, and explicitly privileges the 
transmission/spatial dimension of communication: it is information-centric. Relationally, 
one Member explained that “You can ask to repeat if you think it is possible to mend [a 
misunderstanding]. But if [a colleague] thinks he is understandable [and he is not], people 
will ignore him and he will have to learn the hard way. This happens with native 
language too, if you come at people out of the blue” (OM33). “You have a short time,” 
says another Member, and therefore “must give a clear message. After one to two years 
people stop thinking about the form they use. Some deputies [the original label for 
MEPs] never achieve this, but the majority do” (OM20). 
As a kind of thought experiment, I asked a technician about the possibility of an 
interpreter asking a Member to clarify what he or she meant before plunging into an 
uncertain rendering: “Oh, to interact,” he replied. “The machine is not made to offer this 
possibility” (F12). “The machine cuts that off?” I wondered. “The machine doesn’t cut 
nothing,” he asserted. “If the human expressed the need of this possibility, the machine 
can offer this possibility” (F12). Some Members express ultimate belief in a 
technological solution, e.g., “We won’t need interpreters in the future because of machine 
translation” (OM35); but someone else mentioned off the record that “there was an 
experiment with machines …it was such a failure.” Other Members pinpoint “the real 
problem is the time limit. You have to be concise, to the point” (OM08). Encompassing 
ELF, other lingua francas, mother tongues and the electronic technology, a Member 
claimed: “The instruments are not very important. Being in the mainstream…you have 
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just one instant, one moment to come, to be in the center or this possibility is lost” 
(OM20). 
5.3.3.3 Time 
The perceived need to control time is the hidden ideology that justifies complaints 
about misunderstanding. Misunderstandings are a scapegoat, framed as impediments to 
the pace of communication. “The interpreting is a very good thing. They are strongly in 
place: when they stop, everything stops” (NM26). Understood as “the most organized 
workforce in the institution” (F04), some other permanent Parliament staff resent that 
“interpreters have power” (F04). Although interpreters are constrained from intervening 
in misunderstandings, “they will stop if it is too fast” (OM35). According to a technician, 
The president of the room…has a Slow Down light. If interpreters think 
the speaker is speaking too fast, so maybe speaks like this, ‘Blahblahblah 
[speaking very fast],’ and they can’t follow the speaking, they have a 
button on their desk that gives a signal to the president and blinks this 
letter, so the president has to know. He has to say to the speaker, ‘Please 
slow down because the interpreters can’t follow you.’ This system is 
programmed that at least two interpreter desks have to press the Slow 
Down button to give the signal…it could be two people in the same booth 
[or in different booths]…to be sure that the one didn’t press the button just 
like this [demonstrating brushing over it by accident.] (F12) 
During more than thirty hours of simultaneously-interpreted meetings, I observed only a 
handful of requests from a Chairperson asking colleagues to slow down for the sake of 
interpretation. 
European Parliament Interpreters keep pace with the typical rate of speech. 
Members express two sides of the same coin: on one side, “When it’s slow, it becomes 
tedious” (OM44); on the other, “You have no time. The regime here is such…first you 
have to get the speaking time from the Group…the Liberals [in this Member’s particular 
293 
context] have seven minutes to speak, for all others only one to two minutes. You can’t 
say, ‘No, you didn’t understand me’” (NM64). Another Member concurs: it is “not only a 
language issues…Yesterday I had two minutes, sometimes only one minute. I am lucky if 
I get three minutes” (OM42). “The scarcity of time in an institution like this” (OM03) is 
taken for granted. “If you add thirty seconds per speaker for interpretation, that increases 
the meeting by three hours while [also] eliminating three topics” (OM03). This is the 
reason justifying why “most use English even though there is interpretation: it hastens 
things up, doesn’t create delays” (NM24). “Sometimes the English [interpretation] is 
slow,” says another Member, giving a different twist to the constitution of time: “then I 
listen in French. For instance with the Greek President, it is difficult to keep track, 
especially when he is going fast” (NM28). 
“If Greek is spoken,” explained another Member, “then you have the pivot. All 
the translations [sic] are delayed” (NM26). There can be “an uncomfortable hiatus,” 
which one Member likened to “dead air [being] the worst thing you can have on the 
radio” (OM44). This is born out by at least one Member’s overt impatience: “I have no 
time for waiting! The interpretation is taking too long. There is too much time waiting” 
(NM01). Others disagree: “Concerns about timing are not really valid,” expressed an 
administration official, “there is no time loss” (F25). A Member agrees, “there is some 
delay, in some cases but it does not hinder work or listening” (OM07). Others are even 
more blasé: “I never think about time. I am so occupied with listening and learning 
languages” (OM40). The relationship between language choice and time was best 
summarized by this Member: “You have no time to think about language: you have to 
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take part in the debate. Sometimes it is better, necessary to use your own language. And 
sometimes another” (OM20). 
The relentless pace shows up most problematically in two ways. “Sometimes,” 
one Member said, “people use language to get more power, if we have to move 
rapidly…sometimes this [multilingualism] is misused” (NM54). A few may be offended 
when “they cut off things [a colleague] had to say” (OM03). The most obvious 
breakdown of what controlled multilingualism is the way it is performed during voting. 
Here, a Member said, “the time delay is insurmountable” (NM28). “Votes are moving at 
a high rate,” explains an MEP, “600 votes in three hours. If inaccurately interpreted—it 
can throw you off and you’re lost for six votes before you find your place” (OM44). 
Another Member explained, 
Today during the vote, I can’t follow the Dutch translation and I don’t 
understand the Spanish [spoken by the Chairperson]. I tried English. After 
five minutes I switched. I switched five times and always too late, and 
sometimes the numbers were wrong. Visually, I can follow who is in 
front, if they vote For [he raises his hand], then I [raises his hand], but if 
they vote Against, then I am too late. (OM31) 
Forcing Members to guess at the timing of yes/no votes by relying on visual cues from 
other Members is probably not in the best interests of European democracy. 
In this chapter, I have presented the discourse about the system of SI in the EP in 
a way to let it speak for itself. The major themes have all been introduced: the use of 
one’s own language/mother tongue or a lingua franca, EFL, Member control of diction 
(words and meanings) as well mistakes and misunderstandings, risk, quality and speed. 
The question of marginalizing monolinguals has been raised, the application of 
multilingualism problematized, and the concept of pluralingualism introduced. Before 
elaborating the findings and presenting the conclusion, it is necessary to place the 
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institution of the Parliament and the system of SI in the EP in historical time. Although 
the once-vaunted European Constitution failed,205 a quote about it serves as the discursive 
bridge for placing the current discourse about SI in the EP in its most relevant historical 
timestream (Neustadt and May, 1986): 
We [the European Parliament] organized the Convention Debates, we 
organized the Charter Debates. In fact, the success of the Charter led the 
Heads of certain governments at the Summit to decide to have a 
Convention on the future of Europe, and that is the genesis of the 
Constitution. And I don’t think we can say that it was very very successful 
and it took place in eleven languages…and then say multilingualism had 
nothing to do with the success of that particular formula. Everyone is 
respected if they are allowed to speak their own language. (F38, in 2005) 
Compare the sentiments in that quotation with this one, from a book review of The 
Origins of Simultaneous Interpretation by Frances Gaiba (1998): 
It is no exaggeration to say that without simultaneous interpretation, the 
1945-1946 multilingual Nuremberg trial of major figures of the Nazi 
regime could not have taken place… for the interpreting profession, it was 
an exemplary—and almost unparalleled—instance of human and technical 
triumph over the linguistic obstacles that can otherwise impede the 
implementation of the loftiest sentiments of fairness. (Morris, 1999) 
Vuorikoski also echoes the sentiment: 
It has been said that Europe is on everyone’s lips, but in different languages. 
Preserving the cultural identity of the Member States has been considered 
essential in the European context, and one way of maintaining cultural identity 
has been the language policy which guarantees the official languages of the 
Member States the status of an official language in the European Union as well. A 
plurality of cultures has been experienced as a value that the community does not 
                                                
205  Referendum votes from France and Belgium went against the Treaty during the first 
research period (May 2005). The sense of disappointment in Parliament’s halls was 
palpable, but Members remained resolute. They found another way to consolidate 
the European Union with the Lisbon Treaty, which came into force with some 
fanfare during the second research period (2009) by linking it to the European 
Parliament’s 50th anniversary. 
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want to surrender; instead, the many ways of thinking have been seen as a 
challenge rather than a handicap. (Zeyringer 1991: 7) In fact, the European 
communities are the only international community where the languages of all the 
Member States enjoy the status of an official language. This policy has been seen 
to act as a safeguard for political and legal equality, as citizens are able to follow 
the functioning of the institutions in their own language. (Ramos-Ruano 1991: 
61–65)” (in Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 73). 
The system initiated at Nuremberg has evolved in sophistication and capacity to enable 
the regime of controlled multilingualism at the European Parliament. It also has had a 
serious effect upon Deaf communities and other linguistic minorities who require 
interpreting at the interface of their daily lives and the major institutions of society. The 
next chapter will explore this history, beginning at Nuremberg and then providing a case 
history of professional interpreting and American Deaf Culture. 
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CHAPTER 6 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF A SYSTEM 
OF SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION 
6.1 Timestream Placement of the Discourse about SI in the EP 
Placement is Neustadt and May’s (1986) term for the locating an organization in 
its proper historical timestream. 
To link conventional wisdoms of the present with past counterparts and 
future possibilities; to link interpretations of the past with the experiences 
of their interpreters, and both with their prescriptions; to link proposals for 
the future with the inhibitions of the present and inheritances of the past - 
all these mean to think relatively and in terms of time, opening one’s mind 
to possibilities as far back as the story’s start and to potentialities as far 
ahead as relevant (judged, of course, from now, hence subject to revision 
later). That entails seeing time as a stream. It calls for thinking of the 
future as emergent from the past and of the present as a channel that 
perhaps conveys, perhaps deflects, but cannot stop the flow. (Conveys? 
Deflects? In what degree? A critical concern!) Perception of time-in-flow 
cannot help but be encouraged by purposeful study of stretches of history, 
regardless of whose it is or what the focus” (1986: 246). 
Recall the concept of indexicality, which refers to the forward-acting impulse of language 
use in the present. Looking backwards, at the time of utterance and enactment, 
indexicalities are entailments206 that shape social transactions through their persistence in 
language use. 
                                                
206  Entailment is the long tail of indexicality, the social meanings which always 
accompany referential/denotational meaning. “Through indexicality, every utterance 
tells something about the person who utters it - man, woman, young, old, educated, 
from a particular region, or belonging to a particular group, etc. - and about the kind 
of person we encounter - we make character judgments all the time…”  (Blommaert, 
2004, p. 11). 
298 
6.1.1 Nuremburg: The Originating Scene 
The possibility of generating mutual understanding among the four languages of 
plaintiffs and defendants after WWII was weighed from the beginning against a need for 
speed, yet the ramifications of this tension have received practically no investigation. 
Scholarship on the Nuremberg International War Crimes Tribunal is extensive. However, 
as of 1998, Gaiba estimated only a dozen pages involved interpreting; these are spread 
across a mere four sources: Conot, 1983; Neave, 1978; Persico, 1994; and Tusa & Tusa, 
1983. The absence of interpreting from historical analysis is interesting precisely because 
everyone was concerned with how long the Nuremberg trials could take because of the 
language differences. “The language problem had surfaced as soon as the talks began in 
London” (Persico, 1994, p. 53). The attitude that language difference is a problem was 
commonsense: consecutive interpretation would simply take too long. 
Regarded as the birthplace of professional simultaneous interpretation, for our 
analysis what is important is that the crucible of an international court of law for crimes 
against humanity established the exemplar for the performance of simultaneous 
interpreting in all settings. Requirements imposed on Nuremberg interpreters were 
dictated by unquestioned imperatives concerning speed, expectations for accuracy based 
largely on a myth of linguistic equivalence, and the ability of humans to interface 
seamlessly with electronic technology. 
Cast as “this dumb idea that the Americans were putting on” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 
85), the solution to the language problem was generated by an interpreter. Colonel Léon 
Dostert had interpreted for General Eisenhower, and for both “the German Army, 
occupying his town during the First World War and for the American Army which 
liberated it” (Gaiba, 1998, pp. 133-134). An American military officer born in France, 
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Dostert contacted two officials close to Chief Justice Robert H. Jackson and arranged 
with IBM to provide a demonstration to Chief Justice Jackson’s aide (Charles Horsky) 
and his son Bill, convincing them of the idea (Persico, 1994). 
Whether Dostert had a flash of insight (spawned, perhaps, by his experiences as 
an immigrant), reasoned his way through the juxtaposition of time with pluralingualism, 
or simply extended the knowledge he had of the recently patented Filene-Finlay 
equipment being built and distributed by IBM (Gaiba, 1998), somehow Dostert realized 
that the new “IBM System” (Tusa & Tusa, 1983) could enable interpretation to be 
conducted in parallel, that is, simultaneously, rather than in sequence (consecutively). 
“Our work in Nuremberg was based essentially on the Filene-Finlay system” (Uiberall, as 
cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 43-44). Siegfried Ramler, another long-term Nuremberg 
interpreter, described the need “to make trial proceedings and documents understandable 
to judges, prosecutors, defendants, and defense counsel in Courtroom 600 [of the 
Nuremberg Palace of Justice], as well as to audiences around the world following the 
proceedings?” (2008, p. 50). Others credited the engineers: 
There was a primary difference between the subsequent trials and the 
international. The international was [run by the] four powers, and there 
had to be [simultaneous translation [sic] in] four different languages, and 
that is a big job. It wouldn’t have been done at all except for the ingenuity 
of IBM engineers. They made possible the simultaneous translation [sic] 
system, provided earphones for every seat in the courtroom. 
 The subsequent trials, although they were international trials in the 
sense that they were done under international law, were all American, so 
that we only had the simultaneous translation [sic] of German/English and 
English/German, and that simplified things a great deal from the 
administrative point of view. (Robert King, in in Stave et al, 1998, p. 159) 
The subsequent trials are instances of community interpreting; there was also community 
interpreting at Nuremberg (see Section 6.1.7). 
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 Neglecting mention of community interpreting in the historical record, and/or 
hiding it within the duties of translators, is one of the ways that dehumanization became 
embedded as a control mechanism for simultaneous interpretation. The emphasis on 
information contained in the language is another tactic of dehumanization that was 
necessary for the trials to be conducted. By separating information from the person, 
communication could occur without regard for the Other. In this case, a most despicable 
“other” (in the bodies of the defendants) but also for everyone associated with the trial in 
any capacity: victims, rescuers, bystanders, uncharged perpetrators, etc. 
6.1.2 The IBM System 
There was anxiety about getting the system in place. “The equipment went astray” during 
shipping (Tusa & Tusa, 1983, p. 218) and “everything depended on having the 
interpreting system in place on opening day” (Persico, 1994, 12). When it did arrive, only 
three weeks in advance (Gaiba, 1998, p. 39), “the British Signal Corps did all the wiring, 
and laid many miles of wiring in there. It was a very sophisticated network” (Chapman, 
in Gaskin, 1990, p. 93). Dan Kiley, who designed the layout of the courtroom and built 
the interpreters booths along with some other specific furniture, described it as “a 
quadrilingual translation [sic] system. Earphones, and so forth” (in Stave et al, 1998, p. 
26). While the wiring was being installed, the interpreters were playing at a mock trial in 
the courtroom’s attic. “We played various roles which we had to guess at because no one 
had seen a war crimes trial before. . . . we discovered a number of things that we had not 
thought of before” (Uiberall, in Gaskin, p. 42-43). In a review of Gaiba’s The Origins of 
Simultaneous Interpretation, Morris summarized the complicated process this way: 
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Those responsible for the arrangements as they affected the interpreters 
tried to ensure that the latter had the best possible conditions for their 
work, subject to time and space constraints. Having dared take the risk of 
making use of an untried approach - the ‘simultaneous’ technique had 
been used in the pre-war period only for the reading out of pre-translated 
versions of speeches or simultaneously providing multiple-language 
versions of consecutive interpretation - they tried to build in as many 
measures as possible to enable the interpreters to do the best job possible. 
They also recognized the human element. Arrangements were made to 
provide discreet signals when a speaker needed to slow down, or if it 
became necessary to interrupt the proceedings for reasons related to 
interpretation. A monitor in the courtroom constantly kept an ear on all 
working interpreters, and was prepared to replace anyone who showed 
signs of fatigue, if necessary interrupting the proceedings to do so. (1999, 
p. 352) 
One of the most prominent features of the IBM system as it was used during the 
Nuremberg trials was awareness of and attention to the social implications of using the 
brand new technology. Acknowledging these implications required participation by 
interpretees: speakers and listeners were actively involved in the overall facilitation of the 
simultaneous interpretation process. 
Alfred Steer, Administrative Head of the Language Division at the trials, 
explained: “We had a system of two lights: a yellow one meaning ‘Please slow down,’ 
and a red one meaning ‘Please stop the proceedings momentarily’” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 
38).207 The lights were an outcome of the mock trials: 
In the first place, there is a certain speed beyond which you cannot 
possibly hear and talk, so there had to be a system to keep people from 
getting too fast. Then someone came up with the idea of light signals: a 
                                                
207  Ramler describes three lights (or calls one two different colors): “As with traffic, we 
developed a system of orange and red lights which would be flashed by the monitor, 
signalling speakers in the courtroom. The yellow light was a signal to slow down and 
to prevent two parties from speaking at the same time. The red light, used sparingly, 
gave a sign to the presiding judge to declare a recess” (2008, p. 51-52).  
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yellow light coming on for ‘slow down’, and a red one for ‘stop’. The 
latter was for situations where the interpreter could not carry on because 
he had a coughing spell or something – it happened once or twice – and 
then you pushed the red button, and everything stopped until you were 
ready to go on. (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 43) 
The role of a monitor was invented to watch for impending interpreter failure. 
“Occasionally an interpreter would freeze,” Ramler explains, “either because of a 
translation [sic] difficulty or because of a shock effect arising from the nature of the 
testimony” (2008, p. 50). The monitor sat very close to the currently-working interpreter 
because “sometimes it was possible to step in and help” (Uiberall, in Gaskin, p. 43). 
Administrator Steer described how it worked: “I’d press the red one, which was in front 
of Lord Justice Lawrence, he would stop everything and I’d make the shift” (Gaskin, 
1990, p. 38). Ramler says, “The interpreters at the microphone appreciated [Lawrence’s] 
understanding of the challenges we faced and his admonition to counsel and witnesses to 
speak slowly” (2008, p. 49). 
Most surprising (looking back from today’s standard practice), the following was 
widely understood and accepted: 
Interpreting in these cases had a lot of pitfalls, and very often at the end of 
the day we [interpreters] were not exactly overjoyed at the way it came 
through. We would run upstairs to the reviewing people and say, ‘Hey, 
that wasn’t exactly the best way to do it. Have you checked that?’ You 
had a lot of safeguards against mistranslations—I don’t think any that 
occurred remained in the transcript. (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, p. 47) 
The reviewing process was the work of a third team of interpreters (Gaiba, 1998; Gaskin 
1990). Peter Uiberall, “one of the longest-serving interpreters at the Nuremberg Trials” 
(Morris, 1999, p. 351), says it was a fight to convince the personnel people to allow the 
third team (Gaiba, 1998). Interpreter monitors (know as team interpreters in the field of 
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community interpreting today) and transcript reviewers were communication 
accommodations made in recognition that “the human element” (Morris, 1999, p. 352) 
had to be taken into account, including the effects of time pressure on spontaneous 
performance. 
Making corrections and edits in the record after the fact was an embedded aspect 
of the Nuremberg precedent. “Upstairs in the court-house we had a section which was 
called the reviewing section, where the transcript of the preceding day was gone over by 
interpreters of the third team” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 45). Uiberall continued to describe the 
teamwork functions of the interpreters: 
It was absolutely necessary to have three teams of interpreters: two teams 
alternated in the court-room, with one team on stand-by in the radio room 
behind, with phone connection [ready to relieve failing interpreters], and 
the third team was up in the reviewing section, going over the previous 
day’s transcript word for word: hearing the original, seeing the text of the 
translation [sic] and correcting it. (Gaskin 1990, p. 45) 
It was not unusual for the interpreters to receive help from others in the courtroom. 
Besides debates over meaning among the legal counsel, Uiberall explained how 
defendants in particular were highly attuned to the interpreters when he said: 
Whenever an interpreter got stuck on some technical term that a German 
witness used, you would see either Speer or Schacht or both quickly whip 
out a piece of paper, write the English term on it, and send it along the line 
to the defendant who was sitting closest to the interpreter, who slipped it 
under the glass partition. So we were grateful to them. They were 
interested in good translation [sic], as we were, and were helping where 
they could.” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 84) 
Additionally, “many of the German lawyers understood English, monitored our 
interpretation, and occasionally would object if they thought a given translation [sic] was 
in error” (Ramler, 2008, p. 49). 
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6.1.3 Interpreters on Trial 
IBM was “eager to pioneer the world’s first system of simultaneous 
interpretation” (Persico, 1994, p. 54), which they called the International Translator 
System (Tusa & Tusa, 1983, p. 110). The IBM System enabled up to five different 
languages to be transmitted along separate audio channels; the human beings required to 
produce the essential interpretations of the languages distributed across those channels 
were the last addition to this revolutionary technology. “The system would only work,” 
explained Chief Justice Jackson’s executive, Brigadier General Gill, “if every delegation 
recruited top-notch interpreters” (Gaiba, 1998, p. 45). 
Discovering individuals able to operationalize IBM’s technology so that it could 
function as desired proved difficult. “Only one prospect in twenty had the mental agility 
to listen and talk at the same time” (Persico, 1994, p. 112). The requirements applied to 
prospective interpreters were as strict as those applied to the electronics. The skillset 
required for simultaneous interpreting was quickly differentiated from the skills required 
for a) consecutive interpreting, which utilizes notetaking and allows an interpreter to 
work with whole messages rather than fragments; and b) translating written texts, which 
occurs ‘off-line’ and ‘behind-the-scenes’ at the translator’s individual pace (Gaiba, 1998). 
Seigfried Ramler, an interpreter at Nuremberg, explained that simultaneous interpreting 
“called for the ability to think of the second best word instantly, or the third best word, 
because you could not afford to stop” (U.S. Courts, 2010). 
By his own account, Steer in his administrative capacity tested approximately 400 
potential interpreters, having the most success with individuals from small countries such 
as Belgium and Holland or who worked in telephone services: 
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The Paris international telephone exchange was a superb place to pick 
people up, because they had to deal with conversations in all languages. 
But I found that only about five per cent of experienced [consecutive] 
interpreters could do this Nuremberg job, because of the nervous control 
that was needed, and because it was simultaneous. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 39) 
Uiberall emphasized the significance of the time element: “Before 1945, simultaneous 
interpretation had not existed in the form in which we used it at Nuremberg. . . . 
something entirely new had come up: we had to do spontaneous interpretation, immediate 
interpretation” (Gaskin, 1990, p. 43-44). A mixture of concern, discomfort, and 
skepticism led planners of the tribunal to doubt this new means of manipulating time 
(Gaiba, 1998, p. 37). “The decision to use it at the trial was hard to take because no 
delegation felt comfortable with the multilingual character of the trial and most believed 
at first that simultaneous interpretation would not work at all” (Gaiba, p. 32). Indeed, “it 
was hardly credible that one system could provide access to five languages, and beyond 
imagining that translations [sic] would ever be able to keep up with the proceedings” 
(Tusa & Tusa, 1983, p. 110). 
6.1.4 The Ideology of Speed 
The ideology of speed is only touched upon here, but it completely infiltrates the 
interpreter’s role space208 and functional production. Griffiths (2004) briefly summarized 
an early champion of “the cult of speed” (p. 52), referring to Italian futurist Marinetti’s 
New Religion-Morality of Speed (1916), where he writes of “a new good: speed, and a 
                                                
208  The concept of a multidimensional “role space” (Lee & Lewellyn-Jones, 2013) 
replaces the inaccurate and unnecessarily restrictive concept of interpreters’ “role.” 
Role space will be elaborated later in this chapter. 
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new evil: slowness” because “slowness is naturally foul” (p. 52). Griffiths also quoted a 
critic: 
Paul Virilio writes in Speed and Politics (1986) that “Western man has 
appeared superior and dominant, despite inferior demographics, because 
he appeared more rapid. In colonial genocide or ethnocide, he was the 
survivor because he was in fact super-quick (sur-vif). The French word 
vif, ‘lively,’ incorporates at least three meanings: swiftness, speed 
(vitesse), likened to violence — sudden force, abrupt edge . . . and to life 
(vie) itself: to be quick means to stay alive . . .” (p. 55). 
For the Nuremberg trials, only those interpreters who were quick enough survived the 
encounter with the IBM system. “More than 200 people were tested before the trial to 
obtain the first 36 simultaneous interpreters” (Gaiba, 1998, p. 48). “We staged mock 
trials to judge whether candidates were able to respond instantly to the verbal stimuli 
without falling behind” (Ramler, 2008, p. 52). Turnover during the trial was calculated at 
104% (Gaiba, 1998, p. 56). Steer explained this phenomenon further: 
I acted as an interpreter on a few occasions, but I wasn’t very good at it. 
You need a certain amount of absolutely iron nervous control, so that you 
can absolutely rely on the fact that you’re never going to stutter or stop, 
ever. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 38) 
A court clerk, Ron Chapman, observed the situation: “The interpreters couldn’t wait until 
the whole question had finished, and then translate [sic] it, because it would take so long, 
and it would lose its continuation” (Gaskin, p. 93). Uiberall, who eventually became 
Chief Interpreter (Gaiba, 1998), described the Russian interpreters in this way: 
[They were] excellent – I never saw them flounder. And it is very difficult 
to translate into Russian, for the simple reason that the Russian is so much 
longer: there are more words, so you have to speak faster and get more in 
during the same period of time. (Gaskin, 1990, p. 70) 
In fact, Steer explained, “if the lag got longer [than eight to ten seconds], the interpreter 
would soon get into trouble, because you can only hold a limited number of words in 
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your memory under those conditions” (Gaskin, 1990 p. 39). Steer added, “it tickled me 
no end that [defendant Albert] Speer was the first one to grasp that this idea [of 
simultaneous interpreting] was workable and was saving an enormous amount of time” 
(Gaskin p. 85). Ramler adds another perspective: “After the trials started, Herman Göring 
was overheard to say, ‘This system is very efficient, but it will also shorten my life!’” 
(2008, p. 50). 
The repeated emphasis on saving time, not being able to wait, needing to speak 
faster so as to compress language into less time than its grammar requires, and otherwise 
not losing time, demonstrate that speed was determined to be the single most significant 
criteria driving the professional delivery of simultaneous interpretation. “I know for a fact 
that it was such a stressful thing for these translators [sic] that two or three of them had 
nervous breakdowns during the trial. It was really terrible, because they could not afford 
to get a word wrong,” says Chapman (as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 93). “We had no body 
of experience to draw on,” explains Ramler, “and had to develop the necessary skills on 
our own. These challenges were the impetus to create a system of simultaneous 
interpretation, now in general use throughout the world, but pioneered on a large scale by 
our group at Nuremberg” (2008, p. 50). 
In addition to creating speed as the primary baseline metric for assessing the 
functionality of a simultaneous interpreter, the normal processes of communicative repair 
were denied to interpreters. All of the participants at Nuremberg, including judges, 
defendants, interpreters, administrators, witnesses, reporters and public observers, erected 
a social taboo to isolate the interpreter from the inherently interactive process of co-
constructing meaning. This interaction taboo grew out of the imposed value of speed, 
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general dehumanization of the interpreter as a participant in the communication process, 
and the linguistic paradigm’s emphasis on source language as the only relevant standard 
by which to measure accuracy. 
6.1.5 Iron Nervous Control and the Interpersonal Reduction 
Steer, quoted above describing his inability to perform to the specification of 
speed admits, “I couldn’t attain that sort of assurance. . . . We found that the job of 
interpreting was so nerve-racking that the individual could not do this day after day” (as 
cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 38). By assurance, Steer is probably referring to closure. Closure 
is the skill Ramler (U.S. Courts, 2010) names as “the ability to think of the second best 
word instantly [emphasis added], or the third best word.” There is a fallacy implied in 
Ramler’s description: the metaphor of number is an example of the myth of linguistic 
equivalence in that anyone or everyone would rank the first, second, and third “best 
words” similarly, despite interpreters’ professional knowledge that “there is no such thing 
as an exact translation of any word” (Uiberall, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 48). 
Isolating the interpreter as a linguistic functionary making simple digital decisions 
(“this” word or “that” word) is a mechanism of control: the interpreter is forced to 
eliminate the relational. Cultural distinctions in terms of social interaction and the non-
verbal are erased or suppressed in favour of the more palpable variables of language use 
at the levels of, say, morphology and syntax. This is evidenced by models for assessing 
the quality of interpretation, which always begin with an evaluation of the accuracy of 
diction (literally, ‘exact translation at the level of word) or sense (more loosely, at the 
level of phrasal or aggregate meaning) from source to target text (see, for example, 
Figure 2 in Pöchhacker, 2001, p. 413). In Pöchhacker’s diagram of the communication 
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process, the success of the communicative interaction is represented as following linearly 
from “an accurate rendition of source” (p. 413). The underlying assumption is that the 
faster an interpreter generates an “adequate target-l[anguage] expression” then an 
“equivalent intended effect” is (shown as) achieved (p. 413). In other words, the 
interpretation is deemed successful on the basis of linguistic criteria alone. Notably, the 
temporal direction of evaluation is backwards rather than forward in time: the “source” is 
taken as definitive, as if everyone always says only and exactly what they mean, all the 
time; or as if saying what one means, exactly and precisely, guarantees that one will be 
understood as one intends. These assumptions institute constraints within the 
communication transaction that inhibit voice. 
In other words, the cost of misunderstanding (or even failure) at the cultural or 
social level is presumed to be lower (as in, not worth worrying about too much) than the 
gain of connected knowing (i.e., of co-creating a relationship across difference that is 
solidly based in mutual understanding, cf Belenky et al, 1997). The supposedly lower 
cost of damaged relationships is quantified in an absolute sense (i.e, source-determined 
accuracy), which may not correspond with anyone’s desired outcome. What has occurred 
is that only one area of work-related demand on the interpreter is acknowledged: what 
Dean and Pollard (2001) identified as the linguistic category.209 Completely disregarded 
are the three other sources of work demands: environmental, interpersonal, and 
intrapersonal. As the control for the system of SI in the EP, the simultaneous interpreter 
was produced to maintain the flow of communication transaction, but interpreters are 
                                                
209  Robyn K. Dean & Robert Q. Pollard, Jr. 2001. “Application of Demand-Control 
Theory to Sign Language Interpreting: Implications for Stress and Interpreter 
Training.” Journal of Deaf Studies and Deaf Education, 6(1), p. 5. 
310 
denied the use of controls to manage the various demands put upon them.210 The specific 
items included in each category of demand sources for sign language interpreters will not 
coincide exactly with the demand sources for interpreters in the European Parliament, but 
they are an excellent reference point, particularly as the EP expands it’s Ad Personam 
community-style interpreting services. 
Ignoring the full range of demands in the (now) institutionalized automatic pilot 
of the IBM system’s interpersonal reduction inhibits interpreters and interpretees from 
cooperating with each other to generate and confirm shared understandings. How sign 
language community interpreters are beginning to work comfortably in role space with 
relational autonomy will be explained in the next section about interpreting and the 
American Deaf community. Relational autonomy (Witter-Merithew, Johnson & 
Nicodemus, 2010) is the ability (one could perhaps go so far as to say the authority) of 
interpreters to exercise decision latitude, accounting for all demands and including the 
dynamic flux of alignments with interpretees through exercising an enlightened role 
space. Witter-Merithew et al. explain: “effective autonomy is achieved when the social 
conditions that support it are in place and give the practitioner—and consumers—the 
confidence to take charge of choices” (p. 50). 
Although these will not be detailed here, some of the disciplinary methods used to 
ensure interpreters’ conformity to the need for speed and limits of interaction include 
ridicule (see Kent, 2009) and banishment or threat of banishment. For instance, the latter 
                                                
210  Ramler describes “a trance-like element in this process” of “total concentration, 
staying in tune with the flow of the speaker, and keeping him or her in sight, to 
achieve simultaneity” (2008, p. 52). The phenomenality of this experience of 
concentration is thwarted by different fluencies of ELF and other lingua francas used 
non-fluently. 
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is exemplified in textbooks and scholarly literature on international business, which 
routinely include negative anecdotes or other aspersions against the use of simultaneous 
interpreters (e.g. Luo & Shenkar, 2006; Veruyten, 2006).211 These social sanctions 
emerge from the simple engineering standard utilized at Nuremberg: failure. “We had 
repeated instances when an interpreter would simply fail, break down, be unable to 
continue, and we would have to put in a substitute at as short notice as possible, so that 
the court wouldn’t be delayed any more than need be” (Steer, as cited in Gaskin, 1990, p. 
38). 
Harry Fiss describes himself as a translator at Nuremberg, although he interpreted 
too, but not in the courtroom.212 Fiss was in charge of the prosecutions files. “By that I 
mean I would get a call by an attorney who needed Document So and So for cross-
interrogating Göring. I would have to come up with it translated, analysed. All that work 
would be done by the whole translation division under me” (in Stave et al, 1998, p. 97). 
Fiss was also called upon to interrogate witnesses, including Rudolf Höss and Otto 
Ohlendorff).  
                                                
211 Verluyten (2006) gives an account, Mr Adams goes to China, in which the interpreter 
“was never seen again” after “a misunderstanding” in which “the interpreter made a 
mistake” while interpreting the idiomatic English expression, “you might as well get 
up and have a cup of coffee” (p. 19). This is clearly misplaced blame. The source 
text is problematic, and it seems the audience must have been desperate for a break if 
so many of them left so quickly that they could “pour back into the room” upon 
being called back.  
212  “I didn’t work inside the courtroom. I could only translate; I couldn’t do 
simultaneous interpretation…I failed the exam! I couldn’t do it! Not because my 
German wasn’t good enough. I just couldn’t do it. You have to have a special talent 
for that. It takes a lot out of you. These guys need a rest every two hours. It’s a very, 
very strenuous job.” (Fiss, in Stave, 1998, p. 102). 
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How I was able to do this, I’m wondering. It’s amazing that I was able to 
not manage to feel anything all. I just did my work…the same numbing of 
feelings that helped the SS execute people also helped the survivors…I 
was able to talk to this SS man who had killed I don’t know how many 
hundreds of thousands of people, smoking a cigarette and telling me with 
great pride how he made this killing machine more and more efficient. 
That was Ohlendorff. (p. 98) 
Fiss also wrote “a kind of novel” that was never published about the interrogation of 
Höss (p. 98). Here is an excerpt: 
Mr Booth was saying, “What’s your name?” and I was acting as the 
interpreter. Höss answered in a controlled voice. “Your rank and arm of 
service.” Mechanically the questions and answers came in one language 
and were converted into another. (emphasis added, p. 98) 
Continuing, Fiss switches to first person, as if he is conducting the interrogation, not 
interpreting it. 
I said to him, “You told us once that you’d be willing to sign this 
confession,” and Höss stared at the document and said, “Yes, but there is 
something wrong,” and then he pointed to the second line. “What’s 
wrong?” Höss said to me, “Right here.” He moved his finger across the 
page. “It says here that I personally arranged the gassing of three million 
persons between June 1941 and the end of 1943.” “Well, isn’t that what 
you said?” “I’m afraid not. I said that only two million were gassed. You 
have to get the record straight. The rest died of other causes.” “Other 
causes?” “You know, the usual thing, malnutrition, dysentery, typhoid. 
We had an awful lot of typhoid cases.” “I see.” Mr. Booth leaned back 
and sighed. “Okay, change it then.” 
As the narrator of this account, Fiss puts us in the interpreter’s position. In the absence of 
technology, when there is no glass between the interpreter and the interpretees, 
communication is personal. Recall the community interpreting situation when an 
interpreter (in a medical context), shifted from direct to indirect speech, “step[ping] into 
the situation in order to solve” a “disagreement” (Merlini & Favaron, 2009, p. 195-
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196).213 Perhaps this is why Fiss asserted that his job “was far more interesting” than the 
courtroom interpreting (in Stave, 1998, p. 102).  
Both in the courtroom and without, interpreting the War Crimes Tribunal was 
traumatic. Fiss wrote about his experiences soon after they happened, at a time when 
“nobody wanted to hear anything about the Holocaust” (p. 100). He explains, “I think 
that a lot of people kept silent and tried to repress it and not think about it and not talk 
about it. They repressed everything, including anger” (p. 100). Even though Fiss did talk 
about it, felt anger and even “acted it out” (p. 100), there are still moments when his 
memory is blank. In the scene with Höss,  
[Mr. Booth] pushed the fountain pen across the table. Höss picked up the 
pen, unscrewed the top and without further ado crossed out the three 
million and put in two million over it. Then he signed his name and then 
he blew on the paper until the ink was dry. I never could remember what 
happened afterwards. (p. 99) 
The tactics of coping with trauma were fused with the performance of interpreting: the 
disembodied “mechanical” voice, silence, and repression were normalized as features of 
simultaneous interpretation because everyone involved in the trial had to find ways to 
cope with its horrors. 
6.1.6 The Social Construction of Technology 
In a landmark article about the social construction of the automobile, Kline and 
Pinch (1996) demonstrated conclusively how “users of technology acted as agents of 
                                                
213  This instance was previously described on p. 121 as an example of agency on the 
interpreter’s part. This example also illustrates cooperation from interpretees in 
seeking shared understanding rather than insisting on a literal rendition of ‘what I 
said!’ This example can be more accurately and deeply described in terms of the 
concepts of relational autonomy and role space that are introduced in Section 6.5. 
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technological change” (p. 764). Compare the automobile with the IBM system, and car 
drivers and passengers with interpreters and interpretees. Kline and Pinch showed how 
farm workers in the rural United States acted with “interpretive flexibility” by adapting 
the automobile to a wide range of practical uses that were unintended by the 
manufacturer. By interpretive flexibility, Kline and Pinch refer to the 
new meanings . . . given to the car by the new emerging social group of 
users . . . To the urban user the car meant transport. For the rural users we 
have identified, the car, as well as being a form of transport, could be a 
farm tool, a stationary source of power, part of a domestic technology 
[such as a laundry machine], or perhaps all of these. (p. 777) 
Kline and Pinch’s analysis shows a dynamic of competing interests among social groups 
who are brought into contact with each other by the technology. 
While the automobile industry struggled for decades to establish closure on the 
social meaning and practical uses of the car (Kline & Pinch, 1996), the first interpreters 
and the first consumers of simultaneous interpretation accepted the component 
specifications for the simultaneous interpreter without apparent question or critique. This 
model was picked up by the first wave of interpreter trainers without doubt and is 
evidence of the ideology of speed. No one imagined other, additional or different ways of 
using simultaneous interpreting because there was social consensus that the interpreter 
was supposed to blend in as an invisible part of the machine. 
6.1.7 Nuremberg’s Hidden Community Interpreting  
Intriguingly, Siegfried Ramler describes working as a community interpreter 
(even though he does not use this label), prior to the start of the Nuremberg trial. He 
handled the logistics of housing for troops and officers. “Serving as interpreter, I would 
315 
give the house’s occupants one hour to clear the premises, allowing them to take along 
only items they could carry…while it was unpleasant to evict people from their homes, I 
approached this task as politely as possible” (2008, pp. 36-40). Further, Ramler (and 
certainly others) were involved with interpreting the interrogations that occurred prior to 
the Trial’s start. 
Immediately after my arrival in Nuremberg, I was assigned to interrogations, 
starting early in the morning and often lasting late into the evening. These were 
designed to build the prosecution’s case and validate documentary evidence. The 
interrogations involved defendants and witnesses called to clarify and explain a 
given segment of the prosecution’s case…Guards brought the defendants up from 
their prison cells to one of the interrogation rooms in the Palace of Justice. 
Present in the room would be a prosecution lawyer, a court reporter, and the 
German-English interpreter, which was my function during the pretrial 
phase…When I think back to my most memorable experiences during the four 
years I spent in Nuremberg—over a year with the international trial and three 
additional years with the subsequent proceedings—the interrogations in 
preparation for the major trial stand out, as Germany’s erstwhile leaders presented 
spontaneous and unfiltered testimony. This was the first time, just weeks after 
their capture…that these men were required to answer questions and comment on 
their roles during the [Nazi] regime. The interrogations often paralleled an 
autopsy, where doctors trace the development of a disease leading to the patient’s 
death. Their testimony yielded ‘history in the raw,’ expressed spontaneously 
before formal testimony on the witness stand could be shaped and filtered by 
defense strategy. (emphasis added, 2008, pp. 47). 
A photograph shows Ramler at work, approximately two feet away from a defendant. 
The caption reads: “Charged with kidnapping, enslavement, extermination, and crimes 
against humanity, former Obergruppenführer and SS General Warner Lorenz is 
questioned by interpreter Siegfried Ramler during the pre-trial phase of the Nuremberg 
proceedings” (p. 46). Ramler explains, “During the pretrial phase the language 
interpretation required me to translate [sic] the Counsel’s questions into German, and the 
defendant’s or witness’s responses into English. Some of the accused, such as Göring and 
Ribbentrop, understood English but preferred to wait for the translation and respond in 
German, giving them time to think” (p. 48). 
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These situations are examples of community interpreting. What stands out is the 
intimacy of close proximity, the “spontaneous and unfiltered” and “raw” reality of 
interpreted interaction. In the case of ousting people from their homes, this is an old story 
of interpreters aligned with power. Chinua Achebe describes it in his (1958) classic 
Things Fall Apart: 
When they had all gathered, the white man began to speak to them. He 
spoke through an interpreter who was an Ibo man, though his dialect was 
different and harsh to the ears of Mbanta. Many people laughed at his 
dialect and the way he used words strangely. Instead of saying “myself” 
he always said “my buttocks”. But he was a man of commanding presence 
and the clansmen listened to him. He said he was one of them, as they 
could see from his colour and his language…the white man was also their 
brother because they were all sons of God. And he told them about this 
new God, the Creator of the world… (p. 102). 
Achebe also depicts breakdowns in the interpreted communication, a combination of role 
confusion (or abuse) by the interpreters and the failure of participants to monitor turn-
taking and make sure everyone is equally understood by each other. 
Ramler’s other example involves a small group situation which, given the topic, is 
unavoidably intimate.214 These are the situations that community interpreters work within 
daily. Power and interpersonal dynamics, combined with challenges of mutual 
understanding, are palpable, sometimes even visceral. There is no distance provided by 
technology. This is the fundamental difference between simultaneous interpretation 
performed in the conference mode at the European Parliament and the community mode 
in the neighborhoods, towns and cities where people live in proximity with those who do 
and do not share a common language. 
                                                
214  Interesting that Ramler notes the agency of interpretees, too, in their strategic use of 
simultaneous interpretation as an intercultural communication tool. 
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It may be an overstatement to describe the emphasis on the IBM system of 
conference interpreting over the face-to-face encounters of community interpreting as 
collective amnesia. Nonetheless, the discursive evidence (in history and contemporarily) 
illustrates clearly how one mode became popular while the other was ignored. Was this a 
conscious oversight? A deliberate over-valuing of one mode over the other? Most likely 
not; instead the disparity of emphasis is an example of an ideology (speed) and its 
hegemonic values. In particular, the desire for control associated with the perceived 
objectivity of machine technology rather than the messy immediacy of human emotion 
intertwined with inevitable flaws of subjectivity. The absence of attention to community 
interpreting before, during, and after Nuremberg is perhaps due to the phenomenon of 
discursive repression.  
The lopsided value placed on conference interpreting over and against community 
interpreting suggests the mechanism of repression. Technological utopianism may have 
presented conference interpreting as a panacea for the ills of community interpreting: a 
legacy of being on the wrong side of history that practitioners may prefer to forget. This 
could be one of the sources for the interaction taboo (see section 6.2.7), which prohibits 
participants in SI from engaging with the interpreters ‘directly,’ encouraging everyone to 
act as if the interpreters are not co-participants in the communication.215 
                                                
215  A question this dissertation does not explore is who decided that interpreted 
communication should be judged and evaluated according to how closely it mimics 
same-language communication? This collective pretence perpetuates the interaction 
taboo by reducing the interpreter to a non-human status. The interpersonal reduction 
of the interpreter to a machine (see section 6.2.8) prohibits shared responsibility for 
meaning by discouraging proactive engagement with co-creating mutual 
understanding. 
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6.1.8 The Interaction Taboo 
The conditions of the Nuremberg Tribunal combined with the IBM system created 
a perfect petri dish for the ideology of speed: insert bilingual or multilingual human being 
with iron nervous control and out spurts the professional simultaneous interpreter. No one 
seriously questioned the machine model until it reached beyond the conference and into the 
community. The history of the social construction of technology illustrates how unusual it 
is for a new technology not to be adapted by its intended consumers. Nonetheless, the 
system of SI as it was created at Nuremberg has now grown into the current version of 
controlled multilingualism represented above in the discourse about SI in the EP. 
Creative adaptation of the technology as a tool for pluralingualism has not been 
exercised. Instead, the “simple Derridean point” (Chang, personal correspondence, 
October 15, 2011) about the essential communicative equality of misunderstanding and 
understanding has been suppressed by a discourse that privileges the easy speed of 
presumed mutual comprehension. Unchallenged, the primacy of the conference-style 
model, exemplified by the regime of controlled multilingualism (i.e., the system of SI in 
the EP), results in the common sense that “the time delay is unsurmountable” (NM28). 
Eventually, the model of simultaneous interpretation was exported out of the legalistic 
conference setting and into the community, effecting the daily lives of people in need of 
communication accommodations in order to negotiate with the institutions relevant to the 
quality of their every day lives. 
The Deaf community in the United States was open to and excited by the 
expansion of communication access but unprepared for having their cultural center 
disregarded. The tension built to outrage at the imposition of external control on a 
cultural system of interpreting that had already developed indigenously and continues to 
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prove successful at integrating Deaf people as members of a distinct linguistic minority 
into the larger texture of American life. Although it required decades to develop the 
discursive conscious to articulate the practical consciousness of interpreters with “Deaf 
heart” (e.g., Colonomos, 2013), it is now crystal clear that Deaf resistance to what they 
identified as a machine model of interpreting is has much to do with the insistence on 
speed and language without regard for the give-and-take often required for genuine 
comprehension. Conference interpreting privileges the speed of information transfer and 
calls it quality by a measure (usually called accuracy) that assumes a simplistic 
transparency of meaning and disregards how these enactments shape social transactions. 
Deaf people, familiar with their own cultural model of community-based interpreting, 
understood intuitively that they were being asked to sacrifice cultural values and identity in 
order to be granted access into mainstream culture. They were to give up the imperative of 
ensuring understanding in favour of speed, and thereby surrender the integrity of their 
relationships with each other and outsiders for a fake sense of inclusion. In other words, Deaf 
people called the bluff on the ideology of speed and its lopsided communication emphasis on 
the transmission of information in space. During the height of Deaf activism in the 1990s, 
‘Stop separating your head from your heart,’ was a common accusation against sign language 
interpreters schooled in the ways of conference interpreting. If the European Parliament seeks 
to seriously protect the linguistic heritage and diversity of its citizens’ national languages, 
then Members of the European Parliament must embrace their pluralinguistic contributions 
and model co-constructing a common European identity. Lessons from community 
interpreting about pluralingualism may be of at least equal value to all of the multilingual 
policies which, in practice, support serial homolingualism. 
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Table 18. Timeline of Developments in Community and Conference Interpreting 
 Community SI (e.g., Signed Languages) Date  Conference SI (mainly Spoken Languages) 
 1925-
1926 
Invention of the Filene-Finlay system, 
manufactured by IBM  
 1941 1st simultaneous interpreter training program: 
la Faculté de traduction et d’interprétation 
(ETI) at the Université de Genève  
 1945 United Nations Charter drawn up in five 
official languages, Arabic added in 1973. 
 1945-
1946 
Nuremburg War Crimes Tribunal using the 
“IBM translation system” 
 1948 A Mathematical Theory of Communication by 
Claude Shannon (American)  
 1952 Earliest version of the European Parliament, 
the “Common Assembly” of the European Coal 
and Steel Community 
 1957 Treaties of Rome lead to the “European 
Parliamentary Assembly” of the European 
Economic Community 
 1957 ISIT Paris Institute of Intercultural 
Management and Communication 
 1958 ESIT Paris School of Interpreting and 
Translation at Université de la Sorbonne 
Nouvelle 
 1958 European Economic Council: Regulation No. 1 
determining the languages to be used by the 
European Economic Community institutes 
language rights for national languages in (what 
becomes) the European Union  
1st linguistic argument for ASL published by 
William Stokoe (American) 
1960  
Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID) 
founded (US)  
1964  
 1965 Merger/Brussels Treaty consolidates EU 
Institutions 
RID incorporates (US) 1972  
 1973 European Parliament’s language regime 
expands to six 
Audism: concept coined and defined by Tom 
Humphries (American) 
1975  
Conference of Interpreter Trainers established 
(US)  
1978 Interpreting for International Conferences: 
Problems of Language and Communication by 
Danica Seleskovitch (Serbian-French) 
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 Community SI (e.g., Signed Languages) Date  Conference SI (mainly Spoken Languages) 
1st cognitive research of ASL, “The signs of 
language”, published by Edward S Klima and 
Ursula Bellugi (American) 
1979  
Association of Visual Language Interpreters of 
Canada founded 
1980  
 1981 European Parliament’s language regime 
expands to seven 
National Registers of Communication 
Professionals Working with Deaf and 
DeafBlind People (UK) founded 
1982  
RID rejects ASL as an official organizational 
language 
1984  
1st public criticism of the “machine model” of 
interpreting, RID national convention 
1985  
 1986 European Parliament’s language regime 
expands to nine 
European Forum of Sign Language 
Interpreters founded 
1987  
Deaf President Now! protest at Gallaudet 
University (US) 
1988  
Australian Sign Language Interpreters 
Association founded 
1991  
 1992 All six languages of the United Nations are 
recognized as both official and working 
languages. 
Slovak Republic and Finland recognize Sign 
Language in law 
1993  
Czech Sign Language recognized by law 1995 European Parliament’s language regime 
expands to eleven 
 1996 Alex Ndeezi First Deaf Signer elected as a 
Member to the Ugandan Parliament  
Oralism: defined by Paddy Ladd (British) 1998 European Parliament passes a resolution for all 
Member States to recognize their national sign 
languages 
World Association of Sign Language 
Interpreters founded 
2003  
 2004 European Parliament’s language regime 
expands to twenty 
 2007 European Parliament’s language regime 
expands to twenty-three 
 2009 Ádám Kósa, Deaf Signer from Hungary elected 
to the European Parliament 
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 Community SI (e.g., Signed Languages) Date  Conference SI (mainly Spoken Languages) 
Insign pilot project (http://www.eu-insign.eu/) 
for Deaf citizens to communicate through a 
web-based platform with the European 
institutions 
2014  
6.2 Deaf Resistance and Intercultural Critique 
Taking the US American case, a disconnect in perceptions between the culturally 
Deaf viewpoint and the general perspective of professional sign language interpreters has 
inspired over forty years of debate regarding what makes a good simultaneous interpreter. 
Lou Fant (1990) describes the founding of the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID) 
as an “unexpected outcome” (p. 6) of a federally-funded Workshop on Interpreting for 
the Deaf at Ball State University which “surely would have come about shortly 
afterwards” if it had not happened then and there (p. 6). According to minutes published 
in Fant’s retrospective, sixty-six people launched the professionalization of sign language 
interpreting; one third of these founders were Deaf. Seven of the Deaf sustaining 
members also self-identified as interpreters (p. 5). Due to adequate federal funding for 
training, unprecedented rapid growth ensued. 
Within a few years, however, there was a backlash from the Deaf community 
which, in important respects, continues to the present day. “Deaf individuals are being 
asked to give their trust to someone they have not met before, who has no prior or even 
current connection to their community, and who might not understand their values and 
culture” (McDermid, 2009). The distinction between “conference” and “community” 
interpreters is often brought sharply into focus on this point: elites will not suffer 
interpreters with inadequate linguistic fluency or cross-cultural knowledge while the 
Deaf, as a linguistic minority, seem to lack the institutional leverage to guarantee 
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uniformly high quality standards. This has not stopped the Deaf community from 
insisting on improvements. Indeed, a diagnosis of oppression emerged as both logical 
explanation and empowered resistance after 1983 when RID, by then the national 
certifying organization for professional sign language interpreters in the US, failed to 
recognize American Sign Language as an official language of the organization (MJ 
Bienvenu, 2009). 
6.2.1 A Black Swan 
Thinking in terms of time allows one to recognize that the disruptive effect of the 
IBM System’s model of SI on the cultures of Deaf people is an example of a “black 
swan,” that is, an historical event with deep consequentiality that was not predicted and 
which has not previously been adequately explained (Taleb, 2005). Charlotte Baker-
Shenk published the first treatise against “the machine model” of interpreting (1986). 
Writing on behalf of an unnamed group of colleagues (presumedly including Deaf 
individuals), Baker-Shenk explained how the basic interpreting or machine model of the 
sign language interpreter’s role assumed two “equals” who use the interpreter “machine” 
because they do not share a common language (p. 52). 
Baker-Shenk elaborated that although the interpreter may make some “cultural 
adjustments” to accurately convey the messages of each party, still both parties are on 
their own: every individual must take solo responsibility for their interaction (p. xx). Five 
years later, after the Deaf community had adopted and extended the definition of the 
machine model, Baker-Shenk (1991) clarifies that her original use of 
the term ‘machine’ model ... was to describe the interpreter’s role 
...functioning ...ethically...as machines. This machine model clearly 
reveals the basic tendencies of people in power (the dominant class) both 
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to deny the reality of their power and to deny that power is part of what’s 
going on in every situation. (pp. 123-124) 
Persistent, critical pressure from Deaf interpretees required practitioners, interpreting 
trainers, and sign language interpreting researchers to take notice and eventually respond. 
The Conference of Interpreter Trainers (CIT), established in 1979, became a 
venue for improvement. By 1999, Anna Mindess reported that spoken language 
interpreting professors at the Monterey Institute of International Studies (California) told 
her “that they consider sign language interpreters very advanced in our discussions about 
the cultural aspects of interpreting and in the idea of interpreters as bicultural mediators” 
(p. 161). CIT has continued to steadily increase its reputation. In the main, however, the 
advances of signed language community interpreters have not been much noticed by 
spoken language conference interpreters. 
6.2.1.1 Deaf Voice 
Widening the context to its full historical import, the resistance of conference-
style trained simultaneous sign language interpreters in adapting to the Deaf community-
style model is parallel in contemporary timestream with the resistance of MEP 
interpretees to pluralingualistic social transaction. The dynamics of controlled 
multilingualism in the EP promote competition among exclusive homolingualisms. The 
discursive emphasis on fast information transfer unilaterally promotes and reinforces the 
transmission or machine model of interpreting: a translation machine. A counterdiscourse 
of pluralingualism is a corrective to the unintended but devastating consequences of 
valuing the ease of speed over the quality of shared comprehension. Deaf people, with 
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their unique linguistic and cultural differences, reintroduce the relational by valuing the 
time required to ensure mutual understanding. 
6.2.2 The Deaf Case: Practical to Discursive Consciousness 
Deaf people knew perfectly well how to work with interpreters long before the 
birth of the sign language interpreting profession in Evansville, Indiana in 1964, but they 
had never had to explain it to anyone before. “There have always been information 
sharers, and their responsibility within the Deaf community is to ensure that community 
members understand the information” (Stone, 2009, p. 19). The roots of community 
interpreting were premised in an “original cultural system that [had] been unconsciously 
derived and unconsciously manifested” (Sherwood, 1983, p. 14). It was almost four 
decades before sign language interpreter-researcher Dennis Cokely (2005) distinguished 
between “evolved” and “schooled” interpreters as part of an effort to explain the 
intergroup conflict that was created by the unexpectedly rapid growth of the sign 
language interpreting profession. 
Evolved interpreters are indigenous. They grow up within the community 
interpreting for family and friends as necessary and have, therefore, internalized the 
norms of social behavior in practical ways, just like every other member or close friend 
of the community. Historically, as Sherwood points out, evolved interpreters had 
practical consciousness in the sense meant by Giddens. They simply knew what to do in 
order to make intercultural communication with hearing (non-deaf/non-signing) people 
work, and they did it. A somewhat similar phenomenon is described by old-school 
interpreters for the European Parliament, who recount how they simply ‘fell into’ 
interpreting because they grew up in multilingual families and were good at it, compared 
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with the new-school interpreters who learn languages formally because they have 
consciously determined to pursue interpreting as a career. 
In the US, when schooled sign language interpreters began entering the field in 
large numbers, they added to the force of a new way of interpreting already imposed on 
the Deaf community by an influx of outsiders. These new ways were strange and painful, 
experienced by Deaf persons as alienating and oppressive (e.g., Baker-Shenk, 1986; Fant, 
1990; Moore & Levitan, 2003). Over the years, through advocacy and resistance, Deaf 
people built up a vocabulary for describing the machine model and as well as preferred 
practices and features of “interpreting culturally rich realities” (Cokely, 2001; Mindess, 
1999). Recently, sign language interpreting researchers have 
● re-discovered Deaf norms for interpreting (Adam, Carty & Stone, 2011; Forestal, 
2011; Stone, 2009), 
● created a multidimensional model of the interpreter’s role space (Lee & 
Llewellyn-Jones, 2011), 
● developed the concepts of relational autonomy and decision latitude (Witter-
Merithew, Johnson & Nicodemus, 2011) and 
● adapted a “demand-control schema” (Dean and Pollard 2001, 2011) that is being 
widely adopted as the premier model for professional development and ethical 
performance in community interpreting. 
 
The scaffold for professional practice is now substantial, but its constructs had to be 
forged in opposition to the machine model within a context of intense backlash. 
The next few sections trace a cultural-level development from practical to 
discursive consciousness that the American Deaf Community had to pursue in order to 
resist the imposition of those antagonistic standards of interpreting that infiltrated Deaf 
cultural timespace during the process of professionalizing signed language interpretation. 
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6.2.3 Caught up in the Machine 
The implications of professionalization, specifically of “investing professional 
authority” (Brunson, 2006) in interpreters were not predicted (Fant, 1990) by the tight 
community that launched and led the organizing process in the 1960s. Related to, yet 
different than, the systems of spoken language interpreting at international venues such as 
United Nations and the young institutions of the European Union that sprang from the 
Nuremberg precedent, community interpreting involved visual-gestural American Sign 
Language and spoken (sound-based) English. The spread of the conference interpreting 
model to community interpreting is an example of a phenomenon known in 
organizational management as isomorphism, in which rational procedures (such as 
trainings) that are established and practiced in an institutional context generate a tendency 
to sameness across a given field of activity (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism 
literally means taking the same shape. Schooled sign language interpreters ‘took the same 
shape’ as spoken language conference interpreters because the field of activity was 
presumed to be the same and the rational procedures (instantaneous decision-making 
because you cannot afford to stop, etc.) were unquestioned. 
With uncanny insight, Deaf people pinpointed the machine-like nature of the 
inherited conference interpreting model. “The ‘machine’ or ‘conduit’ model...greatly 
limited [interpreters’] responsibility for either party’s understanding of the other’s 
message. Like a typewriter or telephone answering machine, we [interpreters] were only 
to transmit what we had received without altering its contents in any way” (Mindess, 
1999). 
“The focus of this [machine or conduit] metaphor is on interpreting the 
language of the participants, with the assumption that the primary 
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difference between Deaf people and hearing people can be explained by 
differences in language and modality (signed vs. spoken language). The 
assumption is that the responsibility of the interpreter is to convey each 
person’s words, which would otherwise be inaccessible due to the 
modality difference. (Emphasis in original Hoza, 1999: 44) 
Without historical context, and never having had a reason to defend the evolved 
community interpreting model, the amazing communication accommodation of 
simultaneous interpretation was suddenly experienced as contributing more to the 
oppression of Deaf people than alleviating it. 
6.2.4 “I was a Robot” 
In For Hearing People Only, Moore & Levitan report one of too many such 
instances when interpreters’ authority to assess and act upon practical interaction 
dynamics was suppressed by the pervasive “machine” logic. “We’ve read Lou Ann 
Walker’s harrowing account of ... [being] terribly constrained by the code of ethics” in 
such a way that “a young, poor black woman who had killed her sister’s vicious 
boyfriend in self-defense... [who] should have been acquitted ... was found guilty and 
sentenced to prison. Walker, who sympathized with the woman, was helpless to aid her in 
court: ‘I was a robot.’” (1999/2003: 522).216 Paul Preston, interviewing 150 hearing (not 
deaf) children of Deaf parents explains their disagreement with the model perpetuated by 
the professionalization of interpreting: 
                                                
216 Angelelli (2001) describes this behaviour in machine model terms: “The invisible 
interpreter follows the traffic flow instead of controlling it, ignores differences in 
register, and is indifferent to the parties’ access or lack of access to the message. The 
invisible interpreter is not active in the cross-cultural brokerage but rather, treats the 
message at the linguistic level only” (p. 134). 
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A more mechanistic approach is thought to provide deaf people with 
unfiltered interactions with the Hearing world; any attempt at clarification 
merely sustains the barriers between the Deaf and Hearing. Most 
informants who were professional [evolved] interpreters, however, cited 
their family experiences as favoring a less rigid and mechanistic approach 
to interpreting. (1994, p. 145) 
Baker-Shenk acknowledges how her label, machine model, which she originally intended 
to be specific to ethical decision-making, had been taken up and used to describe another 
dimension of the enactment of simultaneous interpretation. 
Let me clarify my use of the term “machine” model. I first used this term 
at the 1985 RID Convention...since then, it has been used in a different 
way, specifically referring to the linguistic process of word-for-sign or 
sign-for-word, machine-like transliteration. (1991, p. 123) 
A representation of “rigid mechanical Sign” by an interpreter is provided in a work of 
fiction by T.C. Boyle (2006/2007, p. 57). Identity theft has placed a young deaf woman in 
police custody; she does not know why. When the interpreter arrives she explains: 
There’s some huge mistake. All I did was run a four-way stop ... and they, 
they ... Iverson took his time. His signing was rigid and inelegant but 
comprehensible...He held her eyes. His mouth was drawn tight, no 
sympathy there. It came to her that he believed the charges, believed she’d 
led a double life, that she’d violated every decent standard and let the deaf 
community down, one more hearing prejudice confirmed. Yes, his eyes 
said, the deaf live by their own rules, inferior rules, compromised rules, 
they live off of us and on us. It was a look she’d seen all her life... 
It’s crazy. It’s wrong, a mistake, that’s all. Tell them it’s a mistake. 
The coldest look, the smallest Sign. You get one phone call. (p. 8, 12) 
Boyle’s realistic example merges both the ethical and linguistic dimensions of 
mechanical interpreting. Cynthia Roy elaborates: 
Interpreters often describe their role “as the person in the middle” by 
using a metaphor which conveys the image or impression that they serve 
as a bridge or channel through which communication happens. This 
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channel is supposed to relay a message from one speaker to another 
faithfully, accurately, and without personal or emotional bias. The 
performance of this role has been compared to a machine, a window, a 
bridge, and a telephone line — among others — when trying to compress 
the complexity of the role into a simple, singular analogy or metaphor. 
(2000, p. 101) 
Roy’s distinction between a metaphor and a model is important; it is crucial to recognize 
what the metaphor teaches and reveals about the model. Criticism by Deaf people about 
the imposition of this alien model of interpretation focused on the interpreter because it 
was through the interpreter’s adherence to the model that Deaf people experienced the 
destruction of cultural ways of relating to and interacting with others. 
6.2.5 The Schooled Sign Language Interpreter217 
Campbell McDermid (2009) published a study on the social construction of sign 
language interpreters in Canada that illustrates the current state of tension between Deaf 
people as members of a linguistic minority group and sign language interpreters as 
professionals in the business of delivering a communication service that is intended to 
leverage social justice. “At one time,” McDermid writes, “a successful interpreter was 
compared to an inanimate translation machine (Frishberg, 1986; Humphrey & Alcorn, 
2001; Page, 1993), a metaphor that ‘ignore[d] the essential fact that the interpreter [is] a 
human being’ (Frishberg, 1986)” (2009, p. 108). McDermid, like many writing in the 
field now, casts the machine model as an artifact from history, a framing which implies it 
                                                
217  Caveat: The differences and similarities between evolved and schooled interpreters 
are not absolute. The analysis presented here is based on historical, aggregate trends 
and generalized characteristics: exceptions exist. Evolved interpreters are not 
automatically better than schooled interpreters; everyone should be trained (and 
trainable). 
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is no longer influential. However, evidence of machine model outcomes are persistent 
(Campbell, 2009). These adverse outcomes were predicted by Fenton (1993, in 
McDermid 2009: 106) based on similar trends between evolved and schooled interpreters 
unfolding in New Zealand. McDermid describes machine model outcomes in 
contemporary Canada (2009). 
Going back through recent decades, McDermid finds documentation of a trend 
that “…deaf Canadians [are] …distressed by the condescending views of some 
practitioners (Cripps, 1994; Cundy, 1989; Straitiy, 2002)” (in McDermid, 2009), and are 
concerned that schooled interpreters demonstrate “…inability to interpret successfully . . . 
especially from ASL to spoken English (Cripps, 1994; Cundy, 1989)” in (McDermid, 
2009). In other words, schooled interpreters are often better with source messages from a 
dominant spoken language group ‘down’ a language hierarchy than they are with source 
messages ‘up’ the language hierarchy. In light of these concerns and dynamics, it is no 
surprise that McDermid cites another study finding that 14 of 15 interviewed deaf parents 
expressed positive views regarding the use of their hearing offspring (Mallory et al, 1992; 
McDermid, 2009) as evolved interpreters. 
In sum, McDermid (2009) describes the education and training of American Sign 
Language/English interpreters in Canada218 as a process of social construction that has 
shifted the performance of interpreting from its original locally-produced and homegrown 
roots to a style shaped exclusively by the experiences of being trained in school. 
                                                
218  Families of sign languages do not necessarily follow spoken language families. For 
instance, American Sign Language is linguistically related to LSF, langue des signes 
francais (French Sign Language) and spoken French, not to British Sign Language 
(BSL) or spoken English. 
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McDermid adopts Cokely’s label of “evolved” (2005) to describe the original interpreters 
who had a deaf relative and/or worked at a residential school for the Deaf (Carbin, 1996; 
Cokely, 2003; Deninger, 1987; Napier, 2006; Van Herreweghe & Van Nuffel, 2000) and 
“were invited to interpret by the [Deaf] community” (2009, 105; Cokely, 2003; Evans & 
Bomak, 1996; Fenton, 1993; Van Herreweghe & Van Nuffel, 2000). In the literature, 
these evolved interpreters are set in sharp contrast with “schooled” interpreters (Cokely, 
2005), whose faults and weaknesses are extensively documented and continue to vex the 
Deaf Community (e.g., Elliott, 2013). 
6.2.6 Challenging the Machine219 
The Deaf invention of community interpreting is not emphasized in the academic 
literature on simultaneous interpretation. Members of American Deaf Culture understand 
the creation of the first professional organization for signed language interpreters as an 
“offshoot of the Deaf civil-rights movement” (Moore & Levitan, 2003). This Deaf claim 
to ownership of the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf (RID) and thus to signed 
language interpreting informs education, training, and professional development 
discourses within the field, but is rarely explicitly stated in the professional literature. 
One way to regain the evolved interpreting model is to demonstrate that this is the model 
that has been in open competition with the machine model for the last several decades. 
                                                
219   The author (a certified interpreter with no Deaf family) writes as an outsider, hoping 
that insiders will follow and fill in the many holes. In particular, records and stories 
from the NAD and other Deaf-centered and Deaf-led organizations who were 
engaged in the struggle over certification can probably only be gained by core 
members of the Deaf community with direct ties to these individuals. 
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The Deaf version of evolved community interpreters has been being expressed 
through the practices of evolved interpreters for several decades, and sign language 
interpreters have changed the model of interpreting directly because of Deaf criticism. It 
is interesting that spoken language community interpreters do not appear to be under 
similar pressure from their linguistic minority constituencies as signed language 
interpreters have been from the Deaf communities whom we serve. This may be because 
spoken language minority groups are encountering their own versions of moving 
practical consciousness to discursive consciousness in order to defend and uphold their 
own versions of evolved interpreters. The only comparable parallel I have found in the 
literature to date is with Aboriginal interpreters in Australia (Cooke, 2009).220 The crux 
of the criticism directed at signed language interpreters always involves culture. 
Specifically, the oppressive effect of the adopted professional model of conference-style 
simultaneous interpretation is that it promotes the Nuremberg/IBM system, forcing 
minority language participants to give up significant aspects of their cultural ways of 
being. 
Deaf resistance to standard simultaneous interpretation illustrates the importance 
of both the ritual and the transmission aspects of communication. James Carey (1992) 
explains how these two aspects are represented as models of communication (the 
“transmission” model and the “ritual” model). He explains the historical existence of 
these models, side-by-side (although in different power ratios), in American society and 
elsewhere. What the history of simultaneous interpreting shows is a colonization of time 
                                                
220  Cooke (2009) describes how interpreters for Aboriginal communities in Australia 
also place strong cultural expectations on interpreters that are counter to the model of 
the dominant society. 
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by the ideology of speed. This is accomplished by insisting on the linguistic fallacy (all 
words in all languages have equivalents), accompanied by the myth of accuracy (as if 
interpreters can singlehandedly determine meanings once and for all), and insisting on 
communication being accomplished as fast and automatically as possible. The inevitable 
result of interpreting speed and automaticity is homolingualism. 
The core of Deaf feedback is that there are cultural problems with the 
prescriptions of the Nuremberg/IBM transmission model of simultaneous interpretation. 
Specifically, Deaf people’s criticism of the machine model draws attention to the narrow 
emphasis on the transmission of information in the IBM system; which is what is playing 
out in the system of SI in the EP. This transmission model ignores the ritual aspects of 
communication, resulting in disregard for the relationships and identities of the 
interpretees. This social neglect applies to all of the participants and includes the 
interpreter(s), too. Deaf Americans (in particular) and others have been making the case 
that there is always more to communication than information alone. Revising the 
community interpreting model means insisting that ritual elements of social interaction 
are as important as the information content has radical implications because it brings us 
face to face with the interaction taboo. 
6.2.7 Confronting the Interaction Taboo 
The interaction taboo takes many forms, but it always involves not speaking about 
an issue of cultural difference, and probably always involves a power imbalance due to 
social status. Specifically, the interaction taboo supports a ban on interpreters facilitating 
the social aspects of an interpreted interaction in order to assist interpretees with 
comprehending each other. Dean and Pollard critique this as a problem of ethics (see 
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Figure 1), arguing that the profession uses a deontological, rules-based approach that 
ignores interpreter responsibility for the outcomes of interaction. Instead, they argue for a 
teleological ethics (which can also be “too liberal”) that is responsive to “the complex 
situation dynamics in which the individual is continually evaluating potential and actual 
decisions with respect to the outcomes of these decisions may, or are, causing” (2011, p. 
157). 
 
Figure 1. Ethical Decision Making in a Practice Profession 
Source: Dean & Pollard, 2005. Consumers and service effectiveness in interpreting work: A practice 
profession perspective. The above figure, labelled “Figure 11.1,” appeared on page 270 of Interpreting 
and interpreter education: Directions for research and practice published by Oxford University Press. 
Used with permission. 
In the deontological ethical framework (“too conservative”), interpreters “adherence to 
preordained rules” (Dean & Pollard, 2011, p. 157) leaves interpretees to fend for 
themselves. 
Although some interpretees recognize and are able to act on their meta-awareness 
about the unusual situation of interpreted intercultural transaction, generally a 
deontological ethical approach leads to continued repetition of unsatisfactory intercultural 
dynamics. A blatant example comes from McDermid, whose study of American Sign 
Language (ASL) and Interpreter Training Program [ITP] programs found that 
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“Instructors were…advised to avoid criticizing the students for their inappropriate 
behavior or attitudes, as this was probably due to the values of today’s society” (2009, p. 
121). Issues of intercultural difference and different social status are complicated and 
require sensitivity to facilitate. It turns out that schooled interpreters with no previous 
exposure or familiarity with Deaf ways typically have only practical consciousness (not 
discursive consciousness) of proper social behavior, and this practical consciousness is 
only evident within their own personal/cultural contexts (e.g., Cokely, 2005; McDermid, 
2009; Preston, 1994). “Younger students in particular, took for granted their cultural 
identity, lacked any self-awareness around who they were and just dismissed issues of 
culture and power” (McDermid, 2009). Such limits on practical and discursive conscious 
appear vividly apparent in the intercultural, pluralinguistic transaction-contexts of 
simultaneous interpretation. 
Equipping interpreters and interpretees with discursive consciousness specific to 
both intercultural communication and ethical decision-making regarding the socially just 
mediation of unequal relationships will go a long way toward addressing the anxiety 
observed in students “when they were asked to participate in Deaf community events” 
(McDermid, 2009). The interaction taboo prevents conversation between teachers who 
are concerned with a perceived values conflict between ITP and Deaf Studies Programs’ 
non-deaf students and the Deaf community (McDermid, 2009). 
The interaction taboo also supports a subtle conflation in which values of 
individualism are combined with a pathological judgment about Deaf persons and the 
Deaf community. For instance, McDermid includes these two labels together as if they 
always co-occur: “…Some students begin their programs with an individualistic, 
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pathological view of the Deaf community, as suggested by the research (Humphrey & 
Alcorn, 2001; Mindess, 1996). These learners believe there is no difference between 
hearing and Deaf cultures (Peterson, 1999)” (McDermid , 2009: 126). 
While it may be the case that the distinct attitudes of cultural imperialism and 
audism generally co-occur, it is stereotyping to assume that they do. Allowing that 
students may only embody one or the other of these problematic attitudes enables 
important wiggle room for growth through the uncomfortable process of realizing one’s 
own complicity in the dehumanization of other human beings. Likewise, enabling 
conversation about the intersection of various identities (Holvino, 2010) in any given 
student and how these can play into interpreted interaction will open space for instruction 
about religious motivations in interpreting (McDermid, 2009), analysis and diagnosis of 
why interpreting attracts mainly white and middle class students (McDermid, 2009: 116), 
and perhaps crack the field’s gender bias (McDermid, 2009) and attract more men. While 
McDermid’s study results may seem disheartening in the sense that they demonstrate 
weaknesses in the current curriculum for schooling interpreters, what he has achieved is a 
snapshot that can serve as a benchmark against which to measure future improvements. 
Encouragingly, he also reports that the instructors who participated in his study 
“recognized their duty to prepare future citizens of the Deaf community” (McDermid, 
2009) and are doing their best to undo the interaction taboo. 
6.2.8 Exposing the Interpersonal Reduction 
Given historical context, it hopefully becomes more clear why the social justice 
critique of oppression in interpreting practice is often aimed at the interpreter. The 
empowerment argument, however, cannot afford to stop with a reconfiguration of the 
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interpreter’s role. In the absence of discursive consciousness about pluralingualism, the 
cultural aspects of evolved interpreting, combined with the historical timestream of the 
social construction of technology, cannot undo the interaction taboo. Casting all the 
responsibility for effective intercultural communication on the interpreter alone is an 
interpersonal reduction that dehumanizes the interpreter and the interpretees. 
If interpreting is understood to involve relationships as much as information, then 
reducing the complicated whole of interpreted intercultural interaction to a single 
interpersonal dynamic between the interpreter and the Deaf consumer is a fallacy of 
selective observation. Surely there are sometimes issues at this level, but just because the 
interpreter is the obvious crux of the interpreted communication, it does not follow that 
whatever goes wrong must be the interpreter’s fault! The interpersonal reduction needs to 
be recognized as a residue of the machine model that perpetuates the transmission model 
bias of privileging information over relationship. 
Overcoming the interpersonal reduction and interaction taboo can shift entrenched 
dynamics of suspicion that Deaf consumers have about, for instance, being 
“[mislead]…into thinking that [interpreters] are more qualified than they are (Ontario 
Ministry of Education and Training, 1998b, para. 1) (McDermid, 2009). Interpreters 
“lack of awareness of how issues of power and oppression shape their work (Baker-
Shenk, 1986; Taylor & Straity, 1992)” (McDermid 2009) is, ironically, supported in 
some ways by interpretees’ preferences for flow (Kent, 2012). Widening the scope of 
criticism of the machine model to include the interpretees’ participation in rapid turn-
taking, rushing through the delivery of information without allowing processes of 
confirmation for mutual understanding, de-valuing the significance of cultural 
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differences, and other features of the transmission model of interpretation over and above 
the establishment and performance of culturally-respectful relationships, will enable 
interpreters to act as “agents of change” (McDermid, 2009; Witter-Merithew, 1995), 
building productively upon the discourse foundation of basic generalizations that 
reinforce the fact of different cultural norms, such as those for reciprocity (McDermid, 
2009; Smith, 1983; Still, 1990). 
6.2.9 Reconstructing the Model 
In 1979, Jemina Napier explains how the Conference of Interpreter Trainers (CIT) 
was established and “set the benchmark” of professional community interpreting for 
other countries (2010, p. 357). CIT was established six years before Baker-Shenk 
publicized Deaf criticism of the machine model of interpreting. By 1999, Anna Mindess 
reported that spoken language interpreting professors at the Monterey Institute of 
International Studies (California) told her “that they consider sign language interpreters 
very advanced in our discussions about the cultural aspects of interpreting and in the idea 
of interpreters as bicultural mediators” (p. 161). The international Critical Link 
conferences on community/public service interpreting have included signed language 
interpreters on par with spoken language interpreters since their inception in 1995. 
A critical discourse analysis placing the profession of sign language interpreters 
into a relevant historical timestream establishes the link between the steady, persistent 
and determined progress of the Deaf community to return community-style interpretation 
back to its own original cultural roots against the imposed domination of an externally 
imposed system of conference interpreting. Bonnie Sherwood (1987) recognized that 
Deaf ways are so normal to Deaf people that the norms for interculturally-appropriate 
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interpreting existed only in practical consciousness. The process of creating discursive 
consciousness offers insight into the intergroup conflict created by the unexpectedly rapid 
growth of the sign language interpreting profession. 
Recent scholarship by Eileen Forestal (2011), Adam, Carty & Stone (2011), and 
Christopher Stone (2009), have established the historical basis of Deaf norms for 
relationship-based community-style simultaneous interpretation. The re-emergence over 
the past decade of Deaf interpreters, that is, of professional interpreters who are non-
hearing and culturally Deaf, has been described as “shifting positionality” (Cokely, 
2005b, p. 3). The shift is from a position of dependence or oppression to one of 
empowerment and agency. Observable “resistance among hearing interpreters to 
chang[ing] how they [work]” (Forestal, 2011, p. 134) is, I suggest, a “parallel process” 
(Alderfer & Smith, 1982) that mirrors the resistance of interpretees (as seen in the 
European Parliament) to working with interpreters at all. 
6.3 Disrupting Homolingualism: Social Construction of the Automobile 
As I tried to talk with MEPs and officials of the EP about the monologic of 
multilingualism, for a long time words failed. My own practical consciousness was being 
stretched. I kept talking about the ‘monolingualism’ I was observing in the popularity of 
English as lingua franca (ELF), perceiving ELF as resistance to using interpreters. 
Mirroring the experience of linguist Michael Reddy regarding “frame conflict in our 
language about language” (1979), my discursive consciousness was limited by the 
boundaries of my cognition as it had been already shaped through exposure to language 
and social interaction. 
Reddy describes the challenge of his own “frame restructuring” (Schön, 1979): 
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I confess it took nearly five years for me to come around…what stood in 
the way was never a counter-argument, but rather the simple inability to 
think clearly about the matter. My mind would seem to go to sleep at 
crucial moments, and it was only the mounting weight of more and more 
evidence that finally forced it to stay awake. (p. 176, 1979). 
The (then) new frame of radical subjectivism was the subject of Reddy’s struggle to 
restructure his intellectual/cognitive frame. I was dealing with the practical consciousness 
of homolingualism: that impulse and desire to communicate with others who speak the 
same language that I witness in myself and others. Homolingualism is evident in 
intellectual domains and disciplinary sub-fields as well as in regard to natural languages. 
The Deaf community is remarkable in several respects, one of them being the degree to 
which they are willing to embrace everyone who relies upon their eyes for language, 
regardless of their level of fluency, as long as they make the effort to express themselves 
using a signed language. 
The parallel with ELF and every other attempt by language learners to make the 
phatic gesture of connecting with another human being in their (different) language is 
obvious. But the Deaf community’s extraordinary cultural affinity seems to have 
endowed them with a capacity for resistance against linguistic imperialism (Phillipson, 
1992) that exceeds the combined constraint of homolingual bias and the ideology of 
speed. It is this capacity that seems to have motivated the development of discursive 
consciousness regarding the deep practical values of relationally-based community 
interpreting. So Deaf people resist the machine, and in response the profession of 
community interpreting continues to evolve toward a pluralinguistic field increasingly 
characterized by equality of voice. Indigenously, Deaf communities have socially-
constructed communication norms that balance the relational aspects of simultaneous 
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interpretation with the informational aspects of message transfer. The fact that few other 
linguistic groups have challenged the professional model of the interpreter so clearly and 
effectively is perhaps a commentary on the scope and intensity of the underlying speed-
plus-automatic transmission equation. 
In a landmark article in the history of technology, Ronald Kline and Trevor Pinch 
demonstrate conclusively how “users of technology acted as agents of technological 
change” (1994: 764). They locate their argument with others (Douglas, 1987; Fischer, 
1992; Martin, 1991; Nye, 1990) in “support [of] a more specific claim that the use of an 
artifact or system has not only resulted in unforeseen consequences, but that users have 
helped to shape the artifact or system itself” (Nye p. 765). Using a specific model (the 
Social Construction of Technology, Pinch & Bijker, 1984), Kline and Pinch show how 
farm workers in the rural United States were so responsive to the invention of the 
automobile that the automobile industry was compelled to 
1 counter the activities of specific social groups (including aggressive anti-car 
campaigns), 
2 engage in marketing campaigns to discourage the wide range of applications 
invented for vehicles (and especially the engines in them) by the individuals 
who purchased them, and 
3 to develop new products that were responsive to the “interpretive flexibility of 
the rural auto developed by farm men and women during the first decades of 
the century (1994, p. 783-784). 
 
As noted, such intensive and contentious social negotiation is strikingly absent from the 
development of the conference-style system of simultaneous interpretation. Despite the 
pervasive evidence of interpreter failure at Nuremberg, no one questioned the exclusive 
loading of meaning-making onto the interpreter(s) alone. 
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The discourse about the system of SI in the EP shows that simultaneous 
interpretation, as a social technology, remains the expectation. “You can barely see 
them,” says an EP official, shading his eyes as if looking into the far distance (F04). 
“You only meet the interpreters through the glass,” explains an MEP, “That’s why 
Delegations are so important” (OM44). The interaction taboo of interpretees with 
interpreters was architecturally formalized after the Nuremberg trials when interpreters 
were moved off the floor and out of the immediate social interaction into separate, 
segregated booths: behind the glass. The argument being constructed here is not to un-do 
the physical arrangements, but rather to explore the social and discursive codes that have 
reduced the expression, effectiveness, and equality of Members’ voices. How have 
Members come to believe in homolingual communication in such a pluralingual 
environment? 
6.4 Deaf Invention 
As an historical development, the unexpectedly rapid growth of the signed 
language interpreting profession in the U.S. catapulted the American Deaf Community 
into confrontation with the larger “hearing” world. This is a classic case of intergroup 
conflict. What was striking about the institutional climate of the U.S. signed language 
interpreting profession in the 1980s and ‘90s was how it became an extended site for a 
ferocious battle by culturally Deaf people to preserve ASL and residential schools for the 
Deaf as incubators for a vibrant, empowered, diverse cultural community within an 
encompassing American national identity. (Nationalism was not an overt part of the 
ASL/English bilingual-bicultural movement for cultural education and language 
preservation, but its assumptions are microsocially embedded (e.g., Wilcox 1989) in the 
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gender and class structure of prominent Deaf activists, protestors, and educators and 
macrosocially evident in the widespread “English Only” backlash against all bilingual 
education programs in the US (e.g., Olson, 1991). 
There are many factors feeding the successes and sustained passion of 
ASL/English bilingual and bicultural activists. Certainly, the pervasiveness of cultural 
violations (notably by signed language interpreters, teachers of deaf students, and others) 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s (not to mention the previous century of repression) 
contributed to the professional organization of the Registry of Interpreters for the Deaf 
becoming a focal point for concentrated criticism. Judgments rendered by American Deaf 
participants in interpreted communication combine outcome with delivery. This 
combination clearly reflects a cultural imperative to evaluate interpreter performance 
according to Deaf-defined criteria rather than criteria imposed externally by non-Deaf 
people. 
The ultimate measure of success for intercultural, interpreted communication was 
historically defined by the Deaf community in regard to ghostwriters, who were valued 
because (among other skills) they could speak English well, but “the judgment for 
‘speaking well’ comes from the success of the interaction rather than the intelligibility of 
the speech as judged by non-Deaf people” (emphasis added, Adam, Carty & Stone, 2011, 
p. 383). Also, assumptions about the English fluency of Deaf ghostwriters spread “by 
‘word of mouth’ with respect to the success of previous correspondence or interaction” 
(emphasis added, Adam, Carty & Stone, 2011, p. 386). These judgments are based in a 
future orientation to time, the outcome of interpretation in relational terms of satisfactory 
mutual understanding, rather than a past orientation to time, which emphasizes the 
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accuracy of ‘translation’ [sic] by looking ‘backward’ as it were, to a fixed, supposedly 
immutable and inerrant, ‘source message.’ 
A similar emphasis on Deaf-defined criteria for the quality of interpreting is 
expressed by Deaf translator/interpreters working in broadcast television, who place “the 
greatest importance on the Deaf consumer understanding [the target tanguage] 
information” (Stone, 2009, p. 109). This informational emphasis, however, is inherently 
relational, i.e., it highlights the “construction of relevance” (p. 171) between the Deaf 
Translator/Interpreter and their audience as essential to the transmission of information. 
The precedent for the relational model used in broadcast television 
interpreting/translating exists in the traditional Deaf culture practice of ghostwriting 
(Adam, Carty and Stone, 2011), and the practices and principles of such a relational 
model are evident in the work of a growing group of professional Deaf interpreters in the 
United States (Forestal, 2011; Stone, 2009). 
6.4.1 Back Reaction from the Deaf Center 
Carol Padden and Tom Humphries wrote an essay called, “A Different Center,” in 
which they explained how the “the meanings of DEAF and ‘deaf’ are, at the very least, not 
the same. DEAF is a means of identifying the group and one’s connection to it, and ‘deaf’ 
is a means of commenting on one’s inability to speak and hear” (1988, p. 33).221 Padden 
& Humphries recount a friend’s confusion in understanding the label, ‘HARD-OF-
                                                
221  Throughout this dissertation, Deaf is always capitalized to signify the identity group. 
Hearing and speaking ability has not been addressed, neither literally nor 
metaphorically. Padden & Humphries’ essay is in Deaf in America: Voices from a 
Culture. 
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HEARING,’ which is literally defined in exactly opposite terms depending on the central 
point of reference. In spoken English, the measurement is made from the assumed 
standard of sound, so a little hard-of-hearing means a person can hear quite a lot. Very 
hard-of-hearing is someone approaching auditory deafness. However, from the culturally 
Deaf center, “A-LITTLE HARD-OF-HEARING is a small deviation from DEAF, and thus is 
used for someone who is only slightly hearing. VERY HARD-OF-HEARING is someone who 
departs from the center greatly, thus someone who can hear quite well” (p. 41) 
A common source of so-called mistakes and misunderstandings in 
simultaneously-interpreted intercultural transactions comes from the juxtapositions of 
larger world[s] of meaning where there are conventions for describing 
relationships between conditions and identities. Within this world of 
meaning—compared [in this example] to that of English and others—
there is a different alignment, toward a different center. (p. 42) 
Despite the shock and disillusionment of intergroup conflict, the Deaf center has held. 
The core cultural values of ensuring mutual understanding and relational relevance have 
acted back on interpreting researcher-practitioners, who have steadily studied and 
reflected upon the objects of Deaf criticism and begun to provide models that explain and 
illustrate the concerns at the heart of community interpreting as social transaction. 
Dean and Pollard’s (2001) Demand-Control Schema rejects “one static level of 
[linguistic] demand” (p. 5) and foregrounds that “interpreting is best understood as a 
practice profession rather than a technical profession (Dean & Pollard, 2011, p. 156). 
Practice professions like medicine, teaching and law enforcement do 
involve the learning and application of technical skills, but these technical 
skills are always applied in dynamic, interactive social context (i.e., with 
patients, students and citizens/suspects, respectively). In contrast, 
technical professions such as laboratory science and engineering apply 
technical skills in situations that are more removed from social interaction 
with consumers. (2011, p. 156) 
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Recognizing interpreting as a practice profession allows the first major move of 
recognizing the non-linguistic demands of the work. The DC-S emerges from a theory of 
occupational stress which Dean and Pollard adapted from Karasek (1979). Karasek’s 
“model posits two phenomenological dimensions that affect workers in a given setting or 
situation. These dimensions are termed demand and control, and the ‘strength’ of each 
dimension ranges from low to high” (in Dean & Pollard, 2001, p. 2) 
The term demand refers to the requirements of a job, which may include 
aspects of the environment, the actual task being performed, and other 
factors that “act upon” the individual. The term control refers to the 
degree to which the individual has the power to “act upon” the demands 
presented by the job, perhaps by making decisions, bringing skills or 
resources to bear on the task, or altering the environment or other aspects 
of the task demand. (p. 2) 
In addition to explicating the ways demands and controls appear in simultaneous 
interpretation, Dean and Pollard introduced the concept of decision latitude from Karasek 
and his colleague Töres Thorell to the field as a control element within interpreters’ 
professional practice and performances of interpreting. 
Dean and Pollard explain that their “concept of control includes the skills and 
other resources a worker has to cope with demands presented to him [or her] and 
especially [her or] his degree of authority and freedom to exercise decisions about which 
skills and resources to employ and how to do so” (p. 6). The concept and practice of 
decision latitude is now being elaborated as a crucial element of “relational autonomy” in 
which interpreters “[develop] awareness of the various aspects of autonomous decision-
making” (Witter-Merithew et al, 2010, p. 49). 
Interpreter autonomy is in reality relational as a result of the inherent 
social structures upon which it depends for its existence…effective 
autonomy is achieved when the social conditions that support it are in 
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place and give the practitioner—and consumers—the confidence to take 
charge of choices. (p. 50) 
Relational autonomy and decision latitude, within an identified “constellation of 
demands” (Dean & Pollard, 2011, p. 164) and the growing discursive consciousness of a 
broad range of controls (for interpreters and for interpretees), cohere in a new, 
multidimensional model of the interpreter’s role space. 
Role space is “dynamic, reasoned, situational, and negotiable” according to Lee & 
Llewellyn-Jones (2011). See Figure 2. The interpreter’s role space is defined and 
delineated by three primary areas that they represent on a three-dimensional X, Y, and Z 
cube. In their model, the horizontal axis, X, indicates the realm of participation alignment 
(e.g., Garrod & Pickering, 2006); the vertical axis, Y, indicates the dimension of 
interaction management (e.g., Grice, 1968; Giles, Coupland & Coupland 1991); and the 
forward-back Z axis represents the presentation of self (e.g., Goffman, 1981). Lee and 
Llewellyn’s basic premise involves a distinction and a similarity between the interpreter(s) 
and interpretees: 
The interpreter has a different reason for being in the interaction 
compared with the other participants; however, interpreters can avail 
themselves of some of the same strategies used by the other participants to 
present themselves in the interaction. (2011, p. 4) 
Rather than relying upon a deontological ethical code with strict prescriptive rules, they 
call upon a standard of interpreter integrity to ground “a sense that what is happening is 
appropriate for this given interaction” (p. 3).  
Individual decisions made by an interpreter are not made in isolation from 
one another; rather the interactions among decisions (and not a single 
decision point itself) creates the manifestation of the role of an interpreter 
in a given interaction. (p. 2) 
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Figure 2. Interaction Among Three Axes of Interpreter Role Space. Reprinted with 
permission from International Journal of Interpreter Education. (Lee and 
Llewellyn-Jones, 2013). 
This integrity requires the relational autonomy called for by Witter-Merithew et al (2010) 
and echoed by Roderick Jones (2014): “our training should … help our students and 
future colleagues … to acquire the autonomy to develop their own interpreting strategies, 
such that they can develop over the whole course of their career” (p. 9). 
Role space replaces the one-dimensional conception of the interpreter as a passive 
instrument with a technical function. Interpreted interaction is not characterized by 
homolingual continuous action, but is rather a series of one-way turns in which the 
interpreter fluidly adjusts alignment with participants in keeping with emergent 
interpersonal and intercultural demands, with reference to the circumstances of context. 
The initial unfamiliarity of a simultaneously-interpreted, pluralingual communicative 
arrangement does not need to lead to non-cooperative, non-accommodating, and non-
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aligning behaviors by a machine model interpreter. That, Llewellyn-Jones and Lee argue, 
is “not natural communication” (Conference Handout, 2012). 
While the focuse here has been on community interpreting for the Deaf, Diriker’s 
(2004) study of academic conference interpreting discovered “anecdotal accounts of real-
life SI assignments …[that] challenge the analogy of ‘interpreters as electronic devices’ 
and foreground the individual, as well as the social factors, that influence the interpreting 
process” (pp. 47-48). In sum, Dean and Pollard (2012) argue that conceptualizing the 
work of simultaneous interpretation in terms of demands and controls “matters” (p. 80) 
because the Demand-Control Schema provides “a concrete method for thinking 
about…the work and work decisions … [and] to replace intuitive or habitual work 
processes with conscious and deliberate ones” (p. 79). 
6.5 Holding Time with a Relational Model of SI 
The stunning feature at the Deaf center regarding simultaneous interpreting is the 
imperative to hold time.222 Buber’s metaphor of holding ground may be a way to begin to 
explain practical skills of the evolved interpreter, including making active decisions about 
                                                
222  The idea of this generative metaphor (Schön, 1998) is that Buber's (1923) notion of 
"holding ground" provides an initial label for describing what Deaf interpreters, 
ghostwriters, and evolved and schooled/ally interpreters do that is most appreciated 
by Deaf interpretees during interpreted interaction. Holding ground is a metaphor for 
ethical interpersonal communication: it specifically refers to a co-constructed 
interactive process in which a person (“I”) holds your own ground while being open 
to the other (“Thou”). Buber’s concept of holding ground is elaborated by many 
scholars, including Stewart (2006) and Pearce (1994/2007). 
 In practice, holding ground means that you should not abandon or betray your 
own commitments, values, beliefs, and perspectives in order to 'be with,' engage with 
or listen to another – but rather that you can hold these while also holding—even if 
temporarily—the reported ideas, experiences, beliefs, perspectives, and even 
challenges of another. (J. Brooks, personal communication, August 25, 2012)  
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shifting functional alignments within the domain of time. Forestal (2011) found, for 
instance, that one of the most frequent reasons Deaf interpreters223 paused a research 
video to share their thinking with her was to “express reactions toward the HI and the 
dialogue between the HI and the HC” (p. 87).224 Their most common criticism involved 
the failure of the hearing interpreter to manage or ‘hold’ time. In Boyle’s (2006) story, 
rather than forcing a continuation of interaction with an apparently disinterested police 
officer, the evolved interpreter shifts to a kind of consecutive interpreting that divides 
time among respective interpretees, ultimately enabling important information to be 
communicated while simultaneously validating Dana’s humanity (and taking nothing 
away from the officer, whose attention is diffused by multiple responsibilities at the scene 
of a crime). 
References by the Deaf interpreters to temporality in Forestal’s (2011) study are 
most prevalent when the information is most dense. This was also when Deaf Interpreter 
(DI) research participants “discuss[ed] how the HI [Hearing Interpreter] should work 
with the participants in terms of chunking the information differently or when they 
wanted to convey the material to the DC [Deaf consumer]” (p. 87). This is when 
participants “wanted to tell the HI to ‘hold on or slow down’” (Participant F, p. 77), that 
                                                
223  The situation of two sign language interpreters working together, one who is Deaf and 
one who is Hearing, is comparable to relay interpreting in the European Parliament. 
In this case, the Hearing interpreter renders spoken English into sign language and the 
Deaf interpreter is afforded the role space and decision latitude to undertake the labor 
of making sure the information is understood by Deaf interpretees. Likewise, a 
similar process should occur in the other direction, when the burden is on the Hearing 
interpreter to make sure that the Hearing interpretee understands. 
224  Forestal’s codes are HC: Hearing Consumer, HI: Hearing Interpreter, DI: Deaf 
Interpreter, and DC: Deaf Consumer.  
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“the HC [Hearing consumer] was going on too long on one part and … should pause” 
(Forestal, p. 81), or, “There is a run on here. I can’t see any separate ideas…Oh boy…HI 
is going on too long…hold on…” “Wait, I would ask to stop…Hold on” (Participant B, p. 
79), or “hold it…to go at a slower pace” (Participant D, p. 73). 
“Taking the time to explain” (Participant D, as cited in Forestal, 2011, p. 71) was 
most necessary when the information was “very detailed” (Forestal, p. 70). “Whoa, there 
are so many things to point out…I will ask the HI to pause here…” (Participant B, p. 80). 
In fact, the highest percentage (21/120 = 18%) of video stoppages per section of the video 
occurred during the (staged) discussion of the US Federal Housing Authority’s mortgage 
loan criteria. Forestal concluded there was “a lot of information to go through” 
(Participant B, p. 84), so “more pauses would be needed for clarification and additional 
time to review” (p. 84). For instance, in the densest chunk of information, there were 
“three things to explain…ask the HI to stop [to] allow [more time]… [to give] each one at 
a time, rather than pour all three at once” (Participant B, p. 74). 
The temporal problem identified by Forestal’s (2011) participants is twofold, 
involving both the duration of turns and the density of information. Sometimes, they 
identify “the HC was talking was too long…the HI will have to notify the [HC]…to 
break up the information more…and [stop] more often” (Participant F, p. 76). Other 
times they “expressed a wish that ‘[the HI] would stop long enough to allow time to 
interpret’” (Participant F, p. 76). They suggest two specific remedies: for “the 
information to be parceled out in smaller chunks or pause as cued by the DI” (Forestal, p. 
75). Forestal’s findings on the density of information are in keeping with Vuorikoski’s 
(2004) research on spoken language source texts in the European Parliament. 
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Problems with source texts and adequately paced turn-taking between the HI and 
DI in relay are parallel problems that HIs frequently have with HCs. What Deaf 
interpreters are asking of their hearing interpreter teammates is what hearing interpreters, 
both evolved and schooled/allies, have been ‘asking’ (or needing to ask!) of interpretees 
since professional signed language interpreting began: care about achieving mutual 
understanding and participate in the co-construction of relationships, rather than just 
letting them happen as fallout from the transmission machine’s insistence on what 
Participant F described as the “non-stop flow of information” (p. 83). 
The Deaf interpreters sought to be authorized to manage time in order to achieve a 
“balance of working” with both the Deaf and Hearing consumers (Participant E, as cited 
in Forestal, 2011, p. 70). This distinguishes the interaction component of Forestal’s 
research from the television audience translator/interpreters in Stone’s (2009) research. 
Otherwise, U.S. Deaf interpreters expressed the same goals and strategies as British 
Translator/Interpreters: to “make sure the DC understood before moving on to the next 
part” (Participant E, p. 70); not “throw [information]…without processing” (Participant 
B, p. 91); avoid marginalization (p. 121); and to create “an interactive dialogue” (p. 121). 
Dialogic communication is needed by Deaf interpreters with the hearing 
interpreter teammate just as much as with the deaf consumer: this parallel process also 
parallels the hearing interpreter’s need for dialogue with the hearing interpretee. Here is 
the rub of the original interaction taboo of pretending the interpreter is invisible being 
extended into relay processes between team interpreters. Hope for the social 
transformation called for by Forestal (2011) resides in this co-constructive social 
transaction. If Deaf interpreters win their agency and are authorized to utilize role space 
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and hold time, the achievement may spread to spoken language interpreters and 
interpretees, establishing a relational and identity-aware model for community 
interpreting. 
6.5.1 Interpreters’ Unconsciousness 
The greatest support for the reality of human consciousness is that one does not 
know what one does not know until it is learned. Some things are learned as a result of 
intentional study; other things are learned unwillingly, as if by force. There are things a 
person comes to know which seem appallingly obvious in retrospect, and other things one 
can come to know that are simply informative or intriguing. Learning that is significant is 
often accompanied by emotion: this is illustrated by Archimedes’ expression of 
“Eureka!” and backed up by neuroscientific studies on insight, commonly thought of as 
‘Aha!’ moments (Kounios and Beeman, 2009). Surprise indicates the presence of 
something new or unexpected. This is why a study on omissions by sign language 
interpreters caught my attention, because participants and researchers expressed 
“amazement” (Napier, 2002, p. 160) and “astonishment” (p. 178) when they realized “as 
much information is lost unconsciously, as is selectively omitted as part of a conscious 
linguistic process” (emphasis added, p. 178). 
The context of Napier’s study is to demonstrate that interpreter omissions are 
often strategic. That is, the interpreter makes a conscious decision to omit information in 
service of accomplishing another task or aspect of the interpreting process.225 She also 
                                                
225  This aspect of conscious, strategic omissions is not taken up by Vuorikoski, who 
uses omissions as a measure in her study but not as an automatic measure of failure 
(2004, p. 31).  
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finds that omissions occur that interpreters are aware of but are somehow unable to do 
anything about. Although Napier does not elaborate it is not hard to surmise that what 
prevents interpreters from addressing omissions they are aware of and do not want to 
make are the dynamics of social interaction. Interpretees’ criticisms might be more 
productive if they learned and understood this. The typical linguistic model tends to 
characterize any omissions as an interpreter failure, because the linguistic model only 
focuses upon the transfer of information. (Which is why Vuorikoski augmented her 
method.226) However if Napier’s findings are evaluated from an identity and relationship 
perspective, the range of omission types suggests an impasse in social interaction. The 
problem then, is apparently not resolvable by the linguistic model. A new paradigm that 
acknowledges social interaction might enable more adaptation. For instance, a social 
transaction paradigm allows the speculation that the interpreter cannot change unless the 
interpretees change, too. 
6.5.2 Interpreter Omission 
Napier (2002) problematizes the commonsense assumption that interpretational 
omissions are always errors or mistakes of transmission. Her goal is to establish selective 
reductions (of utterances in the source language) as a metacognitive strategy of 
interpreters to enhance message equivalence (of utterances in the target language). In 
other words, Napier documents conscious effort on behalf of interpreters to contribute to 
                                                
226  “While omissions, substitutions and errors may be observed in quantitative terms, SI 
quality is not based on word-for-word equivalence only…The present study will 
move a step forward on the basis of modern SI theory with the aim of finding a 
method for analysing how to operationalize the elusive ’gist’ of the message” (2004, 
p. 31). 
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“meaning potential” (p. 179).227 To accomplish this task, Napier utilizes an omission 
taxonomy she invented in 2001, and describes the limits of consciousness and 
unconsciousness made evident through the research project’s findings in the stages of 
task review and final reflection. The distribution of results across the awareness 
continuum provides a foundation for the development of an epistemology of SI premised 
on interaction (rather than, as it is presently, interaction-tacked-on to the previously-
established functional linguistic model). 
Napier designed a five-type continuum of “potential interpreting omissions based 
on levels of consciousness and strategic-ness” (p. 84). See Figure 2. From left to right the 
continuum proceeds from most conscious (strategic) to least conscious (unaware). She 
places conscious strategic decisions to omit at the left end and completely unconscious 
omissions at the other end, with three degrees of gradient between them. Results show 
that the three intermediate types of omissions, those that are made or recognized by the 
interpreter as they occur but without deliberate strategic intent, occur with particular 
features of language use that prefigure Vuorikoski’s (2004) and Forestal’s (2011) 
findings, including subject-specific terminology, names, repetition and redundancy, 
ambiguity and idioms, and inaudible words or phrases. 
                                                
227  Napier’s construct of “meaning potential” is undefined but might a synonym (or 
similarly relative to) the sociolinguistic concept of voice (Blommaert, 2004). Napier 
(2002) “suggest[s] that omissions should be considered within a framework of 
omission potential…by doing so, it is possible for interpreters to recognize the 
sociolinguistic and sociocultural factors that may influence their production of 
different omission types. The framework allows for recognition of the fact that 
omissions can be used strategically to achieve the meaning potential of an utterance, 
but there is also the potential to make erroneous omissions, which may skew the 
contextual force of the message” (emphasis in original, p. 179). 
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Figure 3. Napier’s Interpreter Omission Taxonomy (reprinted with permission from 
Sign Language Interpreting: Linguistic Coping Strategies, 2002, p. 179). 
Napier carefully identifies these linguistic components of speaker utterances in 
order to establish a distinction between omissions that interpreters are aware of at the 
moment of their occurrence but did not necessarily wish to make from omissions that 
interpreters made with full strategic intentionality to enhance clarity or organization of a 
message. The relative equivalence, percentagewise, at both ends of the consciousness 
spectrum is intriguing: twenty-seven percent of the total number of omissions (of all five 
types, combined) were of the highest order of strategic consciousness and twenty-six 
percent were completely unconscious, with the remaining 47% of omissions spread 
among the three intermediate but inadvertent types. 
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Two startling ramifications leap to view. First, nearly one half of omissions occur 
for reasons of source text production or social transaction among interpretees. Second, 
roughly equal amounts of omissions qualify as conscious strategic selective reductions 
(i.e., are planned with an eye to the future, 27%) and as unconscious omissions 
(specifically not within the awareness of the interpreter, 26%). Napier reports the first-
time realization of some participating interpreters at discovering “the commentary going 
on in their own head” (p. 160), described as an “internal self-critical commentary” (p. 
159) that all ten of the interpreters who participated in her study utilized with or without 
strategic consciousness. These findings open new ground for the field; it could represent 
a move toward a new kind of discursive consciousness. 
Conscious decision-making based on metalinguistic awareness is revealed to be 
an under-acknowledged component of the interpreter’s skillset (Napier, 2002). Most 
surprising to Napier and the participating interpreters, was the finding that “as much 
information is lost unconsciously, as is selectively omitted as part of a conscious 
linguistic process” (p. 178). In other words, despite professional training and as attentive 
as interpreters are to source language messages and target language meanings, 
interpreters do unknowingly miss a measurable quantity of information. 
The rigor of Napier’s research design enabled the identification of “specific 
features of language use [that] elicited the occurrence of particular omissions” (p. 148). 
The common characteristic of all these features (listed above) is their origin: they are 
elements of production of the source language. Notice how the research gaze is focused 
at the linguistic level of diction and lexicalization, rather than on the interpersonal or 
psychosocial dynamics of interaction. Because of Napier’s precision and expertise an 
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example is available. One line of source text produced the highest percentage of 
unconscious omissions. 
Taken in isolation, “So, over to you for a minute,” is a simple sentence. No 
density of subject matter or terminology, nothing obscure or highly specific. The 
explanations provided by participating interpreters as to why this particular utterance was 
omitted make sense. Napier reports: 
All the respondents remarked that they probably had not heard this phrase 
because they were still concentrating on the difficult interpretation of the 
previous sentence…and therefore experienced cognitive overload. (p. 
153) 
Setton’s (1999) cognitive-pragmatic reasons for failure are not marshalled; Napier allows 
the interpreter’s self-report stand. She also does not describe any exploration with her 
participants of the communicative action implied in the utterance. Given that the source 
text is explicitly characterized as a monologue (it is a lecture given by a professor to 
college students), this particular phrase represents a change in footing.228 In her literature 
review, Napier refers to Erving Goffman’s (1981) concept of footing as one of the ways 
speakers define their relationship with an audience (p. 50). In particular, footing has to do 
with the way speakers align themselves within a particular frame for the communication 
event. Footing is crucial to Lee & Llewellyn-Jones’ (2013) depiction of interpreters’ 
shifting alignments with participants in role space. 
Footing is crucial to Lee & Llewellyn-Jones’ (2013) depiction of interpreters’ 
shifting alignments with participants in role space, because it is particularly useful for 
                                                
228  Tebble might identify the speech act, “So, over to you for a minute,” as a framing 
move with the metalinguistic function of alerting students to a shift in the genre 
stages of classroom interaction (2009, p. 210). 
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noting changes in interaction dynamics, such as the signal from a professor that there will 
be a shift from the monologue of a didactic lecture to participatory dialogue, perhaps in 
the form of a question-and-answer session or a period of open discussion. In other words, 
what is suggested by Napier’s text, even though she does not spell it out, is that some 
unconscious omissions during simultaneous interpretations may occur as the result of a 
combination of linguistic and dynamical factors, not exclusively on the basis of lexical 
complexity or other problems with the source text. If I put myself in this situation as an 
academic interpreter, for instance, and I have become accustomed to the mode of 
delivery, then I may not even be tuned to the possibility of a shift in the interaction and 
certainly not while struggling with some particularly dense content.229 
The evidence that omissions may occur for reasons that are not lexical, or for 
reasons in addition to what can be explained by functional linguistics, reaches toward the 
meaning potential of the domain of inquiry that Napier opens up. She herself is explicit 
and consistent in her focus on linguistic coping strategies. However a change in footing is 
an interaction dynamic that interpretees can become aware of and use as a moment to 
assert shared responsibility for the quality of communication and understanding in the 
interpreted interaction. Notice, for instance, the temporal delimitation, “for a minute.” 
Without having been alerted to the change in interaction structure, students relying upon 
                                                
229  Another possibility, that the interactional shift is too obvious to be expressed, is 
suggested by one of Vuorikoski’s findings in regard to references to democracy in 
MEPs speeches. “The material at hand reveals an unsystematic rendering by the 
interpreters of these key concepts and key points that are related to democracy. The 
word ’democracy’ in its various forms is often omitted as if it were something self-
evident that does not have to be repeated” (2004, p. 129). 
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the SI are automatically disadvantaged unless/until other interpretees notice and co-create 
adequate shared time for everyone’s participation. 
As a discourse process, the effect of isolating research to only the linguistic level 
of simultaneous interpretation is to keep the focus of analysis on what interpreters do 
(with languages) while keeping the analytical gaze averted from what the interpretees are 
doing (in co-constructing relationships). In Napier’s (2002) case study, the interpretees 
include every non-deaf student in the class as well as the Deaf student(s) as co-learners. 
The professor is the responsible figure with the most authorization to manage the 
dynamics of interpreted intercultural communication. The discursive and social isolation 
of the interpreter that is reproduced in researcher discourse reinforces social practice that 
de-authorizes both interpreters and interpretees from addressing or otherwise attempting 
to repair common communication breakdowns. At least interpretees could begin to learn 
the symptoms for the large percentage of accidental, unintended omissions (47%) that 
occur within the interpreter’s awareness but cannot (currently) be remedied because of 
limitations imposed on the role. The interaction taboo (Kent, 2012) is what makes 
interventions to restore omitted information seem beyond control. 
Such skills development would also create openings for interpretees to notice 
other deviations from the desired quality of communication of which the interpreter may 
be unaware. While it is obvious that the pace and density of delivery are significant in the 
‘over to you’ instance (and, perhaps less obviously, the turn-taking pace), Napier’s 
overall findings in this study suggest that there is no stand-alone factor that influences the 
rate or type of inadvertent omissions, but instead that there is a combination of 
unfamiliarities: 
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1 lacking familiarity with the specific knowledge domain encompassed by the 
subject of the communication event, and 
2 lacking familiarity with the conventions of discourse use characteristic of the 
setting or scene of the communication event. 
 
In other words, one zone of unfamiliarity involves particular content (a, above), the other 
zone of unfamiliarity involves institutional process (b, above), and the two are 
interrelated in terms of their relative influence on interpreter and interpretee effectiveness 
in a simultaneously-interpreted communication event (again, in keeping with Forestal 
(2011) and Vuorikoski (2004)). While professional interpreters make varying degrees of 
effort to become familiar with both the genre setting and the particular subject matter, the 
interactive challenges of intercultural communication are not able to be resolved without 
the concern and involvement of interpretees. 
If interpretees are concerned with the subset of omissions that interpreters make 
strategically (as the Deaf respondents who participated in a panel organized by Napier 
state that they are), one way to build shared responsibility and enhance quality might 
involve collaborative practice with identifying and resolving the omissions that 
interpreters do not wish to make but are constrained from acknowledging have occurred. 
This applies equally to the concerns MEPs expressed about the quality of interpreting in 
the EP. Such an endeavour will necessarily invite the discovery of omissions that were 
made unconsciously, as well as open inquiry into the reasons supporting omissions made 
strategically. 
What could prove to be the long-term significance of Napier’s work on omissions 
is that the development of this discourse theme may result in an increase of proactive 
accountability by original speakers and receivers: by the former in the generation of 
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source texts and by the latter in confirming comprehension. Increased responsibility by 
interpretees in terms of diction, delivery and reception accompanied by improved skill in 
perceiving and responding to the dynamics of interaction could constitute a substantial 
leap toward mutual accountability for co-creating meanings and understandings during 
simultaneously-interpreted communication. Rather than reinforcing premises that the 
interpreter must cope alone, analysis and training could evolve to embrace the full 
implications of the interactionist paradigm. 
In discovering the interpreter’s individual unconscious regarding unknown 
omissions, Napier (2002) opens the possibility of discovering additional contents of 
unconsciousness within the entire field of Interpreting Studies. She cites a broad literature 
specific to metalinguistic awareness but only a small subset (1996-2000, at the time of 
her publication) is within the domain of interpretation (most of her references to 
metalinguistics are drawn from research on literacy). It is appropo, therefore, that Napier 
reports that most participants in her study “only became conscious” of their applied 
metalinguistic competence when they began talking about it (p. 191). In other words, they 
began to develop aspects of their practical consciousness into discursive consciousness. 
In addition to linking metacommunication and consciousness, Napier establishes 
equivalence between spoken and signed language interpreting of university lectures, 
bridging as well the perceived gap between conference and community interpreting. 
6.6 Interpreting as Chronotopic Calibration: Making Timespace Visible 
Many Members of the European Parliament are sophisticated users of 
simultaneous interpretation. Their discourse about conference SI in the EP 
overemphasizes interpreter omissions and misunderstandings probably because this is the 
364 
most tangible evidence of not being ‘in control’ of the pluralingual communication 
process. MEPs either overlook or are unaware of the other reasons for interpreter 
omissions, such as their own complicity in delivering source texts rife with non-
interpretable features. Only a few MEPs recognize the possibility of omissions that are 
made strategically by interpreters in order to refine a point and enhance voice. Many 
MEPs do concede the pressures of the context that force interpreter omissions by virtue 
of institutional demands not to slow down or stop the proceedings. 
Many members of Deaf cultures are also sophisticated users of simultaneous 
interpretation. Their discourse about community SI and sign language interpreters 
overemphasizes the power position of the interpreter because this is the most tangible 
evidence of not being ‘in control’ of the pluralingual communication process. Deaf 
interpretees often overlook or are unaware of omissions (unless they are informed by 
another bilingual participant, in similar fashion to an MEP’s Assistant monitoring 
interpreted renditions by European Parliament interpreters). Some Deaf interpretees 
recognize conscious omission strategies of interpreters for refining voice within the given 
institutional context. Many Deaf interpretees also recognize time pressure and other 
factors adversely affecting the decision latitude of all participants, including the 
interpreters. Usually any manifestation of these is called oppression. 
As reference groups for each other, conference and community interpreting 
participants (interpretees and interpreters alike) bring language ideology into view, 
helping us perceive flaws in the laissez-faire assumption that the invisible hand of the 
translation machine is sufficient. The critical lens will be sharpened by including 
informal interpreters in the field of international business as another comparison group. 
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Automatic processes of this machine, human-enabled or not, cannot regenerate human 
diversity or cultivate collective intelligence. The transmission machine only drives the 
road of homolingualism. Its passengers, interpretees and interpreters, are indeed out of 
control, subject to the constraints of a fancified IBM system designed for speed, now with 
safeties disabled. 
Carefully-created checks and balances for ensuring shared understanding made 
the original use of the IBM system at Nuremberg capable of handling the pluralinguistic 
challenge of simultaneous interpreting. Communication rituals indigenous to the cultural 
practices of Deaf people ensure understanding by creating the time to check in, ask 
questions, and explain. Interpreters and interpretees who cede their agency, their 
relational autonomy (Witter-Merithew et al, 2010), to the dictates of the transmission 
machine, whether in conference or community settings, surrender culture, identity and the 
power of voice. Only humans in collaboration with each other can adapt to the flux of 
pluralingualist priorities during interpreted transaction. 
This human factor of deciding, consciously, to choose the mode of social 
transaction and its target, authorizes the reference group comparison of interpreters to 
managers and administrators in international business.230 Although it is unlikely that the 
established term for distinguishing conference and community interpreting will evolve 
from mode to timespace calibration, perhaps mode can come to include chronotopic 
                                                
230 “Reference group theory which systematically takes account of positive orientations 
toward non-membership groups can serve as a corrective of [Sumner’s] prematurely 
restricted conclusion [that negative associations are usually directed to outsiders and 
positive associations reserved for insiders]. In-groups and out-groups are often sub-
groups within a larger social organization, and are always potentially so, since a new 
social integration can encompass previously separated groups” (Merton, 1957, p. 298-
299). 
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calibration as part of its essential definition. Conference interpreting, with its emphasis on 
information, tends to homolingualism by erasing difference. Community interpreting, 
with its emphasis on identity and relationship, tends to pluralingualism by maintaining 
cultural difference. In each case, interpreters are stewards of both aims: information void 
of identity (re)generates a homolingual machine; identity without information promotes 
stereotypes and prejudice; each of these reifies structural inequality.  
When identity and information come into conflict or competition, interpreters 
become stewards of the transactive social relationships among interpretees in that 
moment of timespace. Pluralingual transaction, by definition, does not conform to any 
one homolingualism. Instances of non-awareness, of unconscious omission or 
misunderstanding when you think you’ve understood but you have not (the Johari 
Window zone of ‘not knowing what you don’t know’),231 will occur for everyone, 
interpretees as well as interpreters. Moments of uncertainty and not knowing ought to be 
more frequent in interpreted communication than in homolingual transactions, if only 
because homolingualism reinforces similarities and mutually disregards deviations.  
Social interpreting transcends the traditional modes of conference and community 
interpreting by prioritizing the immediate relationship among interpretees in service of 
the emergent aspect of communication that is most salient in the lived experience of 
                                                
231  The Johari Window is a model for interpersonal interaction represented in a two-by-
two grid. The horizontal axis is the self, the vertical axis is the other. The columns 
represent what is known and not known to you and the other, resulting in four 
quadrants. Luft (1984) labels the quadrants open, blind, hidden, and unknown. Open 
is what both you (the self) and the other know; blind is what they know about you 
that you’re unaware of; hidden is what you know that they don’t; and unknown 
“refers to behaviors, feelings and motivation known neither to the self nor to others” 
(p. 61). 
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group dynamics: information or identity. Social interpreting is about helping interpretees 
connect: intellectually (premised in mutually comprehending information) or phatically 
(based in a felt commonality). Social interpreting may involve light and humorous topics, 
but its emphasis on ‘the social’ is to highlight the relationships (when necessary) so that 
information shared is information understood. Shifting between the chronotopes of 
information and identity is a transcultural calibration made possible by asserting human 
agency within the special communication practice of simultaneous interpretation. 
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CHAPTER 7 
SIMULTANEOUS SOCIAL TRANSACTION, 
PLURALINGUALISM AND SHARED IDENTITY 
The reference points established to contextualize this critical discourse analysis 
(consciousness, control, reference groups (culture), and voice) have been used to show a 
structure to the discourse about SI in the EP.232 Hopefully it demonstrates how discursive 
consciousness can be developed from practical consciousness through the rigorous 
application of action learning. The discourse shows a convergence of two frames for 
thinking about language, language difference, and the social innovation of simultaneous 
interpretation. One frame is the European Union’s comprehensive strategy for 
multilingualism and the other frame is the regime of controlled multilingualism 
governing how Members can and cannot use the system of simultaneous interpretation in 
the European Parliament. 
Embedded within these interlocking frames are ideas about language and 
communication that emanate from history and animate ideology about social interaction 
and how identities come to be shared. “There are two ways to understand European 
identity,” explained an MEP, “through a common same language or putting the national 
first, and Europe second” (NM20). This is the European experience, predicated on the 
forcible standardization of language to consolidate nation-states through the construction 
                                                
232  Other relevant histories about interpreting not cross-correlated here include Jesús 
Baigorri Jalón (1999), Aleksandr Šveitser (1999), Kayoko Takeda (2010), 
Małgorzata Tryuk (2010), and Wolfram Wilss (1999). 
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of an imaginary community (Anderson, 1983).233 The European Union today is trying to 
counteract that historical harnessing of homolingualism, but they are constrained from a 
creative solution because they have not (yet) been able re-frame the problem. Hence, as 
the discourse shows, there are problematic communication dynamics, i.e., an interaction 
taboo and the interpersonal reduction of interpreters to machine parts, which together 
feed doubt about the real value of simultaneous interpretation. Ineffective modeling of 
pluralingualism as a unifying field of linguistic equality is now hypothesized as a reason 
that the European Parliament has failed to inspire a sense of commonality among 
Europeans across the European Union. 
7.1 The Language Problem 
In Methodology for the Human Sciences, Mikhael Bakhtin refers to “Humboldt’s 
main problem: the multiplicity of languages,” adding, parenthetically, “the premise and 
the background of the problem – the unity of the human race” (1986, p. 168). Wilhelm 
von Humboldt put ‘the problem’ this way: 
Just as individuals by the power of their idiosyncrasies impart to the 
human intellect a new impetus in uncharted directions, nations may do the 
same for linguistic formation. However, between linguistic structure and 
success in all other types of intellectual activity, there prevails an 
                                                
233  Kroskrity (2000) describes how Michael Silverstein (2000) uses “the Whorfian 
model as a basis for critiquing Benedict Anderson’s less penetrating treatment [of 
“the emergence of a distinctive nationalist ‘we’” (p. 21)]. “Whorf, Silverstein argues, 
demonstrated a concern for examining the fit between cultural and linguistic tropes 
of reality suggested by actual usage and any codable reality that might be behind 
such a project. Whorf demonstrated how ‘habitual thought’ emerged from the 
dialectic of linguistic and discursive practices, on the one hand, and phenomenal 
cultural experience on the other. But Anderson, in contrast to Whorf, ‘seems to 
mistake the dialectically-produced trope…for the reality, rather than seeing…[their] 
dialectical workings…[as] the facts to be characterized and explained’” (p. 22). 
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undeniable relationship. This relationship, moreover, lies principally—and 
we shall consider it here from this aspect only—in the inspiring breath 
which structural linguistic power infuses, in the act of transformation of 
the world, into ideas. (1971(1836), p. 22) 
It appears that Humboldt is more concerned with power than with unity, since he links his 
quest for powerful linguistic structure with the nation by arguing that the nation precedes 
the individual: “As language in its intricacies is but an effect of the national linguistic 
sense, those problems concerning the complex structuring of languages (from which also 
stem their most important variables) cannot be solved adequately if one does not 
subscribe to this viewpoint” (p. 22). 
In other words, from Humboldt’s perspective, there is only one way to solve 
problems concerning the complex structuring of languages: state force. He couches the 
bald assertion with ornate and flowery verbage: 
Such is the nature of this infusion that it diffuses harmoniously through all 
parts of its dominion. If it may be deemed possible that a language 
originates in a nation exactly in this manner, as the word most 
meaningfully and intuitively evolves from the worldview, most purely 
representing it anew and molding itself in such a way as to penetrate every 
nuance of thought easily and unobtrusively, then this language must—so 
long as it maintains its vital principle at all—evoke the selfsame power 
trained in the same direction with equal success in every individual. (p. 22) 
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There are problems with Humboldt’s logic.234 He describes the top-down “infusion” of 
linguistic structural power, wielded by the nation, as a painless process: diffusing 
harmoniously, evolving and penetrating easily, without intrusion; and also having an 
equilateral effect upon everyone (no exceptions). Both assertions are patently untrue. The 
selection and imposition of official languages over regional dialects and other non-
national, non-official languages was and still is politically contentious two centuries later. 
Humboldt, were he able to debate the point, might retort that he is referring to the innate 
learning of linguistic structure along the lines championed by Noam Chomsky (1998) and 
Steven Pinker (1994). Yet, read in context, Humboldt is conflating fluency in a language 
with the enculturation of ideology by the state. This conflation persists in the multilingual 
ideology (and information policy, see the upcoming section Spinning in the Discourse) of 
the EU as well as in discourses about controlled multilingualism in the EP.235 
                                                
234  “Already in Wilhelm von Humboldt (1988) there are strong resonances both with 
Locke (for instance, on the semiotic linkage of the linguistic sign with ideas [pp. 56-
59]) and with Herder (for instance, on language and poetry as the expression of the 
spirit of a people [pp. 42-46, 60]), and mixed strains may be found in varying 
degrees…However, the core principles around which Locke’s and Herder’s 
respective language ideologies cohere contrast markedly in certain fundamental 
respects….Nevertheless it is important to take direct account of the correspondence 
between the language ideologies of Locke and Herder and their implications for 
linguistic theory and practice. We focus especially on the structures of inequality that 
we have found to occupy a significant place in these ideologies” (Bauman & Briggs, 
2000, p. 196).  
235  Bauman & Briggs (2000) describe how Locke’s philosophy of language resonates 
with “the mechanical philosophy of the seventeenth century” (p. 145) and go on to 
critique “the profound impact [of Locke’s Essay] on thinking about language during 
the following three centuries” (p. 149). They argue that “Locke…characterizes his 
Essay, a founding document of linguistic and semiotic inquiry, as an effort to make 
language and human understanding safe for science—and for society” (p. 147). 
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All humans do learn the grammar of at least one language (barring extreme 
isolation or massive cognitive impairment), but there is no way to guarantee a “selfsame” 
uniform effect of ideological persuasion. This is, however, the essential presumption of 
homolingualism. If the structure of language could enforce a singular ideology among all 
persons, then there would be no dissent, only patriotism. No democracy would be 
possible because there would be no basis for competition among political parties. To 
achieve the kind of “equal success” Humboldt appears to value, then humans must be 
denied the move from practical to discursive consciousness. Lacking the critical faculty 
necessary to reflect upon the action of language in the world, people would be stymied at 
the cognitive level of practical consciousness. 
Alternatively, to achieve Humboldt’s encompassing dominion, something must be 
done or used to limit and domesticate which individuals plateau in practical 
consciousness and who will be encouraged to progress to discursive consciousness. 
Giddens’ (1979) distinction between a) the ability to use a language in practical, everyday 
communication and b) the ability to explain what language is and how language works, is 
possible because of the extent to which people are aware of choosing to use certain words 
at certain times in particular circumstances in order to achieve specific goals. The art of 
rhetoric is the application of discursive consciousness within the realm of practical 
communication. Humboldt continues: 
The ingress of such a language, or of one closely approaching it, into the 
history of the world must establish an important era in the course of 
human development, and precisely in the area of its loftiest and most 
marvelous productions. Definite intellectual courses and a definite 
impetus, propelling the mind along such a path, cannot be conceived 
before such languages have originated. They therefore constitute a true 
point of inflection in the internal history of the human race. If they must 
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be regarded as the apex of linguistic structure, they are the initial stage of 
a soul-stirring culture rich in phantasy. (p. 22-23) 
Was Humboldt arguing that such a pervasively-powerful language had not yet 
occurred?236 
Is Humboldt’s aim to survey the diversity of some of the world’s languages in 
order to identify the structural mechanism relating language and intelligence for 
exploitation by the state? How can he hold lofty marvelous intellect in such veneration 
and yet seek to determine how to send the mind along “definite courses” with “definite 
impetus”? Bakhtin (1986) briefly contextualizes his mention of Humboldt’s problem with 
his (Humboldt’s) framing: “the premise and background of the problem—the unity of the 
human race” (p. 168). Bakhtin then narrows Humboldt’s problem to “the sphere of 
languages and their formal structures (phonetic and grammatical)” (p. 168). Pointedly, 
Bakhtin adds: “But in the sphere of speech (within a single or any language) there arises 
the problem of one’s own and another’s word” (p. 168).237 
Wilhelm von Humboldt wrote in German near the beginning of the 19th century. 
His attitudes are painfully ethnocentric. His work, however, is recognized as part of 
                                                
236  Humboldt would not have championed English over German, but “Locke believes 
that the practices he promotes will further social as well as intellectual order: ‘I shall 
imagine I have done some service to truth, peace, and learning if, by any 
enlargement on this subject, I can make men reflect on their own use of language’ 
([Epistle]III.v.6). It seems worthwhile to stress that ‘language’ here means English. 
Although gentlemen should learn Latin and scholars would be wise to study Greek, 
it is the ability to convey one’s thoughts in English that really counts” (Bauman & 
Briggs, 2000, p. 164). 
237  Heteroglossia may be the microsocial manifestation of the macrosocial phenomenon 
of pluralingualism. 
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a long tradition of thinking about language and society that emerges 
clearly in the writings of Vico, Herder, and von Humboldt, who argue that 
verbal art is a central dynamic force in shaping linguistic structure and 
study. Attention to poetics from Sapir, the Russian formalists, and 
members of the Prague school contributed to the development of 
performance and poetics in the 1970s and 1980s. (Bauman & Briggs, 
1990, p. 59) 
Although ostensibly concerned with the relation of the intellect and language, von 
Humboldt essentially established the ideological frame for linguistic diversity in Europe 
with the premise that language difference is a problem that can and should be solved. 
Bakhtin’s rebuke is to refine the problem from formalized structures of language to the 
creative level of language use: the actual words uttered in the dynamic flux of social 
transactions.  
7.2 Re-Setting the Problem 
Donald A. Schön, known for his work in social systems theory, wrote about 
language and problem setting in social policy (1979/1993). “In order to dissolve the 
obviousness of diagnosis and prescription in the field of social policy, we need to become 
aware of, and to focus attention upon, the generative metaphors which underlie our 
problem-setting stories” (1993, p. 148). As we’ve seen, the original metaphor for 
interpreting is a notion of translation-as-transmission, the rapid transfer of information. 
This brings us to what Schön calls “frame awareness,” which is “likely to bring us into 
sharper and more explicit confrontation with frame conflict” (p. 150). Schön’s 
recommended response to frame conflict is 
frame restructuring…constructing a new problem-setting story, one in 
which we attempt to integrate conflicting frames by including features and 
relations drawn from previous stories, yet without sacrificing internal 
coherence or the degree of simplicity required for action.” (p. 152) 
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The task of this concluding chapter is to outline an alternative frame by shifting the 
problem from language diversity per se to social transactions among people 
cooperatively communicating using different languages. 
First: to recap the situation. The stories represented in the discourse about SI in 
the EP are ambivalent. Expressions of criticism and dissatisfaction tend to target the 
interpreter or the interpretation as if a) language use is transparent, rendering 
misunderstandings as not normal, and b) speed is the best measure of effectiveness 
(combined with something called accuracy, but one apparently can’t be accurate and 
slow, only accurate and fast). Rather than recognizing and working with the pluralingual 
reality, language diversity has been set up as if there should be a fix, rather than being a 
material condition inviting continuous mediation. The solutions are problematic: English 
as a lingua franca (ELF) is motivated by a homolingual impulse and creates a code or 
contact language that can exclude the interpreters (who are nonetheless still supposed to 
‘get it right’) as well as other Members who have not learned the code. 
Multilingual MEPs who tend to choose to speak ‘directly’ to those they can by 
codeswitching among the languages they know are also motivated by homolingualism. 
Like those chosing a lingua franca (English or otherwise), discounted is the ‘indirect’ 
communication with all the rest of their colleagues through simultaneous interpretation. 
In most of these cases, the verbal art of rhetoric is reduced to the most simple and basic. 
Ritualistically, each time this happens speed is reinforced as preferable to ensuring 
mutual understanding, strengthening the taboo of interacting to collaboratively determine 
meaning and continuing the interpersonal reduction of the interpreter to a component of a 
machine. The interaction taboo has at least two forms: Members are implicitly 
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discouraged from interacting with other Members whose languages they do not know, 
and Members are structurally prevented from interacting with the interpreters. 
7.2.1 Frame Conflict in English 
Following Schön’s lead, Reddy (1993) argues that if improving communication is 
the goal: 
It will not do to set out post-haste to ‘solve the problem’ of inadequate 
communication. The most pressing task is rather to start inquiring 
immediately about how that problem presents itself to us. For problem 
setting, not problem solving is the crucial process. What kind of stories do 
people tell about their acts of communication? When these acts go astray, 
how do they describe ‘what is wrong and what needs fixing?’ (p. 165) 
Reddy’s clarity is exceptional and his argument so particularly relevant to this context 
that he bears quoting at length. Reddy presents evidence that 
the stories English speakers tell about communication are largely 
determined by semantic structures of the language itself. This evidence 
suggests that English has a preferred framework for conceptualizing 
communication, and can bias thought processes toward this framework, 
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even though nothing more than common sense is necessary to devise a 
different, more accurate framework. (p. 165) 238 
Specifically, Reddy demonstrates that “as a meta-language, English…[is] its own worst 
enemy” (p. 166). 
Reddy took the exact case of “What do speakers of English say when 
communication fails or goes away?” (p. 166) and found a dead metaphor. Dead 
metaphors are called dead because most people would not recognize them as a metaphor 
at all, because they are so ingrained in regular, every day talk. Dead metaphors are taken 
completely for granted as having a literal meaning instead of invoking, as they used to, a 
fresh, living metaphorical image. 
7.2.1.1 The Conduit Metaphor 
The dead metaphor that Reddy noticed involves “the figurative assertion that 
language transfers human thoughts and feelings” (1993, p. 167). He gives the logic of 
this framework the label of 
                                                
238  Emirbayer, cited for his emphasis on transactions in order to conceptualize a 
relational sociology, mentions “One social theorist, Norbert Elias, [who] points out 
that substantialist thinking corresponds closely to grammatical patterns deeply 
ingrained in Western languages [such as English]… ‘Our languages are constructed 
in such a way that we can often only express constant movement or constant change 
in ways which imply that it has the character of an isolated object at rest, and then, 
almost as an afterthought, adding a verb which expresses the fact that the thing with 
this character is now changing. For example, standing by a river we see the perpetual 
flowing of the water. But to grasp it conceptually, and to communicate it to others, 
we do not think and say, “Look at the perpetual flowing of the water”; we say, 
“Look how fast the river is flowing.” We say, “The wind is blowing,” as if the wind 
were actually a thing at rest which, at a given point in time, begins to move and 
blow. We speak as if a wind could exist which did not blow. This reduction of 
processes to static conditions, which we shall call “process reduction” for short, 
appears self-explanatory to people who have grown up with such languages. (Elias 
1978, pp. 111-112)’” (Emirbayer, 1997, p. 281). 
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the conduit metaphor…[which leads] to the bizarre assertion that words 
have ‘insides’ and ‘outsides.’ After all, if thoughts can be ‘inserted’ [into 
words], there must be a space ‘inside’ wherein the meaning can reside . . . 
[or] perhaps, somehow, the listener has erred. In the framework of the 
conduit metaphor, the listener’s task is one of extraction. He must find the 
meaning ‘in the words’ and take it out of them. (p. 168) 
Reddy’s point is that “the conduit metaphor is a real and powerful semantic structure in 
English” (p. 175): linguistically, it is a semantic pathology.239 The conduit metaphor 
contrasts starkly with what he calls the toolmaker’s paradigm: 
In terms of the conduit metaphor, what requires explanation is failure to 
communicate. Success appears to be automatic. But if we think in terms of 
the toolmaker’s paradigm, our expectation is precisely the opposite. 
Partial miscommunication, or divergence of readings from a single text, 
are not aberrations. They are tendencies inherent in the system, which can 
only be counteracted by continuous effort and large amounts of verbal 
interaction. In this view, things will naturally be scattered, unless we 
expend the energy to gather them. They are not, as the conduit metaphor 
would have it, naturally gathered, with a frightening population of wrong-
headed fools working to scatter them. (p. 175). 
The homolingual impulse may be a kind of collective ‘gathering’ reaction to the 
complexity of pluralingualistic discourses. Pluralingualism, like heteroglossia, can be 
said to characterize all discourse, with discourse defined as language-in-use (Blommaert, 
2004). 
If so, the spontaneous emergence of English as a lingua franca (ELF) among 
Members of the newly-expanded European Parliament could be understood as an effort to 
use linguistic resources in order to establish more (or a specific kind of) social order. This 
may be only marginally different than, say, the emergence of Nicaraguan Sign Language 
                                                
239  A definition of semantic pathology, and more of Reddy’s explanation of the conduit 
metaphor as a specifically English language problem, is included in Appendix F.  
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among school-aged children brought together for the first time from around their country 
in the 1970s (Kegl, Senghas & Coppola, 1999). Despite being exposed to numerous adult 
role models using American Sign Language, ASL was not suited to the culture or 
environment that shaped their lives in Nicaragua. Researchers watched in astonishment as 
these children literally created their own language while transacting among themselves. 
The salient difference in these two cases is between children engaging exclusively with 
practical consciousness and adult MEPs transacting with a mix of practical and discursive 
consciousness. 
7.2.1.2 Members on “Words” and “Meaning” in the Discourse about SI in the 
EP 
One MEP’s Assistant was emphatic: “We are often wasting time…a vicious 
circle…it’s a trade-off of national identity for expressing yourself in a way that you 
consider best. We need to give a clearer message, now” (F01/NM17). Another MEP’s 
Assistant was equally insistent: “He always reads the speeches, one minute. He never 
speaks freely. To give as much content as possible” (F17/NM41). The sense of urgency, 
of wasting time, of needing speed and therefore packing as much content as possible into 
a one-minute speech, guarantee exclusionary, homolingual effects such as interpreter 
mis-renderings and the ideological naturalization of the (dead) conduit metaphor. Other 
Members refer to “the” meaning: “We have concern with the sharpness and rightness of 
the interpretation as far as the meaning is concerned” (OM06). And perhaps the ultimate 
dead conduit metaphor question: “How do you translate [sic] a word that doesn’t exist in 
other languages?” (OM35) 
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Members distinguish between interacting during the debates and defining the 
terminology that will be written into law. For instance, the need for “precision is more in 
legal writing. English is easier in dialogue to convey points, using various words” 
(NM24). ‘To convey’ is explicitly a (dead) conduit expression. Interpreters are explicitly 
evaluated in (dead) conduit metaphor terms: “Sometimes…we have interpreters who are 
able to interpret not exactly word-for-word but the spirit—the central part of the 
message” (emphasis added, OM35). “In the beginning,” says another Member speaking 
about ELF, “I didn’t know the dossiers. I understood the translation [sic] but had trouble 
to pick out and sense the meaning” (emphasis added, OM62). According to the dead 
conduit metaphor, ‘the message’ and ‘the meaning’ are like material objects: linguistic 
packages being moved, without transformation, through space. According to non-living 
logic, these packages simply need to be plucked out of the air and properly opened at the 
other end of the pipeline. 
7.2.1.3 Semantic Pathology and Social Policy 
Musing about the social implications of the pervasive semantic pathology of the 
(dead) conduit metaphor, “a case that involved more words than any pathology I had ever 
heard of” (1993, p. 180), Reddy wondered what does this “matter…to the man [sic] on 
the street, to mass culture, to federal policy?” (p. 185). What is the “practical impact” of 
“the English language [having] a less than accurate idea of its own workings, and…the 
power to bias thought processes in the direction of [the conduit] model?” (p. 185) 
Although it is surely unfair to lay the whole blame on English and the dead 
conduit metaphor, I wonder how much English contributes to the confusion in the 
European Parliament regarding the distinction between multilingualism and 
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pluralingualism. Understanding the term, multilingualism, as a signal rather than a 
meaning allows us to examine the code to which this signal belongs and interpret it, 
nonrandonly, among pre-established sets of alternatives.240 The discourse about SI in the 
EP shows a strong correlation between multilingualism and language learning which, 
combined with the popularity of EFL, indexes a preferential bias for homolingualism: use 
of the word multilingualism signals homolingualism. The social order that is reproduced 
by any move to a common language is a classic hierarchy. Not only does it make sense 
that the vast European populace does not identify with controlled multilingualism in the 
EP as a basis of commonality, incessant homolingualism reflects entrapment in the 
ideology of speed with its accompanying belief that controlling information is the best or 
only way to achieve and maintain power. 
Language use achieves such effects on social organization because of the way it 
orients us to the dimension of time. As described previously, communication has both 
spatial and temporal dimensions (e.g., Carey, 1992). The spatial aspect of communication 
is most evident in the use of information for power and control, while the temporal aspect 
of communication is most evident in the repetition of rituals and the regeneration of 
culture. The ritual and cultural elements combine with the information and power 
elements to generate social identifications and intercultural relations. It is the 
transactional, social quality of language use that leads Members to say things like, 
“Language is to the highest extent the core of culture” (OM08) and, “Our language will 
never fly from our borders” (OM54). 
                                                
240  This jargon is from the (1949) Mathematical Theory of Communication developed 
by Claude E. Shannon and later popularized by Shannon and Warren Weaver. See 
Appendix F. 
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Perhaps the core feature articulating the intersection of language and culture is, as 
Blommaert explains, 
an elementary semiotic principle . . . the ‘double arrow of indexicality’, 
the fact that every sign [each word, symbol, behavior and/or collection of 
these] presupposes things and entails things when it is used (Silverstein 
2006). We select [a sign] because of the presuppositions it conventionally 
carries, and addressees understand it on the basis of the entailments it 
triggers. It is at once a repository of past meanings, and a vehicle for 
future meanings. This is not rocket science, but the impact of this simple 
semiotic statement is quite significant. If we broaden the statement 
somewhat, we see that a sign always contains three analytical dimensions: 
one towards its past, another one towards its future. The third one, in 
between both … is the present, characterized by the sign’s non-random 
emplacement. (2012, p. 53) 
Aggregations of indexicality in discourse generate what Bakhtin (1981) calls a 
chronotope. Literally, a chronotope is a timespace: they can be thought of as timescapes 
that are socially constructed through uses of language, influencing the ways we organize 
ourselves in space (and are ourselves then organized by space and time). The ideology of 
speed that justifies the homolingual orientation of MEPs within their pluralingual 
environment is repeated (ritualized) to such an extent that it evokes and animates the 
postmodern condition of timespace compression (Harvey, 1990)241 in the social 
transactions and institutionalizing culture of the European Parliament. 
                                                
241  Harvey’s complicated argument involves the way capitalism has utilized technology 
to collapse time and space so that distance and duration become less meaningful as 
dimensions of every day life. Key features involve acceleration of production and 
consumption, especially of “accelerating turnover time and the rapid write-off of 
traditional and historically acquired values” (1989, p. 291). A result of the 
postmodern condition is “the loss of a sense of the future except and insofar as the 
future can be discounted into the present” (p. 291).  
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7.2.1.4 Calibration and Chronotope Variation 
Bakhtin scholar Michael Holquist elaborates: “Chronotopes provide the clock and 
the map we employ to orient our identity in the flux of existence” (2009, p. 10). What 
Bakhtin had realized in analyzing ancient and Renaissance literature is that a careful 
reader could discern the conception of time characteristic of that era through the authors’ 
use of language. In “Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel” (1981), Bakhtin 
contrasts “adventure time” (Greek and Roman, circa 100-300 A.D.) with “folkloric time” 
(particularly in reference to books by French friar and physician Francois Rabelais, the 
first one of which was published in 1532). Both of these chronotopes stand in stark 
contrast to our own, even though each remains evident in popular and literary culture. 
Other contemporary examples of chronotopic calibrations that are alternative to, and 
contest, timespace compression are available. 
7.2.1.4.1 Contemporary Chronotopes: Two Examples 
In Wisdom Sits in Places (1996), Basso writes of a horrifying moment in his 
fieldwork with the Western Apache, when he fears having jeopardized his entire research 
project because of “my actions, which were wholly unwitting but patently offensive” (p. 
10). Keith Basso’s guide and teacher, Charles Henry, an Apache historian, has identified 
a problem with Keith’s mis-pronunciation of a particular Apache place-name. Charles 
brings this matter to Keith’s attention. Keith does not immediately recognize the depth of 
its significance. After his fourth failure to repeat the name correctly, Keith tries to close 
the episode by relying on the audio-recording: “I’ll work on it later, it’s in the machine. It 
doesn’t matter” (p. 10). 
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It does matter, Charles insists, first in English and then in an explanation to 
another Apache member of the research team, Morley Cromwell. Morley’s main function 
was as an interpreter. Keith’s knowledge of Apache and Charles’ knowledge of English 
enables some (homolingual) communication between them, but neither is fully fluent in 
the other’s language. In the text, Basso provides a (written) English record of Morley’s 
(spoken) interpretation of Charles’ explanation in Apache. Then Basso explains: 
Charles’s admonition, which Morley proceeds to translate [sic] without 
dulling its critical edge, leaves me unsettled and silent. That Charles has 
taken me for someone in a hurry comes as a surprise. Neither had I 
foreseen that my failure to pronounce the stubborn Apache place-name 
would be interpreted by him as displaying a lack of respect. And never 
had I suspected that using Apache place-names might be heard by those 
who use them as repeating verbatim—actually quoting—the speech of 
their early ancestors. (p. 10) 
The integrity of Charles’s admonition is maintained by Morley in the transformation from 
Apache to English. Morley does not mistake Charles’ point of criticism through either 
misunderstanding or misrepresentation. The quality of Morley’s work as a cultural 
interpreter is praised by Basso’s expressed appreciation. 
There are layers to the communication issue between Keith and Charles. Each 
language has different coordinates for determining the meaningfulness of everything that 
is said. To apply the analogy of information theory, each language has different sets of 
alternatives from which to make a nonrandon selection (this jargon is explained in 
Appendix F). In this case, Keith eventually comes to learn the significance of quoting 
place-names rather than simply saying them. It is unclear from the anecdote whether the 
realization comes in the immediate interaction, or as the result of longer-term exposure to 
the meaningful coordinates of Western Apache cultural life. 
385 
As an ethnographer, Basso is attuned to noticing the indicators of difference. He 
recognizes that when difference is present, more effort is required and transformation of 
the usual set of alternatives for decoding signals may become necessary: that is, he is 
using a version of Reddy’s toolmaker paradigm. Basso’s use of the label, interpreting, in 
this situation is technically correct. The criticism he receives is pointed: Keith Basso is 
moving too fast. Keith is perceived as impatient or for some other reason unwilling to 
remain involved in the social transaction until he has oriented himself properly to both 
the landscape and Charlie and Morley’s ancestors through the culturally-correct use of 
language. Basso explicitly identifies this Apache use of language as a chronotope that 
constitutes the temporal backdrop for cultural existence. 
Another example of chronotopic calibration comes from the Xavante of Brazil. 
Laura Graham (1995) writes in her cultural ethnography, Performing Dreams: 
Warā [men’s council] discourse is formally represented so as not to be 
construed as the product of individual speakers. Rather than evincing a set 
of one-to-one correspondences between individual speakers and discourse, 
warā discursive practice represents discourse as a collage of multiple, 
articulating voices. It pragmatically illustrates the emergent 
intersubjectivity inherent in any discursive interaction. In the Xavante 
model, truth is not a universal standard against which individual 
statements are measured; truth can be contested, for it is constructed from 
many voices. (p. 142) 
By orienting to timespace in a creative and co-constituting way, Xavante maintain 
language uses and cultural practices that enable collective decision-making that balances 
the maintenance of internal cultural tradition with adaptation to new intercultural 
contingencies. 
Graham’s (1995) study of dream interpretation and performance among the 
Xavante details a comprehensive process of reality co-construction. Rather than 
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positioning Warodi (the dreamer) as possessor, defender, and sole interpreter of his 
dreams, Warodi shares his dream-songs only as a first step in producing community 
knowledge. While listening to his account during men’s council, the warā, other elders 
add their own voices, singing and making other contributions to the telling: refining and 
rehearsing the upcoming collective, public performance. At each step in the process all 
participants enact the collaborative construction of meaning and cultural identification 
that the ultimate performance is intended to model for the community as a whole. 
Even though Xavante conceptualize a dream to be the experience of an 
individual self—Warodi was the one who initially “experienced” the 
dream—its telling nevertheless [becomes] a cooperative endeavour...By 
collaborating in the telling, the participants altered the nature of Warodi’s 
dream experience beyond what their collective singing had already 
accomplished. As participants in the telling, the elders transformed more 
of Warodi’s dream (or what was represented as a dream) into collective 
experience…Moreover, in their telling the elders were actually doing what 
Warodi was proposing…demonstrat[ing] the way for the Xavante to 
remain forever. (p. 167-168) 
Graham makes note of the polyvocal mode of these collective constructions of wisdom. 
By formally representing discourse production as a collaborative rather 
than an individual endeavour—a hybridization of voices—warā 
discursive practice pragmatically embodies a conception of language and 
speech acts that was articulated by Soviet theorists such as Bakhtin, 
Vološinov, and Vygotsky and…emerging in recent critiques of speech act 
theory. (p. 166-167) 
This is not the homolingualism of a presumed superior or prior set of alternatives from 
which nonrandon selections can be made, but a coordinated effort to draw pluralingually 
upon the collective intelligence and insight of the entire community. 
Considered as a communication strategy, the cultural practice of sharing dreams is 
a powerful discursive tool for maintaining the integrity of specific cultural identity. 
Practically, performing dreams places the Xavante at the center of timespace by 
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calibrating the telling of dreams to position themselves as agents who successfully 
resolve environmental changes and overcome external political threats. Likewise, Basso’s 
study of the Western Apache practice of “speaking in names” (1996), draws explicitly 
upon Bakhtin’s notion of chronotope (p. 62). Basso quotes a definition from The Dialogic 
Imagination (Bakhtin, 1981) that highlights the linguistic fusion of time and space with 
particular points of geography. He explains the fundamental relationship with the land 
that forms the logical basis for Western Apache conceptions of self and culture: a 
relationship that they understand as mutual and co-constituting. The land actively 
communicates with and to Apaches (individually and collectively), especially through the 
voice of ancestors who gave names to places (particular and specific geographical spaces) 
that literally describe their appearance at that time. While environmental changes are 
evident at some places that no longer appear as they once did (for instance, the absence of 
water where, at the time of naming, there was a spring), most places retain a similar 
geographical character. The place-names thus evoke the original stage for the telling of 
historical events that happened there while enabling recognition of changes wrought by 
circumstance. 
Within specific social situations, especially those in which possibilities for public 
criticism and embarrassment are rife, very particular cultural considerations for speaking 
are invoked by Western Apaches. Under these delicate interpersonal conditions, a place-
name (or several) may be uttered “to substitute for the narrative it anchors, ‘standing up 
alone’ (‘o’áá) as Apaches say, to symbolize the narrative as well as the knowledge it 
contains” (p. 89). Place-names are understood by Apaches as direct quotations of their 
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ancestors, and are coded with associated stories of historical events that occurred at the 
named place which embody lessons about what it means to be Apache. Basso explains: 
In addition, place-names implicitly identify positions for viewing these 
locations: optimal vantage points, so to speak, from which the sites can be 
observed, clearly and unmistakably, just as their names depict them. To 
picture a site from its name, then, requires that one imagine it as if 
standing or sitting at a particular spot, and it is to these privileged 
positions, Apaches say, that the images evoked by the place-names cause 
them to travel in their minds. 
Wherever the optimal vantage point for a named site may be located – 
east of the site or west, above it or below, near it or at some distance away 
– the vantage point is described as being ‘in front of’ (bádnyú) the site; 
and it is there, centuries ago, that ancestors of the Western Apache are 
believed to have stood when they gave the site its name. Accordingly… in 
positioning people’s minds to look ‘forward’ (bidááh) into space, a place-
name also positions their minds to look ‘backward’ (t’aazhi’) into time. 
(italics in original, p. 89) 
This juxtaposition of past/present, of ‘looking’ from the ideal angle at a physical place, 
also positions Apache listeners to imagine their own situation ‘at the correct angle’ in 
terms of the values and beliefs of long-standing cultural identity. This simultaneous 
looking-forward and looking-back generated by such “travel in your mind” (p. 91) is a 
calibration to timespace that enables the evocation of past practice as guide for future 
action. It is precisely this kind of language use positioning that is at stake in the 
chronotope. The juncture of chronotopal positionality in interpersonal communication as 
well as in intercultural and institutional discourses generates conditions where 
understanding or misunderstanding can both be turned to a social good. 
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7.2.1.4.2 A Worst Case Instance 
A “cholera chronotope” attached to place and timespace is analyzed in 
comprehensive detail by Charles Briggs and Clara Mantini-Briggs (2003, p. 277). 
Cholera and its attendant narratives cycled twice through the indigenous Warao 
community during the 1990s in Venezuela, leading to more than five hundred easily 
preventable deaths, particularly in Mariusa; a community nestled a fair distance into the 
Orinoco Delta. Premised in a blame-the-victim logic, the transactional talk of government 
officials, healthcare workers, journalists and clergy at every level of national and 
international organization shows an individual and collective calibration to an 
institutionalized, racializing discourse positioning the indigenous population as unclean, 
i.e. as unsanitary citizens (Briggs & Mantini-Briggs, 2003)242 and therefore deserving (or 
at least at fault) for inviting the epidemic. 
The seventh cholera pandemic, historicized in a discursive timestream by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) and the Pan American Health Organization, is 
deemed to have originated in Peru by way of Europe and Asia before arriving at the 
eastern coast of Venezuela (Briggs & Briggs-Mantini, 2003). As a modern-day outbreak 
of a well-known and easily treatable disease, this pandemic “is situated within a master 
                                                
242  Briggs & Mantini-Briggs argue “that the key reason that authorities opted…for stop 
gap measures, information control, and rhetorics of blame was rooted in the way that 
spatializing, temporalizing, and racializing practices came together in institutional 
contexts. The result was to make a race (‘the indígenas’), a space (the delta), and a 
bacteria (Vibrio cholera) seem synonymous” (2003, p. 312). They continue, 
“Cholera continued to carry out the function in the late twentieth century that it 
served during much of the nineteenth—defining sanitary citizenship and identifying 
unsanitary subjects” (p. 319). 
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narrative that purports to track the ‘spread’ of cholera through vast stretches of time and 
space” (p. 277). It is the disease, not human beings, that is centered by this chronotope. 
Chronotopes in WHO publications cast geographic regions and nation-
states as natural units of disease transmission, surveillance, and 
containment. Texts, tables, and maps compare regions and countries in 
ways that create hierarchies of success and failure in combating cholera” 
(p. 283). 
Many of the avoidable deaths occurred among the people of Mariusa, characterized as the 
endpoint of all river journeys leading into the Orinoco Delta, the heart of the Warao’s 
ancestral lands, still remote albeit colonized. 
Mariusa, if understood analytically as a calibrating place-name, thus “serves as a 
limiting case of remoteness, primitivism, and cultural conservatism” (Briggs & Briggs-
Mantini, 2003, p. 217). Warao resistance could not penetrate the pervasive chronotopal 
calibrating of official medicalizing, racializing, and blaming discourses: “Through the 
delta, ‘the Mariusans’ were branded as the human manifestation of cholera’s imagined 
ability to spring up at any point and spread across space” (p. 218). Tragically, these 
“imposed spatial and temporal projections…were far from neutral or politically 
inconsequential” (p. 284). Arrows on summary maps from the WHO during the pandemic 
“trace the ‘movement’ of cholera across vast stretches of time and space….These time-
space connections were perhaps nowhere as naturalized and powerful as in reference to 
places of origin” (p. 277-278). 
The Tortugans [Warao living in another town], on the other hand, never 
become identified with cholera, never become agents of transmission. The 
narrative casts them as innocent bystanders who had the misfortune to be 
on the path taken by the Mariusans. 
Note that cholera, people, and culture follow the same path in this account, 
one that leads from Mariusa to Tortuga. The two places differ in terms of 
391 
time, in that Mariusa continues to be the locus of a previous way of life, at 
the same time that the premodern world coexists with its modern 
counterpart.243 They also differ in terms of space, such that one becomes 
the quintessence of the premodern world of forest gatherers while the other 
is cast as a more modern realm of agricultural production and sale. Mariusa 
and Tortuga are chronotopes—fusions of space and time—and the origin 
narratives that the Tortugans told about themselves and cholera are linear 
movements along this time-space continuum.244 The Tortugans claimed 
that they lived in, if you will, a different time-space zone, thereby creating 
a powerful sense of social distance from the Mariusans.245 (p. 189) 
In what might be understood as horizontal violence, the Tortugans utilize a discursive 
escape from the institutionalized cholera chronotope, which contributes to the structural 
binding of the Mariusans within it. While cholera appears within the populations of both 
towns, the depersonalization imposed from without overwhelms a more comprehensive 
Warao chronotope; one group is sacrificed on behalf of the other. Time and space are 
identified in the institutional discourses and cultural communication practices recognized, 
studied, described, and critiqued in each of these settings. Graham, Basso, and Briggs & 
Mantini-Briggs are alert to Bakhtinian notions and deploy them where they make sense. 
Imagined as a continuum, Bakhtin poses two polarities of adventure time and folkloric 
time as examples of how language fills time, institutionalizing an imagined structuring of 
                                                
243  Briggs & Briggs-Mantini (2003), footnote 5: “Dipesh Chakrabarty [2000] has argued 
that this notion of the simultaneous existence of worlds that belong to distinct 
temporal realms, modern and premodern, plays a key role in constituting modern 
schemes of social inequality” (p. 350). 
244  Briggs & Briggs-Mantini (2003), footnote 6: “See Bakhtin, Dialogic Imagination” 
(p. 350). 
245   Briggs & Briggs-Mantini (2003), footnote 7: “Johannes Fabian [1983] refers to this 
mode of creating distance as the ‘denial of coevalness’ and suggests that it is the 
classic process whereby anthropologists have claimed distance from and superiority 
over the objects of their research, thereby contributing to colonial relations of power 
and domination” (p. 350). 
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timespace that leads to actual social co-constructions of reality. Language use is the 
means of calibration. 
7.2.1.5 Loss: Subtlety, Nuance, Control 
In the European Parliament, the discourse shows how the dead conduit metaphor 
calibrates the information-centric transmission model of communication, resulting in an 
elaborate transmission machine: an extension of the IBM system from the Nuremberg 
Trials. The rigid structure of controlled multilingualism in the European Parliament 
promotes the use of lingua francas, especially English, in order to avoid the exaggerated 
risks of interpretation. “I don’t know,” muses this Member, “ if there are more problems 
with English. It seems not as much is lost as when I use German” (OM03). The notion 
that there is something there “in” the German, waiting to be lost, is conduit model (dead) 
thinking. It reflects the homolingual attitude that communication should occur without 
effort, and also a corollary: if effort is required, there must be something wrong. 
As Reddy says, “In terms of the conduit metaphor, what requires explanation is 
failure to communicate. Success appears to be automatic” (1993, p. 175). The phatic 
qualities of presence desired by Members using ELF, or any lingua franca, are not absent 
from simultaneously-interpreted transaction unless they are forced out by the structure of 
the system. The different qualities of presence required for skillful and strategic 
participation in simultaneously-interpreted communication provide the basis for new 
calibrations to an alternative chronotope. 
A fine-grained reading of the discourse shows Members are conflicted about 
disregarding the significance of interpreting. The nub of the contradiction becomes 
apparent in the discourse about words. One Member defined the choice of his own 
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language or ELF: “If it is something where the terminology is not so important, it is not 
an argument, and speed is not important, then I speak in Meridian” (OM66). These 
criteria do not seem to leave much opportunity to use anything other than English! But, as 
has already been indicated above and will be elaborated further, ELF is not a panacea, 
and may even be hiding consequential, adverse outcomes. A Member’s Assistant spoke 
frankly: “It’s always a problem when you have an English Rapporteur or Draftsman on a 
topic” (F37). “Listen carefully on the English,” warns another Member, “very carefully” 
(OM31). From the other side, in using ELF, “you can talk about complex issues with a 
high percent of understanding and then native speakers are at a disadvantage. Subtlety 
gets lost but no one notices except the native speakers” (NM28). 
Putting something over on native English speakers during the spontaneous 
interaction of debate may appear, on the surface, to be a good thing, especially since 
English speakers are less prone to conform to the multilingual/language learning baseline. 
“It’s easy for me, my mother tongue is English, and all the interpretations that come to 
me are direct, not through relay. [Other language speakers] complain about time and the 
numbers of combinations: Portuguese to Romanian, there can’t be too many specialized 
in that” (OM44). However, as a non-native English-speaking Member observed, “There 
is a feeling that if you speak English here, you can get away with anything” (NM68). 
What can one get away with, I wondered. How and why? I observed an English-speaking 
Member explain the advantage to colleagues in a Political Group meeting: “One of the 
classic things about English is you can interpret it as you wish.” Recall the example 
regarding an international agreement for Israel to withdraw from the Occupied 
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Territories: in English, the specifics were indeterminate, but if the agreement had been 
written in French, there could have been no ambiguity. 
A Member from the UK explained how leaving the English vague leads to very 
specific advantages when it comes time for implementation, because there is latitude to 
interpret the application of the law according to what is expedient at the present time, 
which may have changed since the past time period during which the legislation was 
negotiated and voted into law. An MEP recounts this experience: 
The Second Reading was very difficult in Working Groups and 
Trialogues. On the First Reading the Parliament was nearly unanimous 
but the Commission rejected it. We could have put interpreters on 
everybody but everybody spoke English or partly French. We reached a 
political compromise—all in English. I was happy the Shadow’s Assistant 
is a native English speaker, who warned about some words. You have to 
rely on the native English speakers on your own team. (OM09) 
Which leaves one to wonder, what if you don’t have a native English-speaking Member 
on your team? 
7.2.1.5.1 Examples: Diction, Referent and Indexicality 
“We have problems with the English language,” explained a Member’s Assistant, 
because we are not native speakers, and when both are not native speakers 
it’s very difficult to have a good communication about a Commission 
document, about amendments, and if you read some amendments it’s 
sometimes only one word to change. And that’s very difficult to have all 
the nuance in your own translation from Dutch to English and then from 
English to Spanish, Portuguese. (F37) 
The word “translation” in this quote is accurate. There are two intercultural 
communication issues in the European Parliament: one involves the dynamics of social 
transaction using simultaneous interpretation, the exemplar of pluralingualism. The other 
involves the dynamics of translation: of securing a legal translation that has a chance of 
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complementary judicial interpretation across all twenty-seven countries of the European 
Union. 
As it stands, (witness the asylum legislation wording about the provision of 
interpretation) much legislation in the European Union is written on the basis of how 
much previously-existing legal language can be imported from previously-worked out 
translations. The power of precedent is magnified by resisting efforts for better wordings 
whose ripple effect necessarily entails new translations and may invoke the spread of 
alternate cultural (and intercultural) norms. A truly pluralingual EU would have original 
laws drawn up in each of its languages, distributing the burden of finding equivalence 
equally, rather than privileging one linguistic frame. 
A few of the challenging translation examples shared or observed during 
fieldwork include the French label for government-supported housing because “behind it 
is a logic for social organizing” (OM35), the notion of “cross-border” in Dutch, which 
generated “a big discussion, a very emotional discussion, because the word was not good 
translated into documents and not good translated by the interpretation” (F37), and the 
use of “illegal” or “irregular” in reference to asylum seekers who fail to meet standard 
official criteria or are otherwise of indeterminate status. 
Another translation concern is the invention of new terms, such as “subsidiarity,” 
which is originally a Latin word, related to the Church in Greece and “completely 
artificial from the German point-of-view” (OM08); “employability,” which is “not in the 
French or German dictionary, it’s a British philosophy [about whether a person] can train 
for a job” (OM59); and “flexsecurity,” about which a Member scoffed: “What does that 
mean? Give people some but not too much social security after working” (OM59). 
396 
Another Member mentioned how the need for “parallel words” in all the official 
languages (NM70) comes up, just by working on a material problem such as asbestos 
abatement. There are “such specialized words…in fisheries, chemistry, finance” (OM35), 
and, too often, “the interpreters are not experts in the field; they use another word that is 
the normal word” (F17/M41) rather than the most precise technical jargon. In the analogy 
of mathematical information theory, the interpreters lack the “repertory members” 
(Reddy, 1993) in their pre-existing set of alternatives that could, nonrandonly, be fitted to 
the signal of a given technical term. (Note: the lack of pre-existing alternatives in a 
repertoire of already-matched concepts applies equally with interpreting ELF.) In another 
instance, a Member explains: 
I didn’t have any Meridian text in front of me, so I had to rely on the 
English…it was really on words…I was not aware that the Germans 
would turn up and come up with—they only read half of it, but the 
problem is afterwards…we had to fight from a technical point…what I 
learned is on language…I had tabled that amendment in English…and I 
should have tabled it in Meridian, because in Meridian I would have 
said….. ‘This was an extra argument’ … not as an ‘excluding 
argument’…I read over that when I…drafted the English text, because my 
English is okay, but I’m not a native English speaker…this was a 
language problem…because the spirit of my amendment was certainly not 
to put it as an excluding condition…if I would have tabled that in 
Meridian, the services would have translated that into correct English or in 
the right spirit of English. (OM09) 
The challenge, it seems, is to be able to use the interpreters in order to resolve conflicts 
regarding the words. But this is precisely what the structure of the regime of controlled 
multilingualism prevents, backed up the conduit/transmission model of interpreting and 
further reinforced by the ideology of speed. 
If you know the subject—this is the point really in the Parliament—okay, 
I can’t understand Romanian or Bulgarian or Greek, but I do speak French 
and German fluently. I can understand Italian, I can understand Spanish—
397 
you can get the gist. What you lose in interpretation is… the words. 
(OM63) 
One Member asserted quite plainly that he would have been a better MEP if he had more 
interpreting. “Yes. I think yes because the work of our work is also about the nuance 
about legal things. We have to understand they are a sensitive question and one word 
could change the sense of the item. I think it’s very—it’s important. It’s important” 
(NM73). 
The issue, then, seems to be less along the lines of blaming ‘the machine’ for 
merely doing what it is ‘programmed’ to do, and more along the lines of how can 
Members cope with making the necessary communicative repairs? 
7.2.1.5.2 Asylum 
The Asylum dossier described in Chapter 4 includes a regulation on the provision 
of interpretation and translation for refugees seeking asylum in Europe. There are or “will 
be a lot of environmental refugees…and…many victims of traffickers” (A1)246 as well 
people fleeing war or political persecution. Many are economic refugees “just looking for 
a better life” (A1). Also, “there’s a lot of illegal immigration…coming from Africa, and 
[Malta is] ending up being the buffer zone and the filter of Europe” (A2). “Or for 
instance the Canary Islands have had massive influx some point maybe 20,000, 25,000, 
30,000 people within a few months” (A3). Negotiations among five European Parliament 
Rapporteurs, their Assistants, and Secretariat officials representing different Political 
                                                
246   As with the previous reporting of instances during fieldwork when I am quoting 
individuals heard in meetings but not interviewed; in this section I’ve used a 
different coding scheme for non-interviewed as well as interviewed subjects in an 
attempt to safeguard the confidentiality of research participants. 
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Groups were mainly focused on improving reception conditions and how best to enhance 
the influence of the Parliament in the Trialogues with the Council of Presidents (“the 
Council”) and the European Commission (“the Commission”). For the latter purpose, the 
issue of “solidarity” was key. 
The lack of solidarity between Member States is actually causing a lot of 
problems because the Netherlands [for instance] can have a system up and 
running. They [an interior country] can, you know, have beautiful words 
on being tough on illegal migration and refugees to be welcomed. But if 
you’re faced with hundreds and hundreds of people coming in every day, 
it’s kind of difficult, you know, and you remain responsible just because 
you are, in fact, the external border because of your geographical position. 
(A1) 
Solidarity was the main sticking point in the Trialogues, which focused on whether the 
“shared responsibility towards the external borders” (A1) would be binding (required) or 
voluntary (optional). 
Another sticking point was on how to guarantee standards for the literal, physical 
reception conditions, as the Commission was “opposed to every and any use of the word 
quality” (A4). 
This all sounds very basic, but [my first priority] is to make sure that the 
conditions people, be it illegal or not, but the conditions people are 
received in—this is not correct English, but whatever—that they are up to 
standards, you know, not A-plus, but, you know, just a bed and some food 
and a shower, you know. I mean this is what we talk about. (A1) 
Given the essentially primitive state of reception conditions (at the time), 
The asylum system is one which quite often gets by on sort of ad hoc 
interpretation because also there’s an issue about the numbers side of 
things there; you know, how many people do you have that speak this 
particular Afghan dialect who are not from the same tribe as the tribe 
you’re trying to get away from. (A4) 
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From the Parliament’s perspective, the opportunity of the Asylum dossier was twofold: to 
establish a new European Asylum Support Office as a focal point for solidarity and to use 
the recast of the preceding Directives to improve “the execution law, which is part at the 
end of the law” (A7). As summarized earlier, it was already conceded that improving the 
wording regarding the provision of interpreting would fail. “Within the Asylum 
dossier…the whole focus, [a particular MEP] doesn’t want it to be on this issue of 
language” (A5). 
Nonetheless, amendments were made (review Table 10) regarding the provision 
of interpretation and the debate is representative (even to the level of metonymy) of the 
discourse about SI in the EP. Of particular interest is the fact that “we have been 
discussing [for] hours with Council on how to define language” (A1) and yet few seem 
able to recall the preferred wording, e.g., “I’m not 100% sure on the exact rule” (A5), and 
“…a definition where it is stated understands or presumed—what was it again?” (A1) 
One Trialogue participant recalled from memory: “May reasonably be presumed to 
understand” (A6); and another, “may reasonably presume to understand, that’s from a 
judicial point of view, you or legally you can at least be in line with court cases and so 
on” (A1).247  
There is a switch between the subject and object in the grammar of the last two 
phrases indicating a subtle but significant difference. In the phrase, “may reasonably be 
presumed to understand,” the emphasis is on (in this case) the asylum seeker: “the 
                                                
247   It is unclear what court cases this Member was referring to being in line with. In 
2010 (one year after these conversational interviews), the Parliament and Council 
issued Directive 2010/64 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings. There are eleven references to understanding; the relevant paragraphs 
are quoted in Appendix D.  
400 
Other,” if you will. In the latter phrase, “may reasonably presume to understand,” the 
focus of the decision-making and responsibility has been shifted away from the Other, 
from the asylum seeker, to the person doing the presuming. In this framing, the legal 
protection is not on or for the asylum seeker, but rather for the official(s) administering 
the procedures. For the moment, just keep that nuance in mind. On the question of 
understanding: “There’s a sticking point,” as another participant explained, “a major one. 
We call it a key point, which means if a Political Group says something’s a key point, 
what that means is that that’s the point at which they wouldn’t compromise” (A6). 
It was recognized that the wording in the original draft from the Commission was 
“rather weak—’supposed to understand’” (A1), so it was proposed to “see what we did in 
a Return Procedure because I remember we had on-going discussions for I don’t know 
how long.” This Trialogue participant continues: 
Then I went back to the Return Procedure and I saw the definition used, 
“understands or” et cetera. And then I phoned with the legal services of 
the Commission and they confirmed that if I would propose that specific 
definition, that that would improve the Commission text as much as 
oversight of the Commission not to follow the definition as already 
adopted in another instrument. (A1) 
What is being sought is both the significance of precedent and also the oversight 
responsibility of the European Commission to ensure continuities in wording because 
different definitions used throughout the instruments…is actually causing 
the major problem within the EU because every time we have an 
instrument linked to other instruments, we feel—this is not always the 
case—but we feel to have the same wording throughout the instruments 
thereby creating different treatment, thereby creating too much room to 
maneuver for Member States, creating too much room for all kinds of 
court cases. (A1) 
Here is the relevant section from the (2008) Return Directive (emphasis added): 
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Member States shall provide, upon request, a written or oral translation 
[sic] of the main elements of decisions related to return, as referred to in 
paragraph 1, including information on the available legal remedies in a 
language the third-country national understands or may reasonably be 
presumed to understand. (European Parliament & Council of the EU) 
Was the Commission intending to improve the wording by using “supposed” instead of 
“presumed,” or was it just a “bad translation” from French, as one of the Trialogue 
participants insisted?248 The initial draft of this legislation for a European Asylum 
Support Office was generated by the Commission, in keeping with Vuorikoski’s material, 
in which “a large part of the research material of [her] study is based on documents 
initiated or drafted by the Commission” (2004, p. 77). The distinction between presumed 
and supposed is subtle and, as a matter of differentiation, probably insignificant. Both 
involve making an admittedly subjective judgment. “Those who are more malicious 
about the issue are worried that asylum seekers get good translation [sic] and therefore 
make a stronger case and can stay.” (A6). This person continued: 
There’s a spectrum of opinion there. I’m not suggesting everyone is in 
[this] case, but more disreputable people would be going for that option. 
But the main option with the thing is probably cost and resources to be 
fair to people who are voting for that. (A6) 
                                                
248 “The European Commission consists of [now, 28] Members, known as 
Commissioners, who are appointed by agreement between the member governments. 
Throughout their term of office they must remain independent of the governments 
and the Council…. The role of the Commission is to uphold the common interests of 
the EU. It acts as the guardian of the Treaties, it serves as the executive arm of the 
Communities, it initiates Community policy, and it defends Community interests in 
the Council. The Commission is accountable to Parliament alone. (Noël 1993: 7 –
15…)…The Commission is always represented in the plenary session of the 
Parliament, being addressed by the speakers, and taking the floor when a document 
drafted by the Commission has been debated” (Vuorikoski, 2004, p. 76). 
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As noted, the Return Procedure “is clearly something else” (A1), that is, something other 
than the intake processing of persons seeking asylum that are being emphasized in all of 
the directives included within the Asylum dossier. 
Of particular interest is the Procedures Directive, which is “the Directive that simply 
sets up a frame for the procedures to—for applying for asylum…the Procedures one is 
actually the frame for the whole—at the axis point somehow for the asylum seekers” (A3). 
The reason why the Socialists were so intent on this particular amendment 
on language is because apparently there’s a ruling in The European Court 
of Justice which makes a reference to language and understanding; so that 
is why they believe that there is no legal basis for [the current wording]. 
(A5)249 
“Basically, Geneva Convention and asylum law, and most legal opinion, suggests that an 
asylum seeker needs to have information in a language he or she understands” (A6). 
7.2.1.5.2.1 International Law 
The first appearance of interpreting in major international legislation appears to 
be in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which is a United Nations 
multilateral treaty dating from 1966 and in force since 1976. Article 14, Section 3 on the 
equality of persons before the law, states: 
In the determination of any criminal charge against him, everyone shall be 
entitled to the following minimum guarantees, in full equality: (a) To be 
informed promptly and in detail in a language which he [sic] understands 
of the nature and cause of the charge against him; [and] (f) To have the 
                                                
249  I was unable to track down any particular court ruling. Directive 2010/64 (European 
Parliament & EU Council) provides a legal basis for the right to interpretation for 
victims and defendants of suspected criminal behavior in the European Union. The 
question then becomes why asylum seekers are afforded a lesser legal right to 
understanding. 
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free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak the 
language used in court. (United Nations Office of the High Commissioner 
for Human Rights) 
The next appearance is specific to Europe, in the 1992 European Charter on Regional and 
Minority Languages. Article 9 on judicial authorities says, in reference to both civil and 
criminal proceedings: “at the request of one of the parties, shall conduct the proceedings 
in the regional or minority languages…if necessary by use of interpreters and 
translations.” In 1996, the Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights (also called the 
Barcelona Declaration) was adopted by the World Conference on Linguistic Rights but 
has not yet been approved by UNESCO. Article 20, Section 2 states: “Everyone has the 
right, in all cases, to be tried in a language which s/he understands and can speak and to 
obtain the services of an interpreter free of charge” (UNESCO).250 
Returning to European context, the 1995 Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities entered into effect in 1998; it includes three statements 
about communication access and language rights in Article 10: 
1 The Parties undertake to recognise that every person belonging to a national 
minority has the right to use freely and without interference his or her 
minority language, in private and in public, orally and in writing. 
2 In areas inhabited by persons belonging to national minorities traditionally or 
in substantial numbers, if those persons so request and where such a request 
corresponds to a real need, the Parties shall endeavour to ensure, as far as 
possible, the conditions which would make it possible to use the minority 
language in relations between those persons and the administrative authorities. 
3 The Parties undertake to guarantee the right of every person belonging to a 
national minority to be informed promptly, in a language which he or she 
                                                
250  The Girona Manifesto (2011) reiterates support for the Barcelona Declaration by 
listing ten practical principles. None of these, however, emphasize the significance 
of simultaneous interpreting in live human social transaction. 
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understands, of the reasons for his or her arrest, and of the nature and cause of 
any accusation against him or her, and to defend himself or herself in this 
language, if necessary with the free assistance of an interpreter. (Council of 
Europe) 
In every instance, what we see is no modification of “understanding.” Rather, as an EP 
Asylum Trialogue participant said, only “understands, full stop” (A1). 
7.2.1.5.2.2 What’s In a Word? 
In the case of the European Parliament’s debate about the Asylum dossier, there is 
apparent concern for layers of meaning associated with understanding. It seems a number 
of nonrandon alternatives could be matched (according to mathematical information 
theory), interpretively, with the wording for the Asylum Procedures Directive, including 
“presumed” or “supposed” (and even further refined by “reasonably). The solution opted 
for during this debate (which continued until the Procedures Directive was adopted in 
2013) was to copy phrasing previously established in the 2008 Return Directive: 
“understands or may reasonably be presumed to understand” (emphasis added; see p. 
399). Here is the (2013) Procedures Directive’s wording: 
(25) In the interests of a correct recognition of those persons in need of 
protection as refugees within the meaning of Article 1 of the Geneva 
Convention or as persons eligible for subsidiary protection, every 
applicant should have an effective access to procedures, the opportunity to 
cooperate and properly communicate with the competent authorities so as 
to present the relevant facts of his or her case and sufficient procedural 
guarantees to pursue his or her case throughout all stages of the procedure. 
Moreover, the procedure in which an application for international 
protection is examined should normally provide an applicant at least with: 
the right to stay pending a decision by the determining authority; access to 
the services of an interpreter for submitting his or her case if interviewed 
by the authorities; the opportunity to communicate with a representative 
of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and 
with organisations providing advice or counselling to applicants for 
international protection; the right to appropriate notification of a decision 
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and of the reasons for that decision in fact and in law; the opportunity to 
consult a legal adviser or other counsellor; the right to be informed of his 
or her legal position at decisive moments in the course of the procedure, in 
a language which he or she understands or is reasonably supposed to 
understand; and, in the case of a negative decision, the right to an 
effective remedy before a court or a tribunal. (Emphasis added, European 
Parliament & Council of the EU) 
What happened? Is this some political sleight of hand, a blatant breach of oversight, or 
did the only adjustment with the possibility of gaining enough support get lost in the 
noise of other issues?251 Instead of repeating the language of the Return Directive 
precedent as MEPs indicated they would do, the original “rather weak” wording of the 
initial Commission’s draft has been kept, resulting in different wording in the two pieces 
of legislation: presumed has been replaced by supposed. One of the Trialogue 
participants mused at the time, regarding how some of the amendments were voted in the 
LIBE Committee, “either an alliance was planned in advance or just…how would I 
say…convergence of intentions, the Liberal Group (ALDE) and the Popular Group (EPP-
ED) voted together. And when these two group join, they have a majority” (A8). That 
means these two Groups rejected an amendment without securing passage of an updated 
amendment to achieve the desired alignment in both legal instruments. The conservative 
majority succeeding in maintaining a lesser standard, but failed to obtain the legal 
consistency that was overtly sought. 
                                                
251  Perhaps the researcher, by drawing attention to a matter that Members believed was 
unresolvable, contributed to the ‘noise’? This may have led Members to react 
(probably unconsciously, if so) by deliberately dismissing giving attention to the 
matter. In keeping with Cumming’s (xxxx) theory of a “problematic moment,” the 
noise may have been a group level event indicating the presence of a dynamic with 
constitutive potential to change entrenched power relationships and allow a new 
story about the EP to emerge, with alternative (perhaps even pluralingual) bases of 
co-identification. 
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The Asylum recasts and proposal for a Support Office were being debated just 
months prior to elections. This was a “hot issue…legal migration, it’s asylum, it’s 
procedure rights” (A3):  
parties tend to kind of—they get affected by these issues because they’re 
populous issues. For example, on TV today there’s the big issue about the 
asylum seekers, mainly Afghani asylum seekers in Kali, and now [the 
public is getting their] fill of stories about they’re going to come to [old 
Member country] and so on. (A6) 
Was it just the timing of these “sensitive issues…[with] an extra political dimension” 
(A6)? In a certain literal, legal sense (and quite ironically from the researcher’s 
perspective), the major conservatively-moderate parties did defeat the alliance of smaller, 
left-leaning parties (Socialists, Greens, and GUE) and their argument that EU law on 
linguistic rights should be in sync with the body of international law on linguistic rights. 
But this victory comes at the expense of obscuring the unified command of the desired 
homolingual network of law. 
This Trialogue participant explained the need for the “understanding or” caveat 
(instead of “understanding, full stop”): 
It certainly doesn’t go all the way, but we feel that this is—this could be 
something that wins approval in Council. So we think the Commission’s 
proposal is inadequate. What we want to achieve is one step further, but 
the last step of the way is maybe one step to far…this is probably realistic 
to achieve; whereas a number of Member States already indicated they are 
not willing to go for the full-fledged option…. I think what they consider 
is that this is—this would disproportionately make the whole process so 
much more difficult that if there’s in any single dialect that the applicant 
understands while you could reasonably argue that most applicants would 
understand one of the main languages be it English, French, German or so 
forth, Spanish, Italian, whatever. 
That if there is an inkling that the applicant actually does have some level 
of understanding of that language, it would be ludicrous to actually have 
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to provide an interpreter in every single language combination that would 
be foreseen. (A9) 
Did you catch it? I think it is an instance of social metonymy: when the microsocial 
interaction is bound up one-and-the-same with the macrosocial interaction. Doesn’t this 
sound like the EP’s policy of providing interpreters for Members? If there is an inkling of 
some level of understanding, it would be ludicrous to have to provide an interpreter for 
every Member’s real need. 
7.2.1.5.2.3 Spinning in the Discourse 
This may be an inconsequential tangent, but I am bewildered by the contradictions 
in comments of some of the Members of this Trialogue procedure, just as I found myself 
often being pulled (as if literally drawn against my will) into similar conversations 
revolving around the same themes no matter how diligently I tried to share insights as I 
had them. Sometimes I would ‘re-discover’ an insight that I would recall having had 
before but completely forgotten. Especially the participants associated with the two large 
parties, the EPP (Popular) and ALDE (Liberals), I had to wonder: were they consistently 
and deliberately misrepresenting their position, not just to the other participants but also to 
me? How can switching the word presumed to supposed be considered “sort of 
progressive” (A9) when it flies in the face of the strategy of exact duplication? 
What comes to me repeatedly as I review my fieldnotes and interview transcripts 
is that the participants themselves could not keep the wording clear, despite (some of 
them) having spent “two or three years of negotiations” (A8) on the Return Directive. For 
instance, one Trialogue participant thought the proposed amendment was to insert the 
word reasonably, which is present in both versions. Or maybe it was to take it out? Of 
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course no one had any of the exact texts in front of us while we spoke. “I should have 
taken the text with me” (A1). But there it is: “Normally we use a definition which is 
saying the person should understand or may reasonably presume to understand. That’s 
the definition we currently use” (A1). So again, I’m puzzled: how did supposedly remain 
in the draft and pass into the final version? 
One reason is the pervasive logic of multilingualism with its hidden homolingual 
tendency (to assume everyone understands) as well as the interaction taboo (which 
interferes with attempts to confirm shared understanding). Figure 3 diagrams an analysis 
of institutional discourse about multilingualism triggered by the shocking defeat of the 
European Constitution. That defeat focused European Commissioner Barroso’s attention 
on the problem of communicating Europe. Calling for a Period of Reflection, Barroso 
stimulated a series of discursive contributions whose centripetal action is represented in 
Figure 3. The centering force of the dead conduit/transmission machine keeps policy 
mired: “ritual supporting homolingualism and the interaction taboo are pervasive in 
information and communication policy, which presumes language in merely a utilitarian 
tool for conveying information” (Kent, 2012c, p. 96-97). Specifically, “the problem of 
communicating Europe is exacerbated by the routine (ritualized) dismissal of the social 
interaction and identity implications” of language use (p. 98). One passage from the 
article elaborating the discursive relationships in Figure 3 bears quoting in full. 
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Figure 4. Centripetal Discourse of Multilingualism in EU Language Policy. Space 
constraints for the original article did not allow this figure to be printed in 
The European Public Sphere: From Critical Thinking to Responsible Action 
(Morganti & Bekemans, Eds., 2012). 
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The Final Report of the High Level Working Group on Multilingualism 
names the relationship among language, identity, and political power as 
“somewhat of a taboo subject” (2007: 21). Specifically, this interaction 
taboo regards articulating clearly “the tricky question of the situation of 
speakers of minority and extra-Europe languages” (Gazzola 2006: 
398)…Calls to provide “suitable translation and interpretation services” 
(EC 2008: 5) to the specific groups who most need them are recent and 
not yet supported in durable ways. The White Paper on Communication 
claims “renewed attention is being paid to implement citizens’ right to 
communicate with the institutions in their own language” (2006: 8). This 
vertical communication still relies upon the transmission model of 
communicating information, and fails to provide for horizontal co-
identification through ritualized processes of social [trans]action. (p. 101-
102) 
The machine model leaves interpretees to figure it for yourself. While there are reasons 
this is desirable, it is also not necessarily always realistic. It leads to the assumption that 
someone else will catch errors and make the necessary repair(s). This is a rationale both 
MEPs and interpreters give for not interrupting to clarify or remedy mistakes or 
misunderstandings recognized in the moment; the layers of redundancy in the legislative 
process are intended to filter out mistakes.252 
Of course “the state of play” (A7) with the asylum dossier involved other salient 
issues (from the Members’ point-of-view) than the provision of interpretation to people 
                                                
252  Vuorikoski’s (2004) research hypotheses were essentially predicated on the 
assumption of shared knowledge: “From a theoretical point of view, with reference 
to the cognitive aspects of SI, it is assumed here that the interpreters’ performances 
are based on more or less the same set of background knowledge of the topic under 
discussion. This assumption is based on the fact that interpreters work for the EP on 
a regular basis, whereby they have acquired knowledge of the institutions and the 
substance of the issues under debate. They also study EU documents and 
terminology lists. Thus, the knowledge of the topic that interpreters share with the 
speakers, while not at the same level as that of the MEPs, can be expected to be at a 
considerably higher level than what is frequently the case when interpreters work for 
international conferences in the so- called ’free market’ (i.e. outside the institutional 
context). Consequently, it is hypothesized that interpreters will not face problems 
comprehending the content of the speeches or the terms and concepts” (p. 156-157). 
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whose lives might totally and absolutely depend upon the outcome . The argument for 
communication access was “lost” before it had begun, “specifically in the face of 
Council” (A5) but 
the fact that the wording—’in a language that’ sense—didn’t even get 
adopted into Parliament; so in negotiations with the Council they’ve got 
no hope whatsoever, and they couldn’t even possibly try and negotiate 
with that because they don’t even have support for it in Parliament. (A5) 
Besides playing to xenophobia, or trying to constrain cash flows, another reason why 
Members might themselves have gotten swirled up in an confusing and essentially 
unsubstantial debate about a word is because the system of SI in the EP is itself 
predicated upon presumed or and supposed understanding. “We all know,” says an 
Official, “that the important thing is to get the message; it’s not to—whether the language 
is perfect or not” (F11). Except for when it matters that the language is perfect (or not). 
“There are issues,” offered a Member, “about the level at which you’re doing it and the 
purpose for which you’re doing” (OM78) 
7.2.1.5.3 Double Standards 
Members accept the loss of subtlety and nuance in their own productions of 
English as a lingua franca, but criticize the interpreters for failure to detect subtlety and 
nuance. “Is it possible,” I asked one Member, “for interpreters to do well with subtlety 
and nuance if they don’t know the context as well as the Members?” “Very interesting,” 
is all he said in reply (OM33). The contradiction concerning diction shows up in two 
ways: the double standard for evaluating professional interpreters and the use of 
Assistants or officials with the Secretariats as informal interpreters. 
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Part of the problem about—and certainly in the English language—about 
recruiting highly-skilled interpreters is that people may be highly skilled 
in another language but they are not necessarily highly-skilled in English 
to be able to interpret that nuance into English: their own sort of 
grammatical and vocabulary skills in English are not good enough to do 
that. (OM78) 
It is admitted that fluency in ELF is not a sufficient stand-in for fluency in English. The 
use of Assistants and Secretariat officials is also a mixed bag: 
We spoil it because we have a lot of staff who are competent in more than 
one language and therefore people will sometimes rely on their personal 
assistant or—you know, I mean I’ve seen it—the Secretariat—you keep 
an eye on them; it’s really not their job to be interpreting for a whole set 
of reasons….if they’re interpreting for [an MEP] they’re not doing their 
job as Secretariat. But you know, so people got sortof used to that and 
working with people that they know and—and again—so they don’t 
necessarily want to bring in the more formal interpreting side of it. 
(OM78) 
“Sometimes,” an Assistant explains, illustrating the point, there are “problems of 
technical topics during …the Trialogue meetings, but then you have the assistance of the 
Secretariat so they can explain and help. It’s a problem of interpretation then” (F37). 
A particular example was raised by an official with a Secretariat explaining a 
situation where “we did interpretation,” going on to say, “but in that case…if you do like 
that, there was no language problem” (F38). That situation involved going “step by step, 
because [the Member] had a very radical position…if there was a way to negotiate 
something better, of course he would try.” This official continues: 
But he was not the only one having interpretation limits….I was speaking 
of him because I know him, but for example the Socialists had a French 
Shadow Rapporteur on that file which spoke no English at all. At all. So 
there was somebody speaking only French and somebody speaking only 
Italian, more or less. I mean, well he speaks also some English. The 
French lady didn’t speak a single word of English…so of course all 
meetings, all bilateral meetings [with her] were done among four people. 
That means [the MEP] and me, and the French lady and her 
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Assistant…we managed, let’s say, to put through at least a part of our 
position. So there was a real debate, real negotiation; and it was not 
blocked by the linguistic…difficulties, I would say, in that case at least. 
(F38) 
In that case, what occurred was social interpreting: interpreting by multilingual persons 
who were as concerned with the relationship and quality of connection among Members 
as with the information content, per se. 
Some of the Assistants reflected on their experience as informal interpreters: 
The thing is that I’m fluent in English and I can understand and express 
everything, but if there are negotiations or something, I’m always afraid 
I’ll translate [sic?] something in a different meaning, because you always 
intend something when you use special words and special expressions, 
and I don’t know these words and expressions in English. (F38) 
Limits to informal interpreting by non-professionals are also reached when the 
transmission model infects the social construction of role. Another Assistant concurs, 
“I’m always afraid I’ll interpret with the wrong meaning” (F33). And yet another 
Assistant admits, “It is much more relaxing, not to have to interpret. Sometimes your 
concentration lapses and you miss something. It’s embarrassing to have to ask” (F29). 
That asking (especially by the interpreter) is the essence of social interpreting: rather than 
pretending to an automatic transparency of meaning, in social interpreting every 
participant (interpretees and interpreters) share responsible for constructing meanings that 
are understood in common. Meanwhile, “people [Members] are comfortable with me [an 
Assistant] as an interpreter” (F33) and it is widely understood that Assistants’ interpreting 
“[is] really important for the informal” (F33). 
Two comments are worth making: one is that the kind of “interpreting” that 
Assistants are performing is akin to community-style interpreting such as professional 
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sign language interpreting that upholds Deaf cultural practices around holding time and 
ensuring mutual understanding (as performed by Deaf interpreters and evolved and 
schooled/ally interpreters). The goal in community interpreting, as defined from the 
minority language user’s perspective, is to ensure understanding (e.g., Adam, Carty & 
Stone, 2011; Forestal, 2011, Kent, 2013; Stone 2009). This requires a different utilization 
of role space (Lee & Llewellyn-Jones, 2013) than blending into the machine or fading 
behind the glass as expected of conference interpreters. The Code of Conduct for 
community interpreting is no less professional than the ethical guidelines for conference 
interpreting (see Appendix B), but community interpreters intentionally and purposeful 
attend to the relational as well as the informational needs of the interpretees. 
The language labor being performed by Members’ Assistants is akin to the hidden 
work of bilingual and multilingual employees in multinational corporations. To 
understand this it is useful to look at some of the business management literature 
regarding language use in multinational corporations. 
7.3 Language Brokers and Language Policy in Multinational Corporations 
“Acknowledging the presence of different languages allows those individuals who 
speak different languages to move between different communication zones” but 
international business managers (and researchers of international organizations and 
international management) are not sure, really, how to deal with language brokers (van 
den Born & Peltokorpi, 2010, p. 107). Language brokers are multilingual employees who 
gain informal power by operating as language nodes (Marschan-Piekkari, Welch & 
Welch, 1999) within an institution. This informal power is individually beneficial (Du-
Babcock & Babcock, 1996; San Antonio, 1987) but has been documented to have 
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adverse organizational effects. Harzing & Feely (2008), for instance, found that such 
brokers or “bridge individuals” (Harzing, Koster & Magner, 2010, p. 282)253 become 
situated to act “as information gatekeepers, filtering, delaying, and distorting the 
communication flow to their own advantage” (Harzing & Feely, 2008, p. 54). Described 
as “muddle along functionalism,” there are “numerous drawbacks” (Feely & Harzing, 
2003, p. 46), including adverse consequences to multilingual employees, who may 
become “overwhelmed by the requests to translate company material and their language 
skills are not always appreciated by…colleagues” (Vaara et al., 2005, p. 341). 
Using lingua francas has also proven to have a significant downside, including 
“disintegrating effects […] particularly at organizational levels below top management” 
(Vaara et al, 2005, p. 330). Harzing and Feely go so far as to say that “reliance on a 
single language is fatally flawed” (2003, p. 43). For instance, constraining a company to 
only one standard language may ignore resources at its disposal due to the unique 
knowledge and experiences of employees (Dhir & Goke-Pariola, 2002). Other 
researchers, however, argue that language must be decoupled from culture and a lingua 
franca utilized as an overt mechanism of corporate control (Luo & Shenkar, 2006). 
Regarding English as a Lingua Franca (ELF), the international management 
literature leans homolingually in support of Quirk’s (1990) concern with keeping a 
standard model for language. Quirk’s view is seen as “the deficit perspective” by Kachru 
(1990) because it assumes, homolingually, that native speaker English is ‘right’ or 
                                                
253 “…bridge individuals, refers to individuals with specific language skills that act as 
bridges between employees without the necessary language skills…bridge 
individuals can be structural solutions implemented by the company or can grow out 
of informal solutions” (Harzing et al, 2010, p. 282). 
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‘correct’ by default (Jenkins 2006). Meanwhile, Quirk (1990) attacks the “liberation 
perspective” that he attributes to Kachru, who understands world Englishes in 
pluralinguistic terms as “enabling what had been periphery English users to ‘write back’ 
and rewrite the discourses of their Englishes” (Bolton, 2005). 
Kachru’s liberation perspective also challenges the thesis of Robert Phillipson’s 
(1992) concept of linguistic imperialism in which English is accused of continuing to 
colonize the global population. ELF is also, however, reported as having “dysfunctional 
effects” (e.g., Piekkari & Tietze, 2008). Researchers are calling for increased attention to 
ELF, asking, “Why is it that ELF research does not really have any visibility in business 
communication?” (Louhiala-Salminen & Rogerson-Revell, 2010, p. 91) especially as 
multinational corporations continue to engage “the prevailing reality of English, with the 
largest number of speakers, in interactions which more often than not no native speakers 
participate” (Seidlhofer, 2009, p. 237). Jenkins argues that the prevalence of ELF is seen 
as evidence of empowerment rather than “passivity and exploitation” (2006, p. 165). 
Coming under the umbrella term of World Englishes, effects of “transformative agency” 
for learners of English as a second language (Jenkins, 2006, p. 168; Lantoff, 2000) are 
evident, including “the representation of their sociolinguistic reality far better than either 
British or American norms [for speaking/writing English] are able” (Jenkins 2006, p. 
168). 
Scholarship about languages in international business has been growing for the 
past two decades. Boutet (2001) describes how language increasingly constitutes both the 
process and product of work, and Steyaert, Ostendorp & Gabrois argue that researchers 
are engaging in an intellectual “process of linguascaping” (2010); they question whether 
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all of the ideas about language use being put forth by academics comport with empirical 
data. The neologism of a linguascape was coined by Steyaeart et al. as an extension of 
Appadurai’s (1990) transnational anthropology. 
Conceptually, “a linguascape refers to the discursive space in which an 
organization or any other actor frames and imagines how it can deal with its (de facto) 
multilingual composition” (Steyaeart et al., 2010, p. 277; see also Blommaert et al, 2005). 
The description and analysis of the discourse about SI in the EP is a representation of the 
linguascape of the European Parliament. Although not every single theme matches up, 
the parallels between the discourse about SI in the EP and the issues presented in the 
international management literature are strikingly congruent. 
The most glaring similarity is that language difference is framed as a problem, 
e.g., “the faultlines of language” (Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011). Metonymically, 
language itself is conceived as problematic. Language is “a dividing factor” (van den 
Born & Peltokorpi, 2010, p. 112 citing Anderson & Rasmussen, 2004), a “barrier” (e.g., 
Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011, p. 289 citing Hedlund, 1986; Harzing & Feely, 2008, 
p. 47) and a “problem” (e.g., Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011, p. 293); Harzing & 
Feely, 2008, p. 52) that generates “coupled vicious cycles,” “communication failures” 
and an “adversarial climate” (Harzing & Feely, 2008, p. 54). There are “negative effects 
of language diversity” (van den Born & Peltokorpi, 2010, p. 210 citing Frederickson et al, 
2006). Luo & Shenkar blame “language barriers between the home and host country [as] 
part of the liability of foreignness” (2006, p. 321-322). Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio 
provide a summary: “Previous research broadly agrees that MNCs are multilingual 
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organizations in which language boundaries constitute important barriers to 
communication and knowledge sharing” (2011, p. 289). 
Monolinguals (in particular) are presumed to “suffer from language handicaps” 
(Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011, p. 294), have a “linguistic handicap” (Ehrenreich, 
2010, p. 412 citing Frederickson et al, 2007, p. 418) and experience “linguistic 
inadequacy” (Kunal, 2011, p. 122). Kingston reports “the frustration and exclusion 
experienced by English speakers when their French colleagues spoke among themselves 
in French” (1996, cited by Harzing & Feely, 2008, p. 50), while Brannen & Peterson 
(2009) describe a case in which only monolingual native English speakers experience 
communicative alienation. Concurrently there is a trend reported by Charles (2007) in 
which “native speakers of English are…occasionally causing considerable 
communicative trouble” (cited in Ehrenreich, 2010, p. 426). “English,” reports van den 
Born & Peltokorpi, “is identified to be far from being ‘neutral’ or ‘culture-less’” (2010, p. 
106). All of these framings represent the communication ‘problem’ in (what we will 
properly call) pluralingual organizations as an issue of languages, rather than a problem 
of social/intercultural transaction among people who use different languages. The 
ideology of speed is implicated by Harzing, Koster, & Magner: “language is an important 
barrier, slowing down and increasing the cost of decision-making” (2010, p. 279). 
Piekkari & Tietze even use the engineering metaphor of multilingualism as “noise” 
(2008, p. 267). 
Among the most dastardly accusations against multilingualism (really 
pluralingualism: the use of more than one language in the same timespace) are that 
“language skills are an essential element in the construction of international 
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confrontation, can lead to a construction of superiority and inferiority, and also reproduce 
post-colonial identities” (Vaara, et al., 2005, p. 596). For instance, “employees who 
operate in a foreign language are placed in disadvantageous positions compared to those 
who are able to express themselves in their mother tongue” (Piekkari et al, 2005, p. 341). 
Simultaneously, “the common corporate language may also be a challenge for those who 
are allowed to use their mother tongue, because they realize the danger of one-way 
communication” (Piekkari et al, 2005, p.341 citing Laine-Sveiby, 1991). This body of 
literature is aptly summed up as “a systematic analysis of the problems associated with 
language differences” (Harzing & Feely, 2008, p. 52). 
The homolingual assumption of such a blatant language-as-problem ideology 
ought to be glaringly obvious. Conduit metaphor (dead) transmission thinking is present 
as well. For instance, organizational goals are often explicitly framed in terms of 
“information flows with a minimum loss of information” (van den Born & Peltokorpi, 
2010, p. 110), and interpreters are supposed to mask evidence of misunderstandings so 
that tensions can “pass unnoticed” (Albl-Mikasa, 2010, p. 141). An anti-interpreting 
discourse runs through the literature almost as if in order to pre-emptively discredit it. 
Feely & Harzing list five specific reasons why using an interpreter “clearly injects a 
potential source of misunderstanding into the proceedings” (2003, p. 44). The reasons 
that justify blaming the interpreter are familiar: interpreters must understand the context, 
have specialized knowledge of complex subjects, be familiar with interpretees as 
individual members of their particular cultures (not stereotypes), and be able to represent 
each interpretee’s rhetorical voice. 
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In an unusual move, the fifth reason Feely & Harzing (2003) provide for why 
using simultaneous interpretation might ‘inject misunderstanding into’ the 
communication is the interpretees reluctance to share relevant background with the 
interpreters. This is a mix of engineering and conduit metaphors and points to the 
fundamentally social nature of ‘the problem.’ Generally, simultaneous interpretation is 
hidden with the realm of “invisible translation” (Piekkari & Tietze, 2008, p. 268 citing 
Barner-Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011), but the interesting move of putting at least some 
responsibility on the interpretees (and not just the interpreters) is that it points the way to 
“the heart of social interactions” (Piekkari & Welch, 2010, p. 468) by opening inquiry 
into “the interfaces or translation [sic] points between the languages used” (Barner-
Rasmussen & Aarnio, 2011, p. 294). Such a re-focusing allows a “look at the ‘positive’ 
or ‘facilitative’ aspects of identity and subjectivity construction related to language and 
communication policies” (Vaara et al., 2005, p. 621). 
“Sensitively managed,” Harzing & Feely concede, “there is no reason why code 
switching should impair the relationship [among employees who speak different 
languages]” (2008, p. 55). Charles and Peikkari emphasize “that corporate training 
schemes should focus on the broad spectrum of international communication rather than 
on increasing a systematic knowledge of any one language” (2002, p. 9). But, selective 
recruitment of individuals with pre-existing multilingual skills is “inherently costly” and 
“does not eliminate the language barrier [sic], but merely shifts it down a level” (Feely & 
Harzing, 2003, p. 47). Possibilities of simultaneous interpretation are implicitly avoided. 
The desire for homolingual communication permeates the linguascapes of 
multinational corporations just as it does the European Parliament. Some researchers 
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advocate a common corporate language in hopes of “reducing the need for translation 
[and/or interpretation] and potential for miscommunication” (van den Born & Peltokorpi, 
2010), even though “communication difficulties stemming from a lingua franca are 
caused by limited language skills” (van den Born & Peltokorpi, 2010). Likewise, 
“communication problems are caused because of the difficulty of understanding different 
types of English used by non-native speakers or poor translations of written material 
(Charles & Marschan-Piekkari, 2002). Reddy’s (1993) toolmaker’s paradigm has not yet 
appeared in the international management literature to complicate the three translation 
[sic] models summarized by Janssens, Lambert, & Steyaert (2004): mechanistic, cultural, 
and political. 
Although a mechanistic perspective on languages and communication is critiqued 
as “unrealistic…unproductive—perhaps even dangerous” (Barner-Rasmussen &Aarnio, 
2011, p. 288), Shannon’s (1948) mathematical information theory can help us see how 
most of the research on languages in international management has deployed a limiting 
formula with a pre-determined code of matched sets of alternatives. Option: apply a 
social identity lens and (as a result) find inequality. Alternative: apply a homolingualist 
lens and find (as a result) trouble with diversity. “Unequal distribution of language skills 
across linguistic boundaries tends to increase language-based inter-group boundaries,” 
state van den Born & Peltokorpi (2010, p. 106 citing Lauring, 2008 and Marschan-
Piekkari et al, 1996b), as if no remediation exists. 
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Meanwhile, if “communication…is only possible via interpreters” (Ehrenreich, 
2010, p. 421), discount that option, too.254 Homolingualism can manifest in all these ways 
and includes “the assumption that ‘one language fits all’ communication needs” (Piekkari 
& Tietze, 2010, p. 267). Homolingualism promotes taking understanding for granted, 
which plays out in “language [and language use being] taken for granted—not 
questioned, examined, used as a variable, or explained” (Louhaiala-Salminen & 
Rogerson-Revell, 2010, p. 91). 
7.4 Simultaneity 
The focus is simultaneity rather than working out the details of similarity. 
Paul Amar 
                                                
254  In a paper on organizational strategy, Luo and Shenkar (2006) argue that 
“coordination costs [for multinational corporate enterprise (MNEs)] are reduced 
directly as a result of lower translation requirements and indirectly via minimization 
of the misinterpretations associated with linguistic barriers” (p. 324). They admit, 
however, “while we have discussed linguistic differences, we did not attempt to 
measure such differences” (p. 336), nor did they “elaborate on institutional variables 
that may influence the dynamics of language choice and their effectiveness” (p. 
336). They further suggest: “While MNEs with global strategies are likely to use a 
uniform language, the pressure to do so might be lower when the languages used in 
diverse locations are less dissimilar (e.g., French and Italian). In contrast, languages 
from different families (e.g., English and Chinese) involve fundamentally different 
discourse forms, which might undermine understanding even when an interpreter is 
used, and thus create much greater challenge for an MNE that needs to transcend 
national boundaries” (emphasis added, p. 336). There are (at least) three, inter-
related assumptions: one is the unquestioned tactic that differences which exceed 
interpretation can—and should—be avoided and ignored; second is the untested 
belief that shifting the burden and costs onto individuals for language learning is 
both directly and indirectly more cost effective for the MNE; and third is assuming 
that the short-term homogeneity of forced shared language use offers greater 
controls to the organization than long term adaptation to incorporating interpretation 
in order to preserve differences, which, if valued through highlighting and 
engagement, can foster innovation and creativity. 
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To take languages and language use as a pluralingual variable in the social 
organization of institutional and cultural life is a way to address the simultaneity effects 
of simultaneous interpretation and social transaction in terms of shared identity. 
“Differences,” writes Evangelina Holvino, “and the identities constructed based on them 
are interdependent and always interacting” (2006, p. 2). Her work255 addresses a 
manifestation of what I have called an interaction taboo, specifically that there “is little 
evidence that the importance of these intersections is acknowledged” (2010, p. 249). The 
intersectionality of difference and identity is made visible by the presence and use of 
simultaneous interpreters in the European Parliament. The discourse about SI in the EP, 
however, evades proactive engagement with the simultaneity of pluralingualism through 
its normative preference for homolingualism. As a terministic screen (Burke, 1996), this 
echoes Holvino’s observation of the field of organization studies and managerial practice, 
that “the silence on these intersections is outstanding” despite a discourse of “managing 
diversity” (2010, p. 249).256 
I will only note the similarities I can imagine between the administrative 
strategies of controlled multilingualism in the European democratic policy context and 
managing diversity in the international management context by surmising that both are 
motivated by, and therefore (aim to) regenerate, homolingualism. The essential insight of 
                                                
255   Holvino’s express purpose is “to reconceptualize the intersections of race, gender 
and class as simultaneous processes of identity, institutional and social 
practice…bringing to a close the modern impulse to search for a meta-narrative that 
attempts to integrate race, gender and class (Sacks, 1989)” (2010, p. 249). That 
‘modern impulse for integration’ is akin to homolingual desire. 
256   Another relevant silence regards “the unreflexive use of English” and subsequent 
neglect of “language multiplicity” in the field of management and organization 
studies (Steyaert & Janssens, 2013). 
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Holvino’s model of simultaneity is that “simplification is no longer an alternative” (2010, 
p. 262). The social field (Levitt & Schiller, 2004) of Members of the European 
Parliament is a “transtemporal and translocative space” (Tweed, 1999 cited in Levitt & 
Schiller, 2004). The European Parliament cannot be representative of Europe without 
pluralingualism. Members are, of necessity, exposed to more than their own language. 
Increased discursive consciousness is called for by the urgency of the history we are all 
living now. 
Holvino’s recommended intervention is to begin telling “the hidden stories at the 
intersections,” which are inherently “more complex stories” (2010, p. 263) than those that 
are usual and familiar. The most relevant hidden stories in the discourse about SI in the 
EP are those of the MEPs who do not know English or another lingua franca. Non-
dominant-language speaking Members of the European Parliament are the keepers and 
safeguard of difference in Europe. While it may be considered a weakness of this 
research that few of their stories are included here, this analysis uses the accessible and 
available discourse to “[focus] on institutional practices, how they create power and 
material advantages and disadvantages for different groups and how these practices are 
reinforced by and relate to specific symbolic and discursive organizational processes” (p. 
264). 
Further, the emphasis on thinking in terms of time and history (Neustadt & May, 
1986) is responsive to Holvino’s call to “[articulate as] social practices, the relations 
between organizational processes and their broader social, material and historical 
contexts;” this is achieved in particular by “explicating how that context and history show 
up in every day practices” (2010, p. 265). The description and critical analysis of the 
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discourse of SI in the EP presents the possibility of a temporal zone and physical space 
that could be characterized by, and deliberately championed as, an institutional 
community of pluralingual practice (cf Wenger, 1998) based in “fundamental 
simultaneity” (Holvino, 2010, p. 250) 
Such a fundamental simultaneity, achieved by pluralingual calibration, may 
provide a pivot for shifting the social field257 beyond the European Parliament to the 
European public sphere. The shift would entail changing from a “concept of 
society…that is…automatically equated with or confined by the boundaries of a single 
nation state” (Levitt & Schiller, p. 1004, 2004) to a new imaginary of a shared European 
identity based in simultaneous social transaction that retains intercultural difference 
because of language difference maintained in shared timespace rather than splintered 
through serial monolingualisms and homolingualisms. The pluralingual practices and 
performances of simultaneous interpretation could become an exemplar of what Levitt 
and Schiller call “simultaneous incorporation,” a both/and approach to transnationality 
rather than “the nation-state container view of society258 [which] does not capture, 
adequately or automatically, the complex interconnectedness of contemporary reality” 
(2004. p. 1006). 
                                                
257   “Bourdieu used the concept of social field to call attention to the ways in which 
social relationships are structured by power. The boundaries of a field are fluid and 
the field itself is created by the participants who are joined in struggle for social 
position” (Levitt & Schiller, 2004, p. 1008). 
258   Ulrich Beck (2000) says “‘the container view of society’ … [composes] most of the 
sociology of the first age of modernity” (in Levitt & Schiller, 2004, p. 1007-1008). 
Notice the similarity of analogy between the container view of society and the 
conduit model of communication.  
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The challenge of Europeanization is “a fundamental problem of social theory—
how to rethink society if we do not take national boundaries for granted” (Levitt & 
Schiller, p. 1005, 2004). One hurdle to overcome is methodological nationalism in policy 
making, that is, “the tendency to accept the nation-state and its boundaries as a given in 
social analysis” (p.1007). The insight of Europe’s multilingual/language learning policy 
is that homolingualism is archaic. The substantive issue of simultaneous incorporation 
requires comprehension of the placement of the European Parliament in the historical 
timestream of the people’s struggle for social justice. 
Paul Amar, in a guest lecture at Hampshire College,259 describes “the return of the 
future” in the timeline of history after it was “proclaimed dead in the 1990s” and “revived 
as medieval history by George W. Bush’s War on Terror.” After the supposed death of 
history, the future again became a topic of public discourse arising from the simultaneous 
eruption of occupations in Tahrir Square, the Wisconsin State Assembly, and multiple 
Occupy movements (citing particularly the Occupation at the University of California). 
According to Amar, “The Future” re-enters history with the Arab Spring, with the 
uprising of “The People” as a social actor, and the role of The Social as an actor in 
history. 
                                                
259  Paul Amar gave the 14th annual Eqbal Ahmad Lecture at Hampshire College 
(Amherst MA, United States) on March 8, 2012. Retrieved 25 March 2014, 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dNbLc7pLUMc 
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A coordinated engagement of public intellectuals260 to the previous global 
uprising against the US invasion of Iraq (15 February 2003) “triggered a widespread 
debate on the meaning of Europe in which intellectuals from practically every European 
country—including several from Eastern Europe—weighed in” (Kumar, 2008, p. 88). 
Paul Amar characterizes that anti-war protest as merely as a footnote because it failed: 
Iraq was still invaded. In “The Question of European Identity: Europe in the American 
Mirror,” Krishan Kumar critiques Habermas’ and Derrida’s “attempt to construct a 
European identity as against America” (p. 91), arguing for Europeans to “face fully and 
acknowledge the legacy we want to refuse” (p. 96).261 
Kumar quotes American Iris Marion Young: “Surely invoking a European 
identity inhibits tolerance within and solidarity with those far away…I fear Habermas 
may reinscribe the logic of the nation-state for Europe, rather than transcend it” (Young, 
2005, p. 153; p. 156 in Kumar, 2008, p. 98). Kumar is critiquing an essential 
homolingualism: “They [Habermas and Derrida] look inward when they should be 
looking outwards” (p. 98). Kumar’s critique of a selective contrast [Europe vs. the US] 
premised in a temporary homolingualism [agreement there should not be an invasion] 
                                                
260   Jurgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida wrote an article that was published on May 
31, 2003 in a leading French and German newspaper. Prior correspondence with 
other “well-known intellectuals, such as Umberto Eco, Adolf Muschg, Gianni 
Vattimo and Fernando Savater…[arranged that] on the same day…simultaneously 
appeared articles by these other authors, responding to it, in a number of leading 
newspapers in France, Italy, Spain and Switzerland” (Kumar, 2008, p. 88). 
261   Habermas and Derrida write of constructing a core European identity based on 
distinguishing between “the legacy we appropriate, and the one we want to refuse’ 
(2005: 10)” (in Kumar, 2008, p. 96). 
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suggests there is sufficient discursive consciousness among Europe’s intellectuals to 
propagate a pluralingual center as the ground for a common European identity. 
7.4.1 Challenges of Pluralingual Transaction 
Premised in homolingualism and codified by controlled multilingualism, the 
interaction taboo between Parliament Interpreters and the Members of the EP is rigid 
enough to result in an interpersonal reduction, dehumanizing the interpreter as an 
automatic decoder, an instrument assisting the tool of language in the mechanical 
reproduction of inequality. The structure of controlled multilingualism in the EP that 
divides the formal from the informal determines the linguistic interactions of Members. 
An official with a Secretariat for one of the Political Groups describes how 
the use of languages through negotiations depends on the Member…[Mr 
MEP, for instance] has never been very… easy with foreign languages. 
He understands and speaks English. He understands and speaks Spanish. 
But when you come to a technical level, when you need legal language of 
the language, then he has problems. So if he has to make a public speech 
in English, either he prepares it or he feels he’s not able to express himself 
fully; thus either he has interpretation or he prefers not to take part or 
taking part but not to intervene. So of course this affects negotiation quite 
a lot….this is one of the most important [issues]…in your research from 
my point of view. Because it happened already a couple of times that we 
had Coordinators, for example, without translation. Usually they try to 
have translation. Sorry, interpretation. But it happened a couple of times 
and he was like not motivated to take part, because he knew he couldn’t 
really—he could just say, ‘ I support a decision,’ or ‘I’m against a 
decision.’ But he would have a hard time to explain why. 
So interpretation comes up to be extremely important to—if you want to 
be able not to only say ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ but also to explain your position. So I 
would rather say it is the essence of the political action. Because if you 
can’t express your reasons why you are making a political fight, well all 
the Parliamentary debate gets useless. Then it gets just to be a machine 
where nobody will change his mind and you have no chances to convince 
somebody else of your position. (F38) 
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Multilingualism has been turned, at least in the regime of controlled multilingualism 
governing the system of simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament during 
the 6th Parliamentary Term (2004-2009), into the reproduction of homolingualisms that 
inhibit voice. 
7.4.1.1 How Would You Prefer to Lose Control? 
When we’re arguing about language, it’s usually about something else. 
Robert Lane Greene262 
In the rooms and hemicycles of the European Parliament, Members literally turn the 
channel dial to listen to their language of preference. A Member borrowed that 
convenient metaphor to describe the codeswitching of multilingual colleagues: “You 
change language [he gestures turning a knob], switch languages during an intervention to 
be well understood by everybody, not to be mistranslated [sic]. It is a way of showing it’s 
very international.” (OM20) The homolingual assumption is at work; that unquestioned 
assumption of ‘being understood by everybody.’ Vuorikoski opened her research with 
this sentiment expressed by a Finnish Commissioner: “‘If the topic is of a very general 
nature, I can speak Finnish. When dealing with issues that are technical and complicated, 
I prefer using a language such as English, which can be understood directly by everyone.’ 
(November 1, 2003)” (2004, p. 15). This untroubled assumption of ‘understanding’ is 
                                                
262   Overheard at the booksigning for You Are What You Speak (2011). Lane Greene was 
the keynote speaker for the 2012 Business Language Research and Teaching (BLRT) 
Conference of the United States’ Centers for International Business Education and 
Research (CIBER). I used this quote in a Prezi on “Misunderstanding and 
Innovation: English as a Lingua Franca” which was a 2011 Award presentation at 
the conference and available online. 
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opposed to the purported risks and dangers of misinterpretation by Parliament’s 
simultaneous interpreters. The homolingual choice of a lingua franca is justified by the 
rejection of difference, regardless of scale. By this logic, different understandings are 
equally as bad as misrepresentations; a missed understanding as egregious as an 
omission. It is a tight ideology. 
Homolingual convergence as a language ideology is supported by the ideology of 
speed. Many of the informal meetings (where interpreters are not required by the rules, 
such as that of Coordinators),263 were explicitly created in order “to speed up the work” 
(F11). No matter the sacrifice of Members whose language profile requires interpretation. 
At the informal level, where the wording of law is crafted with attention to its 
translational power across cultures and countries, language difference in the intercultural 
social interaction is either erased or managed in ad hoc fashion. As a result, rather than 
considering the broader and more far-reaching social implications of articulation within 
the EU as well as between the EU and international law, (as, for instance, in the case of 
providing interpreting for asylum seekers), an impatience with diversity misses the clue 
that a conflict over word can provide. 
                                                
263   In this case, “eight times over ten they provide interpretation…[in] LIBE meeting 
and plenary meetings he always have me [an Assistant or member of the Secretariat]. 
Committee meetings and plenary meetings, you always have interpretation; 
otherwise there’s no meeting. It’s a rule. While Coordinators, it’s not really any 
worry that you need—that you have to have interpretation at Coordinator’s 
level…[because] they can not just say—decide—anything. They decide as far as 
everybody agrees” (F11). This official said, at another point in the conversation: 
“Well, French is my first foreign language. So if I can negotiate in French, I’m much 
happier. Negotiating in English for me is a little bit limitating, too. so I can guess for 
somebody who just has a basic level, it must feel really  [laughter] difficult” (F11). 
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In the asylum case, the point is not that “reasonably presumed” is better or worse 
than “reasonably supposed.” Instead, the clue in the confusion is the attempt to qualify 
what counts as understanding. That effort is problematic for all kinds of reasons, most 
germane being that comprehension, especially at the level of mutual understanding, is not 
a controllable substance. Control is constituted in the rituals not in the words. If the 
rituals accord respect to everyone, democracy and social justice become achievable. 
The comparison between an asylum seeker to the European Union and an MEP 
fluent in only one European language may seem too far-fetched, but the dynamics of 
trying to achieve voice in a linguistically-imbalanced situation are similar. The 
consequences of failure to achieve voice in these disparate settings, however, cannot be 
compared. The point of this illustration is that it encapsulates the controversy about 
simultaneous interpretation. Members “break into English, because they don’t trust the 
interpreters to pick up the subtleties” (F04). Subtleties? According to the discourse, much 
of the political communication using a lingua franca is reduced to the level of a blunt 
object. 
Let’s return to the analogy of mathematical information theory. If there is a 
misunderstanding at the simplified level of discourse, chances are high that either the 
code is damaged or there are not pre-existing matched sets of alternatives from which 
interpreters can make a nonrandon selection. In homolingual interpersonal 
communication, such instances are usually handled in a face-saving way. In the system of 
SI in the EP, if there is an identified problem with the interpretation, Members “don’t 
know if I can intervene” (OM06). Regarding non-simplified language, one Member 
shared his frustration about a particular instance: “I have a very specific point-of-view, to 
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get out of the standard view. Sometimes the concept, [the interpreters] don’t understand 
it…if you use English…it will be understood” (OM33). 
Without belaboring the inherent homolingualism, what some Members talked 
about was their desire to be innovative. They wanted to break through and away from 
established ways of thinking by proposing creative alternatives. They felt stymied by the 
interpreters rendering ‘the same ol’ party line.’264 This is where the ideology of speed 
impinges directly upon interpreter performance. The emphasis on speed and quick 
decision-making for instant closure, no less now than when SI was inaugurated with the 
IBM system at Nuremberg, pushes interpreters to snap decisions based on the pre-
existing ‘set of alternatives’ within the repertoire associated with that particular language 
combination, as specific as possible to the speaking individual, their political party’s 
standard ideology, or whatever else is clued in from the diction choices in the source text. 
These closure skills, as they are called within the profession, are the easiest measurement 
of interpreting aptitude. 
When an interpreter is clued to another set of nonrandon alternatives for 
interpretation, the misunderstanding that arises is not the work of a wrong-headed fool 
(Reddy, 1993, p. 175) but the inevitable result of a system under too much time pressure 
(cf Vuorikoski, 2004). Reducing the quality of discourse in order to avoid errors is not the 
only remedy. While ELF is a viable strategy evidenced by its rapid growth and 
persistence; it does not resolve communication difference and it exacerbates 
homolingualism. Minimizing misunderstanding can be also be accomplished by adhering 
                                                
264   The Members who shared egregious stories from their own experience usually went 
‘off the record,’ therefore I can only provide general characterizations. 
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to the EP’s indigenous argumentation genre (Vuorikoski, 2004), increasing clarity and 
using repetition, as well as by increasing skills at recognizing and repairing challenging 
communication dynamics when they occur, rather than allowing them to fester and 
ramify. Adopting the pluralingual strategy means re-evaluating the conditions of social 
transaction and accepting that what is most conducive to equitable simultaneously-
interpreted communication are not the assumptions of homolingual communication. 
For instance, the “laugh waves” (OM35) that accompany jokes when there is “a 
relay in English: whoever understood the original is the first wave, then the English is the 
second wave, and the third wave from the relay” (NM56). The result is “you can be three 
sentences along before the Greeks get the jokes” (OM44). One particular anecdote 
involved a situation involving a relay in which it was attributed that “the Germans got it 
last and laughed aloud. The debate had moved on to discuss the number of casualties in 
an armed conflict…[the laughter] was not appreciated” (OM08). Although clearly 
unfortunate, the timing of the laughter is relative: it happened when it happens, it is what 
is. The conundrum brings to mind Keith Basso’s situation of being ‘too much in a hurry.’ 
Perhaps Basso as an individual could adapt more readily to the established temporal 
calibrations of western Apache culture than the Members can, as an organized group, 
adapt their collective, intercultural behavioral and attitudinal norms to generate a 
different orientation to pluralingual time. 
If, for instance, “the Members know what each other’s languages are” (F30), why 
does the conversation ‘move on’ when a relay is required? Why is it framed as “a 
problem [that] the relay …is much slower, a full sentence behind” (OM28)? This 
questioning is what Schön describes as 
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the hermeneutic problem, the problem of the interpretation of texts in a 
very broad sense, the problem of literary criticism. The concern here is to 
understand the kinds of inferences by which such interpretations are 
made, the sorts of evidence pertinent to them, and the criteria by which 
they should be judged and tested. (1993, p. 138) 
Why is the relay happening? What does it involve? In every instance, relay involves 
communication among the languages sometimes characterized as exotic, such as “Finnish 
to Dutch” and “Greek to Hungarian.” Even without relay sometimes there is a ripple 
effect. “I can tell a joke in English…[then] you go on and suddenly there are Lithuanians 
laughing up in the corner. You’d get a shock—’What are they laughing about?’” 
(OM44). Other times, as I observed during an AFET meeting, a joke was told (in 
English) but the laughter was confined to a particular section of Members, the periphery 
never laughed at all. 
Another Member clarifies the issue with humor (emphasis added): 
If somebody tells a joke, which is always dangerous in politics because it 
can be misunderstood, people laugh. Now the people who understand the 
first language, laugh spontaneously. It’s then translated, so five or ten 
seconds, other people start laughing. Sometimes with, say, a minority 
language, by which I mean one which is spoken by few people, the 
interpreter is actually interpreting from another interpreter. So you’re then 
getting a third wave of laughter, which is quite funny, but it’s not really 
natural. (OM63) 
The assertion of nature, that the syncopated rhythm of interpreted interaction is not 
natural, is evidence of cultural hegemony (Gramsci, 1971; Hall, 1986). The benchmark of 
homolingual interaction is extended through illusion of what is/isn’t natural. Rather than 
being evaluated within its own conditions of production, simultaneously-interpreted 
social transaction is evaluated according to criteria for an altogether different kind of 
communication, that which is both monolingual and homolingual. 
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The linguascape of communication in the European Parliament is not 
homolingual: involves the use of other languages in the same space and at the same time. 
Multilingualism as a language ideology has prevented the generation of norms that are 
adaptive to the observed outcomes of pluralingual social transaction. The time tolerance 
of Members stretches beyond the spontaneous ripple, but reaches its (apparent) limit of 
shared social interaction in the instances of Meridian-to-Meridian interpretation and 
voting. Just as Members are reluctant or even resistant to using headphones to listen to 
their ‘exotic’ colleagues, they are also (apparently) willing to periodically sacrifice them: 
“If I see that I can communicate with English…if two or three don’t speak English I don’t 
mind” (NM21). The ultimate breakdown of the information transmission machine occurs 
during voting, when the ideology of speed exceeds the human capacity to communicate. 
Even though, as an Official clarified, the system “was never intended to move to 
one language” (F32, the homolingual impulse combines with the ideology of speed: as a 
longterm EP official stated, the interpreting regime is “a trajectory we’ve followed. To 
alter it will be difficult” (F04). In addition to the homolingual impulse, there is what is 
understood about the nature of politics itself, which means, “sometimes compromises have 
to made in private” (OM09).265 The desire for such “talks under four eyes: no interpreters 
needed” (OM03) plays right into homolingualist insider/outsider language lines. It also 
points to a deeper resentment: “From the moment there is a third person there, the 
atmosphere is changed” (OM09). Isn’t that the point of a pluralingual democracy? A 
Member recounts the situation of a colleague negotiating with the Council: 
                                                
265   Some Members insist that everything important happens in meetings.  
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He don’t speak English. But the others and we are not understanding 
Italian. So he has his interpreter with him…and he tells his interpreter 
what he wants to say…then there is a translation [sic]…then Council is 
answering. His interpreter translate [sic] the message, but then—that is a 
very bad position in negotiations, a very bad position. When you have no 
direct contact, when you cannot discuss directly vis-a-vis, then you are in 
a bad position. (OM67). 
This prejudice against interpreted interaction is validated by reference to the homolingual 
situation. It is as if “your contact by eyes” and the ability to “see how is the relationship” 
(ON67) are eradicated by the language mediation of an interpreter: as if interpretees’ own 
perceptions no longer exist. 
7.4.1.1.1 Relying on the Wrong Criteria: The Homolingual Illusion 
It is difficult to participate with this person between us. 
Old Member (OM) of the European Parliament 
“Even with the best people [interpreting], there are still problems even though you 
expect it should be smooth” (emphasis added, OM03). Where does this expectation come 
from? The highest form of ‘smoothness’ is what Csikszentmihaly (1990) described as the 
psychological experience of “flow.”266 I am suggesting that when we are communicating 
homolingually, that is, with people who ‘speak the same language’ (be it a language such 
as the mother tongue or a disciplinary or ideological language, interpreted or not), we 
                                                
266   As an optimal psychological state, Csíkszentmihályi (1990) describes flow as 
completely absorbing, to the extent of immersion: “Time flies. Every action, 
movement, and thought follows inevitably from the previous one, like playing jazz” 
(Csíkszentmihályi, quoted by Geirland, 1996). Based on the definition of flow as “a 
state of "intense emotional involvement" and timelessness that comes from 
immersive and challenging activities” (Grierland, 1996), an action learning 
hypothesis is that the experience of communicative flow is a reference point for 
cultivating chronotopic awareness. 
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experience a certain kind of flow that, put simply, feels good. Flow may be only the 
phatic communication function of sharing some basis of identification, but it also applies 
to being immersed in a task and unaware of the conditions enabling the task: fish in 
water; people in air. 
I suspect that it is the desire to achieve or maintain that flow that motivates the 
resistance to interpretation, and the disappointment of losing flow contributes to the 
discourse theme of complaint about interpreter’s purported mistakes and 
misunderstandings. “Don’t think about it, “urges this Official. “Try not to use them… 
interact directly, you can act more quickly and gauge understanding” (F04). The 
assumption that one cannot “gauge understanding” during simultaneous interpretation is 
false. In actuality, just as one example, “the evidence arises in debate when someone 
disagrees and I would not expect them to disagree—why?” (OM29). The ideology of 
speed motivates the desire for flow; if you cannot find any rationale for slowing down 
then you will continue to reject the alternate rhythms of pluralingual interpreting. 
There are apparently many sanctions to compel Members to conform to the 
homolingual imperative: “In Parliament, if someone asks a question and you do not 
answer in their language, then they do not ask again” (NM26); and “it becomes difficult 
when language becomes an issue of nationalism or patriotism instead of a cultural value” 
(OM57). The multilingual homologic is celebrated: “In the cafe, you can listen and hear 
so many languages. It is very interesting. The communication is the tool, in such a case 
no one is concentrated on the language: it’s the goals. And the necessity to be polite” 
(OM20). There may be a mild tyranny of politeness that also draws Members to provide 
that inkling of understanding; and there is disagreement on the extent to which (when and 
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whether) complete comprehension or fully fluent expression matters: “Listening is not 
the issue…[rather] to express every detail” (OM12). Or is it more true that “it is very 
seldom that one needs to make a precise point in one’s own language” (NM24)? 
7.4.1.2 Authorizing Interpretation 
The problem is we have no contact with the interpreters. 
There is no interpersonal.  
I know some of them but it is sporadic and  
no one is talking about this problem.  
 
New Member (NM) of the European Parliament 
The negative and adverse consequences of the system of controlled 
multilingualism were perceived by the Parliament’s interpreters during the first chaotic 
year (2004-2005) of the big bang enlargement. Interpreters’ concerns composed “a 
discourse of danger and loss” (Kent, 2009) and foreshadowed everything the Members 
articulate in their discourse during the last year (2008-2009) after the big bang 
enlargement. The research periods coincide like bookends for the 6th Parliamentary term. 
The designed of controlled multilingualism structures an inability to intervene in the 
ideology of speed, driving Members to the homolingual option rather than cultivating the 
full pluralinguistic capacities of communication involving simultaneous interpretation. 
An insightful Member commented, “The rhythm is fundamental” (OM33), but the 
pace of some aspects of Parliament’s language regime is faster than humanly possible. 
Several Members offered their political wisdom, to select a few issues for an entire term 
and follow them carefully all the way through. European Parliament Interpreters offer 
advice, too: 
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This is an environment where the illusion of being understood correctly easily 
gets created. For example, if you are in a meeting and have to say something, 
you’ll probably be referring to a text that has been talked about in three, four, or 
five previous meetings, so everybody knows what you’re talking about. That’s a 
great advantage because even if you don’t express yourself exactly, the listener 
knows what you’re talking about and can fill in the gaps, so you get the illusion of 
being understood if you speak English. This is very dangerous because then you 
think that with your medium English, you get understood and you don’t need all 
these interpreters…I even had my doubts, but the proof is they don’t understand 
each other. You see it especially when there’s a new topic. People who think their 
English is good have to speak in their mother tongue because they can’t cope with 
speaking in English – the new terms, new reality they don’t know. (EP Interpreter 
#12) (Kent, 2009, p. 67) 
Familiar flows of connection and communication overlap and intersect with Members’ 
topical interests and motivations, leading to affinity groupings based in a kind of 
attraction to what requires the least effort. (Which is not to imply Members are not 
working hard. Every Member I spoke with impressed me, including Members that did not 
self-select for inclusion in this research. I did not witness the stereotype of the Parliament 
as a dumping ground for politicians unwanted in the national scene.) 
Regarding the provision of interpretation, from the first year of the big bang 
enlargement to the last, many Members agreed: “More and more often I use it” (NM53). 
Members consistently commented on the increasing quality and caliber of interpreters. Many 
Members want to use the system of SI in the EP passively, meaning they want to listen to the 
original language (if they know enough of it) whenever possible but speak in their own 
language and trust the interpreters’ renditions. “For my MEP,” explained one Assistant, 
“[speaking] English would be unusual. He wants to know exactly what he’s saying; he trusts 
the interpreters so much more than he trusts his own English” (F15/NM18). Members who 
had experienced working with interpreters while traveling on Delegations were, in general, 
much less critical of the interpretation process. “I had an experience in China: it works” 
(OM42). 
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Relations are changed when interpreters go with Members somewhere 
else. It’s an open secret: there are affairs. They work more closely 
together, physically, standing next to each other…’ Did he understand?’ 
You can query. (F28) 
Fear of gossip and negative press should not deter the larger goal. The ability to interact 
with the interpreter, rather than treating them as an uncommunicable part of a machine, 
changes everything. 
Members also warn each other about the consequences of language choices: “Our 
[Meridian] colleagues always speak [their] Meridian…and they told us [our] Meridian is 
important. ‘Speak Meridian, otherwise we will lose our rights to speak [it]’” (OM67). 
This Member continues: 
All the people from [our Meridia] speak English…and I have seen what 
happens. In the Delegation of eight persons to the Slovakia, we have four 
people from Meridia. There were one or two from England, one from 
France, one from Germany, one from Austria. They had translation [sic]. 
We not. We were four, but not right to have translation [sic]…And you 
see that in the Parliament, we have no problems. But outside the 
Parliament on Delegations, then all the time we have to speak English. 
(OM67). 
Another Member urges, “Look to [the] booth…you’ve got to understand who you’re 
working with. The accuracy is what’s important, not the speed” (OM44). 
Historically, Delegations have played an important function in allowing Members 
and Interpreters to interact. Since 2010, the new service of Ad Personam interpretation 
should fulfil a similar function. 
7.4.1.3 Ad Personam Interpretation 
Why don’t they publicize this?  
Old Member (OM) of the European Parliament 
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The Member comments in this section are hopefully no longer representative of 
the situation in Parliament. In 2008-2009 Ad Personam was brand new, now it has been 
in use for all of the 7th Parliamentary term (2009-2014); the quality of access should be 
much greater than during the pilot.267 “At the moment,” a Member’s Assistant explained 
(during the 6th term), “there is not a good regulation to have an interpretation during a 
Shadow meeting, during a roundtable conference, during a discussion with some 
Members about amendments” (F37/M81). In 2008-2009, the Ad Personam program was 
just being piloted, initially with only five languages.268 See Appendix E for the rules and 
request form. Members that I talked with were “astonished to learn about personalized 
interpretation” (OM09) and found it “hard to give an answer [about whether it is 
worthwhile] because I have never used it” (NM02). Some MEPs, musing on why it had 
not been more widely taken advantage of during the pilot, suggested, “Maybe they don’t 
know Ad Personam is available” (OM58). Intriguingly, after one of the rare 
professionally-interpreted interviews that I was able to have with an MEP who did not 
speak English, the volunteer interpreter commented that, in such a direct interpersonal 
setting,269 “[the Member] does not know how to use an interpreter” (F39). 
                                                
267  Appendix E is a copy of the bilingual request form (in French and English) for Ad 
Personam interpreting: it defines the eligible Member roles and request logistics 
(subject, location, languages requested, participants). Such information is 
characteristically requested for any community interpreting job. The only substantial 
difference between the Ad Personam request and a community interpreting request is 
the inclusion of a feedback form. 
268   I was told by an Official (F23) that the most popular combination in the first year 
was Italian-English. 
269   In this instance there were four people: the researcher, the interpreter, the MEP and 
the MEP’s primary Assistant. 
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In other words, the Member wanted to apply the same impersonal (dead) conduit 
model by ignoring the visible dynamics of interaction and focusing only on the language. 
Another Member’s first reaction to the idea of using Ad Personam interpreting was that 
“it would be awkward with [only] five or six people” (OM42). Experiences of using their 
Assistant,270 an Official with one of the Secretariats, or a colleague as an informal 
interpreter, seemed to fly out of mind. However, in contrast with the impersonalization of 
the usual conference interpreting situation, with the interpreters removed “behind the 
glass,”271 in dialogue interpreting (that is, community interpreting) all the resources of 
interpersonal communication are present.272 The dynamics of presence and visibility 
interrupt the European Parliament’s systemic illusion of homolingual communication. 
This immediacy is what characterizes community interpreting. The most cutting edge 
theory and practice has consistently come from the specialized sub-field of sign language 
interpretation (e.g. Mindess, 1999; Napier, 1979). 
                                                
270   “It’s quite funny that normally the people don’t address me [an Assistant during ad 
hoc interpreting], because they know that I’m an interpreter and they’ll look at him 
and they answer him, and they look at him even if I speak…they address him” (F38). 
Also: “I don’t have the feeling that [my interpreting] disturbs conversation 
normally…[my MEP] can understand lots of the spoken words, he has just a 
problem to express English, but I think he understands quite well. And that makes it 
much more easier because you don’t have to translate [sic] every word” (F38). 
271   “You never see them, only behind glass, in the booth. Their worlds and ours don’t 
contact each other very much—we only negotiate with the Service of provision” 
(F04). (Evidence of the interaction taboo.) 
272   “Dialogue interpreting includes what is variously referred to in English as 
Community, Public Service, Liaison, Ad Hoc or Bilateral Interpreting—the defining 
characteristic being interpreter-mediated communication in spontaneous face-to-face 
interaction” (Mason, 1999, p. 147). 
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The humanized presence of an interpreter in sign language interpreting, whose 
performance includes monitoring the achievement of mutual understanding (Forestal, 
2011; Stone, 2009) introduces the possibility of “real interpreting” (Turner, 2007) in 
which all participants “acknowledg[e] the interdependence of process, perceiver and 
product . . .[bringing a] sense of reflexivity, this necessarily knowing relationship, this 
interdependent relationship of knowing between the interpreter, the interpretees, the act of 
interpreting and that which is interpreted” (p. 189). Setting prejudice against signed 
languages aside,273 an exemplary model for social interpreting as a relational-cultural 
counterpart to balance out the information-and-control (dead) conduit model of SI in the 
EP already exists in sign language community interpreting. 
By now, one hopes, many Members have had positive experiences with Ad 
Personam interpretation. The only Member I spoke with in 2009 who had personal 
experience with the program was delighted. “Just now,” the MEP explained, 
I am [effective] for the project and I have all the conditions for my job and 
I have interpretation ad personam and he is very good because without it, 
it will be only formally and I—just now I am able to do this job in good 
effectiveness. (NM70) 
Other Members readily grasped its potential: 
I think that the idea of a personal interpreters is very, very good because if 
you have the—not non-formal, but formal discussion, for example, with 
deputies from Belgium Parliament,274 et cetera, it is possible to discuss on 
                                                
273   I admit to being disheartened at the frequency of EP Interpreters, Members and other 
Officials saying something to the effect of, “I’m not used to thinking of that as 
interpreting” (F31), in regard to communication with Deaf persons involving a 
signed language. 
274   Aside: The Flemish Parliament in Belgium has an elected Deaf Member, Helga 
Stevens, who is now serving her second consecutive term, 2004-2014. She is running 
for the European Parliament; elections are 25 May 2014. 
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the normal level of, you know, which we know English, for example, or 
French. But when in the case when it’s discussion about, for example, 
agreement, a resolution, here I think must be professional interpreter. 
(NM63) 
No doubt there are other stories, too, less successful accounts due to various factors. If 
there are more negative or critical stories than affirmative ones about the Ad Personam 
interpreting provision, I would question to what extent the conduit model metaphor 
predominates, and seek to identify the means by which interpreters are being authorized 
to ensure mutual understanding. 
The discourse reported here establishes that “it can be tricky when there’s no 
interpretation” (F07). The homolingual imperative may lead Members to feel that “it is 
embarrassing to ask just for me” (OM62), and of course, to request interpretation is 
“political” because “you’ve got to ask somebody for it” (OM63). The myth in the 
discourse about SI in the EP is that the choice of a lingua franca, be it ELF or another 
language shared by the interacting Members, is somehow less political. It is not. Rather, 
the homolingual option has consequences both in the immediate (perceived) achievement 
or failure to achieve voice, and in the long-term calibration toward a timespace that 
accords with Europe’s pluralingual dream. 
7.5 The Toolmaker’s Paradigm 
They were very aware that communicating was hard work. And their 
successes were extremely rewarding to them, because they retained a 
distinct sense of awe and wonder that they could make the system work at 
all. It was a daily miracle, which had improved their respective standards 
of living immensely.  
Michael Reddy (1993, p. 185) 
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The transmission metaphor may have been what Schön calls a “generative 
metaphor” (1993) when the IBM system was invented at Nuremberg, but it turns out 
closely related to the (dead) conduit metaphor, with unintended consequences that invite 
critique and revision. Angelelli (2001) clearly states the main symptom of the problem: 
interpreters, as “powerful individuals [have] often have been portrayed as invisible and 
deprived of agency that is essential to their performance of very complex linguistic and 
information processing tasks” (p. 1). Thinking in terms of time, we can anticipate that, 
without intervention, the discourse about SI in the EP will continue to calibrate to 
homolingualism and the ideology of speed.  
In Reddy’s (1993) thought experiment, he describes the conduit metaphor as the 
work of an “evil magician” who is “very upset” by the effectiveness of the conscious 
communication practiced by intentional toolmakers (p. 185). “He hypnotized them in a 
special way, so that, after they received a set of instructions and struggled to build 
something on the basis of them, they would immediately forget about this” (p. 185). The 
idea is that the toolmakers would forget the struggle and the effort based on a “false 
memory that the object had been sent to them directly, via a marvelous mechanism in the 
hub” (p. 185). 
Is the system of SI in the EP a false or fouled mechanism because it does not 
erase difference? An MEP said, “Language seems like a handicap for communication but 
I think it is a force” (OM62). Despite the strong themes of complaint and blame, the 
elements of a toolmakers paradigm are present, already. Schön elaborates: 
The essential difficulties in social policy have more to do with problem 
setting than with problem solving, more to do with the ways in which we 
frame the purposes to be achieved than with the optimal means for 
achieving them. It becomes critically important, then, to learn how social 
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policy problems are actually set and to discover what it means to set them 
well or badly. (1993, p. 138) 
Reddy is unequivocal in his critique of the conduit metaphor: “This model of 
communication objectifies meaning in a misleading and dehumanizing fashion. It 
influences us to talk and think about thoughts as if they had the same kind of external, 
intersubjective reality as lamps and tables” (1993, p. 186). Do Members of the European 
Parliament, their co-legislators in the Council and Commission, and the civil servants of 
the European Institutions, need to revisit and evaluate whether their “instruction manual 
for use of the language system…is the wrong manual” (Reddy, p. 188)? 
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Figure 5. Two Interpreting Chronotopes 
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7.5.1 The Mechanical Reproduction of Inequality 
It’s a lost post occupied here, even with the best translation [sic].  
New Member of the European Parliament 
Interpreters refer to the European Parliament’s new languages, and some of the 
small old languages, as exotic languages (F36). The instances of the pseudonym, Meridia, 
throughout this dissertation include references by Members of these countries to their 
own languages, including the new (post big bang enlargement) exotic languages from 
eastern Europe (Bulgarian, Czech, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Romanian, 
Slovak and Slovenian) as well as from the smaller exotic languages from old EU member 
nations (Danish, Hungarian, Finnish and Swedish).275 In a few instances, the fake label of 
Meridia is also used to mask the specificity of other Members in an effort to protect the 
anonymity of the volunteer participants in this research. 
The following quote describes a Member’s take on the use of English as a lingua 
franca (italics added): 
The reason that you heard a lot of English [in the EPP’s closed political 
group debate on totalitarianism] is not because English people are 
speaking on it but because the new countries, they tend to use English a 
lot. Surprisingly, more than their native language…It’s about acceptance. 
The kind of feeling that they have that their language is a minority 
language and it may just apply to one country, so you’ll find…I suspect 
with the new countries there’s an element of making an effort to be kind of 
integrated. Because if you think that Swedes and Finns, they speak 
English very often, but I reckon they speak English more in Committees 
and Parliamentary Plenaries because they can speak English, basically, 
                                                
275  At the risk of stereotyping, I’ve generalized many of the smaller or newer languages 
to the EU’s language regime as exotic. In actual practice, “exotic” depends on the 
vantage point of each person according to his or her own language profile and 
relative exposure. 
449 
and some of them can speak very good English. And therefore it’s easier 
for them to be understood by a wider group and not just through 
translation [sic]. So you do get, I’d say Swedes, Finns, maybe also 
Hungarians very much speaking English, even if their English is not very 
good, because they feel that’s a way of speaking to a wider audience. 
(OM68) 
This Member’s discursive consciousness accords with the discourse analysis. The use of 
ELF is a concession involving a) an acceptance of minority status of one’s own language 
and b) a desire for homolingualism (‘to be integrated’ and ‘to be understood’). The idea 
that ELF-users are “understood by a wider group” may or may not be statistically true, 
but it certainly defines a core membership group on homolingual terms, therefore 
establishing the very language-based insider/outsider boundaries and hierarchies of 
inequality that interpreting is designed to level out. Finally, the notion that “it’s easier” 
for the original speaker to use ELF is a very selective representation of the complexities 
of language choice. It ignores both the pressure of selective listening by colleagues and 
the communicative costs for non-fluent ELF users who surrender the rhetorical repertoire 
associated with the use of their mother tongue. 
Rather than promoting the persistence of cultural and linguistic diversity, i.e., of 
pluralingualism, Members lament their perceived incapacity and envision a more 
homolingual future: “Doing my work in English is a handicap, but the young generation 
is better” (OM27). In the interests of speed, rules are bent and even broken: “A document 
prepared only in French may not be voted on because it is not in English, but an English-
only document will be voted on” (F2). One Member called the language use dynamics “a 
meta-monolingualism” (NM28). 
If the social norms for using interpreters are different from context to context, this 
knowledge did not become apparent during the research period. Based on the discourse, 
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in the smaller, informal meetings where fewer languages are in use, Members may be 
more proactive with codeswitching (as in Scenarios B, C, and F from Table 7), but very 
few participants in this study were able to name or describe alternative uses or 
understandings of interpretation along the lines of pluralingualism with its emphasis on 
the social aspects of interpreting (less than 10%). Even fewer recognized a non-conduit 
framing as viable. Instead, most MEPs seem to believe in “TINA: There Is No 
Alternative” regarding what is perceived as “a deep structural problem that can’t be 
overcome” (NM28). 
Despite the admitted fact that “it is certainly a disadvantage, not to understand” 
(OM62), the system invites continued, unchanged use. After all, “we have all the 
boxes…” (OM36), gesturing to the booths lining the meeting rooms. In the end, the 
discourse themes of risk, loss, danger, complaint and blame cohere centripetally: 
“There’s only one second for this” (OM67). “We just did not have enough time” (NM73). 
7.5.2 Pivot? Time for an Economy of Cultures, Not Control 
“The economy is psychological—one factor is optimism” (NM25). Once the 
biases of homolingualism are identified, the natural move of intelligence is to become 
alert to their presence and effects in daily life: to detect their action in practical 
consciousness and begin to grow discursive consciousness. Once one has discursive 
consciousness, the linguascape changes. The possibilities for control reframe the 
behaviors and courses of action that are available and important within the narrow 
exigencies of the moment. The action research impetus of this fieldwork continues: 
which path will Parliament pursue? 
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To my knowledge, I was only introduced twice to groups that I had been invited 
to observe in a way that included a description. I was intrigued by these host Members’ 
explanations of what I was doing. One Member said, “I told them that you are interested 
in the possibilities of a good translation” (OM67). The other said that I was interested in 
“how we can cope with our language system” (OM33). The latter MEP understood me 
better, while the former MEP illustrates the most basic condition of communication: 
meaning is in the mind of the listener. What I found and have gathered here is an 
interpretation of a discourse that exposes a system of simultaneous intercultural 
transaction trapped in the inertia of an ideology of speed and desire for homolingual 
communication. 
Instead of creating and promoting the necessity and desirability of simultaneous 
interpretation as a crucial intercultural design element in a pluralingual European Union; 
a discourse of complaint and blame minimizes and disincentivizes entrants to the career 
field. Meanwhile, “the demand is ten times the need” (OM57). If the market was 
extended to interpreting in the community, such as is needed to provide quality 
interpretation to asylum seekers (or even the communication needs of current residents 
and citizens of Europe speaking foreign and minority languages), the explosion of jobs 
and extended circulation of capital in the economy would be phenomenal. A field of 
linguistic equality premised in the shared capability to communicate across difference 
(drawing upon Sen, 1992) could generate the basis of common European identity, not in 
the conduit metaphor terms of control, but on the basis of an expanding sphere of ritually 
shared experiences through participation in the special intercultural communication 
practice of simultaneous interpretation. 
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Think it’s not possible? That’s what was said about simultaneous interpreting at 
Nuremberg! And about the European Parliament, too: “No one ever thought [interpreting 
after the big bang enlargement] would be possible” (OM57). Given the enduring 
examples of successful SI, why is it that “few consider the cost of non-interpreting” 
(F25)? 
7.5.3 The Heteroglossic and Pluralingual Reproduction of Diversity 
We can’t have the multilingualism [sic] without interpretation. It’s 
necessary and I consider multilingualism as—I can’t say the most 
important, but one of the very important basis of European Union. If we 
want the people, the inhabitants of the Europe Union, our wealth in 
European Union, we have to respect it, yes.  
New Member of the European Parliament 
Often, when I mentioned the possibility of community-style interpreting to 
Members, I would get a response like this: “Am I sitting in the coffee bar having a chat 
with you, or are you in the office with a task we have to do?” (OM78) Community-style 
interpreting can handle serious negotiating done over coffee, small talk that occurs in the 
office, and Ad Personam interpretation in meetings the Parliament structure has deemed 
‘informal.’ Despite the formality of the institutional structure, “It’s absolutely true that 
the political debate is a conversation. It should show the interpreting, and it does” 
(OM61). The fact that “sometimes it falls apart hugely” (OM03) is an indicator of 
difference: these glitches in the system are natural to the conditions of human 
communication. Rather than judging them on the basis of homolingual flow, the 
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dynamics of ‘mistakes’ and ‘misunderstanding’ offer potentially valuable clues toward 
creative resolutions that reach beyond the house into the public sphere.276 
Learning to work with the laugh waves, for instance, and creating means for 
Members to share inspirational or instructive cultural contributions from their home 
countries through strategies that work with time, rather than against it, become possible 
with the development of discursive consciousness. Then, pluralingualism becomes a 
matter of political will and intercultural commitment. Differences of language use 
dynamics provide insight into what people value. In the debate regarding a statement by 
the Parliament on totalitarianism in Europe, EPP Members discussed matters calmly in a 
few of the major languages while in the Socialists’ group there was an extremely high 
percentage of mother tongue use and much more animation.277 At another time, mother 
tongue use broke out in the EPP group while discussing an issue of sex education. A fight 
on the working time directive also elicited more pluralingual behavior in some of the 
Political Groups than many other topics. 
In all these instances, the interpreters rendered interpretations and those who were 
listening made progress sorting things out. “On the topics with ethical problems or 
complicated social aspects, it is difficult to express your ideas…it is always better to 
                                                
276   Some recommendations are suggested in Appendix A, which includes the text of a 
report submitted to the Bureau of the Parliament summarizing key points of this 
research relevant to Members. 
277   Fifty-two turns of talk in two hours, eleven languages total: only three of the 52 turns 
fully in English, with four more including English in a codeswitch. This extremely 
interactive debate involved Members speaking French, English, Swedish, German, 
Bulgarian, Estonian, Spanish (from a Czech MEP), Lithuanian (via retour to 
English), Slovakian, Czech and Greek. There was one observable technical glitch 
with a microphone that didn’t come on; it was resolved within seconds. 
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speak your own language” (NM27). A fear expressed by some concerning proactively 
promoting the use of interpreting, is if it would interfere with language learning: “but, 
will it stop multilingual?” (OM59). No. These are not competing but complementary 
paradigms. ELF and other lingua francas have their place and time; the criticism offered 
here regards the presumed superior value of homolingual over interpreted transaction. 
What’s even funnier and even cleverer, a Lithuanian, for example, will 
use a pun. He’ll pause, giving you the impression he’s looking for his 
words, but he’s not, he’s making you listen to what he’s saying, and then 
he’ll use an English word in a way which an Englishman wouldn’t, but 
it’s expressing what he’s thinking. I just think it’s terribly clever. But how 
on earth could an interpreter cope with that? Very difficult. (OM63) 
Humor is clearly welcome! 
They are some words not good interpreted. So I say that I’m surprised 
there’s not war in Europe because sometimes the positive sense is 
interpreted as a negative or the—how you say—the numbers…the 
statistics, 40 is 400 and 5 is 50 and so on. So there some very, very funny. 
(NM73) 
Such grammatical and semantic glitches are inconsequential, and cleverness is 
appreciated (keeping Vuorikoski’s (2004) caveats in mind, sometimes linguistic puns and 
language games will require explanation). Substantively, “understanding what detention 
means” (F13) is vital: whose cultural notion of time passing will be codified, whose 
conception of the relative value of time spent in restrictive conditions of existence, is 
quite significant. The nub of the communication challenge for Europe is how to 
structurally design difference into a system seeking uniformity? 
If you can distinguish when Members need to “speak their own language for 
political points so that it’s quoted in their national newspapers” (OM63), why not also 
learn to recognize the cultural value of generating a pluralingual institutional culture in 
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which the consistent use of mother tongues and simultaneous interpretation is a) just as 
normal as multilingual codeswitching, and b) equally valued out of recognition of the 
long-term calibration to a chronotope that honors mutual intercultural understanding. 
7.5.4 The Real Value of Interpreting 
A senior politician at the European Parliament explained, “Normally people do 
not understand the difference between interpretation and translation. Translation remains 
there; interpretation is to allow people to communicate” (OM57). The distinction that 
matters is in the dimension of time. By creating rituals of interaction premised in 
controlling and managing the interpreter, information exchange becomes the exclusive 
constituent of relationships. Cultural distinctiveness drops out. The only thing shared is 
the shallow gesture of exchange. Mutual understanding and humane interconnection are 
rarely achieved. This temporal function of simultaneous interpretation is rarely 
highlighted in discursive consciousness. What the discourses about SI in the EP and SI in 
the American Deaf Community show is a conflict at the level of practical consciousness. 
Taken together, these two discourses show how language(s) and language use in social 
transactions contribute to social constructions of cultural realities by calibrating to 
particular chronotopes. 
Two different orientations to time are evident in the discourses about the 
conference interpreting style prevalent in the European Parliament and the community 
interpreting style preferred by the culturally Deaf. To put it in very rough terms, the 
discourse about community interpreting emphasizes culture; while the discourse about 
conference interpreting emphasizes control. Simultaneous interpretation that leans toward 
the cultural dimension of communication involves communing in the present, being 
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aware of engaging in rituals of social transaction that compose the relationships and 
identities that sustain society. When simultaneous interpretation is understood as a kind 
of oral translation, such as in the system of SI in the EP, this emphasizes the information 
transmission dimension of communication, over-privileging the immediate control of 
space and neglecting the ritual dimension that controls and contains societies over time 
(Carey, 1992): i.e., in the dureé, Bergson’s durance. The assumptions of oral translating 
(if only understood from the paradigm of linguistic functionalism and the conduit model) 
are, instead, to seek to fix a (singular) meaning for the future: to exercise power in ways 
that attempt to reduce relationships to one homolingual dimension, re-inscribing 
inequality and ultimately destabilizing society. 
On the basis of this analysis, interpreting has three essential values. The first 
value of interpreting is that it make time visible. This is evident in the discourse themes 
of complaint and the reasons given for choosing a lingua franca. The second value of 
interpreting stems from the first: by making time visible, interpreting makes culture 
visible: specifically cultural difference, which appears in social transactions as 
‘misunderstandings’ and ‘mistakes.’ Because interpreting makes culture and cultural 
differences visible, it also makes power visible. This is evident in the hierarchical 
relationships demonstrated by the observations and explanations Members provide for 
listening behaviors, such as when to use or not use the headphones, when to use or not 
use interpreting services that are provided, and when to carry on when interpreting 
services are needed but not provided. 
These values of interpreting have an exponential relationship with each other that 
results in discursive calibrations to timespace, generating the chronotopes that then shape 
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many of the material conditions of our lives. Understanding this creative generativity 
could enable individual and collective agency through the collective exercise of 
discursive consciousness. Participating in the special intercultural communication 
practice of simultaneously-interpreted transactions can bring the differential calibrations 
of homolingualism and pluralingualism into awareness. Rather than surrendering to the 
chronotope inherited from modernity, alert participants, interpretees and interpreters 
alike, can choose to bring the wisdom of lived experience and education into daily living 
and labor. 
Freely giving one’s words to an interpreter is a democratic act and a vote of 
confidence in the capacity of communication to establish connection without needing to 
erase difference. Listening to the words and expressions of another person expressed 
through the lens of interpreter embraces the inevitability that meaning is always flexible 
and contingent, that mutual understanding is an activity that requires energy and 
continual investments of attention and reflection. Holding time to allow for and 
normalize the syncopations of pluralingual flow through retour and relay equalizes the 
linguistic playing field. A discourse of pluralingualism could replace the discourse of 
homolingualism, especially in an institution like the European Parliament, which has as 
part of its mission to be a centering focal point for the constitution of a European identity 
premised in the preservation of linguistic diversity. 
Simultaneous interpretation draws attention to chronotopes and highlights the existential 
tension between homolingualism and pluralingualism. Do we want to live in a world 
where people speak different languages but all say the same thing? Or a world in which 
people speak different languages and say different things? The essential contribution of 
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simultaneous interpretation is to collaboratively generate a livable future. Yes, learn 
languages! Participate as an interpretee in simultaneously-interpreted social transactions, 
even become an interpreter! Engage the paradox: Europe has an amazing opportunity to 
hurry up and create the rituals that allow us all to slow down and solve some serious 
problems. 
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APPENDIX A 
LETTER TO KLAUS WELLE AND TARGETED REPORT 
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To:  Members of the European Parliament 
From:  Stephanie Jo Kent, Fulbright Fellow, PhD Candidate in Communication 
Re:  Request to the Bureau to authorize translation and distribution of the 
following Research Report (un-commissioned) to Members about 
Language Use Strategies and the System of Simultaneous Interpretation 
Date:  7 February 2010 
Findings and recommendations based on conversations with 55 Members about their 
use of the system of simultaneous interpretation in 2008-2009. 
Table [7]:  MEPs language choices and strategies when addressing other MEPs.  
See this table in the text; was Table 1 in the original report. 
Discussion of Table [7]: 
The choices and strategies outlined in Table [7] show that Members (in 2008-2009) are 
sophisticated in terms of adapting quickly to the presence/absence of simultaneous 
interpretation (SI). The main discursive themes from direct conversations with Members 
about interpreting in the EP include: 
● proclamations concerning the utility (or even necessity) of knowing English, 
● politicization of the language choices of Members who choose to use their 
official language and rely on the group’s collaborative use of the process of 
interpretation, 
● low-key criticism of (so-called) interpreter errors (compensated by de rigour 
proclamations of EP Interpreters being the best in the world), and 
● assumptions that SI can be measured according to the standards and effects of 
frozen translations of legislation. 
 
In general, however, Members focus so sharply on the task (generating EU legislation 
through debate, deliberation, and compromise) that less attention is given to the processes 
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of constructing meaning through SI, exposing a non-strategic, passive construction by 
Members of institutional norms and attitudes regarding language use. The implications of 
a laissez-faire approach to the use of simultaneous interpretation combined with the 
attitudes evident in themes above are significant. Under-utilization and deliberate non- 
utilization become ‘goals’ in this model for SI systems. This outcome may explain the 
main finding from Members’ talk about SI: which is their dual sense of risk and loss 
regarding communication in the EP. 
Snapshots of a language culture after Enlargement (2005-2009): 
Table [7] illustrates the result of strategies developed by Members as they learned how to 
cope with the challenges of the enlarged language regime that was instituted at the 
beginning of the Sixth Term. In the spring of 2005, EP Interpreters described, among 
other things, a sense of danger and loss as MEPs displayed inadequate language skills 
(Kent, 2009). The two groups (Interpreters, Members) do not refer to exactly the same 
risks, dangers, and losses. However, the presence of strongly-felt sentiments indicates the 
extent and depth to which culture is being created and shared among people who have 
different roles and responsibilities within the institution. See Table [8]. 
Theoretical Implications: 
Multiple fluencies and the ability to switch quickly among languages is an individual 
talent or acquired skill that is independent of culture. Switching languages is akin to 
changing channels but keeping the same “direct” frequency. The repetition and 
aggregation of privileging the choice of a lingua franca rather than SI is what generates 
culture – and shared identity. 
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Table [8]: Comparison of Dangers, Risks, and Losses between MEPs and EP 
Interpreters (EPIs) 
See Table 8 in the main text; was Table 2 in the original report. 
Organizational and Representational Implications: 
It appears that power dynamics within the institution have been shifted, at least in part, 
onto the language structure of the SI system. MEPs desire to control meaning, combined 
with a general distrust of simultaneous interpretation, leads to language use choices that 
are monolingual in character rather than essentially [plura]lingual.278 One of the best 
uses of SI, for instance, is to explore the full range of each language and culture’s vantage 
point on a particular matter. If such perspectives are explored during negotiations they 
can be worked through in advance of the legal translations, thus avoiding the discovery of 
contradictions after the legislative process is supposed to be complete. 
Recommendations (Practical): 
1 Conceive of the interpreters as allies; they want to make you understood. 
2 Use the new Ad Personam interpretation service as much as possible. “The 
places where you most need interpretation,” explained a Member, “is where 
you are least likely to receive it.” 
3 Write speeches in advance – but use the revision process to clarify one or two 
key points rather than pack in as much nuance as possible. Consider: 
a. What is your communicative goal, and 
b. Who is your audience? 
                                                
278  At the time of writing the original report, I had not yet internalized the theoretical 
necessity of replacing multilingualism with pluralingualism.  
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4 If you must pack in as much as you can, add clarifying contextual details for 
the interpreter. This is more work but the result will be closer to your aim. 
5 Seek patterns in so-called “errors” of interpretation in order to broaden 
perception of the range of causal factors (see General Recommendation “D” 
below). 
6 Take advantage of pauses and delays during interpretation to think deeply 
about what is being said and the possible directions the conversation could go. 
7 Consider the effects of using jokes and famous cultural quotations: relational 
or informative? If the main purpose is to convey cultural strengths and unique 
qualities, this calls for a particular kind of translation. If you want an 
emotional effect (laughter, inspiration, shame, etc.), that may require a 
different ‘spin’ in [interpretation].279 An efficient system could be built to 
streamline the dissemination of adequate translations (see General 
Recommendation “E” below). 
 
Recommendations (General): 
1 Imagine the interpreter as an extension of your own intellect, but remember 
they are not telepathic – the more you give them to work with (background, 
context, goals, etc), the more closely they will come to matching the effect 
you want to create in your audience. 
2 Remain aware of the distinction between “interpretation” and “translation.” 
Even though “translation” technically includes both written and spoken forms, 
when you describe the interpreters or the process of simultaneous 
interpretation as “translation” you invoke the standards of legal linguistics – 
the consequence is forgetting that simultaneous interpretation involves live 
speech which has the quality of always being able to be corrected, refined, and 
revised through interaction. 
3 Being able to switch language channels is a substitution of a different type of 
monolingualism, not the preservation of linguistic difference. Only when the 
SI is in use and you are engaged (at some level) with the tensions of 
difference (especially of time/timing, and cross-cultural understanding) are 
                                                
279  Similarly (to the preceding footnote), it seemed useful (at the time of generating this 
report) to use the more familiar term, translation. The concept of interpretation is 
more accurate and precise. 
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you participating in multilingualism [technically, pluralingualism] as a new 
form of common European identity. 
a. What kind of intercultural communication do you want to model? 
b. Which basis for sharing identity do you want to affirm? 
4 Cultivate a capacity for exploring “errors” of interpretation. The explanation 
may provide more important information than the error itself: (4a) and (4b) 
(below) are communication problems at the interpersonal level; (4c) at the 
organizational level; and 4(d) at the institutional level. 
a. Is it an error of fact or confusion that will be remedied through repetition 
and thus is no cause for concern? 
b. Is it an error of fact or confusion that could lead to a problem later, and 
thus needs to be addressed and corrected now? 
c. Is the error an indicator of lack of cooperation between the speaking 
Member(s) and the working interpreters in the relevant booths? 
d. Is it possible the speaker is making an unexpected rhetorical move, beyond 
or outside of the usual discourse? 
4 A “Joke and Quote” hotline/database could be constructed over time, built up 
through a dedicated internal communication system. For instance: 
a. MEPs or their Assistants send the joke/quote to the Head of Booth for the 
language in which they’ll speak (e.g., Hungarian). 
b. Head of Booth delegates the task (as appropriate) of crafting translations 
with explanation. 
c. Distribution to all “B” interpreters of the source language (via email with a 
copy to the database keeper). These Groups can be set up in advance. 
d. The Datakeeper position may become a focal point quickly or over time, 
pending repetition of jokes/quotes and/or frequency of use, which may 
necessitate streamlining the communication flow in a different sequence. 
5 Over time the capacity of everyone – Interpreters and Members alike – will 
build, and together you will develop a stronger multilingual/multicultural 
container for creating the common European identity out of the mix of cultural 
and linguistic differences. 
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Concluding remarks: 
The system of simultaneous interpretation in the European Parliament is administered 
with a level of sophistication that facilitates the political work you are here to do. An 
effect of the system’s generally smooth operation is to experience pauses, delays, 
mistakes, and misunderstandings as disappointing breakdowns or rude ruptures. Rather 
than a cause of problems, these could be viewed as opportunities for developing 
collaborative skill in using SI among different languages to improve communication and 
decision-making to yield a stronger, more creative Parliament for the citizens of Europe. 
 
Kent, Stephanie Jo. 2009. “A Discourse of Danger and Loss: Interpreters on Interpreting 
for the European Parliament.” In Quality in Interpreting: A Shared Responsibility. Sandra 
Hale and Uldis Ozolins (Eds.). Amsterdam: John Benjamin’s Publishing Company. 
 
This copyrighted report is a selection of research findings of particular interest to 
Members. Please request the Bureau of the European Parliament to authorize 
translation into all EU official languages and distribution to current MEPs and EP 
Interpreters. 
 
25 January 2010, © Stephanie Jo Kent 
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APPENDIX C 
PROVISION AND EXCEPTIONS FOR THE LEGAL REQUIREMENT TO 
PROVIDE SIMULTANEOUS INTERPRETATION FOR MEMBERS OF THE 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Provision of Simultaneous Interpretation in the European Parliament 
Rule 138 Languages280 
1 All documents of Parliament shall be drawn up in the official languages. 
2 All Members shall have the right to speak in Parliament in the official language of 
their choice. Speeches delivered in one of the official languages shall be 
simultaneously interpreted into the other official languages and into any other 
language the Bureau may consider necessary. 
3 Interpretation shall be provided in committee and delegation meetings from and into 
the official languages used and requested by the members and substitutes of that 
committee or delegation. 
4 At committee and delegation meetings away from the usual places of work 
interpretation shall be provided from and into the languages of those members who 
have confirmed that they will attend the meeting. These arrangements may 
exceptionally be made more flexible where the members of the committee or 
delegation so agree. In the event of disagreement, the Bureau shall decide. 
Where it has been established after the result of a vote has been announced that there are 
discrepancies between different language versions, the President shall decide whether the 
result announced is valid pursuant to Rule 164(5). If he declares the result valid, he shall 
decide which version is to be regarded as having been adopted. 
However, the original version cannot be taken as the official text as a general rule, since a 
situation may arise in which all the other languages differ from the original 
text. 
                                                
280  All quotations are from the Rules of Procedure (16th Edition, European Parliament, 
2004).  
472 
Exceptions to providing simultaneous interpretation 
Rule 81 Implementing measures 
1 When the Commission forwards a draft of implementing measures to Parliament, the 
President shall refer the draft of measures to the committee responsible for the act 
from which the implementing measures derive. When the procedure with associated 
committees has been applied with regard to the basic act, the committee responsible 
shall invite each of the associated committees to communicate its views orally or by 
letter. 
2 The chair of the committee responsible shall set a deadline for Members to propose 
that the committee object to the draft of measures. Where the committee considers it 
to be appropriate, it may decide to appoint a rapporteur from among its members or 
permanent substitutes. If the committee objects to the draft of measures, it shall table 
a motion for a resolution opposing the adoption of the draft of measures which may 
also indicate the changes that ought to be made to the draft of measures. 
If, within the applicable deadline calculated from the date of receipt of the draft of 
measures, Parliament adopts such a resolution the President shall request the Commission 
to withdraw or amend the draft of measures or submit a proposal under the appropriate 
legislative procedure. 472 
3 Where there is no part-session before the deadline expires, the right of response shall 
be deemed to have been delegated to the committee responsible. This response shall 
take the form of a letter from the committee chair to the Member of the Commission 
responsible, and shall be brought to the attention of all Members of Parliament. 
4 If the implementing measures envisaged by the Commission fall under the regulatory 
procedure with scrutiny, paragraph 3 shall not apply and paragraphs 1 and 2 shall be 
supplemented as follows: 
a the time for scrutiny281 shall start to run when the draft of measures has been 
submitted to Parliament in all official languages. Where shorter time-limits 
                                                
281  Rule 79 Procedures relating to scrutiny of voluntary agreements  
1. Where the Commission informs Parliament of its intention to explore the use of 
voluntary agreements as an alternative to legislation, the committee responsible may 
draw up a report on the substantive issue in question pursuant to Rule 45.  
2. When the Commission announces that it intends to enter into a voluntary 
agreement, the committee responsible may table a motion for a resolution 
recommending the approval or rejection of the proposal, and under what conditions.  
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apply (Article 5a(5)(b) of Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the 
procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the 
Commission) and in cases of urgency (Article 5a(6) of Decision 
1999/468/EC), the time for scrutiny shall, unless the chair of the committee 
responsible objects, start to run from the date of receipt by Parliament of the 
final draft implementing measures in the language versions submitted to the 
members of the committee established in accordance with Decision 
1999/468/EC. Rule 138 shall not apply in this case; 
b Parliament, acting by a majority of its component members, may oppose the 
adoption of the draft of measures, justifying its opposition by indicating that 
the draft of measures exceeds the implementing powers provided for in the 
basic instrument, is not compatible with the aim or the content of the basic 
instrument or does not respect the principles of subsidiarity or 
proportionality; 
c if the draft of measures is based on paragraph 5 or 6 of Article 5a of Decision 
1999/468/EC, which provides for curtailed time-limits for opposition by 
Parliament, a motion for a resolution opposing the adoption of the draft of 
measures may be tabled by the chair of the committee responsible if the 
committee has not been able to meet in the time available. 
Rule 90 Recommendations within the framework of the common foreign and security 
policy 
1 The committee responsible for the common foreign and security policy may draw up 
recommendations to the Council in its areas of responsibility after obtaining 
authorisation from the Conference of Presidents or on a proposal within the meaning 
of Rule 114. 
2 In urgent cases the authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 may be granted by the 
President, who may likewise authorise an emergency meeting of the committee 
concerned. 
3 During the process for adopting these recommendations, which must be put to the 
vote in the form of a written text, Rule 138 shall not apply and oral amendments shall 
be admissible. 
The non-application of Rule 138 is possible only in committee and only in urgent cases. 
Neither at committee meetings not declared to be urgent nor in plenary sitting may there 
be any departure from the provisions of Rule 138. 
The provision stating that oral amendments shall be admissible means that members may 
not object to oral amendments being put to the vote in committee. 
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4 Recommendations drawn up in this way shall be included on the agenda for the next 
part session. In urgent cases decided upon by the President, recommendations may be 
included on the agenda of a current part-session. Recommendations shall be deemed 
adopted unless, before the beginning of the part-session, at least 37 Members submit 
a written objection, in which case the committee’s recommendations shall be included 
on the agenda of the same part-session for debate and voting. A political group or at 
least 37 Members may table amendments. 
Rule 139 Transitional arrangement 
1 Exceptionally, in applying Rule 138, account shall be taken, with regard to the 
official languages of the Member States which acceded to the European Union on 1 
May 2004, as of that date and until 31 December 2006, of the availability in real 
terms and sufficient numbers of the requisite interpreters and translators. 
2 The Secretary-General shall each quarter submit a detailed report to the Bureau on the 
progress made towards full application of Rule 138, and shall send a copy thereof to 
all Members. 
3 On a reasoned recommendation from the Bureau, Parliament may decide at any time 
to repeal this Rule early or, at the end of the period indicated in paragraph 1, to 
extend it.282 
Rule 176 Committees of inquiry 
7 A committee of inquiry may contact the institutions or persons referred to in Article 3 
of the Decision referred to in paragraph 2 with a view to holding a hearing or 
obtaining documents. 
Travel and accommodation expenses of members and officials of Community institutions 
and bodies shall be borne by the latter. Travel and accommodation expenses of other 
persons who appear before a committee of inquiry shall be reimbursed by the European 
Parliament in accordance with the rules governing hearings of experts. Persons called to 
give evidence before a committee of inquiry may claim the rights they would enjoy if 
acting as a witness before a tribunal in their country of origin. They must be informed of 
these rights before they make a statement to the committee. 
                                                
282  “On 11 March 2009 the European Parliament adopted a resolution to prolong the 
provisional derogations with regard to the use of especially Irish and Maltese until 
the end of the parliamentary term from 2009 to 2014.” Grahnlaw Euroblog: 
Retrieved 7 April 2014, http://grahnlaw.blogspot.com/2009/03/european-
parliament-amendments-rules-of.html 
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With regard to the languages used, a committee of inquiry shall apply the provisions of 
Rule 138. However, the bureau of the committee: 
- may restrict interpretation to the official languages of those who are to 
take part in the deliberations, if it deems this necessary for reasons of 
confidentiality, 
- shall decide about translation of the documents received in such a way as 
to ensure that the committee can carry out its deliberations efficiently and 
rapidly and that the necessary secrecy and confidentiality are respected. 
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APPENDIX D 
LEGAL REFERENCES TO “UNDERSTANDING” INTERPRETATION DURING 
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
DIRECTIVE 2010/64/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE 
COUNCIL of 20 October 2010 on the right to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings 
 
Relevant paragraphs from the preamble: 
(14) The right to interpretation and translation for those who do not speak or understand 
the language of the proceedings is enshrined in Article 6 of the ECHR, as interpreted in 
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. This Directive facilitates the 
application of that right in practice. To that end, the aim of this Directive is to ensure the 
right of suspected or accused persons to interpretation and translation in criminal 
proceedings with a view to ensuring their right to a fair trial. 
(15) The rights provided for in this Directive should also apply, as necessary 
accompanying measures, to the execution of a European arrest warrant ( 2 ) within the 
limits provided for by this Directive. Executing Members States should provide, and bear 
the costs of, interpretation and translation for the benefit of the requested persons who do 
not speak or understand the language of the proceedings. 
( 2 ) Council Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA of 13 June 2002 on the European arrest 
warrant and the surrender procedures between Member States (OJ L 190, 18.7.2002, p. 
1). 
(17) This Directive should ensure that there is free and adequate linguistic assistance, 
allowing suspected or accused persons who do not speak or understand the language of 
the criminal proceedings fully to exercise their right of defence and safeguarding the 
fairness of the proceedings. 
(21) Member States should ensure that there is a procedure or mechanism in place to 
ascertain whether suspected or accused persons speak and understand the language of the 
criminal proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter. Such 
procedure or mechanism implies that competent authorities verify in any appropriate 
manner, including by consulting the suspected or accused persons concerned, whether 
they speak and understand the language of the criminal proceedings and whether they 
need the assistance of an interpreter. 
(22) Interpretation and translation under this Directive should be provided in the native 
language of the suspected or accused persons or in any other language that they speak or 
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understand in order to allow them fully to exercise their right of defence, and in order to 
safeguard the fairness of the proceedings. 
Relevant paragraphs from Article 2: Right to interpretation 
1. Member States shall ensure that suspected or accused persons who do not speak or 
understand the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are provided, without 
delay, with interpretation during criminal proceedings before investigative and judicial 
authorities, including during police questioning, all court hearings and any necessary 
interim hearings. 
4. Member States shall ensure that a procedure or mechanism is in place to ascertain 
whether suspected or accused persons speak and understand the language of the criminal 
proceedings and whether they need the assistance of an interpreter. 
7. In proceedings for the execution of a European arrest warrant, the executing Member 
State shall ensure that its competent authorities provide persons subject to such 
proceedings who do not speak or understand the language of the proceedings with 
interpretation in accordance with this Article. 
Relevant paragraphs from Article 3: Right to translation of essential documents 
1. Member States shall ensure that suspected or accused persons who do not understand 
the language of the criminal proceedings concerned are, within a reasonable period of 
time, provided with a written translation of all documents which are essential to ensure 
that they are able to exercise their right of defence and to safeguard the fairness of the 
proceedings. 
6. In proceedings for the execution of a European arrest warrant, the executing Member 
State shall ensure that its competent authorities provide any person subject to such 
proceedings who does not understand the language in which the European arrest warrant 
is drawn up, or into which it has been translated by the issuing Member State, with a 
written translation of that document. 
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APPENDIX F  
REDDY ON THE CONDUIT MODEL 
Reddy (1993) explains that his “initial work…suggests it is easier, when speaking 
and thinking in terms of the conduit metaphor, to blame the speaker for failures” (p. 168). 
Within the context of the discourse about SI in the EP, blame (at least complaint) is 
typically assigned to the interpreter, not the original Member (e.g. this research; and 
Vuorikoski, 2004). Interpreters’ rendered speech (their interpretations) are accused of 
‘causing’ misunderstanding (a similar phenomenon occurs in international business), 
which is further attributed to interpreters’ failure to extract ‘the meaning.’ “After all,” 
Reddy continues, “receiving and unwrapping a package is so passive and so simple—
what can go wrong? A package can be difficult or impossible to open. But, if it is 
undamaged, and successfully opened, who can fail to find the right things in it?” (p. 168). 
To illustrate the power of the conduit metaphor, Reddy conducts a thought 
experiment comparing and contrasting the conduit metaphor with an alternative framing 
he calls the toolmaker’s paradigm. He shows that 
the overwhelming tendency of [a communication] system, as viewed by 
the conduit metaphor, will always be: success without effort….in terms of 
the toolmaker’s paradigm…we come to…the opposite conclusion. Human 
communication will almost always go astray unless real energy is 
expended. (p. 174) 
Semantic Pathology 
Reddy argues that the conduit metaphor is “not just a list of expressions” but the 
evidence of semantic pathology (1993, p. 178). Semantic pathology is 
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a concept from pretransformational semantics. In his Principles of 
Semantics, Stephen Ullman (1957, p. 122) makes use of the term semantic 
pathology. A semantic pathology arises “whenever two or more 
incompatible senses capable of figuring meaningfully in the same context 
develop around the same name.” (in Reddy, p. 178) 
For instance, the two possible meanings of the English phrase, “I’m sorry,” are an 
apology or a display of sympathy. Reddy characterizes the need to distinguish between 
these two alternatives as a “delicate and difficult problem:” 
“I’m sorry” can mean either, “I empathize with your suffering,” or “I 
admit fault and apologize.” Sometimes people expect apologies from us 
when we only wish to sympathize, in which case saying, ‘I’m sorry,” is 
either the perfect hedge or the opening line of a fight. Other times, people 
think we are apologizing when they see no need for us to apologize and 
respond with, “That’s alright, it wasn’t your fault.” (p. 178) 
The issue of semantic pathology concerns whether it is important to distinguish the 
metaphor of a conduit from the actualities of human communication using language. 
Reddy argues that “the interaction of the conduit metaphor with the conceptual 
foundations of information theory” resulted in “the whole notion of information as ‘the 
power to make selections’” being “muddled beyond repair” (p. 182). 
Shannon and Weaver’s Mathematical Theory of Communication 
Reddy uses mathematical information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) to: 
1 illustrate how words do not contain meanings but are only signals for a co-
construction of meaning among people laboring to establish an ‘a priori 
shared context,’ and 
2 show how the conduit metaphor contaminated efforts to extend “the essential 
insight of information theory” to other domains (notably biology and the 
social sciences), and is 
3 evident in the labeling of their model as well as in Shannon and (especially) 
Weaver’s ordinary language use. 
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“The conceptual basis of the new mathematics,” claims Reddy, “though not the 
mathematics itself, has been completely obscured by the semantic pathologies of the 
conduit metaphor” (1993, p. 181). Mathematical information theory is 
based totally on the notion that the message…is never sent anywhere…the 
“received signals” were not necessarily the “transmitted signal” because 
of the possible intervention of distortion and noise. But they blithely 
wrote the word “message” on the right, or receiving side of their famous 
paradigm (Shannon & Weaver, 1949, p. 7). At the very least they should 
have written “reconstructed message” there. In their theory, something is 
rebuilt on that right side which, hopefully, resembles the original message 
on the left side. The ambiguity of the word “message” should have led 
them to regard this word as a disaster and never to consider it for use. (p. 
183) 
The reconstruction that occurs on the right/receiving side of the information model is 
accomplished through a process of selection among previously-established alternatives, 
which are part of an ‘a priori shared context.’ 
The “signals” of the mathematical theory are…patterns that can travel, 
that can be exchanged..the alternatives—the “messages” are not contained 
in the signals. If the signals were to arrive at the receiving end, and the set 
of alternatives was damaged or missing, the proper selections could not be 
made. The signals have no ability to bring the alternatives with them; they 
carry no little replica of the message. (p. 182) 
Reddy summarizes Shannon and Weaver’s mathematical information theory thus: 
Information is defined as the ability to make nonrandom selections from 
some set of alternatives. Communication, which is the transfer of this 
ability from one place to another, is envisioned as occurring in the 
following manner. The set of alternatives and a code relating these 
alternatives to physical signals are established, and a copy of each is 
placed at both the sending and receiving ends of the system. This act 
creates what is known as an “a priori shared context,” a prerequisite for 
achieving any communication whatsoever. At the transmitting end, a 
sequence of the alternatives, called the message, is chosen for 
communication to the other end. But this sequence of alternatives is not 
sent. Rather, the chosen alternatives are related systematically by the code 
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to some form of energy patterns which can travel quickly and retain their 
shape while they do travel—that is, to the signals (p. 181). 
By analogy with what has been learned from the discourse about SI in the EP, the 
homolingual assumption presumes that an a priori context with matching sets of 
alternatives has already been established, and the code (of, say, English as a lingua 
franca/ELF) aligns perfectly with the copies of these alternatives in all the relevant 
sending and receiving locations, that is, within the cognition (be it at the level of practical 
or discursive consciousness) of each Member, every interpreter, and all languages. 
The point of mathematical information theory is that “information [is] the power 
to reproduce an organization by means of nonrandom selections. Signals do something. 
They cannot contain anything” (Reddy, 1993, p. 184). Weaver, apparently, “could not 
hold the theory clearly in mind when he spoke of human communication, and used 
conduit metaphor expressions almost constantly” (p. 183). Shannon, however, “used 
exactly the right ordinary language terms. He wrote, ‘The receiver ordinarily performs 
the inverse operation of that done by the transmitter, reconstructing the message from the 
signal’ (p. 34)” (in Reddy, p. 184). Building from Reddy’s critique in order to apply the 
analogy of mathematical information theory to the discourse about SI in the EP, we come 
up with a definition of communication as the (repeated, therefore ritual) transfer of the 
social ability to make nonrandom selections from a set of alternatives in order to 
reproduce a social organization. 
Reddy (1993) elaborates a major and minor framework of the conduit metaphor 
and lists the implications of their core expressions. The major framework (p. 170) of the 
conduit model implies: 
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● language functions like a conduit, transferring thoughts bodily from one person 
to another—e.g. “If you salesmen can’t put this understanding across to the 
clients more forcefully, our new product will fail” (p. 189); 
● in writing and speaking, people insert their thoughts or feelings in the words—
e.g., “If you can’t pack more thought into fewer words, you will never pass the 
conciseness test” (p. 190); 
● words accomplish the transfer by containing the thoughts or feelings and 
conveying them to others—“His words carry little in the way of recognizable 
meaning” (p. 191); and 
● in listening or reading, people extract the thoughts or feelings once again from 
the words—e.g., “Please pay attention to what’s there in the words!” (p. 193) 
 
Reiterating, Reddy says: 
The major framework [of the conduit metaphor] sees ideas as existing 
either within human heads or, at least, within words uttered by humans. 
The ‘minor’ framework overlooks words as containers and allows ideas 
and feelings to flow, unfettered and completely disembodied, into a kind 
of ambient space between human heads. In this case, the conduit of 
language becomes, not sealed pipelines from person to person, but rather 
individual pipes which allow mental content to escape into, or enter from, 
this ambient space. (p. 170) 
The minor framework (p. 170-171) involves three categories of expression: 
1 thoughts and feelings are ejected by speaking or writing into an external ‘idea 
space’—e.g., “IBM put forth the idea that they had been mistreated” (p. 194); 
2 thoughts and feelings are reified in this external space, so that they exist 
independent of any need for living human beings to think or feel them—e.g., 
“The concept made its way very quickly into the universities” (p. 196); and 
3 these reified thoughts and feelings may, or may not, find their way back into 
the heads of living humans—e.g., “Different ideas come to mind in a situation 
like this” (p. 197). 
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